Martin,
J.:
—In
these
matters,
the
plaintiffs
appeal
the
senior
prothonotary's
orders
dismissing
the
actions
for
want
of
prosecution.
The
statements
of
claim
were
issued
in
October
of
1987
and
the
defences
filed
in
June
of
1988.
In
July
of
1988
counsel
for
the
Crown
asked
the
plaintiffs’
solicitors
if
they
intended
proceeding
with
the
actions.
When
he
had
not
received
a
reply
by
November
2,
1988
he
repeated
his
request
and
informed
the
plaintiffs’
solicitors
unless
they
took
the
necessary
steps
to
bring
the
matters
to
trial
within
three
weeks,
he
would
seek
instructions
to
apply
to
have
the
actions
dismissed
for
want
of
prosecution.
In
fact,
the
plaintiffs’
solicitors
did
not
reply
to
either
of
the
letters
to
counsel
for
the
Crown
and
on
April
19,
1989
motions
to
dismiss
the
plaintiffs'
claims
against
the
defendants
were
filed
with
the
Court.
The
plaintiff,
Dara
Wilder,
one
of
the
plaintiffs
in
action
no.
T-2350-86,
who
is
also
the
president
of
one
of
the
plaintiffs
in
action
no.
T-2365-86,
discovered
that
applications
to
dismiss
both
actions
for
want
of
prosecution
were
pending
before
the
Court
when
he
called
his
solicitors
in
April
or
May
of
1989.
He
took
timely
steps
to
change
solicitors
and
thereafter
his
new
solicitors
acted
promptly
to
oppose
the
applications
which
were
heard
by
the
the
senior
prothonotary
at
Ottawa
on
August
18,
1989.
The
senior
prothonotary
ordered
that
the
plaintiffs'
actions
be
dismissed
for
want
of
prosecution.
It
is
from
these
decisions
that
the
plaintiffs
appeal.
It
is
apparent
that
the
senior
prothonotary
was
of
the
view
that
the
delay
was
an
inordinate
one
and
shared
the
view
of
counsel
for
the
Crown
that
the
plaintiffs’
solicitors
were
not
prosecuting
the
actions
with
due
dispatch.
In
my
view
there
was
evidence
before
the
prothonotary
upon
which
he
could
have
come
to
that
conclusion.
The
fact
that
I
may
have
come
to
a
different
conclusion
on
the
same
facts
is
not
enough
for
me
to
set
aside
the
prothonotary's
decision
and
I
decline
to
do
so.
Counsel
for
the
plaintiffs
argued
that
not
only
must
there
be
the
finding
of
a
delay
but
in
order
to
dismiss
an
action
for
want
of
prosecution
the
applicant
must
show
that
the
delay
has
prejudiced
him
or
has
somehow
deprived
him
of
the
proper
opportunity
to
present
his
case
before
the
Court.
Unless
the
defendant
can
show
such
prejudice
occasioned
by
the
delay,
the
better
course,
according
to
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs,
is
to
penalize
the
plaintiffs
in
costs
for
the
delay
as
opposed
to
taking
the
drastic
step
of
taking
away
his
right
of
action.
I
do
not
dispute
that
under
such
circumstances
the
better
course
for
the
prothonotary
might
have
been
to
penalize
the
plaintiffs
in
costs,
but
in
my
view
that
choice
is
within
the
discretion
of
prothonotary
who
deals
with
the
application.
In
these
matters
the
prothonotary
chose
to
dismiss
the
actions
for
want
of
prosecution
rather
than
award
costs
against
the
plaintiffs.
As
already
indicated
there
was
evidence
before
the
prothonotary
of
a
substantial
delay
on
the
part
of
the
plaintiffs
which
entitled
the
prothonotary
to
conclude
that
the
plaintiffs
were
not
prosecuting
the
actions
with
due
dispatch.
Once
the
prothonotary
came
to
that
conclusion
he
was
entitled
to
dismiss
the
actions
for
want
of
prosecution.
As
Collier,
J.
said
in
Schering
Canada
Inc.
v.
Berlex
Canada
Inc.,
19
C.P.R.
(3d)
250
at
251:
An
appeal
from
a
decision
of
a
prothonotary
is
not
a
hearing
de
novo.
It
must
be
shown
the
prothonotary's
decision
was
based
on
a
wrong
principle,
or
an
error
in
law,
or
on
a
complete
misapprehension
of
the
facts,
or
for
some
other
compelling
reason
requiring
interference
by
a
judge
sitting
in
an
appellate
position.
As
I
can
find
no
reversible
error
in
the
prothonotary's
decision,
orders
dismissing
the
plaintiff's
applications
will
be
issued
with
costs.
Applications
dismissed.
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