Robins,
Griffiths,
Osborne,
JJ.A.:
—
The
question
in
this
appeal
is
whether
the
factual
circumstances
are
such
as
to
provide
a
valid
basis
in
law
for
permitting
the
appellant
to
withdraw
his
guilty
plea
to
the
charge
of
income
tax
evasion
on
which
he
was
convicted
on
April
8,
1986.
In
our
opinion,
no
grounds
have
been
established
which
would
justify
the
Court
in
striking
out
the
plea
and
ordering
a
new
trial
at
this
stage.
The
appellant
is
himself
a
lawyer
and
was
represented
by
experienced
defence
counsel
throughout
the
prosecution
of
the
charges
against
him.
It
can
be
accepted
that
he
was
suffering
from
extreme
stress
at
the
time
of
trial,
not
only
as
a
result
of
the
income
tax
charges,
but
as
a
result
also
of
disciplinary
charges
before
the
Law
Society
and
a
number
of
civil
lawsuits
against
him.
Nonetheless,
he
participated
in
the
preparation
of
the
statement
of
facts
which
was
put
before
the
Court
and
upon
which
the
conviction
was
registered
and
the
joint
submission
as
to
sentence
was
made.
The
statement
was
carefully
redrafted
by
the
appellant
and
his
counsel
so
as
not
to
indicate
any
professional
misconduct
involving
his
clients
that
could
prove
prejudicial
to
him
in
the
pending
discipline
proceedings.
The
material
before
us
does
not
indicate
any
inaccuracy
in
the
statement.
It
is
clear
from
the
transcript,
and,
in
particular,
the
comments
of
counsel,
that
the
appellant
intended
to
admit
the
facts
contained
in
the
agreed
statement
which
proved
that
he
committed
the
offence
charged,
and
agreed
to
a
conviction
being
entered
without
a
trial.
It
is
also
clear
that
he
did
not
misapprehend
the
effect
of
the
guilty
plea.
The
fact
that
his
trial
counsel
was
forceful
in
asserting
his
view
that
the
appellant's
mental
condition
was
such
that
he
should
plead
guilty
is
not
a
basis
for
setting
aside
the
plea.
Mr.
Carter,
it
might
be
added,
does
not
contend
that
any
“improper
pressure"
was
exercised
by
trial
counsel.
We
think
it
significant
that
this
appeal
was
not
launched
until
after
the
appellant
had
served
his
sentence
(although
his
monetary
fine
remains
in
large
part
outstanding)
and
his
problems
with
the
Law
Society
and
in
the
civil
courts
had
been
determined.
It
is
also
significant
that
no
application
was
made
to
the
trial
court
to
postpone
the
trial
on
the
basis
that
the
appellant's
mental
or
emotional
condition
precluded
him
from
defending
himself
against
the
charges,
as
it
is
now
alleged.
Nor
has
any
evidence
been
presented
to
this
Court
as
to
the
state
of
the
appellant's
mental
health
at
the
time
of
trial
notwithstanding
that
counsel
appearing
for
the
appellant
on
the
application
to
extend
the
time
for
appeal
(not
Mr.
Carter)
advised
the
Court
that
such
evidence
would
be
forthcoming
on
the
appeal.
The
appeal
will
accordingly
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.