Taylor,
T.C.C.J.:—
These
appeals
against
assessments
of
income
tax,
were
all
heard
on
common
evidence
under
the
informal
procedure
on
August
10,
1993
at
Sudbury,
Ontario.
For
James
A.
Jastrebski
the
issue
was
whether
amounts
received
—
1990:
$20,877
and
1991:
$21,450
—
were
in
respect
of
loss
of
wages
in
consequence
of
an
event
occurring
before
1974;
and
for
Gabrielle
Jastrebski
the
issue
was
that
of
child
tax
credit,
the
determination
of
which
would
flow
from
the
result
in
the
appeals
of
James
A.
Jastrebski.
Both
parties
were
agreed
that
the
loss
of
wages
matter
fell
to
be
decided
under
section
3,
paragraph
6(1)(f)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
and
subsection
19(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Application
Rules.
Mr.
Jastrebski
provided
the
Court
with
a
written
explanation
of
his
situation,
and
gave
direct
testimony
with
regard
to
the
details.
The
last
few
paragraphs
of
his
written
submission
do
summarize
his
position:
I
suffer
from
Unipolar
Affective
Disorder
which
commenced
in
1969
with
the
sudden
transfer
from
Moosonee
to
South
Porcupine,
not
knowing
what
I
had
done
wrong
to
warrant
this,
and
the
constant
close
supervision
and
questioning
by
my
superiors,
as
a
predisposing
event.
I
had
continuous
mental
strain
through
this
time
until
the
accident.
This
motor
vehicle
accident
with
a
police
cruiser
on
June
6,
1972
was
the
precipitating
event.
This
period
of
time
was
extremely
devastating
to
me.
This
satisfies
the
requirements
of
my
income
not
being
taxable.
No
T4A
slips
should
have
been
issued.
It
appears
that
the
contentious
issue
appears
to
be
the
proper
interpretation
of
the
word
"event".
I
have
submitted
information
to
you
that
describes
the
initial
predisposing
event
as
commencing
in
1969,
and
the
precipitating
event
occurring
in
1972.
I
would
also
refer
to
some
earlier
comments
provided
by
Mr.
Jastrebski
in
the
same
submission:
.
.
.
the
illness
has
been
an
ongoing
affliction
since
March
1969.
On
October
1966,
I
joined
the
Ontario
Provincial
Police.
.
.
.
In
order
to
join
the
OPP,
I
had
to
undergo
mental
and
physical
assessments,
and
was
interviewed
several
times.
I
was
given
a
clean
bill
of
health
and
welcomed
to
the
force.
In
March
1969,
I
became
a
constable
and
was
transferred
to
Moosonee
Detachment.
.
.
.
In
August
of
1969,
I
was
visited
by
a
senior
officer
from
South
Porcupine
Headquarters.
He
came
to
my
residence.
We
had
a
brief
talk
at
which
time
he
informed
me
that
effective
August
2,
1969
I
was
transferred
to
South
Porcupine
Detachment.
I
was
glad
that
I
was
getting
out,
but
wondered
why
so
suddenly,
as
it
was
a
two
year
posting,
but
he
refused
to
comment.
He
would
not
tell
me
why.
.
.
.
On
June
6,
1972,
I
was
involved
in
a
motor
vehicle
collision
while
driving
a
government
vehicle
auto
15-162.
In
essence
Mr.
Jastrebski
ascribed
his
present
mental
condition
to
the
difficulties
encountered
in
the
transfer
to
Moosonee
(1969)
and
the
actual
event"
as
the
auto
accident
(1972).
Counsel
for
the
respondent
took
the
position
that
Mr.
Jastrebski
was
in
good
health
on
joining
the
OPP
in
1966,
and
while
his
short
stay
in
Moosonee
may
not
have
been
pleasant
it
was
not
an
"event"
that
can
be
used
in
the
context
of
the
relevant
legislation.
Further,
even
after
the
1972
auto
accident,
following
some
psychiatric
treatment
and
prescription
for
medicine,
Mr.
Jastrebski
returned
to
work
in
March
1973
and
continued
in
that
role
until
he
was
hospitalized
in
1982,
and
then
was
retired
and
placed
on
the
“wage
loss
replacement"
plan
noted
above.
He
continued
on
medication
and
medical
treatment.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
referred
to
the
case
of
Gabrielle
v.
M.N.R.,
[1984]
C.T.C.
2722,
84
D.T.C.
1635
(T.C.C.)
and
the
comments
therein
regarding
the
word
“event”.
The
appellant
noted
the
reference
to
the
same
word
in
Interpretation
Bulletin
428.
In
my
view
the
comments
in
Gabrielle,
supra,
questioning
the
alleged
interpretation
to
be
placed
on
the
word
"event"
arising
out
of
I.B.
428
are
substantial
and
correct.
While
it
may
be
perfectly
proper
for
Revenue
Canada
to
assess
a
taxpayer
with
such
a
generous
interpretation
of
"event",
I
am
not
persuaded
that
it
is
appropriate
for
this
Court
to
follow
the
same
practice
when
dealing
with
an
appeal
under
the
specific
words
of
the
Act.
I
am
not
satisfied
that
the
“onset
of
a
disease”
qualifies
as
an
"event".
Further,
under
the
particular
circumstances
of
these
appeals,
the
evidence
does
not
support
the
"onset
of
the
disease"
at
any
particular
time
—
1977
or
1982
might
be
equally
eligible
—
although
I
do
not
need
to
review
that.
Finally,
while
the
employment
conditions
and
requirements
of
Mr.
Jastrebski
work
responsibilities
indeed
may
have
been
of
great
strain
and
stress,
and
perhaps
overwhelmed
him,
that
does
not
appear
to
me
to
qualify
as
an
"event"
either.
Certain
statements
made
at
the
trial
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
require
notation
in
these
reasons:
1.
For
the
year
1991
for
James
A.
Jastrebski,
in
the
assessment
an
amount
of
$2,145
was
imposed
as
penalty.
That
amount
was
to
be
deleted,
and
the
appeal
dealt
only
with
the
remaining
balance.
2.
Appeal
93-754(IT)l
for
Gabrielle
Jastrebski
for
the
year
1990
is
to
be
dismissed.
This
has
been
replaced
by
appeal
93-1426(IT)l
for
that
same
year.
The
1991
portion
of
appeal
93-754(IT)l
remained
for
determination.
In
the
end
analysis
—
except
for
the
$2,145
penalty
amount
above
which
is
allowed
—
the
appeals
on
all
aspects
of
the
matter
are
dismissed,
for
both
parties.
Penalty
deleted;
appeals
dismissed.
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