Robertson,
J.A.:—These
two
appeals
arise
from
a
decision
of
a
learned
trial
judge
wherein
he
dismissed
the
appellants'
appeals
with
respect
to
certain
notices
of
assessment
issued
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
Pursuant
to
those
notices,
the
appellants
were
assessed
as
follows
for
taxes
pursuant
to
the
Excise
Tax
Act
(R.S.C.
1985,
c.
E-15)
for
the
years
1986
and
1987:
(1)
excise
tax
on
the
importation
of
bulk
cooking
wine
(levied
on
the
appellant
“Grantham”
only);
and
(2)
federal
sales
tax
on
the
sale
of
re-packaged
cooking
wine
(levied
on
both
"Grantham"
and
National").
The
appellants
were
unable
to
persuade
the
trial
judge
that
the
cooking
wine
which
had
been
imported
and
sold
was
not
subject
to
the
taxing
provisions
of
that
Act.
That
is
the
issue
raised
on
these
two
appeals.
However,
it
must
be
noted,
at
the
outset,
that
we
are
dealing
with
the
imposition
of
two
distinct
taxes
under
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
as
it
then
read.
Excise
tax
Section
24
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
imposes
an“
"excise
tax"
on
imported
wine
at
a
rate
which
varies
with
the
alcoholic
content
thereof.
For
example,
paragraph
24(1)(a)
reads
as
follows:
24.(1)
There
shall
be
imposed,
levied
and
collected
the
following
excise
taxes:
(a)
a
tax
of
one
and
seventy-nine
one-hundredths
cents
per
litre
on
wines
of
all
kinds
containing
not
more
than
one
and
two-tenths
per
cent
of
absolute
ethyl
alcohol
by
volume
[Emphasis
added.]
Subsection
24(5)
of
the
Act
provides
a
broad,
but
inconclusive,
definition
for
the
term
wine:
(5)
In
this
section,
"wine"
includes
spirituous
liquors
that
are
the
products
of
fruits,
vegetables,
roots,
herbs,
grain,
molasses,
sugar
or
other
fermentable
substances
and
are
obtained
by
the
normal
alcoholic
fermentation
of
the
juices
or
extracts
therefrom
and
not
by
distillation.
[Emphasis
added.]
The
legal
argument
advanced
by
the
appellants
is
premised
on
the
fact
that
cooking
wine
is
produced
by
adding
1.5
per
cent
salt
by
weight
to
non-vintage
bulk
wine.
It
is
an
accepted
fact
that
the
addition
of
salt
renders
the
wine
unfit
to
drink
as
an
alcoholic
beverage.
This
explains
why
in
provinces
such
as
British
Columbia
this
particular
product
can
be
sold
in
grocery
stores
(see
Liquor
Control
and
Licensing
Act,
R.S.B.C.
1979,
c.
237,
section
62,
which
exempts
cooking
wine
from
the
scheme
of
that
Act
because
it
is
unfit
for
consumption
as
an
alcoholic
beverage).
Thus,
the
appellants
argue
that
the
impotability
of
the
product
takes
it
outside
the
ambit
of
the
taxing
provisions
outlined
above.
In
other
words,
if
this
product
cannot
be
regarded
as
a
"beverage"
or
"drink"
it
cannot
be
described
as
wine.
Rather,
cooking
wine
must
be
looked
upon
as
an
ingredient
to
be
mixed
with
or
used
in
the
preparation
of
food.
The
learned
trial
judge
rejected
this
argument
on
the
basis
that
the
Act
does
not
include
any
reference
to
the
potability
of
the
wine,
but
only
to
its
"spirituous
nature";
that
is,
its
alcoholic
content
and
the
method
whereby
it
is
extracted.
In
my
opinion,
the
addition
of
salt
to
the
product
in
question
and
the
resulting
impotability
of
the
beverage
does
not
detract
from
the
fact
that
the
appellants'
cooking
wine
falls
within
the
parameters
of
the
relevant
provisions.
My
reasoning
is
straightforward.
First,
and
most
importantly,
it
must
be
acknowledged
that
the
excise
tax
is
imposed
"on
wines
of
all
kinds”.
Second,
wine
is
broadly
defined
to"
include”
spirituous
liquors,
products
which
are
not
normally
considered
wine.
Third,
the
fact
that
wine
is
defined
in
such
a
manner
as
to
"include"
various
substances
indicates
that
the
definition
is
not
intended
to
be
restrictive.
Finally,
the
appellants
have
been
unable
to
demonstrate
that
the
interpretation
being
given
to
the
term
wine,
insofar
as
the
excise
tax
is
concerned,
is
somehow
contrary
to
the
scheme
of
the
Act
or
in
conflict
with
another
statutory
provision.
Against
this
backdrop,
I
am
not
persuaded
that
Parliament
intended
a
distinction
to
be
drawn
between
wine
which
is
or
is
not
potable.
The
fact
that
it
chose
to
include
"wines
of
all
kinds"
is,
in
my
opinion,
conclusive
with
respect
to
this
aspect
of
the
appeal.
Accordingly,
the
assessment
in
regard
to
the
excise
tax
must
be
deemed
valid.
However,
that
determination
is
not
necessarily
applicable
in
regard
to
the
"sales
tax”
provisions
which
establish
an
additional
and
separate
framework
for
raising
revenue.
Federal
sales
tax
The
other
tax
imposed
under
the
Act
is
labelled
the
"consumption
or
sales
tax"
(later
to
become
the
"GST").
