Brulé,
T.C.C
J.:—This
appeal
involves
the
taxpayer's
1973
taxation
year.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("Minister")
assessed
the
appellant
and
included
penalties
on
the
basis
that
he
failed
to
report
income
of
$60,000
while
the
appellant
maintains
no
such
income
was
earned.
Facts
Without
going
into
all
the
details
suffice
it
to
say
that
the
appellant
was
involved
in
a
diamond
scheme
in
which
he
collected
funds
from
certain
people
and
in
conjunction
with
others
delivered
these
funds,
or
part
thereof,
to
people
in
Amsterdam.
He
hoped
as
a
result
of
his
participation
he
would
be
assured
a
profit.
The
Minister
gave
to
the
Court
a
notice
of
intention
in
which
certain
material
would
be
relied
upon
indicating,
inter
alia,
that
the
appellant
in
this
diamond
operation
had
been
convicted
of
tax
evasion.
When
this
matter
first
came
on
for
hearing
the
Minister
argued
that
as
a
result
of
the
conviction,
the
doctrine
of
issue
estoppel
was
applicable
with
respect
to
the
failure
of
the
taxpayer
to
report
$60,000.
of
income.
The
Tax
Court
in
a
decision
([1987]
1
C.T.C.
2437,
87
D.T.C.
299)
held
that
issue
estoppel
did
not
apply.
This
decision
was
then
appealed
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
who
ruled
that
issue
estoppel
did
not
lie
because
of
a
lack
of
identity
of
issue.
The
quantum
of
suppressed
income
was
in
doubt
in
the
criminal
proceedings
([1988]
2
C.T.C.
78,
88
D.T.C.
6323).
Appellant's
position
In
his
evidence
the
appellant
maintained
that
all
the
money
he
collected
was
invested
in
the
diamond
scheme.
He
said
that
he
received
no
benefit
as
the
whole
adventure
was
a
fraud
and
he
personally
lost
money.
His
role
was
merely
that
of
an
agent.
Respondent's
position
For
his
part
the
Minister
said
that
the
specific
facts
concerning
the
scheme
remained
uncertain
because
of
the
conflicting
stories
given
by
the
appellant.
An
assessment
had
been
made
and
only
the
oral
evidence
of
the
taxpayer
was
presented.
There
were
no
material
documents
given
to
the
Court
and
no
corroborating
evidence
to
his
story.
As
a
result
the
Minister
contends
that
the
assessment
should
stand.
Analysis
Once
an
assessment
has
been
made
the
onus
lies
with
that
person
being
assessed
to
destroy
the
allegations.
The
authority
for
this
may
be
found
in
the
case
of
The
Queen
v.
Wellington
Taylor,
[1984]
C.T.C.
436,
84
D.T.C.
6459
wherein
Rouleau,
J.
said
at
page
439
(D.T.C.
6461):
As
I
have
stated,
the
assessment
shall
remain
valid
until
it
is
found
to
be
erroneous
by
the
Court.
This
principle
is
enunciated
in
Morch
v.
M.N.R.,
[1949]
Ex.
C.R.
327,
[1949]
C.T.C.
250,
4
D.T.C.
649.
On
an
appeal,
the
burden
is
on
the
taxpayer
to
overturn
the
assessment.
It
is
deemed
valid
because
of
subsection
152(8)
of
the
Act;
it
is
the
taxpayer's
appeal
and
he
must
therefore
show
that
the
impeached
assessment
is
an
assessment
which
ought
not
to
have
been
made;
and
it
follows
that
the
facts,
almost
to
exclusivity,
are
within
the
taxpayer's
knowledge.
This
basic
principle
dates
back
to
1925
as
was
clearly
set
out
in
the
case
of
Anderson
Logging
v.
The
King,
[1925]
S.C.R.
45,
[1917-27]
C.T.C.
196,
52
D.T.C.
1209.
While
the
appellant
gave
a
long
story
about
all
of
his
activities
many
of
the
episodes
were
almost
unbelievable.
For
example
he
said
that
he
had
bought
an
original
Rembrandt
painting
for
$600.
The
principal
endeavour
for
the
appellant
was
to
make
a
prima
facie
case
refuting
the
assessment,
at
least
to
the
extent
that
the
onus
would
be
placed
on
the
respondent
to
prove
such
assessment.
Such
was
not
done.
The
respondent
relied
on
two
deposits
made
to
the
appellant's
account
and
shown
to
the
Court
as
Exhibits
R-2
and
R-3.
The
only
explanation
given
under
cross-
examination
was
that
such
were
part
of
his
1973
income
tax
return.
An
inspection
of
this
return
shows
only
some
paintings
sold
at
a
loss.
Some
of
which,
including
a
Rembrandt
and
a
Raphael,
were
sold
at
ridiculously
low
prices.
Presumably
the
$60,000
was
a
part
of
these
sales
but
no
details
were
provided
to
relate
such
sales
to
the
deposits
shown
by
the
respondent.
While
this
case
is
different
from
most
appeals
of
assessment
the
appellant
cannot
deny
there
was
evasion
of
tax.
The
Federal
Court
of
Appeal,
as
set
out
above,
said
that
the
quantum
suggested
in
the
criminal
proceedings
could
not
be
used
in
the
civil
matter
as
such
was
in
doubt.
The
Court,
however,
is
not
satisfied
that
a
proper
explanation
has
been
given
why
the
$60,000
should
not
be
included
in
the
taxpayer's
1973
income,
nor
why
penalties
should
not
be
imposed.
Appeal
dismissed.