Muldoon:
—
Counsel
for
the
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada
moves
to
strike
out
the
plaintiff’s
statement
of
claim
pursuant
to
Rule
419(1)(a),
that
is,
that
it
discloses
no
reasonable
cause
of
action.
The
expression
of
a
cause
of
action
must
inhere
within
the
very
words,
phrases
and
allegations
of
the
statement
of
claim,
if
cause
of
action
there
be,
because
Rule
419(2)
exacts
that
"no
evidence
shall
be
admissible
on
an
application
under
paragraph
(1)(a)”.
Of
course,
it
means
also,
that
if
a
cause
of
action
of
some
description
be
disclosed,
it
does
not
count
unless
it
be
disclosed
to
lie
against
the
designated
defendant.
The
Court
has
carefully
perused
the
50-page,
174-paragraph
statement
of
claim
which
Her
Majesty’s
Deputy
Attorney
General
asks
the
Court
to
strike
out,
in
effect,
by
dismissing
the
action
before
the
defendant
is
even
called
upon
to
lodge
a
statement
of
defence.
This
long,
prolix,
imprecise,
rhetorical,
rambling,
declamatory
and
melodramatic
statement
of
claim
basically
calls
upon
the
Court
to
revoke
(or
to
compel
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
to
revoke)
the
"registered
charity”
status
of
the
Watch
Tower
Bible
and
Tract
Society
of
Canada
(the
Society),
at
the
plaintiff's
behest.
The
plaintiff
also
evinces
a
grievance
against
the
Society's
practice
of
holding
internal
disciplinary
proceedings
which
operate
in
closed
sessions
among
Jehovah's
Witnesses
in
Canada,
and
he
calls
upon
this
Court
to
declare
such
in
camera
disciplinary
courts
to
be
in
violation
of
paragraph
2(a)
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
Indeed,
the
plaintiff
asserts,
it
is
just
because
the
Watch
Tower
internal
disciplinary
tribunals
would
never
accord
an
open,
public
hearing
to
those
Jehovah's
Witnesses
(hereinafter,
J.W.s)
who
question
the
financial
transactions
and
dispositions
of
the
Society's
funds
that
he
asks
this
Court
not
only
to
declare
such
proceedings
to
be
against
the
guaranteed
rights
expressed
in
the
Charter,
but
also
to
revoke
the
"registered
charity”
status
of
the
Society.
Some
examples
of
the
passages
in
the
statement
of
claim,
illustrative
of
the
theme
running
through
most
of
its
174
paragraphs,
are
these:
39.
Thus,
Watch
Tower
of
Canada
may
at
any
time,
put
in
it's
[sic]
own
men
as
a
judicial
committee.
One
can
be
ever
sure
that
such
appointees
of
Watch
Tower
of
Canada
would
be
well
drilled,
Letters
Patent,
Object
XI,
"to
protect
any
other
interest
of
the
corporation",
by
assuring
that
debaters
of
untaxed
Watch
Tower
monies
are
quickley
pilloried
out
of
a
congregation
of
Jehovah's
Witnesses.
40.
Yet
a
further
device
to
seal
off
debaters
of
Watch
Tower
untaxed
monies.
Defence
in
depth,
against
Democratically-inclined
J.W.'s
searching
the
whereabouts
of
elusive
untaxed
Watch
Tower
monies,
a
supremely
clever
Watch
Tower
invention
of
corporation-law.
ORGANIZATION
book,
p.86,
.
.
.
The
Watch
Tower
Society
through
it's
branch
representatives
has
the
authority
to
send
one
or
more
elders
(perhaps
including
a
circuit
overseer)
into
the
congregation
to
examine
the
situation
and
make
it’s
report
and
recommendation
to
the
branch”.
41.
One
must
marvel
at
the
cool
efficiency
and
thoroughness
of
the
Watch
Tower
Society
of
Pennsylvania's
self-made
machinery
called
corporation-law
where,
under
the
guise
of
religion,
immense
annual
monies
pour
into
it’s
hands,
unimpeded,
and
needing
no
accounting
for.
Much
of
that
untaxed
money
floods
in
through
Watch
Tower
of
Canada.
42.
Watch
Tower
appeal
judges?
A
coven
of
untouchables
empowered
by
home
made
corporation-law,
to
root
out
questioners
of
Watch
Tower
money
matters,
and
to
ensure
power-in-perpetuity
to
the
Party.
