Stone,
J.A.:—On
October
8,
1991,
in
adjourning
this
appeal
from
an
order
of
Muldoon,
J.
of
August
23,
1990,
another
panel
of
this
Court
ordered
that
the
new
date
for
the
hearing
be
fixed
by
the
Judicial
Administrator
unless
a
consent
order
disposing
of
the
appeal
was
applied
for
on
or
before
December
16,
1991.
No
such
consent
order
having
been
applied
for,
the
parties
filed
amended
memoranda
of
fact
and
law
in
accordance
with
that
order
after
which
the
appeal
was
re-scheduled
to
be
heard
on
this
date.
In
its
amended
memorandum,
the
appellant
submits
that
section
179
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
as
it
stood
when
its
shareholders,
apparently
non-residents
of
Canada,
made
the
subject
investment
in
Canada
and,
indeed,
when
the
matter
was
first
brought
forward
by
the
appellant
in
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
from
which
the
proceedings
in
the
Trial
Division
were
brought
by
way
of
appeal,
entitled
the
appellant,
upon
making
a
simple
request
therefor,
to
have
the
proceedings
held
in
camera.
A
later
amendment
to
that
section,
which
became
effective
prior
to
the
commencement
of
the
proceedings
in
the
Trial
Division,
requires
a
taxpayer
wishing
in
camera
proceedings
to
establish
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
court
that
the
circumstances
of
the
case
justify
in
camera
proceedings.
In
our
view,
it
is
not
at
all
to
the
point
for
this
Court
to
determine
at
this
time
whether
the
former
or
revised
text
of
section
179
will
govern
any
request
the
appellant
may
make
for
in
camera
proceedings.
If
such
a
request
should
be
made
it
could
only
be
presented
to
the
Trial
Division
rather
than
to
this
Court
on
the
present
appeal.
This
appeal
is
for
the
determination
only
of
those
issues
which
are
raised
against
the
judgment
of
August
23,
1990.
No
issue
of
entitlement
to
in
camera
proceedings
was
determined
by
that
judgment.
The
fact
of
the
existence
of
section
179
and
that
it
may
be
invoked
by
the
appellant,
does
not
assist
that
party
in
its
arguments
on
this
appeal.
That
having
been
said
it
remains
now
to
dispose
of
the
appeal
on
its
merits.
By
the
judgment
under
appeal
the
appellant's
witness
upon
examination
for
discovery
was
ordered
to
answer
certain
questions
which
he
had
refused
to
answer,
to
complete
answers
or
provide
further
and
better
answers
in
respect
of
undertakings
given
at
the
examination
for
discovery
and
to
produce
a
specific
document
which
he
refused
to
produce
at
that
examination.
The
unanswered
questions
in
controversy
pertain
to
the
identity
of
the
appellants
shareholders
and
of
its
part-time
manager
of
a
Manitoba
farm
which
the
appellant
purchased
in
1976
and
sold
in
1980,
and
the
document
is
a
trust
deed
under
which
the
witness
being
examined
held
the
shares
in
trust
and
which
identifies
the
shareholders
by
name.
The
appellant's
position
before
this
Court,
as
it
was
in
the
Trial
Division,
is
that
the
identity
of
the
shareholders
and
that
of
the
farm
manager
is
not
relevant
to
the
issues
pleaded,
that
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
already
has
this
information,
and
that
the
witness
on
examination
for
discovery
being
a
solicitor
as
well
as
a
trustee
was
bound
by
solicitor
and
client
privilege
which
shielded
him
from
any
requirement
to
produce
the
trust
deed.
Muldoon,
J.
rejected
all
of
these
arguments
for
the
reasons
which
he
gave.
Counsel
informed
this
Court
at
the
hearing
that
his
client
is
now
prepared
to
disclose
the
name
of
the
part-time
farm
manager
as
ordered
by
the
Trial
Division.
Notwithstanding
Mr.
Green's
very
full
and
forceful
argument
we
are
not
persuaded
that
Muldoon,
J.
erred
in
making
the
order
of
August
23,
1990,
for
the
reasons
which
he
gave
and
with
which
we
are
in
substantial
agreement.
Accordingly,
this
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.
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