Bowman,
T.C.C.J.:—I
reserved
judgment
on
this
motion
to
extend
time
for
filing
a
notice
of
objection
in
part
because
of
the
complexity
of
the
statutory
provisions
involved
but
more
importantly
because
it
reveals
an
appalling
state
of
affairs
that
cries
out
for
administrative
and
legislative
change.
On
or
about
March
21,
1991,
the
applicant,
Mr.
Frank
Corazza,
was
sent
a
document
described
as
a
notice
of
assessment.
The
following
is
a
copy
of
the
document
with
the
applicant's
handwritten
notes.
The
back
of
the
document
had
the
following
notation:
Inquiries
If
you
wish
to:
(a)
receive
clarification
of
any
aspect
of
the
assessment,
(b)
make
representations
concerning
some
point
with
which
you
do
not
agree,
or
(c)
submit
additional
information,
you
should
contact
the
District
Taxation
Office
from
which
the
notice
of
assessment
was
received.
If
you
are
unable
to
resolve
the
issue
by
such
an
inquiry
you
may
wish
to
make
a
formal
legal
objection
to
your
assessment.
This
may
be
done
by
filing
a
“notice
of
objection”
in
prescribed
form
within
90
days
of
the
mailing
of
the
notice
of
assessment.
Copies
of
the
prescribed
form
T400A
may
be
obtained
at
any
District
Taxation
Office
(note:
the
prescribed
form
to
be
used
to
make
an
application
for
reconsideration
of
that
portion
of
an
assessment
in
respect
of
the
liability
of
a
director
as
it
pertains
to
section
22.1
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
and/or
section
68.1
of
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act,
1971,
is
form
CPT100,
in
which
case
a
formal
appeal
must
be
filed
within
90
days
from
the
receipt
of
the
notice
of
assessment).
On
August
16,
1991,
the
applicant
filed
an
application
with
this
Court
for
an
extension
of
time.
The
letter
was
received
by
the
Court
on
August
16,
1991.
It
reads
as
follows:
I
wish
to
apply
to
have
the
time
for
filing
my
objection
to
Tax
Assessment
#10425
extended.
The
following
are
the
reasons
for
not
filing
my
objection
earlier.
1.
I
picked
up
the
registered
letter
containing
the
Notice
of
Assessment
from
the
Post
Office
and
didn't
open
it
immediately.
There
had
been
many
other
letters
dealing
with
debts
owing
by
Debcor
Electric
Inc.,
and
I
thought
this
was
just
one
more.
2.
When
I
finally
opened
it
and
realized
that
this
time
the
assessment
was
aimed
at
me
rather
than
the
company
I
decided
to
object.
But
since
copies
of
the
sections
referred
to
in
the
assessment
were
not
included
with
it
I
went
to
libraries
to
try
to
get
a
copy
of
the
sections
referred
to
in
the
notice
so
that
I
could
understand
why
the
assessment
was
directed
at
me
rather
than
the
company.
I
was
then
going
to
fill
out
the
objection
form.
3.
However,
when
I
asked
the
clerks
at
the
library
for
the
books
called
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
Act
and
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act,
they
didn't
show
on
their
computers.
4.
Not
knowing
what
else
to
do,
I
wrote
to
the
person
who
sent
me
the
assessment
within
the
90
day
period,
asking
for
copies
of
the
sections
and
a
copy
of
the
objection
form.
5.
I
received
these
by
his
letter
dated
July
30/1991
and
immediately
proceeded
to
fill
out
the
objection
form,
but
because
it
was
no
longer
within
the
90
day
period
I
enquired
what
to
do
and
was
told
I
must
make
this
application.
The
notice
of
objection
which
accompanied
the
application
was
as
follows:
It
is
obvious
that
Mr.
Corazza
attempted
to
follow
the
procedures
set
out
in
the
form
which
the
official
of
the
Department
sent
him
after
the
time
for
objecting
had
expired.
In
responding
to
the
application,
counsel
for
the
respondent,
on
February
7,1992,
wrote
the
following
letter
to
the
Court:
Please
be
advised
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
does
not
oppose
the
ranting
of
the
within
application
for
extension
of
time
insofar
as
it
applies
to
the
federal
tax,
penalties
and
interest
portion
of
the
assessment
pursuant
to
section
227.1
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
Notice
of
which
was
dated
March
21,
1991.
Further,
please
be
advised
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
opposes
the
granting
of
the
within
application
for
extension
of
time
insofar
as
it
applies
to
the
Provincial
tax,
Canada
Pension
Plan,
Unemployment
Insurance,
and
related
interest
and
penalties
portion
of
the
assessment
in
respect
thereof,
Notice
of
which
was
dated
March
21,
1901.
He
states
that
this
Honourable
Court
is
without
jurisdiction
to
grant
said
matters.
On
the
same
day
as
the
purported
assessment
was
issued
to
Mr.