Finally,
the
prayer
for
relief
runs
thus:
174.
THEREFORE,
I,
Joseph
Reed,
ask
this
Federal
Court
of
Canada
for
a
WRITTEN
Judgment:
(a)
That
this
Court,
because
of
denial
of
Charter
Rights,
REVOKE
the
"registered
charity"
status
of
Watch
Tower
Bible
and
Tract
Society
of
Canada,
which
status
was
granted
to
said
corporation
by
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation,
Charitable
and
Non-Profit
Organizations
Section.
(b)
That
all
donations,
gifts,
bequests
by
will,
to
Watch
Tower
Bible
and
Tract
Society
of
Canada,
shall
henceforth
and
immediately
be
SUBJECTED
to
INCOME
TAXES.
(c)
That
the
practice
of
Watch
Tower
Society
of
Canada-commissioned,
internal
disciplinary
courts
which
operate
in
closed-session,
public-excluded
manner,
among
Jehovah's
Witnesses
in
Canada,
be
declared
to
be
in
violation
of
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms,
sec.
II,
(d)
”
.
.
.
in
a
fair
and
public
hearing”.
And
that
such
closed-session
courts
are
in
violation
of
sec.
2(a)
"Everyone
has
the
following
freedoms;
(a)
freedom
of
conscience
and
religion”
And
that
such
courts-in-camera
of
Watch
Tower
of
Canada-commission,
be
declared
to
be
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
An
apt
description
of
Canada
in
political-legal
terms
is:
a
secular,
federal,
parliamentary
democracy,
with
further
definitional
refinements
being
provided
in
the
Constitution
of
Canada,
including
the
Canadian
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms,
among
several
other
texts
both
legislative
and
learned.
Here,
the
principal
concern
is
with
the
aspect
of
secularity.
Canada
is
a
secular
state,
with
freedom
of
religion.
A
secular
state
must
be
distinguished
from
a
theocratic
state.
In
a
theocratic
state,
the
(usually
the
one
and
only
permissible)
church,
temple
or
mosque
is
the
State,
such
that
one
can
be
punished
upon
the
judgment
of
judicial
clergy
who
are
certifiably
expert
in
state
theology
for
disbelief
or
expression
of
opinion
contrary
to
official
dogma.
The
sentence
is
damnation
and
the
execution
of
the
sentence
not
infrequently
despatches
the
hapless
convict
irrevocably
and
purportedly
thither,
whether
truly
so,
or
not,
no
one
ever
knows
for
sure.
A
secular
state
with
freedom
of
religion
accords
scope
to
the
people,
or
more
correctly,
the
people
assert
their
right,
to
establish
and
adhere
to
their
own
beliefs,
which
when
organized
by
many
individuals,
usually
evince
private
systematic
theocracy.
In
law
no
one
is
compelled
to
be
a
member
or
believer,
and
equally
no
one
is
compelled
to
remain
a
member
or
believer.
In
such
religious
communities,
a
disciplinary
tribunal
might
well
condemn
some
contending
member
or
believer
to
damnation,
but
the
secular
state
does
not
lend
its
servants
to
the
execution
of
the
sentence,
nor
does
such
state
condemn
anyone
to
damnation
or
to
any
lesser
perdition.
In
fact,
in
any
collision
between
religious
practice
and
secular
law,
the
secular
state
will
jealously
enforce
its
criminal
law
and
other
public
law
despite
religious
claims
or
objections.
Indeed
when,
as
sometimes
happens,
congregations
fall
to
quarrelling
less
ethereally
and
more
materialistically
over
property,
the
legal
title
or
possession
of
which
is
a
matter
of
law,
the
Courts
of
these
secular
states,
wherein
are
included
the
provinces
of
Canada,
will
undertake
to
resolve
the
dispute
over
matters
within
their
secular
jurisdiction.
However
the
Courts
of
secular
states,
with
freedom
of
religion,
are
not
concerned
with,
nor
entitled
to
intervene
in,
matters
of
individual
souls,
sanctity,
fellowship,
baptism,
circumcision,
confirmation
or
ultimate
hope
of
eternal
presence
in
the
Beatific
Vision.
