Addy,
J.:—The
facts
in
this
case
are
not
in
dispute.
There
have
been
documents
filed
on
consent
as
Exhibit
1,
and
in
the
pleadings
the
facts
mentioned
by
the
plaintiff
on
which
he
relies
have
been
largely
admitted
by
the
defence.
During
the
recess
I
have
read
the
judgment
of
the
court
below,
His
Honour
Judge
Sarchuk
in
this
particular
case
and
he
has
summarized
the
facts
and
the
issue
before
the
Court
and
there's
no
point
in
my
repeating
them
here.
I
must
say
at
the
outset
that
I
agree
with
his
conclusions
regarding
the
application
of
paragraph
8(1)(b)
which
provides
that:
8.(1)(b)
A
deduction
may
be
made
for
the
amounts
paid
by
a
taxpayer
in
the
year
as
or
on
account
of
legal
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
collecting
.
.
.
salary
or
wages
owed
to
him
by
his
employer
or
former
employer.
[Emphasis
added.]
I
agree
also
with
the
finding
of
His
Honour
Judge
Sarchuk
to
the
effect
that
the
words
in
that
paragraph
are
clear
and
unambiguous
and
that
the
taxpayer
must
establish
that
the
expenses
were
incurred
in
the
collection
of
the
salary
or
wages
and,
therefore,
they
must
be
incurred
in
some
sort
of
proceeding
against
the
employer
or
the
person
who
owes
the
salary
or
wages.
By
no
stretch
of
the
imagination,
in
my
view,
can
legal
expenditures
made
in
defending
a
charge
of
rape
and
a
charge
of
unlawful
confinement
be
considered
as
expenses
for
the
purpose
of
collecting
salaries
or
wages
owed
to
the
appellant
by
the
school
board.
Therefore,
such
expenditures
cannot
be
allowable
as
a
deduction
from
income
under
that
section.
The
cases
relied
upon
by
the
appellant
are
inapplicable
as
they
relate
to
self-
employed
professionals
such
as
doctors
or
accountants,
and
in
other
cases
to
a
corporation
or
to
outlays
and
expenses
for
the
purpose
of
producing
income
from
a
property.
These
matters
are
covered
y
para
rap
18(1)(a)
and
the
wording
is
quite
different
from
that
of
paragraph
8(1)(b).
And
the
purpose
of
one
section
Is
quite
different
from
that
of
the
other.
Although
it
is
not
necessary
for
me
to
do
so,
I
with
to
add
that
I
agree
with
counsel
for
the
respondent
to
the
effect
that,
had
I
found
that
the
section
was,
in
so
far
as
the
wording
is
concerned,
applicable
to
a
salaried
teacher
and
applicable
to
the
situation
under
which
he
expended
the
moneys,
he
would
still
not
have
been
able
to
recover
because
the
salaries
or
wages
were
not
owed
to
him
in
the
year
1983,
which
is
the
year
under
appeal,
and
therefore
any
legal
expense
made
at
that
time
would
not
be
covered
by
that
section.
I
therefore
find
that
the
action
will
be
dismissed
with
costs
and
judgment
will
issue
accordingly.
Appeal
dismissed.
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