Corazza
an
identical
document
was
issued
to
his
wife
Debbie
Corazza.
She
applied
at
the
same
time
as
Mr.
Corazza
for
an
extension
of
time
for
objecting.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
consented
to
her
application
without
the
qualification
contained
in
the
second
paragraph
of
the
letter
of
February
7,
1992,
and
an
order,
extending
the
time
without
qualification,
was
issued
by
Judge
Bonner.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
on
this
application
took
the
position
that
the
Court
was
without
jurisdiction
to
extend
the
time
for
objecting
to
those
portions
of
the
purported
assessment
relating
to
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act
and
the
Canada
Pension
Plan.
Her
position
was
that
the
document
set
out
above
and
called
a
"notice
of
assessment"
was
in
reality
a
notice
of
four
assessments
and
that
the
applicant
was
obliged
to
follow
four
separate
procedures.
The
federal
Income
Tax
Act
Under
section
227.1
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act,
directors
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
under
certain
circumstances
to
pay
amounts
that
a
corporation
has
failed
to
deduct,
or
withhold
or
remit
under
certain
sections
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act.
Also,
directors
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
amounts
of
tax
exigible
under
Parts
VII
or
VIII
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act
where
the
corporation
has
failed
to
do
so.
This
obligation
is
subject
to
a
number
of
exceptions,
the
most
notable
being
the
exercise
of
due
diligence
by
the
director
to
prevent
the
corporation's
failure
to
make
the
required
payments.
Under
subsection
227(10)
the
Minister
is
entitled
to
assess
a
director
for
his
or
her
liability
under
section
227.1
and
if
he
does,
Divisions
I
and
J
of
Part
I
are
applicable
mutatis
mutandis.
Section
165
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act
deals
with
a
taxpayer's
right
to
object
to
assessments
under
Part
I
and
section
167
gives
the
taxpayer
the
right
to
apply
to
this
Court
for
an
extension
of
time
for
objecting.
The
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act
Section
36a
of
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act
(now
section
38,
R.S.O.
1990,
c.
1.2)
is
for
all
practical
purposes
identical
to
section
227.1
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act
and
it
imposes
the
same
type
of
obligation
on
a
director
as
section
227.1
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act,
but
in
respect
of
the
corporation's
obligations
under
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act.
Certain
other
sections
of
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act
are
relevant:
Section
20
(now
section
22
R.S.O.
1990
c.
1.2):
Section
165
of
the
Federal
Act
applies
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act.
Section
24
(now
section
26
R.S.O.
1990
c.
1.2):
Sections
166,
167
and
179
of
the
Federal
Act
apply
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act.
Part
IV
of
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act,
section
50,
(now
section
49,
R.S.O.
1990,
c.
1.2),
deals
with
collection
agreements
between
the
federal
and
provincial
governments.
These
provisions
authorize
the
federal
Minister
to
act
as
agent
for
the
Provincial
Minister
in
assessing
and
collecting
provincial
income
tax
due
under
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act.
Section
49,
R.S.O.
1990,
c.
1.2
reads
as
follows:
Section
49(1)—The
Treasurer,
with
the
approval
of
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
council,
may,
on
behalf
of
the
Government
of
Ontario,
enter
into
a
collection
agreement
with
the
Government
of
Canada
pursuant
to
which
the
Government
of
Canada
will
collect
taxes
payable
under
this
Act
on
behalf
of
Ontario
and
will
make
payments
to
Ontario
in
respect
of
the
taxes
so
collected
in
accordance
with
such
terms
and
conditions
as
the
collection
agreement
prescribes.
(3)
Where
a
collection
agreement
is
entered
into,
the
Minister,
on
behalf
of,
or
as
agent
for,
the
Provincial
Minister,
is
hereby
authorized
to
employ
all
the
powers,
to
perform
all
the
duties
and
to
exercise
any
discretion
that
the
Provincial
Minister
or
the
deputy
head
has
under
this
Act
including
the
discretion
to
refuse
to
permit
the
production
in
judicial
or
other
proceedings
in
Ontario
of
any
document
that
it
is
not,
in
the
opinion
of
the
Minister,
in
the
interest
of
public
policy
to
produce.
At
first
blush
it
might
have
appeared
that
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
was
the
appropriate
Court
under
subsection
167(1)
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act
to
extend
the
time
limit
for
filing
a
notice
of
objection
to
an
assessment
made
under
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act.
However,
an
amendment
to
section
1
of
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act
was
made
in
1989
and
that
was
further
amended
in
1990.
The
amendment,
subsection
1(6),
as
it
reads
in
c.
1.2,
R.S.O.
