Christie,
A.CJ.T.C.:
—It
is
alleged
in
the
notice
of
appeal
and
admitted
in
the
reply
thereto
that
by
an
assessment
dated
July
9,
1985,
the
respondent
disallowed
a
claimed
business
loss
deduction
of
$206,132
regarding
the
appellant's
1984
income
and
assessed
on
the
basis
that
this
loss
was
an
allowable
capital
loss
and
that
the
Minister
disallowed
related
claimed
noncapital
losses
carried
forwarded
to
the
appellant’s
1985
and
1986
taxation
years.
Also
there
is
no
dispute
about
these
facts
that
are
alleged
in
the
notice
of
appeal:
8.
In
1976,
the
Appellant
moved
to
California
and
formed
a
joint
venture
called
Glen
Arbor
Developments.
The
members
were
Venchiarutti
Investment
Corporation,
a
corporation
controlled
by
the
Appellant,
and
Glenside
Investors
Corporation,
a
corporation
controlled
by
one
Ken
Bond.
9.
In
early
1977,
Glen
Arbor
Developments
purchased
a
one-half
interest
in
an
approximately
132
acre
parcel
of
land
in
Morgan
Hill,
California.
It
was
intended
that
Glen
Arbor
Developments
and
Rockwood
Ranch
as
joint
venturers
would
subdivide
the
property
into
a
57
lot
subdivision
to
be
known
as
"Rockwood
Estates".
10.
At
the
same
time,
the
Appellant
and
his
spouse,
Edda
Venchiarutti,
each
purchased
a
50%
interest
in
a
2.5
or
so
acre
parcel
which
was
adjacent
to
the
132
acre
parcel
and
was
previously
severed
from
it.
.
.
.The
California
Property
was
constructed
in
1978.
11.
By
an
agreement
dated
the
26th
day
of
February
1981,
the
Appellant
and
Edda
Venchiarutti
agreed
to
sell
the
California
Property
to
Robert
and
Judith
Profeta
(the
"Purchasers").
The
sale
closed
in
late
August
1981.
A
portion
of
the
purchase
price
was
paid
by
way
of
a
Promissory
Note
and
Deed
of
Trust
executed
by
the
Purchasers
in
favour
of
the
vendors
in
the
principal
amount
of
(U.S.)
$287,500
(the
"Note").
12.
On
July
19,
1983,
an
order
of
the
California
Superior
Court
rescinded
the
1981
sale,
declared
the
Note
void
and,
inter
alia,
ordered
the
Appellant
and
Edda
Venchiarutti
to
return
all
monies
paid
to
the
Purchasers
on
closing.
13.
The
Purchasers
were
also
granted
a
lien
on
the
California
property
for
the
value
of
their
judgment.
The
California
Property
was
then
sold
pursuant
to
a
Sheriff's
Sale
Order
in
November
1984
in
which
all
of
the
sale
proceeds
were
distributed
to
the
Purchasers
and
in
which
the
Sheriff
returned
the
writ/warrant
"fully
satisfied".
The
only
witness
at
the
hearing
was
the
appellant.
His
evidence
is
that
for
a
period
in
excess
of
30
years
he
has
been
in
the
business
of
building
houses
and
developing
and
selling
land
primarily
in
Mississauga,
Oakville,
Metropolitan
Toronto
and
California.
This
included
industrial
and
commercial
real
estate.
Corporations
controlled
by
the
appellant
or
members
of
his
immediate
family
were
involved.
Particulars
of
the
appellant’s
involvement
in
the
acquisition,
development
and
sale
of
real
estate
commencing
in
the
late
1950s
or
early
1960s
are
in
evidence.
It
is
unnecessary
to
recite
the
details.
Suffice
it
to
say
that
his
involvement
was
substantial.
In
1970
the
appellant's
business
affairs
were
at
a
low
ebb
and
because
of
this
and
a
family
rift,
consideration
was
given
by
the
appellant
and
his
wife
to
emigrating,
but
unspecified
events
led
to
this
notion
being
placed
in
abeyance.
Australia
had
been
considered
and,
in
addition,
a
friend
and
former
employee
of
the
appellant's
who
was
residing
in
California,
Mr.
Ken
Bond,
urged
him
to
move
there.
The
matter
arose
again,
the
family
home
was
sold
and
in
August
1976
the
appellant
moved
to
California.
