Bonner,
T.C.C.J.:—On
August
8,
1991,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
reassessed
Intertan
Canada
Ltd.
(the
"appellant"),
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
for
interest
in
the
amount
of
$373,814.39
on
what
he
found
to
be
insufficient
instalment
payments
in
respect
of
the
1985
taxation
year.
The
appellant
asserts
in
this
appeal
that
the
Minister
erred
in
applying
subsection
5301(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations
(the"
Regulations")
as
amended
by
P.C.
1985-2277
to
its
1985
taxation
year.
The
basic
thrust
of
the
appellant's
arguments
is
that
the
amended
regulation
applies
prospectively,
not
retroactively.
The
issue
is
whether
subsection
5301(1)
of
the
Regulations
as
amended
by
P.C.
1985-2277
applies
to
the
calculation
of
the
appellant's
"first
instalment
base”.
The
facts
are
not
in
dispute.
The
appellant
is
a
Canadian
corporation.
At
all
material
times
its
fiscal
year
ended
on
June
30.
It
was
of
course
liable
to
pay
its
tax
in
instalments.
Pursuant
to
subparagraph
157(1)(a)(ii)
of
the
Act,
it
chose
to
pay
monthly
an
amount
equal
to
1/12
of
its
"first
instalment
base”
for
the
year
in
question.
Subsection
157(4)
of
the
Act
provides
that
the
meaning
of
“first
instalment
base"
is
that
prescribed
by
regulation.
Before
the
amendment
in
question
subsection
5301(1)
of
the
Regulations
defined
"first
instalment
base"
in
such
a
way
to
permit
the
deduction
of
scientific
research
tax
credits
allowed
by
virtue
of
section
127.3
of
the
Act.
Subsection
5301(1)
read:
5301.(1)
Subject
to
subsections
(6)
and
(8),
for
the
purposes
of
subsections
157(4)
and
161(9)
of
the
Act,
“first
instalment
base”
of
a
corporation
for
a
particular
taxation
year
means
the
amount
equal
to
the
product
obtained
when
the
tax
payable
by
the
corporation
under
Part
I
of
the
Act,
computed
without
reference
to
sections
123.3
to
123.5
thereof,
for
its
taxation
year
immediately
preceding
the
particular
year,
is
multiplied
by
the
ratio
that
365
is
of
the
number
of
days
in
that
preceding
year.
The
appellant
calculated
its
first
instalment
base
for
the
1985
taxation
year
in
accordance
with
this
regulation.
It
deducted
the
tax
credit
allowed
by
virtue
of
section
127.3
of
the
Act,
that
is
to
say,
it
calculated
”.
.
.
tax
payable
by
the
corporation
under
Part
I”
for
the
1984
taxation
year
as
$5,704,134.87
being
Part
I
tax
after
deducting
a
scientific
research
tax
credit
of
$8,225,000
under
section
127.3.
It
paid
12
monthly
instalments
of
$500,000
each
for
the
1985
taxation
year.
If
"tax
payable”
had
been
computed
without
reference
to
section
127.3
of
the
Act
as
required
by
the
amended
version
of
the
Regulations
then
the
appellant's
instalment
base
would
have
been
calculated
with
reference
to
$13,929,134.87
(its
1984
tax
liability
without
the
deduction
of
the
scientific
research
tax
credit).
On
February
15,
1984,
four
and
a
half
months
before
the
commencement
of
the
appellant's
1985
taxation
year,
the
Department
of
Finance
issued
a
press
release
in
which
it
announced
the
intention
of
the
government
to
change
the
calculation
of
the
instalment
base.
The
release
read
in
part:
SPECIAL
INVESTMENT
TAX
CREDITS
WILL
NOT
REDUCE
TAX
INSTALMENT
REQUIREMENTS
The
proposed
amendments
require
that
the
instalment
base
for
a
taxation
year
be
calculated
before
deducting
these
tax
credits.
Further,
where
a
taxpayer
acquires
a
scientific
research
tax
credit
or
share
purchase
tax
credit
investment
during
his
taxation
year,
the
amount
of
the
tax
credit
shall
not
be
taken
into
account
in
estimating
his
tax
instalment
for
the
year.
The
proposed
amendments
will
not
affect
scientific
research
tax
credits
and
share
purchase
tax
credits
earned
on
investments
before
February
16,
1984.
Also,
the
proposed
amendments
will
not
apply
with
respect
to
scientific
research
or
share
purchase
tax
credits
in
respect
of
investments
acquired
before
March
1,
1984,
providing
arrangements
for
the
issue
of
the
security
are
substantially
advanced
today.
