Rip,
T.C.J.
[Translation]:—These
appeals
are
by
Dragon
Construction
Limitée
("Dragon"),
the
appellant,
from
assessments
for
the
1982,
1983
and
1984
taxation
years
made
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
the
respondent,
by
which
the
latter
denied
the
appellant
investment
tax
credits
("tax
credits’)
pursuant
to
subsection
127(5)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
("the
Act")
amounting
to
$21,910
for
1983
and
$34,450
for
1984.
The
case
also
concerns
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
for
the
1982
taxation
year,
denying
a
carryover
in
1982
of
a
tax
credit
balance
of
$3,160
for
the
1983
taxation
year,
not
claimed
in
1983.
The
Minister
said
that
the
appellant
is
not
entitled
to
the
tax
credits
claimed
in
1983
and
1984
because
the
property
in
question
was
not
"prescribed
equipment"
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
127(10.1)(f)
of
the
Act,
mainly
because
if
was
not
used
principally
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
For
the
purposes
of
this
appeal
paragraph
127(10.1)(f)
read
as
follows:
“qualified
construction
equipment”
of
a
taxpayer
means
prescribed
equipment
acquired
by
him
after
April
19,
1983
that
has
not
been
used,
or
acquired
for
use
or
lease,
for
any
purpose
whatever
before
its
acquisition
by
him
and
that
is
(i)
to
be
used
by
the
taxpayer
principally
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
a
business
other
than
a
business
(A)
the
income
from
which
is
exempt
from
income
tax
by
virtue
of
any
provision
of
this
Act,
or
(B)
the
income
from
which
is
not
included
in
his
income
or,
in
the
case
of
a
non-resident
person,
in
his
taxable
income
earned
in
Canada,
or
(ii)
to
be
leased
by
the
taxpayer,
if
(A)
the
equipment
is
leased
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
ordinary
course
of
carrying
on
in
Canada
a
business
the
income
from
which
is
other
than
income
referred
to
in
clause
(i)(A)
or
(B),
to
a
lesee
who
can
reasonably
be
expected
to
use
the
equipment
principally
for
the
purpose
referred
to
in
subparagraph
(i),
and
(B)
the
taxpayer
is
a
corporation
whose
principal
business
is
a
business
described
in
any
of
clauses
127(10(d)(i)(A)
to
(E)
or
in
any
combination
thereof,
or
is
a
taxpayer
whose
principal
business
is
a
construction
business.
(c)
an
amount
not
exceeding
the
lesser
of
(i)
his
investment
tax
credit
at
the
end
of
the
year
in
respect
of
property
acquired,
or
an
expenditure
made,
in
a
subsequent
taxation
year
and
after
April
19,
1983,
to
the
extent
that
the
investment
tax
credit
was
not
deductible
under
this
subsection
in
the
taxation
year
in
which
the
property
was
acquired,
or
the
expenditure
was
made,
as
the
case
may
be,
and
(ii)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
tax
otherwise
payable
by
him
under
this
Part
for
the
year
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
the
amounts,
if
any,
determined
under
paragraphs
(a)
and
(b).
Section
127(5)
was
amended
by
1983-84,
c.
1,
s.
72(2),
in
effect
from
the
date
of
royal
assent
on
January
19,
1984.
Section
127(5)
previously
read
as
follows:
There
may
be
deducted
from
the
tax
otherwise
payable
by
a
taxpayer
under
this
Part
for
a
taxation
year
an
amount
not
exceeding
the
lesser
of
(a)
his
investment
tax
credit
at
the
end
of
the
year,
and
(b)
the
aggregate
of
(i)
$15,000,
and
(ii)
/2
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
tax
otherwise
payable
by
him
under
this
Part
for
the
year
exceeds
$15,000.
Subsection
127(9)
defines
"investment
tax
credit".
For
the
appellant
it
was
an
amount
equal
to
five
per
cent
of
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
the
capital
cost
to
him
of
qualified
construction
equipment
acquired
by
him
in
the
year,
calculated
without
regard
to
subsection
13(7.1).