1990,
is
as
follows:
Subsection
1(6)
Where
a
provision
(in
this
subsection
referred
to
as“
that
section")
of
the
Federal
Act
or
the
Federal
Regulations
is
made
applicable
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
that
section,
as
amended
from
time
to
time
heretofore
or
hereafter,
applies
with
such
modifications
as
the
circumstances
require
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act
as
though
it
had
been
enacted
as
a
provision
of
this
Act
and,
in
applying
that
section
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
in
addition
to
any
other
modifications
required
by
the
circumstances,
(a)
a
reference
in
that
section
to
tax
under
Part
I
of
the
Federal
Act
shall
be
read
as
a
reference
to
tax
under
this
Act;
(c)
a
reference
in
that
section
to
a
particular
provision
of
the
Federal
Act
that
is
the
same
as
or
similar
to
a
provision
of
this
Act
shall
be
read
as
a
reference
to
the
provision
of
this
Act;
(h)
a
reference
in
that
section
to
a
word
or
expression
set
out
in
Column
1
of
the
following
Table
shall
be
read
as
a
reference
to
the
word
or
expression
set
out
opposite
thereto
in
Column
2
of
the
following
Table;
|
TABLE
|
|
|
Column
1
|
Column
2
|
|
Her
Majesty
|
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
|
|
Ontario
|
|
Canada
|
Ontario
|
|
Department
of
National
Revenue
|
Ministry
of
National
Revenue
|
|
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
|
Deputy
Head
|
|
Taxation
|
|
|
Minister
|
Provincial
Minister
|
|
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada
|
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
|
|
Ontario
|
|
Tax
Court
of
Canada
|
Ontario
Court
(General
|
|
Division)
|
|
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Act
|
Courts
of
Justice
Act,
1984
|
|
Federal
Court
of
Canada
|
Ontario
Court
(General
|
|
Division)
|
|
Federal
Court
Act
|
Courts
of
Justice
Act,
|
|
1984.
..
|
How
a
taxpayer
in
the
position
of
Mr.
Corazza
could
reasonably
be
expected
to
find
his
way
through
this
legislative
minefield
is
utterly
beyond
me.
It
seems
clear
from
section
1
that
an
extension
of
time
to
file
a
notice
of
objection
to
an
assessment
for
taxes
owing
under
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act
must
be
made
in
the
Ontario
Court
(General
Division)
and
the
appropriate
court
in
which
to
apply
for
such
relief
is
not
the
Tax
Court
of
«Canada.
Mr.
Corazza
should
consider
seeking
advice
promptly
on
the
advisability
of
moving
in
the
Ontario
Court
for
an
extension
of
time
to
object
under
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act.
The
result
will
no
doubt
come
as
a
surprise
to
practitioners
who
have
routinely
filed
notices
of
objection
on
behalf
of
individuals
assuming
that
any
adjustment
to
the
federal
tax
would
automatically
result
in
a
corresponding
adjustment
to
the
provincial
tax.
No
particular
problem
arises
with
respect
to
provincial
corporate
assessments
which
are
issued
separately
under
the
Corporations
Tax
Act
of
Ontario
and
to
which
separate
provincial
notices
of
objection
must
be
made
unless
the
provincial
assessments
are
"designated".
Similarly,
assessments
of
tax
against
individuals
under
Part
I
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act
usually
show
separately
the
provincial
tax
assessed
and
where
the
provincial
tax
is
simply
a
percentage
of
the
federal
tax
any
adjustment
of
the
federal
tax
should
automatically
result
in
a
reduction
of
the
provincial
tax
by
reason
of
section
11
of
the
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.O.
1990,
c.
1.2.
Therefore,
as
a
practical
matter,
the
problem
is
obviated
administratively.
Indeed,
there
might
be
an
administrative
solution
to
the
problem
here,
as
counsel
advised
me
that
the
Minister
would
consider
all
aspects
of
the
purported
assessment
in
reviewing
the
objection,
It
is
scant
comfort
that
he
is
at
the
mercy
of
administrators
who
erect
technical
roadblocks
that
no
layman
and
few
specialists
can
comprehend.
I
share
the
concern
expressed
by
Judge
Mogan
of
this
Court
in
Stiege
(M.B.S.)
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
2005,
91
D.T.C.
808
where
he
stated
at
page
2008
(D.T.C.
810):
With
some
regret,
I
will
grant
the
Respondent's
application
and
issue
the
requested
order
quashing
the
purported
appeal
herein.
My
regret
is
based
on
an
assumption
that
most
individuals
residing
in
Ontario
would
not
know
that
there
was
an
Ontario
Income
Tax
Act
and
a
separate
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Ontario
for
disputes
relating
to
matters
arising
under
that
Act.
Such
individuals
have
contact
with
only
the
federal
Department
of
National
Revenue
concerning
income
tax
matters:
filing
the
tax
return;
subsequent
inquiries;
receiving
a
notice
of
assessment;
serving
an
objection;
receiving
a
reassessment
or
confirmation.
At
that
point,
most
individuals
would
expect
(as
the
purported
Appellant
herein)
to
follow
the
well-worn
path
of
appeals
under
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act.
It
is
regrettable
that
the
Appellant
must
learn
at
this
late
stage
in
the
proceedings
that
she
has
appealed
to
the
wrong
court.