The
scientific
research
tax
credits
claimed
by
the
appellant
for
the
1984
and
1985
taxation
years
were
in
respect
of
debt
obligations
acquired
by
it
after
March
1,
1984.
An
agreed
statement
of
facts
filed
at
the
hearing
indicates
that
the
appellant
was
unaware
of
the
proposal
to
change
the
law.
Paragraph
18
of
the
agreement
reads
in
part:
.
.
.
a
wholly-owned
subsidiary
of
a
U.S.
corporation
in
the
Tandy
Corporation
group
of
companies.
The
preparation
of
Canadian
income
tax
returns
and
other
Canadian
tax
compliance
matters
including
calculating
and
paying
tax
instalments
was,
during
the
appellant's
1985
taxation
year
administered
from
the
offices
of
Tandy
Corporation
in
Fort
Worth,
Texas
without
assistance
or
review
by
Canadian
accountants.
When
calculating
and
making
the
instalment
payments
.
.
.
neither
the
appellant
nor
the
individuals
administering
the
appellant’s
Canadian
tax
compliance
knew
of
the
proposed
change
in
the
law
described
in
the
press
release.
Subsection
5301(1)
of
the
Regulations
was
amended
by
P.C.
1985-2277,
subsection
16(1),
to
create
the
new
definition
of
"first
instalment
base"
as
follows:
5301.(1)
Subject
to
subsections
(6)
and
(8),
for
the
purposes
of
subsections
157(4)
and
161(9)
of
the
Act,
the
“first
instalment
base”
of
a
corporation
for
a
particular
taxation
year
means
the
product
obtained
when
the
tax
payable
by
the
corporation
under
Part
I
of
the
Act,
computed
without
reference
to
sections
123.3
to
123.5,
127.2
and
127.3
thereof
and
before
taking
into
consideration
any
amount
referred
to
in
any
of
subparagraphs
161
(7)(a)(i)
to
(vii)
thereof
that
was
excluded
or
deducted,
as
the
case
may
be,
for
its
taxation
year
immediately
preceding
the
particular
year,
is
multiplied
by
the
ratio
that
365
is
of
the
number
of
days
in
that
preceding
year.
The
amendment
was
not
made
until
July
24,
1985,
some
24
days
after
the
close
of
the
appellant's
1985
taxation
year.
It
was
registered
on
July
25,1985
as
SOR/85-696.
It
was
published
in
the
Canada
Gazette
Part
II
on
August
7,
1985.
Subsection
22(9)
of
SOR/85-696
reads:
Sections
15
and
16
are
applicable
with
respect
to
(a)
amounts
deducted
under
sections
127.2
and
127.3
of
the
Act
in
respect
of
shares,
debt
obligations
and
rights
acquired
after
February
15,
1984,
other
than
shares,
debt
obligations
or
rights
acquired
before
March
1,
1984
where
arrangements,
evidenced
in
writing,
for
the
issue
of
the
shares
or
debt
obligations
or
granting
of
the
rights
were
substantially
advanced
before
February
16,
1984;
and
.
.
.
.
In
making
the
assessment
now
under
appeal
the
Minister
computed
the
first
instalment
base
for
the
appellant's
1985
taxation
year,
on
the
basis
that
no
amount
was
deductible
in
respect
of
the
scientific
research
tax
credit.
His
assessment
rested
on
the
premise
that
the
amendment
to
paragraph
5301(1)
of
the
Regulations
precluded
the
deduction.
Consequently,
he
assessed
interest
in
respect
of
insufficient
instalment
payments
for
the
appellants
1985
taxation
year
pursuant
to
subsection
161(2)
of
the
Act.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argues
that:
A
retroactive
regulation,
i.e.
one
that
changes
past
consequences
of
past
actions,
is
ultra
vires
and
invalid
unless
the
statute
which
authorizes
the
making
of
the
regulation
authorizes
the
making
of
retroactive
regulations
expressly
or
by
necessary
implication.
In
the
year
in
question,
subsection
221(2)
of
the
Act
read:
(2)
No
regulation
made
under
this
Act
has
effect
until
it
has
been
published
in
the
Canada
Gazette
but,
when
so
published,
a
regulation
shall,
if
it
so
provides,
be
effective
with
reference
to
a
period
before
it
was
published.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
an
unauthorized
regulation
has
no
force
but,
in
my
view
subsection
221(2),
expressly
authorizes
the
making
of
regulations
having
retrospective
effect.
In
Omstead
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
2615,
91
D.T.C.