Factors
that
favoured
this
move
over
the
Australian
option
was
that
it
gave
easier
access
to
friends
and
family
in
Canada
and,
should
the
change
be
regarded
as
a
mistake,
reestablishing
in
Canada
would
be
easier.
The
appellant's
wife
and
four
children
accompanied
him.
The
children
ranged
in
age
from
4
to
14
years.
Another
home
was
purchased
on
Black
Prince
Court,
Morgan
Hill,
California,
and
the
family
took
up
residence
there.
As
indicated
in
the
notice
of
appeal,
the
appellant
became
involved
in
a
joint
venture
in
California
called
Glen
Arbor
Developments,
the
members
of
which
were
Venchiarutti
Investment
Corporation
that
was
controlled
by
the
appellant
and
Glen
Side
Investment
Corporation
controlled
by
Ken
Bond.
Early
in
1977
Glen
Arbor
Developments
acquired
a
50
per
cent
interest
in
a
132-acre
parcel
of
land
in
Morgan
Hill,
which
is
south
of
San
José
in
Santa
Clara
county,
California.
The
area
was
sparsely
developed
being
basically
farming
country
devoted
to
grazing
and
the
cultivation
of
fruit.
The
other
50
per
cent
was
with
another
joint
venture
called
Rockwood
Ranch.
The
only
individual
identified
in
the
evidence
with
Rockwood
Ranch
is
Mr.
Edward
J.
Lazzarini.
The
intention
was
to
subdivide
the
132
acres
into
building
lots
and
develop
it.
It
was
known
as
"Rockwood
Estates".
On
February
7,
1977,
the
appellant
and
his
wife
entered
into
an
agreement
with
Lazzarini
to
purchase
a
three-acre
parcel
of
land
described
as
Parcel
C,
Oak
Glen
Avenue,
Santa
Clara
County
(which
is
the
parcel
referred
to
as
"the
California
property"
in
the
passages
cited
from
the
notice
of
appeal)
for
$40,000
U.S.
This
parcel
was
adjacent
to
the
132
acres
and
had
been
previously
severed
from
it.
Parcel
D
was
sold
to
Ken
Bond.
It
is
said
that
$40,000
was
about
$20,000
below
market
value.
The
consideration
for
this
special
price
was
that
the
appellant
and
his
wife
would
construct
a
somewhat
sumptuous
residence
on
Parcel
C
that
would
be
used
in
establishing
the
appellant's
reputation
in
the
Morgan
Hill
area
as
a
constructor
of
quality
homes
and
as
a
model
in
the
promotion
of
sales
in
Rockwood
Estates.
The
construction
was
completed
in
1978
at
a
cost
of
about
$307,000.
It
consisted
of
4,850
square
feet
of
living
space
and
included
five
bedrooms,
three
bathrooms,
powder
room,
games
room,
TV
room,
den,
large
pool,
tennis
court,
etc.
An
expensive
solar
heating
system
was
installed.
The
appellant
and
his
family
moved
there
from
Black
Prince
Court.
The
appellant
said
that
in
the
normal
course
he
would
not
have
built
his
residence
there
because
of
the
remoteness
of
the
area.
Also,
apart
from
the
promotional
purposes,
he
would
not
have
installed
the
solar
system
because
of
the
expense.
When
asked
what
he
and
his
wife
intended
to
do
with
the
California
property
if
the
subdivision
had
been
completed
he
replied:
“1
think
enough
time
would
have
gone
by
after
that
that
we
would
sell
it
and
certainly
have
gotten
our
money
out
of
it.”
He
was
then
asked
why
he
would
sell
rather
than
remain.
This
answer
was
given:
"It
was
expensive.
We
were
young
enough
that
we
could
move
and
get
into
something
different.
It
was
certainly
the
type
of
home
that
was
probably
too
large
for
our
means
at
the
time.”
Difficulties
were
encountered
with
respect
to
the
development
of
Rockwood
Estates,
the
most
serious
of
which
was
that
government
authorities
in
Santa
Clara
County
imposed
a
moratorium
on
development
that
included
Rockwood
Estates
because
of
concern
about
water
supplies.
There
were
problems
with
septic
tank
systems
at
the
time.
This,
combined
with
a
desire
on
the
part
of
the
appellant's
family
to
return
to
Canada
and
good
business
prospects
in
Toronto
precipitated
the
decision
to
leave
California.
On
February
12,
1981,
the
California
property
was
listed
for
sale
by
the
appellant
and
his
wife.
The
address
given
in
the
listing
form
is
17285
Chesbro
Lake
Drive.