The
Canada
Pension
Plan
The
purported
assessment
refers
to
Mr.
Corazza's
liability
under
section
22.1
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan.
If
Mr.
Corazza
had
difficulty
in
finding
this
section
it
is
not
surprising.
Section
22.1
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
was
enacted
by
section
119
of
chapter
1,
S.C.
1984,
which
came
into
force
on
January
1,
1985.
Section
22.1
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
was
not
included
in
the
Revised
Statutes
of
1985
because
it
was
not
in
force
on
December
31,
1984.
Section
22.1
was
renumbered
as
section
21.1
and
included
in
chapter
6
of
the
1st
Supplement
to
the
Revised
Statutes
of
1985.
Evidently
the
Statute
Revision
Commission
may,
pursuant
to
paragraph
6(d)
of
the
Statute
Reunion
Act,
alter
the
numbering
of
sections
of
the
public
general
statutes
of
Canada.
Section
21.1
reads
as
follows:
(1)
Where
an
employer
who
falls
to
deduct
or
remit
an
amount
as
and
when
required
under
subsection
21(1)
is
a
corporation,
the
persons
who
were
the
directors
of
the
corporation
at
the
time
when
the
failure
occurred
are
jointly
and
severally
liable,
together
with
the
corporation,
to
pay
to
Her
Majesty
that
amount
and
any
interest
or
penalties
relating
thereto.
(2)
Subsections
227.1(2)
to
(7)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
apply,
with
such
modifications
as
the
circumstances
require,
in
respect
of
a
director
of
a
corporation
referred
to
in
subsection
(1).
(3)
The
provisions
of
this
Act
respecting
the
assessment
of
an
employer
for
an
amount
payable
by
the
employer
under
this
Act
and
respecting
the
rights
and
obligations
of
an
employer
so
assessed
apply
in
respect
of
a
director
of
a
corporation
in
respect
of
an
amount
payable
by
the
director
under
subsection
(1)
in
the
same
manner
and
to
the
same
extent
as
if
the
director
were
the
employer
referred
to
in
those
provisions.
Subsection
23(2)
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
as
it
appears
in
chapter
38
of
the
3rd
Supplement
to
the
Revised
Statutes
of
Canada
was,
in
its
current
form,
enacted
as
subsection
24(2)
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
by
section
75
of
chapter
46
of
the
Statutes
of
1987.
It
reads:
(2)
Subsections
161(11)
and
220(4)
and
(5),
sections
223
to
224,3,
subsections
227(9.1)
and
(10),
sections
229,
236,
244
(except
subsections
244(1)
and
(4))
and
subsections
248(7)
and
(11)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
apply
with
such
modifications
as
the
circum-
stances
require
in
relation
to
all
contributions,
interest,
penalties
and
other
amounts
payable
by
a
person
under
this
Act.
Section
27
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
C-8
is
as
follows:
27.
(1)
Where
any
question
arises
under
this
Act
as
to
whether
a
person
is
required
to
make
a
contribution
as
an
employee
for
a
year,
or
as
an
employer
with
respect
to
an
employee
for
a
year,
or
as
to
the
amount
of
any
such
contribution,
(a)
the
employee,
the
employer
or
the
representative
of
the
employee
or
employer
may,
on
or
before
April
30
in
the
immediately
following
year,
apply
to
the
Minister
to
determine
the
question;
or
(b)
the
Minister
on
his
own
initiative
may
at
any
time
determine
the
question.
(2)
Where
the
Minister
has
assessed
an
employer
for
an
amount
payable
by
him
under
this
Act,
the
employer
or
his
representative
may
appeal
to
the
Minister
for
a
reconsideration
of
the
assessment,
either
as
to
whether
any
amount
should
be
assessed
as
payable
or
as
to
the
amount
so
assessed,
within
ninety
days
of
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice
of
assessment.
(3)
Where
a
question
specified
in
subsection
(1)
is
to
be
determined
by
the
Minister
(a)
pursuant
to
an
application
by
an
employee
or
his
representative,
the
Minister
shall
notify
his
employer,
or
the
representative
of
his
employer,
(b)
pursuant
to
an
application
by
an
employer
or
his
representative,
the
Minister
shall
notify
the
employee
specified
in
the
application
or
his
representative,
(c)
on
his
own
initiative,
the
Minister
shall
notify
the
employer
or
his
representative
and
any
employee
who
may
be
affected
by
the
determination
or
his
representative,
or
(d)
pursuant
to
an
appeal
under
subsection
(2),
the
Minister
shall
notify
any
employee
who
may
be
affected
by
the
determination
or
his
representative,
of
his
intention
to
determine
the
question
and
shall
afford
to
the
employer
and
employee
affected
or
either
of
them
or
the
representative
of
both
or
either
of
them,
as
the
circumstances
require,
an
opportunity
to
furnish
information
and
to
make
representations
to
protect
their
interests.
