Teskey,
T.C.C.J.:—The
appellant
appeals
from
reassessment
of
income
tax
for
the
years
1982,
1983,
1984
and
1985.
There
are
two
issues
herein.
The
first
issue
for
the
Court
to
determine
is
the
appellant's
adjusted
cost
base
of
120,000
shares
of
New
Forty-Four
Mines
Ltd.
(New
Forty-Four).
At
trial,
the
appellant
claimed
he
purchased
from
Aztec
Development
Corporation
Ltd.
(Aztec)
65,000
shares
of
New
Forty-Four
for
$156,300
in
August
of
1983.
He
had
reported
and
claimed
an
adjusted
cost
base
of
$325,000.
In
argument,
he
requested
the
Court
to
find
an
adjusted
cost
base
of
$87,600.
The
respondent
in
his
Reply
assumed
that
the
appellant's
cost
base
was
not
greater
than
$30,000.
Aztec
was
solely
owned
by
the
appellant,
and,
therefore,
all
dealings
between
the
appellant
and
Aztec
were
not
at
arm's
length.
When
the
Court
looks
at
non-arm's
length
transactions,
it
must
balance
the
oral
testimony
carefully
against
the
written
documentation.
It
is
incumbent
upon
a
taxpayer
to
have
the
written
documentation
to
a
non-arm's
length
transaction
in
clear
unequivocal
form
to
back
up
the
oral
statements.
Where
there
is
a
conflict
between
the
written
documentation
and
the
oral
testimony,
the
Court
will
normally
not
accept
the
oral
statements.
The
only
written
evidence
submitted
by
the
appellant,
dealing
with
shares
in
August
of
1983,
shows
that
he
borrowed
from
the
Toronto
Dominion
Bank
$156,300
and
turned
the
same
over
to
Aztec,
and
at
the
same
time,
65,000
shares
of
New
Forty-Four
were
transferred
from
Aztec
to
the
appellant,
as
evidenced
by
share
certificate
2583.
The
appellant
says
that
he
purchased
the
65,000
shares
of
New
Forty-Four
from
Aztec
for
the
said
sum
of
$156,300.
Exhibit
A-5
is
a
letter
from
the
Toronto
Dominion
Bank
to
the
appellant
dated
August
12th,
1983.
This
letter
confirms
that
the
appellant
did
borrow
$156,300
from
the
Toronto
Dominion
Bank
and
that
the
money
went
to
Aztec.
It
also
confirms
that
65,000
shares
of
New
Forty-Four
registered
in
Aztec's
name
were
transferred
to
the
appellant.
It
does
not
corroborate
the
appellant's
testimony
on
the
purchase
of
these
shares,
and
on
this
point,
the
letter
is
neutral.
Against
this
evidence,
the
financial
statement
of
Aztec
shows
the
$156,300
as
a
loan
from
the
appellant
to
it.
It
also
states
that
the
appellant
purchased
the
120,000
shares
of
New
Forty-Four
for
$30,000.
This
is
not
a
case
where
credibility
is
an
issue.
The
Court
is
prepared
to
accept
the
appellant's
sworn
testimony.
However,
for
some
unknown
reason,
Aztec's
financial
statement
was
prepared,
filed
and
tax
paid
thereon,
which
statements
differ
from
the
oral
evidence.
The
appellant's
own
tax
return
is
wrong.
Under
the
circumstances
of
this
case,
the
appellant
cannot
deny
Aztec's
financial
statement
or
tax
return.
He,
by
signing
the
return
and
the
return
being
accepted
by
the
respondent,
must
abide
by
it.
Therefore,
he
has
been
unable
to
demonstrate
that
the
Minister's
assumptions
herein
are
wrong.
The
second
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
in
the
years
1983,1984
and
1985,
was
farming
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
It
is
acknowledged
that
prior
to
1983,
he
was
a
class
1
farmer
as
defined
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
the
Moldowan
decision.
The
appellant
filed
tax
returns
for
these
three
years
as
a
class
1
farmer
and
wrote
off
losses
in
excess
of
$5,000
a
year.
At
trial,
the
appellant
abandoned
this
position
and
said
he
was
a
class
2
farmer
and
that
he
should
have
the
benefit
of
restricted
farm
losses.
The
Minister
assumed
that
the
appellant
in
these
years
is
neither
a
class
1
or
class
2
farmer
and
that
his
farming
operation
did
not
have
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
and,
therefore,
he
is
not
entitled
to
deduct
his
losses
from
other
income.
There
is
very
little
evidence
before
this
Court
to
substantiate
the
appellant's
position.
He
had
valuable
farm
equipment.
He
says
that
he
expected
to
make
a
profit
but
did
not
back
up
his
opinion
with
facts
to
demonstrate
this.
He
claims
he
got
into
the
rainbow
trout
business,
but
no
evidence
was
given
as
to
the
capacity
of
his
pond,
as
to
the
cost
of
buying
and
feeding
the
trout,
or
as
to
the
sale
price
of
the
trout.
The
only
evidence
was
that
the
price
was
depressed
when
they
were
marketed.
The
appellant's
tax
returns
again
are
at
odds
with
his
testimony.
His
1983
tax
returns
show
that
at
the
first
of
the
year,
no
livestock
was
on
hand
and
income
of
only
$1,037,
the
$37
being
patronage
payments
and
$1,000
was
for
a
right-of-
way.
The
1984
return
shows
$10,000
worth
of
cattle
being
purchased
and
$874
worth
of
horses,
the
only
income
being
$1,850
for
hay.
The
1985
return
shows
no
livestock
purchased
and
gross
income
of
$11,646.56
on
sale
of
cattle.
There
is
no
evidence
to
show
that
this
income
of
$11,646.56
was
for
the
sale
of
all
of
the
cattle
purchased
the
previous
year,
part
of
the
cattle
or
just
a
few
of
them.
The
appellant
is
bound
by
his
returns,
and
without
objective
evidence
as
to
what
the
operation
was
and
to
how
the
appellant
planned
to
make
a
profit,
the
Court
must
find
that
he
has
failed
to
discharge
the
onus
that
he
had
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
The
Court
would
like
to
say
that
it
found
the
appellant
to
be
a
sincere,
honest
businessman,
and
in
no
way
do
the
reasons
of
judgment
of
this
case
in
any
way
cast
any
reflection
upon
his
integrity
or
his
statements.
It
may
well
have
been
that
he
might
have
been
able
to
prove
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
if
he
had
realized
the
evidence
that
ought
to
have
been
called.
There
is
no
doubt
that
he
thought
he
had
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
but
that
is
an
objective
test
that
has
to
be
met
with
evidence,
and
it
is
for
this
Court
to
determine
based
on
that
evidence
whether
there
was.
For
the
above
reasons,
the
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.