Before
and
during
the
years
at
issue,
Dragon
bought
construction
equipment
to
lease
it
primarily
to
a
lessee
who
would
use
it
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
Naturally,
the
possibility
existed
that
items
of
equipment
would
be
leased
to
other
lessees,
since
the
equipment
had
to
be
used
as
often
as
possible
in
order
to
cover
the
heavy
purchase
price.
Prior
to
the
years
at
issue
the
construction
equipment
was
generally
used
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada,
chiefly
by
the
principal
lessee.
The
principal
lessee
was
a
subsidiary
of
Dragon,
Société
Les
Excavations
Hel-Ren
Ltée
("Hel-Ren").
Hel-Ren
performed
subcontracts
for
various
contractors,
supplying
machinery
and
an
operator.
The
cost
of
performing
this
work
was
charged
at
an
hourly
rate.
If
other
companies
were
interested
in
leasing
equipment
without
using
the
services
of
an
operator,
Dragon
leased
the
equipment
to
those
customers.
If
the
customers
from
time
to
time
asked
that
work
be
done
with
the
services
of
an
operator,
they
were
referred
to
Hel-Ren.
Mr.
Yves
Gauthier
is
one
of
the
directors
and
a
shareholder
of
Dragon,
which
is
a
family
company.
He
explained
that
the
contracts
with
customers
were
short-term
and
varied:
two
days,
a
week,
ten
days
and
so
on.
On
December
28,
1983
Dragon
purchased
a
new
excavator,
a
CAT
235
("Property
A”),
to
meet
the
needs
of
Hel-Ren,
at
a
cost
of
$313,000
from
Hewitt
Equipment
Ltée
(“Hewitt”)
of
Montréal.
The
first
registration
of
this
equipment
was
dated
February
3,
1984,
but
Dragon
rented
Property
A
to
Hel-
Ren
in
January;
in
January
and
February
Property
A
was
rented
by
Hel-Ren
to
the
contractor
Meloche
for
work
on
a
site
on
Ile-Perrot.
Mr.
Gauthier
said
this
equipment
could
be
used
before
being
registered.
Mr.
Gauthier
testified
that
one
day
in
mid-February
1984
he
received
a
telephone
call
from
Lavalin
International
Inc.
("Lavalin"),
the
subsidiary
of
a
well-known
corporation.
Lavalin
wanted
to
rent
a
used
excavator,
of
the
(d)
to
be
leased
by
the
taxpayer,
to
a
lessee
(other
than
a
person
exempt
from
tax
under
section
149)
who
can
reasonably
be
expected
to
use
the
property
in
Canada
primarily
for
any
of
the
purposes
referred
to
in
subparagraphs
(c)(i)
to
(x),
but
this
paragraph
does
not
apply
in
respect
of
property
that
is
a
prescribed
property
for
the
purposes
of
paragraph
(b),
unless
(i)
the
property
is
leased
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
ordnary
course
of
carrying
on
a
business
in
Canada
and
the
taxpayer
is
a
corporation
whose
principal
business
is
(A)
leasing
property,
(B)
manufacturing
property
that
it
sells
or
leases,
(C)
the
lending
of
money,
(D)
the
purchasing
of
conditional
sales
contracts,
accounts
receivable,
bills
of
sale,
chattel
mortgages,
bills
of
exchange
or
other
obligations
representing
part
or
all
of
the
sale
price
of
merchandise
or
services,
or
(E)
selling
or
servicing
a
type
of
property
that
it
also
leases,
or
any
combination
thereof
and
.
.
.
same
type
as
Property
A,
in
good
condition
for
work
in
Algeria.
Mr.
Gauthier
testified
that
the
lease
was
to
be
for
three
months:
one
month
for
shipping
it
to
Algeria,
one
month's
operation
in
Algeria
and
one
month
to
bring
it
back.
Dragon
had
eight
other
excavators
of
the
same
type
as
Property
A.
Lavalin
might
be
an
eventual
customer:
it
was
the
first
time
Lavalin
had
contacted
Dragon
and
Mr.
Gauthier
clearly
wanted
to
do
business
with
Lavalin.