(4)
An
application
for
the
determination
of
a
question
or
an
appeal
for
reconsideration
of
an
assessment
by
the
Minister
shall
be
in
prescribed
form
and
shall
be
sent
by
registered
mall
to
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
Taxation
at
Ottawa.
(5)
On
an
application
or
an
appeal
under
this
section,
the
Minister
shall,
with
all
due
dispatch,
determine
the
question
raised
by
the
application
or
vacate,
confirm
or
vary
the
assessment,
or
re-assess,
and
he
shall
thereupon
notify
any
employee
affected
or
his
representative
and
the
employer
or
his
representative.
(6)
Unless
an
application
has
been
made
by
an
employee
or
employer
or
the
representative
of
an
employee
or
employer
in
accordance
with
subsection
(1)
with
respect
to
any
year,
where
an
amount
has
been
deducted
from
the
remuneration
of
the
employee
for
the
year
or
has
been
paid
by
the
employer
as
a
contribution
with
respect
to
an
employee
for
the
year,
or
where
no
amount
has
been
so
deducted
or
paid,
after
April
30
in
the
following
year,
the
amount
so
deducted
or
paid
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
deducted
or
paid
in
accordance
with
this
Act,
or
it
shall
be
deemed
that
no
amount
was
required
to
be
deducted
or
paid
in
accordance
with
this
Act,
as
the
case
may
be,
but
nothing
in
this
subsection
restricts
the
authority
of
the
Minister
to
determine
any
question
on
his
own
initiative
under
subsection
(1)
or
to
make
any
assessment
under
this
Act
after
that
date.
(7)
Where
the
Minister
is
required
to
notify
an
employee
who
may
be
or
is
affected
by
a
determination
under
this
section,
he
may
cause
the
employee
or
his
representative
to
be
notified,
in
such
manner
as
he
deems
adequate,
of
his
Intention
to
make
the
determination
or
of
the
determination,
as
the
case
may
be.
R.S.,
c.
C-5,
section
28;
1974-75-76,
c.
4,
section
17.
Sections
29
and
30
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
were
repealed
and
reenacted
by
section
9,
S.C.
1988,
c.
61,
an
Act
to
amend
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Act
and
other
Acts
in
consequence
thereof.
Section
29
became
28
in
the
4th
Supplement
to
the
Revised
Statutes
of
1985
and
reads
as
follows:
(1)
An
employee
or
employer
affected
by
a
determination
by
or
a
decision
on
an
appeal
to
the
Minister
under
section
27,
or
the
representative
of
either
of
them,
may,
within
ninety
days
alter
the
determination
or
decision
is
communicated
to
that
employee
or
employer,
or
within
such
longer
time
as
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
on
application
made
to
it
within
those
ninety
days
may
allow,
appeal
from
the
determination
or
decision
to
that
Court
by
sending
a
notice
of
appeal
in
prescribed
form
by
registered
mall
to
the
Registry
of
that
Court.
(2)
On
an
appeal
under
this
section,
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
may
reverse,
affirm
or
vary
the
determination,
may
vacate,
confirm
or
vary
the
assessment,
or
may
refer
the
matter
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
and
shall
thereupon
in
writing
notify,
the
parties
to
the
appeal
of
its
decision
and
of
its
reasons
therefor.
It
appears
from
this
legislation
that
there
is
no
procedure
for
filing
a
notice
of
objection
to
an
assessment
under
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
similar
to
that
which
exists
under
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act.
If
the
document
which
Mr.
Corazza
received
was
indeed
a
notice
of
assessment
under
the
Canada
Pension
Plan,
as
authorized
by
subsection
21.1(3)
of
the
Canada
Pension
Plan,
it
would
seem
that
the
procedure
that
must
be
followed
is
to
apply
to
the
Minister
for
a
reconsideration
of
this
assessment
under
subsection
27(2),
which
by
reason
of
subsection
21.1(3)
applies
to
directors
who
are
assessed.
Unless
the
Minister
is
anxious
to
make
matters
even
more
difficult
for
Mr.
Corazza
than
he
already
has
he
should
treat
the
handwritten
note
on
the
purported
notice
of
assessment
as
such
an
application
and
communicate
his
determination
to
Mr.
Corazza,
thereby
permitting
him,
if
the
determination
is
unfavourable,
to
appeal
to
this
Court.
Unemployment
Insurance
Act
The
statutory
provisions
with
respect
to
assessments
and
appeals
are
substantially
similar
to
those
under
the
Canada
Pension
Plan.
Once
again,
the
Minister's
purported
notice
of
assessment
refers
to
the
number
of
the
section
as
originally
enacted.
Section
68.1,
referred
to
in
the
purported
assessment,
was
enacted
by
section
123
of
chapter
1
of
the
Statutes
of
Canada,
1984.