It
is
imposed
pursuant
to
section
27
and
applies
to
all
goods.
The
section
makes
specific
reference
to
wines:
27.(1)
There
shall
be
imposed,
levied
and
collected
a
consumption
or
sales
tax
at
the
rate
prescribed
in
subsection
(1.1)
on
the
sale
price
or
on
the
volume
sold
of
all
goods
(1.1)
Tax
imposed
by
subsection
(1)
is
imposed
(a)
in
the
case
of
wines
and
goods
on
which
a
duty
of
excise
is
imposed
under
the
Excise
Act,
or
would
be
if
the
goods
were
produced
or
manufactured
in
Canada,
at
the
rate
of
eighteen
per
cent.
(6)
In
this
section,
"wine"
has
the
meaning
given
that
term
by
subsection
24(5).
However,
certain
goods
are
exempt
from
the
blanket
sales
tax
imposed
by
section
27.
Section
29
provides
that
section
27
is
inapplicable
with
respect
to
goods
mentioned
in
Schedule
3.
That
schedule
reads
as
follows:
SCHEDULE
III
PART
V
FOODSTUFFS
1.
Food
and
drink
for
human
consumption
(including
sweetening
agents,
seasonings
and
other
ingredients
to
be
mixed
with
or
used
in
the
preparation
of
such
food
and
drink),
other
than:
(a)
wine,
spirits,
beer,
malt
liquor
and
other
alcoholic
beverages;
[Emphasis
added.]
In
my
opinion,
the
appellants'
argument
that
cooking
wine
is
exempt
from
sales
tax
is
unassailable.
First,
the
above
schedule
makes
specific
reference
to
the
potability
criterion
—"food
and
drink
for
human
consumption".
Second,
even
though
wine
becomes
an
exception
to
the
exemption,
wine
is
referred
to
along
with
"other
alcoholic
beverages".
Finally,
cooking
wine
can
fairly
and
reasonably
be
regarded
as
falling
within
the
exemption
accorded
food
for
human
consumption
in
that
sweetening
agents,
seasonings
and
ingredients
to
be
mixed
with
food
are
also
expressly
exempted.
Conclusion
The
appeal
of
"Grantham"
(A-1156-91)
should
be
allowed
in
part
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
cooking
wine
is
subject
to
the
excise
tax
under
section
24
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
but
is
not
subject
to
the
federal
sales
tax
under
section
27
of
that
Act.
With
respect
to
this
appeal,
there
should
be
no
costs.
I
would
allow
the
appeal
of
"National"
(A-1155-91)
and
refer
the
matter
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
cooking
wine
is
not
subject
to
the
federal
sales
tax
under
section
27
of
the
Act.
This
appellant
should
be
entitled
to
costs
in
this
Court
and
in
the
Court
below.
Létourneau,
J.A.:—
I
agree
with
the
reasoning
and
the
result,
but
I
would
like
to
add
a
few
remarks
concerning
the
excise
tax
on
importation.
In
common
parlance,
the
word
"wine"
refers
to
an
alcoholic
beverage.
There
is
uncontradicted
evidence
that
cooking
wine
is
obtained
by
the
addition
of
salt
to
non-vintage
wine
and
is
therefore
altered
to
the
point
of
making
it
unfit
to
drink
as
a
beverage.
As
my
colleague
Robertson,
J.A.
mentions,
cooking
wine
can
fairly
and
reasonably
be
regarded
as
an
ingredient
to
be
used
in
the
preparation
of
food
and
therefore
as
food
for
human
consumption.
Were
it
not
for
the
words
"wines
of
all
kinds"
found
in
section
24
of
the
Act,
I
would
have
concluded
that
cooking
wine
is
not
taxable
at
all
under
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
whether
it
is
under
section
24
or
section
27
of
the
Act,
because
it
is
not
a
wine
in
the
common
and
usual
sense
of
the
word.
However,
the
definition
of
wine
in
subsection
24(5)
and
the
use
of
the
words
“wines
of
all
kinds"
in
section
24
reveal
an
intention
on
behalf
of
Parliament
to
levy
a
tax
on
all
sorts
of
wines
and
not
only
on
drinking
wines
that
people
are
familiar
with.
The
definition
of
wine
in
subsection
24(5)
includes
wines
such
as
palm
wine,
cherry,
apple
or
potato
wine,
ginger
wine,
rice
wine
and
dandelion
wine
to
name
but
a
few.
The
words
"wines
of
all
kinds"
apply
not
only
to
table
wines,
but
also
to
sacramental,
medicinal
and
cooking
wines.
Having
said
that,
I
do
not
want,
however,
to
be
understood
as
saying
that
"wines
of
all
kinds"
cover
anything
that
is
made
out
of
wine.
There
comes
a
time
when
a
product
originally
made
out
of
wine
ceases
to
be
wine.
This
is
certainly
the
case
with
wine
vinegar.
The
same
could
be
said
of
a
medicinal
wine
when
the
quantity
of
medicine
in
it
transforms
the
original
product
into
a
medication
notwithstanding
it
may
still
be
loosely
called
"medicinal
wine".
In
the
case
at
bar,
I
am
satisfied
that
the
addition
of
a
quantity
of
salt
to
wine
so
as
to
make
it
a
cooking
wine,
though
such
process
alters
the
primary
function
of
that
wine
as
a
beverage,
does
not
change
the
fact
that
the
end
product
remains
wine,
one
of
a
kind
among
wines
of
all
kinds.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.