Accordingly,
Dragon
agreed
to
Lavalin’s
request
and
rented
Property
A
on
February
29,
1984.
The
lease
was
in
fact
renewed
monthly
until
February
1985,
when
Property
A
was
returned
to
Canada.
On
Property
A's
return
to
Canada
Dragon
repaired
it
to
rentable
condition.
Property
A
was
sold
in
1986.
Dragon
bought
two
other
excavators,
CAT
225
("Properties
B
and
C"),
which
it
rented
to
Lavalin.
Dragon
and
Lavalin
began
negotiations
to
rent
these
properties
in
February
1984.
Mr.
Gauthier
testified
that
Dragon,
which
had
three
CAT
225s,
was
considering
buying
two
others
in
any
way
it
could.
The
company
bought
two
excavators
from
Hewitt
on
March
15,
1984
and
rented
them
the
same
day.
Mr.
Gauthier
said
that
the
rentals
were
for
three
months
and
were
extended
monthly
until
1985.
He
admitted
that
he
knew
Lavalin
wanted
to
use
these
excavators
in
Algeria,
and
this
was
in
fact
the
case.
These
two
excavators
were
returned
to
Canada
with
Property
A
and
after
repairing
them
Dragon
rented
them
to
Hel-Ren,
until
they
were
sold
in
March
1986.
Mr.
Gauthier
stated
that
Dragon
rented
Properties
B
and
C
(CAT
225)
to
Lavalin
for
good
business
reasons,
though
the
latter
had
only
requested
used
equipment.
The
appellant
said
that
the
use
of
the
three
excavators
in
Algeria
was
very
limited
and
marginal
compared
to
the
Canadian
use
to
which
they
had
been
almost
exclusively
devoted,
the
use
in
Algeria
was
justified
on
sound
business
principles,
and
therefore
such
use
should
not
disqualify
the
tax
credit
claims.
The
respondent
contended
that
the
appellant
was
not
entitled
to
the
tax
credits
because
the
three
excavators
were
not
prescribed
equipment
under
paragraph
127(10.1)(f),
mainly
because
they
were
not
principally
used
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
Under
subparagraph
127(10.1)(f)(ii),
the
phrase
"qualified
construction
equipment"
of
a
taxpayer
means
in
particular
new
prescribed
equipment,
purchased
by
him
for
rental
in
the
ordinary
course
of
the
operation
of
his
business
in
Canada
to
a
lessee
who
"can
reasonably
be
expected"
to
use
it
"principally"
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
In
short,
the
equipment
must
be
acquired
by
the
taxpayer
to
be
leased
to
a
lessee
who
can
reasonably
be
expected
to
use
it
principally
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
The
appellant
must
determine
at
the
time
the
equipment
is
acquired
whether
it
can
reasonably
expect
that
its
present
lessees,
or
the
lessees
to
whom
the
equipment
will
be
leased,
will
use
it
principally
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
The
question
of
whether
it
can
reasonably
be
expected
that
the
equipment
will
be
used
in
this
way
is
a
conclusion
as
to
the
future
which
must
be
made
at
the
time
the
equipment
is
acquired.
In
its
Capacity
as
owner
of
the
equipment,
the
appellant
may
determine
when
and
how
the
equipment
leased
will
be
used.
It
must
consider
the
way
in
which
its
past
and
present
lessees
have
used
and
are
now
using
the
leased
equipment,
as
well
as
the
use
of
the
equipment
by
any
other
person
to
whom
it
can
reasonably
expect
to
lease
it
during
its
anticipated
active
life.
Evidence
relating
to
the
possible
use
of
the
equipment
by
lessees
during
tis
anticipated
active
life
may
be
helpful
to
a
court
in
determining
the
use
that
a
possible
lessee
is
likely
to
make
of
the
equipment
at
the
time
it
is
acquired.
This
would
also
depend
in
part
on
established
leasing
practices.
In
subparagraph
127(10.1)(f)(ii),
the
equipment
must
be
used
principally
by
the
lessee,
not
the
appellant,
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
The
adverb
"principally"
modifies
use
of
the
equipment
by
the
lessee,
not
the
appellant.
