Brulé,
T.CJ.:—The
appellant
appeals
from
reassessments
of
his
1981
and
1982
taxation
years,
which
reassessments
were
arrived
at
by
the
net
worth
method.
This
method
involves
measurement
of
net
worth,
that
is
to
say,
the
excess
of
assets
over
liabilities
at
both
the
beginning
and
end
of
a
period
and
the
assumption
that
any
increase
over
the
period
is
income,
except
to
the
extent
that
some
other
source
of
the
increase
can
be
identified
and
eliminated.
To
the
amount
thus
determined
there
is
added
an
amount
calculated
to
have
been
expended
for
day-to-day
personal
expenses
over
the
period.
It
is
apparent
that
the
net
worth
method
leads
to
a
result
which
is
much
less
precise
than
that
obtained
by
direct
measurement,
that
is
to
say,
the
ascertainment
of
total
revenues
and
the
deduction
of
the
costs
of
earning
them.
Issue
In
spite
of
the
inaccuracy
of
a
net
worth
assessment,
counsel
for
the
appellant
accepted
the
amounts
represented
by
it
except
for
one
point
and
that
is
the
matter
in
issue.
The
statement
showed
that
upon
entering
Canada
the
appellant
stated
that
he
had
the
equivalent
of
$17,000
Canadian,
whereas
it
was
alleged
that
the
difference
of
unreported
income
of
some
$130,000
was
held
by
the
appellant
and
brought
to
Canada
from
Guyana.
Facts
The
appellant
came
to
Canada
in
1976.
At
the
time
of
entry
he
indicated
to
the
Canadian
Immigration
Authorities
that
he
had
approximately
$17,000
as
an
amount
to
be
transferred
to
Canada.
His
evidence
was
that
while
working
in
Guyana
he
was
able
to
accumulate
approximately
$1,000,000
Guyanese
which
was
held
in
two
bank
deposits
(transcript
of
his
evidence
page
31).
This
money
he
alleged
was
converted
and
brought
to
Canada
over
the
years
using
go-betweens
to
bring
the
money
to
Canada.
By
1983
he
had
brought
after
foreign
exchange
approximately
$150,000
to
this
country,
so
his
testimony
revealed.
The
appellant
admitted
that
he
had
made
some
money,
which
was
not
declared
for
tax
purposes,
in
assisting
Guyanese
people
to
be
smuggled
into
the
United
States.
He
also
stated
that
he
was
not
the
leader
of
this
operation,
but
that
a
Mr.
Fawcett
was
in
charge
and
came
to
the
appellant
offering
his
services.
The
appellant’s
evidence
was
self-serving.
Mr.
Fawcett
in
his
evidence
contradicted
this
saying
that
the
appellant
asked
him
to
help
some
fellow
countrymen
get
to
the
United
States.
He
claimed
that
there
were
10-20
occasions
he
helped
while
the
appellant
had
said
only
five
or
six.
Analysis
It
was
obvious
that
at
least
the
appellant
or
Mr.
Fawcett,
if
not
both,
committed
perjury
in
the
evidence
given.
While
the
appellant
gave
a
great
deal
of
evidence
which
was
not
corroborated
in
any
manner
the
Court
recognizes
that
such
is
not
always
necessary.
In
the
case
of
R.
v.
Covert
(1917),
34
D.L.R.
662
a
Justice
of
the
Alberta
Supreme
Court
held
at
page
673:
In
my
opinion
it
cannot
be
said
without
limitation
that
a
Judge
can
refuse
to
accept
evidence.
I
think
he
cannot,
if
the
following
conditions
are
fulfilled:
(1)
That
the
statements
of
the
witness
are
not
in
themselves
improbable
or
unreasonable;
(2)
That
there
is
no
contradiction
of
them;
(3)
That
the
credibility
of
the
witness
has
not
been
attacked
by
evidence
of
his
character;
(4)
That
nothing
appears
in
the
course
of
his
evidence
or
of
the
evidence
of
any
other
witness
tending
to
throw
discredit
upon
him;
and
(5)
That
there
is
nothing
in
his
demeanor
while
in
Court
during
the
trial
to
suggest
untruthfulness.
In
the
present
case
there
were
many
statements
of
the
appellant
which
seemed
unreasonable
such
as
it
not
being
illegal
to
make
money
in
foreign
exchange
while
a
customs
inspector
in
Guyana.
He
contradicted
himself
several
times
as
seen
in
the
transcript
of
his
evidence.
Above
there
is
reference
to
having
money
on
deposit.
Later
he
changed
this
to
a
safety
deposit
box.
He
said
at
page
13
that
he
would
convert
the
money
into
Guyanese
so
that
he
could
make
money
personally
while
at
page
66
of
the
transcript
he
stated
he
was
keeping
the
money
in
foreign
exchange.
His
character
and
credibility
were
attacked
by
showing
the
criminal
problems
he
had
with
Canadian
authorities.
The
evidence
of
Fawcett
may
not
be
accurate
but
certainly
it
threw
discredit
on
the
evidence
of
the
appellant.
While
many
names
and
many
documents
were
given
to
the
Court
not
one
person
gave
evidence
in
support
of
the
appellant.
The
people
who
brought
money
to
Canada
should
have
been
produced
and
the
makers
of
the
various
documents
were
not
present
to
be
cross-examined.
In
addition
to
the
above
the
appellant
did
not
keep
any
records
as
required
by
section
230
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Nor
did
he
report
his
income
accurately
in
the
years
concerned
as
he
admitted.
These
matters
in
themselves
are
sufficient
to
disallow
the
appeal.
The
matter
may
best
be
summed
up
by
the
statement
of
Reed,
J.
in
the
case
of
Alvaro
Patricio
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
C.T.C.
360;
84
D.T.C.
6413
at
page
362
(D.T.C.
6415):
.
.
..
however
the
plaintiff
appeared
to
me
to
be
a
person
who
will
make
statements,
and
give
answers,
to
produce
the
most
convenient
result
for
himself
at
the
time,
rather
than
attempting
to
be
as
accurate
and
truthful
as
possible.
This
characteristic
renders
most
of
his
evidence
of
dubious
value.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.