It
became
section
54
in
the
Revised
Statutes
of
1985
and
reads
as
follows:
(1)
Where
an
employer
who
fails
to
deduct
or
remit
an
amount
as
and
when
required
under
subsection
53(1)
is
a
corporation,
the
persons
who
were
the
directors
of
the
corporation
at
the
time
when
the
failure
occurred
are
jointly
and
severally
liable,
together
with
the
corporation,
to
pay
to
Her
Majesty
that
amount
and
any
interest
or
penalties
relating
thereto.
(2)
Subsections
227.1(2)
to
(7)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
apply
with
such
modifications
as
the
circumstances
require,
in
respect
of
a
director
of
a
corporation
referred
to
in
subsection
(1).
(3)
The
provisions
of
this
Part
respecting
the
assessment
of
an
employer
for
an
amount
payable
by
him
under
this
Act
and
respecting
the
rights
and
obligations
of
an
employer
so
assessed
apply
in
respect
of
a
director
of
a
corporation
in
respect
of
an
amount
payable
by
the
director
under
subsection
(1)
in
the
same
manner
and
to
the
same
extent
as
if
the
director
were
the
employer
referred
to
in
those
provisions.
1984,
c.
I,
s.
123.
Subsection
61(1)
is
as
follows:
Where
any
question
arises
under
this
Act
as
to
whether
a
person
is
required
to
make
a
payment
of
an
employee's
premium,
or
an
employer's
premium,
or
as
to
the
amount
of
any
such
premium,
in
a
year,
(a)
the
person
concerned
may,
on
or
before
April
30
in
the
immediately
following
year,
apply
to
the
Minister
to
determine
the
question;
or
(b)
the
Minister
on
his
own
initiative
may
at
any
time
determine
the
question.
(2)
Where
the
Minister
has
assessed
an
employer
for
an
amount
payable
by
him
under
this
Act,
the
employer
may
appeal
to
the
Minister
for
a
reconsideration
of
the
assessment,
either
as
to
whether
any
amount
should
be
assessed
as
payable
or
as
to
the
amount
so
assessed,
within
ninety
days
of
the
day
of
mailing
of
the
notice
of
assessment.
Section
70
of
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act
reads
as
follows:
(1)
The
Commission
or
a
person
affected
by
a
determination
by,
or
a
decision
on
an
appeal
to,
the
Minister
under
section
61
may,
within
ninety
days
after
the
determination
or
decision
is
communicated
to
him,
or
within
such
longer
time
as
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
on
application
made
to
it
within
those
ninety
days
may
allow,
appeal
from
the
determination
or
decision
to
that
Court
in
the
manner
prescribed.
(2)
On
an
appeal
under
this
section,
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
may
reverse,
affirm
or
vary
the
determination
or
may
vacate,
confirm
or
vary
the
assessment,
and
shall
thereupon
in
writing
notify
the
parties
to
the
appeal
of
its
decision
and
the
reasons
therefor.
1970-71-72,
c.
48,
s.
84;
1980-81-82-83,
c.
158,
s.
53.
The
Minister
should
treat
Mr.
Corazza's
handwritten
note
as
an
application
for
reconsideration
of
the
purported
assessment.
He
has
not
responded
to
that
application
under
either
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
or
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act.
I
turn
now
to
the
relief
that
should
be
granted
on
this
motion.
Fundamental
justice
requires
that
this
taxpayer
be
given
an
opportunity
to
contest
his
liability
under
all
of
the
Acts
which
the
Minister
has
purported
to
apply
and
that,
in
doing
so,
he
be
entitled
to
challenge
the
validity
of
the
purported
notice
of
assessment.
In
Leung
(J.)
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
2268,
91
D.T.C.
1020,
which
was
decided
after
Deerhurst
Resorts
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1989]
2
C.T.C.
2082,
89
D.T.C.
352,
Judge
Rip
of
this
Court
held
that
an
omnibus
notice
of
assessment
which
was
virtually
identical
to
the
document
issued
in
this
case
was
invalid
on
the
basis
that
it
was
so
inadequate
that
it
did
not
fulfil
the
statutory
requirement
that
notice
be
sent.
I
am,
respectfully,
in
complete
agreement
with
his
conclusion.
A
piece
of
paper
emanating
from
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
listing
sections
from
four
different
statutes,
two
sections
of
which
are
misdescribed,
and
setting
out
one
global
amount
is
not
a
notice
of
assessment
under
any
one
of
those
statutes.
A
document
is
not
a
notice
of
assessment
under
a
particular
statute
unless,
at
a
bare
minimum,
it
informs
the
taxpayer
of
the
quantum
of
his
liability
under
that
statute.
As
stated
by
Thorson,
J.
in
Pure
Spring
Co.
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1946]
Ex.
C.R.
471,
[1946]
C.T.C.
169,
2
D.T.C.
844
at
page
198
(D.T.C.
857):
The
assessment
is
different
from
the
notice
of
assessment;
the
one
is
an
operation,
the
other
a
piece
of
paper.