As
previously
stated,
the
address
given
in
the
agreement
of
February
7,
1977,
to
purchase
the
California
property
is
Oak
Glen
Avenue.
Nothing
was
said
at
the
trial
about
this
difference,
but
there
is
a
clear
inference
in
the
pleadings
of
both
parties
that
they
accept
both
addresses
as
relating
to
the
same
parcel
of
real
estate
and
I
am
treating
them
as
such.
I
note
that
maps
placed
in
evidence
show
Oak
Glen
Avenue
as
being
a
continuation
of
Chesbro
Lake
Drive.
Negotiations
with
Robert
G.
Profeta
and
his
wife
Judith
followed
and
they
purchased
the
California
property
for
$619,125,
a
good
deal
of
which
was
financed.
The
closing
date
was
August
31,
1981,
and
about
this
time
the
appellant
and
his
family
returned
to
Canada.
In
the
subsequent
litigation
regarding
the
California
property
that
is
referred
to
in
paragraphs
12
and
13
of
the
notice
of
appeal,
supra,
the
Profetas
prevailed
throughout.
While
there
are
a
number
of
documents
in
evidence
about
this
litigation
—
most
pertaining
to
the
forced
sale
consequent
upon
the
judgment
—
none
state
the
basis
of
the
claims
made
by
the
Profetas.
The
appellant
simply
said
that
they
had
found
problems
with
the
home.
At
the
time
of
the
sale
to
the
Profetas
it
appeared
that
the
appellant
and
his
wife
would
realize
a
significant
profit.
When
asked
if
he
regarded
it
as
ordinary
income,
he
said
that
he
did
not
think
about
it
at
the
time.
This,
notwithstanding
the
nature
of
his
commercial
background.
It
is
settled
that
in
disputes
of
the
kind
before
the
Court
on
this
appeal
the
onus
is
on
the
appellant
to
establish
that
the
respondent's
assessment
is
in
error.
This
onus
can
be
discharged
on
an
evidentiary
balance
of
probabilities.
I
accept
that
at
the
time
relevant
to
this
appeal
the
appellant
had
a
long
history
as
a
trader
in
real
estate
in
Canada.
This
continued
in
California
and
that
history
included
dwelling
houses.
This
does
not,
however,
of
itself
establish
that
a
loss
on
the
acquisition
and
sale
of
a
residence
could
be
claimed
as
a
business
loss
deduction
in
computing
income
any
more
than,
for
example,
does
the
fact
that
a
trader
realizes
a
profit
on
the
acquisition
and
sale
of
a
parcel
of
real
estate
necessarily
mean
that
the
profit
is
business
income.
Depending
on
the
facts
of
a
particular
case,
it
could
be
a
capital
gain.
In
my
opinion
the
whole
of
the
evidence
does
not
show
that
the
respondent
erred
in
his
assessments
of
the
appellant's
liability
to
tax.
While,
when
he
went
to
the
United
States
there
existed
the
possibility
of
his
returning,
there
is
nothing
unique
about
this.
That
possibility
often
exists
when
individuals
or
families
emigrate
from
Canada
and
it
is
not
uncommon
for
some
to
return.
When
he
and
his
family
moved
to
California
the
basic
intention
was
to
make
that
their
new
permanent
home.
The
first
home
acquired
there
was
on
Black
Prince
Court.
When
the
California
property
was
ready
for
occupancy
the
family
moved
there.
That
the
land
was
acquired
at
a
discount
because
it
was
intended
that
when
a
residence
was
built
thereon
it
would
be
used
in
promoting
the
development
of
Rockwood
Estates
taken
together
with
the
fact
that
this
intended
use
was
realized
is
not
incompatible
with
the
California
property
having
been
acquired
with
the
intention
that
it
would
be
the
permanent
home
of
the
Venchiarutti
family.
Further,
what
evidence
there
is
in
this
regard
indicates
that
this
is
the
use
to
which
the
property
was
put
until
it
was
sold
to
the
Profetas.
A
taxpayer's
permanent
residence
does
not
cease
to
have
that
characteristic
simply
because
he
makes
use
of
it
part
of
the
time
for
a
commercial
as
opposed
to
a
domestic
purpose
or
uses
part
of
it
for
a
business
function
such
as
office
space.
It
follows
from
what
has
been
said
in
these
reasons
that
the
appeal
cannot
succeed
and
a
judgment
shall
issue
dismissing
it.
Appeal
dismissed.