Dragon's
business
before
1984
consisted
of
leasing
construction
equipment
to
various
firms
who
operated
a
construction
business
in
Canada,
and
to
Hel-Ren
the
employees
of
which
used
the
equipment
principally
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
The
deposition
by
Mr.
Gauthier
that
he
had
never
had
any
contact
with
Lavalin
before
mid-February
1984
was
not
seriously
challenged
during
the
cross-examination,
and
I
accept
it.
Dragon
acquired
Property
A
in
the
ordinary
course
of
its
equipment
purchases
for
the
purpose
of
leasing
to
its
customers.
Property
A
was
first
leased
to
Hel-Ren,
which
leased
it
to
a
contractor
in
Québec.
Lavalin’s
telephone
call
regarding
the
leasing
to
Property
A
was
fortuitous
and
could
not
reasonably
have
been
anticipated
at
the
time
the
equipment
was
acquired
on
December
29,
1983.
On
that
day
Dragon
expected
to
do
business
with
its
ordinary
customers,
who
could
reasonably
be
expected
to
use
Property
A
principally
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
It
is
thus
clear
that
Property
A
is
qualified
construction
equipment
within
the
meaning
given
to
that
phrase
by
paragraph
127(10.1)(f).
In
March
1984
Lavalin
was
a
customer
of
Dragon.
Mr.
Gauthier
explained
that
Dragon
could
have
leased
Lavalin
two
of
the
excavators
which
it
already
owned,
but
Mr.
Gauthier
decided
to
lease
Lavalin
two
new
excavators.
Properties
B
and
C
were
acquired
and
leased
by
Dragon
the
same
day,
as
negotiations
for
their
lease
had
begun
in
February
1984.
At
the
time
the
two
excavators
which
are
Properties
B
and
C
were
acquired,
Dragon
had
agreed
to
lease
them
to
Lavalin
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Algeria.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argued
that
each
of
the
leases
made
with
Lavalin
for
the
three
excavators
ran
for
three
months.
He
therefore
concluded
that
at
the
time
Properties
B
and
C
were
acquired,
Dragon
reasonably
expected
three-month
leases
only
with
Lavalin,
and
that
the
subsequent
leasing
of
the
equipment,
once
the
three-month
period
was
over,
was
to
ordinary
customers
who
used
the
equipment
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
The
three
leases
for
Properties
A,
B
and
C
were
entered
in
evidence.
As
I
interpret
these
leases,
they
were
not
solely
for
a
three-month
period
as
Mr.
Gauthier
seemed
to
think.
Twice
in
each
of
the
page-long
contracts
it
states
that
the
minimum
lease
period
is
three
months;
on
the
printed
form
there
is
a
heading
“MINIMUM
LEASE
PERIOD”,
the
words
"three
months"
are
typed
below
and
the
words
"minimum
lease
period:
three
months"
with
the
monthly
rental
are
typed
in
the
body
of
the
lease.
I
therefore
conclude
that
each
of
the
contracts
was
for
an
unspecified
period,
probably
until
the
equipment
was
no
longer
required
for
the
project
in
Algeria,
not
just
for
three
months.
I
believe
that
this
was
the
real
meaning
of
the
agreement
between
Dragon
and
Lavalin.
On
the
facts,
it
is
clear
that
properties
B
and
C
were
acquired
for
Lavalin,
which
could
not
reasonably
be
expected
to
use
the
equipment
principally
for
the
purpose
of
construction
in
Canada.
It
would
appear
from
the
explanation
regarding
the
changes
made
to
the
reassessment
by
the
1982
taxation
year
that
the
1983
investment
tax
credit
of
$3,160
already
applied
in
1982
was
disallowed
in
its
entirety.
There
was
no
other
explanation
submitted
to
the
Court
as
to
why
the
1982
taxation
year
was
at
issue.
The
appeal
for
the
1982
taxation
year
is
accordingly
dismissed.
The
appeals
for
the
1983
and
1984
taxation
years
are
allowed
with
costs,
and
the
assessments
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
an
investment
tax
credit
for
Property
A
only.
Appeals
allowed
in
part.