1244,
Sarchuk,
T.C.C.J.,
considered
subsection
22(9)
of
SOR/85-2277
in
relation
to
the
effective
date
of
the
amendment
to
subsection
5300(1)(a)
of
the
Regulations
which
deals
with
scientific
research
tax
credits
in
the
calculation
of
the
instalment
base
for
individuals.
At
page
1247,
he
stated:
The
language
of
subsection
22(9)
of
SOR/85-696
makes
Regulation
5300(1)(a)
applicable
to
amounts
deducted
under
sections
127.2
and
127.3
of
the
Act
in
respect
of
shares,
debt
obligations
and
rights
acquired
after
February
15,
1984.
The
words
used
by
the
legislators
in
my
view
clearly
express
that
the
Regulation
is
to
be
effective
with
reference
to
a
period
before
it
was
published,
that
period
being
all
relevant
times
after
February
15,
1984.
These
words
are
sufficient
to
comply
with
the
requirement
contained
in
subsection
221(2)
of
the
Act.
I
agree.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
also
submits
that
if
a
regulation
made
under
the
Act,
is
to
be
effective
with
respect
to
a
period
prior
to
the
day
on
which
it
is
made,
it
must
comply
both
with
paragraph
9(1)(a)
of
the
Statutory
Instruments
Act,
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
38,
and
with
subsection
221(2)
of
the
Act.
I
disagree.
Subsection
9(1)
of
the
Statutory
Instruments
Act
provides
that:
No
regulation
shall
come
into
force
on
a
day
earlier
than
the
day
on
which
it
is
registered
unless
(a)
it
expressly
states
that
it
comes
into
force
on
a
day
earlier
than
that
day
and
is
registered
within
seven
days
after
it
is
made,
or
(b)
it
is
a
regulation
of
a
class
that,
pursuant
to
paragraph
(b)
of
section
27,
is
exempted
from
the
application
of
subsection
(1)
of
section
5,
in
which
case
it
shall
come
into
force,
except
as
otherwise
authorized
or
provided
by
or
under
the
Act
pursuant
to
which
it
is
made,
on
the
day
on
which
it
is
made
or
on
such
later
day
as
may
be
stated
in
the
regulation.
[Emphasis
added.]
Subsection
9(1)
is
not
obscure.
It
enacts
a
general
rule
but
contemplates
the
creation
of
exceptions.
In
Omstead,
supra,
Sarchuk,
T.C.C.J.,
stated
the
position
as
follows
at
pages
2619-20
(D.T.C.
1247):
I
have
concluded
that
the
sections
of
the
Statutory
Instruments
Act
and
the
Interpretation
Act
referred
to
do
not
apply
in
view
of
the
existence
of
a
specific
provision
regarding
regulations
made
by
the
Governor
General
in
Council
pursuant
to
the
authority
granted
by
section
221
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
particular
I
refer
to
subsection
221(2)
thereof
which
at
the
relevant
time
read
as
follows:
The
amendment
before
me
clearly
provides
that
it
was
to
be
effective
with
respect
to
transactions
occurring
prior
to
its
enactment.
The
intention
of
the
legislators
is
not
uncertain
and
its
expression
in
the
amendment
to
the
Regulations
is
not
ambiguous.
Again,
I
agree.
Subsection
221(2)
of
the
Act
was
intended
to
place
regulations
under
the
Act
which
contain
the
requisite
provision
in
a
category
excepted
from
the
general
rule
laid
down
in
subsection
9(1)
of
the
Statutory
Instruments
Act.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argued
that
subsection
22(9)
of
SOR/85-696
only
says
that
section
16
is
applicable
to
deductions
under
section
127.3
of
the
Act
in
respect
of
a
certain
category
of
shares,
debt
obligations
and
rights
namely,
those
acquired
after
February
15,
1984
and
those
acquired
after
that
date
and
before
March
1,
1984
where
the
requisite
arrangements
were
appropriately
advanced.
This
manner
of
describing
the
ambit
of
section
16
does
not,
he
submitted,
comply
either
with
the
requirements
of
paragraph
9(1)(a)
of
the
Statutory
Instruments
Act
or
of
subsection
221(2)
of
the
Act.
It
is
not,
counsel
said,
an
express
statement
of
a
day
prior
to
registration
or
a
reference
to
a
period
prior
to
publication.
Counsel
went
on
to
assert
that
language
of
the
kind
contemplated
and
required
by
paragraph
9(1)(a)
of
the
Statutory
Instruments
Act
and
subsection
221(2)
of
the
Act
is
found
in
subsections
22(4),
(6)
and
(7)
of
SOR/85-696.
It
is,
I
think,
an
unduly
literal
approach
to
construction
to
assert
that
the
Governor-in-Council
can
only
exercise
its
authority
under
section
221
of
the
Act
to
make
regulations
having
retrospective
effect
by
referring
to
a
period
of
time
and
not
to
transactions
which
take
place
during
a
period.