This
is
a
matter
of
substance,
not
of
form.
The
Minister
must
inform
the
taxpayer
that
the
operation
of
assessment
has
taken
place.
He
has
not
done
so
here.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
was
unable
to
tell
me
what
amounts,
if
any,
were
purportedly
assessed
under
the
four
statutes.
This
raises
a
serious
question
whether
the
operation
of
assessment,
which
must
necessarily
be
antecedent
to
the
notice
thereof,
has
in
fact
taken
place
under
all
or
any
of
the
four
statutes.
In
Wallace
(M.)
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
2341,
91
D.T.C.
1134,
Judge
Rip
was
faced
with
the
same
type
of
cryptic
purported
notice
of
assessment
as
I
am
in
this
case.
It
listed
four
statutes
under
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
alleged
that
he
had
assessed.
The
taxpayer
appealed
to
this
Court.
The
Minister
brought
a
motion
to
quash
the
appeal
on
the
basis
that,
notwith-
standing
the
statement
in
the
purported
notice
of
assessment
that
tax
had
been
assessed
under
section
227.1
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act,
in
fact
nothing
had
been
assessed
under
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act.
There
is
nothing
in
the
material
before
me
to
indicate
that
the
Minister
has
not
done
the
same
thing
here
as
he
appears
to
have
done
in
a
number
of
other
directors'
liability
cases:
he
has,
evidently
without
making
any
independent
separate
ascertainment
of
liability
under
the
statutes
which
he
purports
to
apply,
automatically
and
mechanically
issued
a
document
bearing
a
fixed
wording
identical
to
that
which
we
have
here.
To
refer
to
section
numbers
that
have,
on
consolidation,
been
renumbered,
to
give
no
breakdown
of
the
amounts,
if
any,
purportedly
assessed
under
the
four
statutes,
and
then
to
argue
that
the
taxpayer
should
be
denied
a
right
to
contest
his
liability
under
three
of
the
four
statutes,
exemplifies
bureaucratic
arrogance
and
indifference
to
the
rights
of
taxpayers.
The
applicant
was
not
even
given
copies
of
the
underlying
corporate
assessments
upon
which
the
purported
assessments
were
based.
Since
I
have
concluded
that
the
purported
notice
of
assessment
is
invalid,
it
might
be
argued
that
I
should
dismiss
the
application
on
the
basis
that
Mr.
Corazza
has
nothing
to
object
to.
This
course
of
action
has,
I
understand,
commended
itself
to
certain
members
of
this
Court.
A
different
course
of
action
is
in
my
view
appropriate.
Accordingly,
I
have
decided
that
the
most
practical
remedy
and
the
one
which
affords
the
greatest
protection
to
the
taxpayer
in
the
circumstances
is
to
grant
the
application
for
the
extension
of
time
for
serving
a
notice
of
objection
even
though
one
basis
of
challenge
to
the
purported
assessment
is
that
it
is
not
an
assessment
or
that
it
is
void
or
that
no
proper
notice
has
been
given.
It
would
seem
to
me
that
where
a
taxpayer
wishes
to
object
to
or
appeal
from
a
purported
assessment
on
such
a
basis
the
proper
course
is
to
follow
the
ordinary
objection
or
appeal
procedure
even
though
he
is
seeking
to
have
the
purported
assessment
set
aside
on
the
basis
that
it
is
a
nullity.
One
would
in
the
normal
course
object
to
or
appeal
against
a
statute-barred
assessment
rather
than
apply
to
an
appropriate
court
for
a
declaration
that
the
purported
assessment
is
a
nullity.
The
situation
is
somewhat
analogous
to
that
described
by
Duff
C.J.
in
Provincial
Secretary
of
P.E.
I.
v.
Egan,
[1941]
S.C.R.
396
at
399
where
he
said:
I
think
the
contention
of
the
appellant
is
well
founded
that
section
(1)
of
chap.
5
of
the
P.E.I.
Statutes
of
1940
gives
prima
facie
an
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court
(P.E.I.)
from
any
decree,
judgment,
order,
or
conviction
by
a
Judge
of
a
County
Court
who
is
acting
in
a
judicial
capacity,
through
persona
designata
and
not
as
the
County
Court,
under
the
authority
of
a
Provincial
statute.
This
is
not
intended
to
be
an
exhaustive
description,
but
in
such
circumstances
I
think
an
appeal
lies.
The
fact
that
the
County
Judge
has
acted
without
jurisdiction
does
not,
in
my
opinion,
affect
this
right
of
appeal.
Once
the
conclusion
is
reached
that
the
section
intends
to
give
an
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court,
even
where
the
County
Court
Judge
is
exercising
a
special
jurisdiction
and
not
as
the
County
Court,
I
can
see
no
reason
for
limiting
the
scope
of
the
appeal
in
such
a
way
as
to
exclude
questions
of
jurisdiction.