It
it
true
that
such
matters
can
become
contentious
and
inflame
the
passions,
but
so
long
as
those
passions
and
their
physical
expressions
do
not
cause,
create
or
commit
criminal
offences
or
civil
delicts,
which
are
entirely
within
the
state's
power
of
legislation,
the
secular
state
will
not,
and
ought
not
to
intervene
in
religious
affairs,
for
which
the
people
assert
their
freedom,
guaranteed
in
and
by
the
Charter.
Nor
will
it
intervene,
even
when
the
religious
tribunals
manifestly
exhibit
bad
or
poor
judgment,
for
with
freedom
of
religion,
it
is
not
for
the
secular
state
to
exact
of
religious
bodies
the
creation
of
appellate
tribunals
in
imitation
of
the
secular
judicature.
The
land
of
Canada's
major
legal
heritage
was
not
always
a
secular
state
with
freedom
of
religion,
as
anyone
familiar
with
the
life
stories
of
Thomas
More
and
previous
and
subsequent
martyrs
well
knows.
Yet,
over
the
centuries
the
development
of
the
secular
parliamentary
democracy
went,
in
fits
and
starts,
generally
hand-in-hand
with
the
people's
right
to
freedom
of
religion.
In
Canada,
today,
the
adherents
of
at
least
two
of
the
world’s
great
religions,
Judaism
and
Christianity,
exhibit
a
tolerance
and
indeed
respect
for
the
principles
of
the
democratic
secular
state
with
freedom
of
religion.
It
not
only
accords,
but
exacts,
all
person's
right
to
hold
to
the
tenets
of
their
faiths
without
discrimination
or
bloodshed.
That
"freedom
of
conscience
and
religion”,
as
well
as
“freedom
of
thought,
belief,
opinion
and
expression,
including
freedom
of
the
press
and
other
media
of
communication”
are
equally
guaranteed
by
the
Charter,
does
nothing
to
dilute
the
quality
of
civilization
in
Canada:
their
equality
enhances
it.
Nor
do
the
latter
freedoms
dilute
the
former.
To
be
sure,
the
Charter
is
integral
to
the
Constitution
of
Canada
and,
by
section
32
thereof,
it
applies
to
all
provincial
and
federal
legislative
and
governmental
power
and
all
matters
within
their
respective
authority.
But,
the
Charter
notably
does
not
provide
for,
nor
did
anyone
ever
imagine
that
it
would
apply
to,
religious
disciplinary
tribunals,
precisely
because,
on
the
contrary,
it
guarantees
freedom
of
religion.
Therefore,
this
Court
will
not
interfere
with
the
obvious
dispute
about
the
practice
and
procedure
of
adjudicating
disfellowship
which
has
erupted
between
the
plaintiff
as
a
disaffected
J.W.
and
the
Watch
Tower
Bible
and
Tract
Society
of
Canada.
In
this
regard
it
is
plain
and
obvious
that
the
plaintiff's
statement
of
claim
discloses
no
cause
of
action
which
is
cognizable
by
this
Court.
Then,
to
seek
to
move
the
Court
to
revoke
the
Society's
charitable
status,
is
a
misconception
of
secular
lines
of
authority.
Section
200
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
mandatorily
imposes
upon
the
Minister
and
Deputy
Minister
a
duty
to
administer
and
enforce
that
statute,
including
of
course
the
provisions
regarding
registered
charities.
An
action
to
compel
the
Minister,
according
to
law,
to
revoke
that
status
would
come
closer
to
the
mark,
but
would
still
miss
It.
The
Income
Tax
Act
provides
no
comprehensive
definition
of
a
charity,
and
so
the
Minister
and
taxpayers
alike
must
look
to
the
common
law
of
England,
the
land
of
Canada's
major
heritage
of
law,
in
order
to
appreciate
the
legal
meaning
of
the
concept.
As
was
noted
by
Lord
Macnaghten
in
the
decision
of
the
House
of
Lords
in
The
Commissioners
For
Special
Purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
v.
Pemsel,
[1891]
A.C.
531,
"charity"
is
a
peculiarly
English
concept
of
law
and
equity.
At
pages
580
and
581,
and
at
583
and
584,
he
explained
that
charitable
uses
and
trusts
form
a
distinct
head
of
equity,
made
the
more
conspicuous
because
owing
to
their
very
nature,
they
are
not
obnoxious
to
the
general
rule
against
perpetuities.