In
effect,
in
subsection
22(9)
of
SOR/85-696,
the
Governor-in-Council
says
(subject
to
an
exception)
that
subsection
5301(1)
of
the
Regulations,
as
amended,
excludes
from
the
computation
of
first
instalment
base
section
127.3
deductions
in
respect
of
debt
obligations
acquired
during
the
period
after
February
15,
1984.
The
message
is
clear.
I
do
not
read
subsection
221(2)
as
a
provision
intended
to
restrict
the
freedom
of
expression
of
the
Governor-in-
Council.
Clarity
of
language
is
required
and
not
the
use
of
a
specific
formula
of
words.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
further
submits
that:
.
.
.
the
Department
of
Finance
press
release
dated
February
15,
1984
does
not
support
or
justify
giving
retroactive
effect
to
the
amendment.
The
appellant
made
instalment
payments
in
accordance
with
the
law
as
it
was,
and
as
the
appellant
knew
it,
throughout
the
appellant’s
1985
taxation
year.
A
press
release
is
not
law
and
a
taxpayer
should
not
be
expected
to
comply
with
a
press
release
as
if
it
were
law.
Changes
to
income
tax
law
announced
in
government
press
releases
do
not
always
get
enacted
and
do
not
always
get
enacted
as
first
announced.
A
taxpayer
also
should
not
be
deemed
or
expected
to
know
the
content
of
all
government
press
releases
as
he
is
deemed
to
know
the
law.
He
explains:
If
the
appellant
had
paid
its
instalments
for
1985
based
on
the
press
release
and
the
change
to
the
law
had
not
been
made,
the
appellant
would
not
have
been
entitled
to
interest
with
respect
to
such
overpayment.
It
is
submitted
that
the
appellant
should
not
be
penalized
for
not
complying
with
proposed
changes
in
the
law
which
might
not
be
enacted
when
there
was
a
potential
detriment
to
the
appellant
in
such
a
course
of
action.
However
all
of
that
is
quite
beside
the
point.
The
force
of
the
amended
regulation
does
not
depend
in
any
way
on
the
issuance
of
the
press
release
or
the
appellants
knowledge
of
it.
The
facts
on
which
counsel
relies
do
not
permit
the
courts
to
ignore
otherwise
valid
statutory
provisions.
It
was
submitted
that:
.
.
.
the
purpose
of
the
relevant
sections
of
the
Act
and
the
Income
Tax
Regulations
having
to
do
with
instalment
payments
and
instalment
interest
is
to
ensure
pay-
ment
on
a
regular
basis
throughout
a
taxation
year
of
tax
liability
for
the
year.
In
this
context
the
concept
of
first
instalment
base
is
intended
to
benefit
taxpayers
by
requiring
payments
and
interest
only
in
respect
of
the
lesser
of
the
previous
year’s
actual
liability
or
an
estimate
of
the
current
year's
liability.
To
exclude
valid
scientific
research
tax
credit
and
share
purchase
tax
credit
deductions
which
reduce
actual
liability
in
the
current
year
or
previous
year
is
inconsistent
with
and
antithetical
to
the
purpose
of
the
instalment
provisions.
Accordingly,
there
is
no
basis
in
the
purpose
of
the
relevant
provisions
for
construing
the
amendment
to
section
5301
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations
as
having
retroactive
effect.
I
disagree
with
the
conclusion.
The
basis
for
construing
the
amendment
as
having
retroactive
effect
is
to
be
found
in
the
unambiguous
language
of
subsection
22(9)
of
SOR/85-696.
Nothing
more
is
needed.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
notes
that
subsection
22(9)
of
SOR/85-696
provides
that
the
part
of
the
amendment
contained
in
section
16
of
SOR/85-696
relating
to
deductions
under
sections
127.2
and
127.3
becomes
effective
in
one
way
and
the
part
of
the
amendment
relating
to
deductions
described
in
subsection
161(7)
becomes
effective
in
another
way.
He
states
that
this
is
tantamount
to
providing
two
different
effective
dates
for
a
single
regulation
and
submits
that
subsection
221(2)
of
the
Act
does
not
authorize
this.
He
submits
that
subsection
22(9)
of
SOR/85-696
is
ultra
vires
and
invalid
on
this
basis.
In
my
opinion,
nothing
in
subsection
221(2)
requires
that
a
single
regulation
must
have
only
one
effective
date.
I
cannot
find
that
the
assessment
is
not
authorized
by
the
law.
The
appeal
will
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.