As
the
Attorney-General
observed
in
the
course
of
his
argument,
lawyers
are
more
familiar
with
the
practice
of
dealing
with
questions
of
jurisdiction
raised
by
proceedings
by
way
of
certiorari
and
prohibition.
A
tribunal
exercising
a
limited
statutory
jurisdiction
has
no
authority
to
give
a
binding
decision
upon
its
own
jurisdiction
and
where
it
wrongfully
assumes
jurisdiction
it
follows,
as
a
general
rule,
that,
since
what
he
has
done
is
null,
there
is
nothing
to
appeal
from.
But
here
we
have
a
statute
and
this
is
only
pertinent
on
the
point
of
the
meaning
and
effect
of
the
statute.
It
has
always
seemed
to
me
that
the
proceeding
by
way
of
appeal
would
be
the
most
convenient
way
of
questioning
the
judgment
of
any
judicial
tribunal
whose
judgment
is
alleged
to
be
wrong,
whether
in
point
of
wrongful
assumption
of
jurisdiction,
or
otherwise.
There
is
no
appeal,
of
course,
except
by
statute
and,
I
repeat,
the
question
arising
upon
this
point
is
entirely
a
question
of
the
scope
and
effect
of
this
statute.
Since
the
Minister
has
not
seen
fit
to
specify
how
much
he
is
purporting
to
assess
under
any
of
the
four
Acts,
and
it
is
unclear
whether
we
are
dealing
with
an
assessment
or
a
notice
of
assessment
at
all
or
whether
the
document
may
have
some
partial
validity,
I
do
not
see
how
it
is
possible
for
this
Court
to
make
subdivisions
that
the
Minister
has
not
made.
I
derive
some
support
for
this
view
from
the
decision
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
M.N.R.
v.
Reau
me,
[1989]
1
C.T.C.
267,
89
D.T.C.
5091.
The
problem
in
that
case
differed
somewhat
from
the
one
with
which
I
am
faced.
Although
it
seems
clear
that
the
Minister
thought
that
he
was
assessing
under
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act
and
the
Canada
Pension
Plan,
it
appears
that
the
notice
of
assessment
referred
only
to
section
227.1
of
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act.
On
this
basis
the
Court
stated
at
page
269
(D.T.C.
5093):
By
no
process
of
gymnastic
can
the
assessment
“in
respect
of
Liability
under
section
227.1
of
the
Income
Tax
Act'
be
taken
to
include
other
liabilities
imposed
under
other
statutes.
It
may
indeed
be
that
the
Tax
Court
is
without
jurisdiction
to
deal
with
objections
and
appeals
under
the
Canada
Pension
Plan
and
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act,
1971,
but
since
the
Minister
failed
to
assess
the
respondent
under
those
two
statutes,
there
can
be
no
question
as
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Tax
Court
to
grant
an
extension
of
time
for
Filing
a
Notice
of
Objection
in
respect
of
the
only
assessment
the
Minister
did
make
against
the
respondent,
namely,
an
assessment
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Here,
it
is
true,
reference
is
made
to
other
statutes
but
as
stated
I
cannot
subdivide
the
relief
granted
where
the
Minister
has
not
seen
fit
to
subdivide
and
allocate
the
burden
that
he
is
seeking
to
impose.
The
Reaume
decision
is,
in
a
sense,
at
the
opposite
end
of
the
spectrum
to
Wallace
to
which
I
referred
above.
In
Reaume
the
Minister
in
the
notice
of
assessment
alleged
that
he
had
assessed
under
only
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act
but
asserted
before
the
Court
that
he
had
assessed
under
three
statutes.
In
Wallace
the
Minister
referred
to
four
statutes,
including
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act
but
took
the
position
before
the
Court
that
he
had
not
assessed
under
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act.
In
the
present
case,
it
is
impossible
to
know
what
assessing
action,
if
any,
the
Minister
may
have
taken
or
thought
he
was
taking.
The
Court
cannot
be
expected
to
excise
from
the
relief
granted
an
extension
of
time
with
respect
to
statutes
other
than
the
federal
Income
Tax
Act
where
there
is
no
evidence
of
what,
if
anything,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
has
done
under
those
other
statutes.
By
extending
the
time
generally
for
objecting
the
Court
is
putting
the
taxpayer
in
the
same
position
as
that
in
which
he
would
have
been
had
he
filed
a
notice
of
objection
within
the
90-day
period
following
the
date
of
the
purported
notice.
The
ultimate
determination
of
the
validity
of
the
notice
will,
of
course,
be
for
the
trial
judge
who
hears
the
matter,
if
it
reaches
that
point.
The
application
is
granted
and
the
time
for
serving
a
notice
of
objection
to
the
purported
assessment
against
Mr.
Corazza
dated
March
21,
1991,
bearing
serial
number
10425
is
extended
to
a
date
that
is
one
month
from
the
date
of
the
order
herein.
Application
granted.
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