The
Act
of
43
Eliz.
I
was
held
to
authorize
certain
enumerated
gifts
to
charity
which
otherwise
would
have
been
held
to
be
void.
The
enumerated
objects
of
charitable
giving
are
not
exclusive
but
rather
illustrative
examples.
Nevertheless,
there
is
no
doubt
that
religious
and
educational
charities
are
firmly
rooted
in
and
among
the
non-exclusive
list
of
enumerated
objects.
After
noting
some
of
the
various
objects
which
have
been
held
to
be
lawfully
charitable
in
a
legal
and
technical
sense
not
always
or
necessarily
consonant
with
that
of
common
parlance,
Lord
Macnaghten
was
reported
as
noting:
If
a
gentleman
of
education,
without
legal
training
were
asked
what
is
the
meaning
of
“a
trust
for
charitable
purposes",
I
think
he
would
most
probably
reply,
“That
sounds
like
a
legal
phrase.
You
had
better
ask
a
lawyer."
That
is
why,
no
doubt,
the
Act
leaves,
in
the
first
instance,
the
establishment
and
the
disestablishment
of
charitable
status
to
the
Minister
to
determine
upon
representations
from
the
would-be
or
the
impugned
person
or
organization
purporting
to
carry
on
the
work
of
a
charity,
whether
religious,
educational,
for
relief
of
poverty
or
with
objects
generally
beneficial
to
society.
No
doubt
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
can
intervene
to
interpret
and
declare
the
law
either
upon
a
lawsuit
or
application
for
judicial
review.
But
there
must
be
proper
grounds.
Such
grounds
do
not
reside
in
the
plaintiff’s
exhaustively
expressed
disaffection
with
the
Society's
‘‘dis-
fellowshipping”
procedures,
even
when
invoked
against
a
J.W.
who
seeks
to
debate
the
Society’s
use
of
its
donated
funds.
The
plaintiff
stated
to
the
Court
that
he
has
never
requested
or
petitioned
the
Minister
to
review
the
Society's
status
as
the
Minister
may
surely
do
pursuant
to
sections
149.1
and
168
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
this
suit
against
Her
Majesty
there
is
no
allegation
that
the
Minister
has
behaved
unlawfully
in
this
regard.
Again,
when
asked
if
he
has
commenced
an
action
for
accounting
against
the
Society
in
the
superior
court
of
the
province
where
its
head
office
is
located,
the
plaintiff
responded
that
there
is
"no
way"
in
which
he
was
going
to
sue
the
Society
directly.
There
is,
in
these
circumstances,
no
way
in
which
he
can
sue
the
Watch
Tower
Society,
indirectly,
by
means
of
the
statement
of
claim
filed
in
this
Court
against
Her
Majesty
which
seeks
revocation
of
the
Society's
charitable
status,
a
matter
confided
by
law
to
and
upon
the
Minister,
all
on
the
basis
of
the
plaintiff's
complaints
about
the
Society's
conduct
of
its
internal
disciplinary
proceedings.
If
the
plaintiff
has
been
wronged,
then
it
is
the
Watch
Tower
Society,
and
not
the
State,
which
has
wronged
him.
These
reasons
are
over-long
for
the
disposition
of
a
defendant's
motion
under
Rule
419(1)(a).
It
has
often
been
said
by
judges
of
this
Court
that
if
and
when
it
be
truly
plain
and
obvious
that
a
statement
of
claim
discloses
no
reasonable
cause
of
action,
no
elaborate
reasons
are
needed
to
say
so.
However,
in
deference
not
only
to
the
plaintiff's
request
for
written
reasons,
but
also
to
the
constitutional
nature
and
the
importance
of
the
subject
matter,
these
reasons
are
expressed
extensively,
just
as
both
Divisions
of
the
Court
did
in
the
cruise
missile
case.
The
plaintiff's
statement
of
claim
is
to
be
struck
out
and
the
action
dismissed.
It
discloses
no
reasonable
cause
of
action.
The
palintiff
shall
pay
to
the
Crown
its
taxable
costs
of
and
incidental
to
this
action
and
motion.
Needless
to
say,
the
Crown,
in
its
discretion,
is
not
obliged
to
pursue
the
plaintiff
for
its
taxed
costs.
Motion
granted.
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