Rip,
T.C.C.J.:—Elizabeth
Phillips
,
the
appellant,
appeals
from
purported
assessments
of
tax
made
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("
Minister")
pursuant
to
subsection
160(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"federal
Act").
The
trial
proceeded
by
way
of
an
agreed
statement
of
facts
which
reads
as
follows:
1.
Margaret
Levietta
Phillips
(the
“
transferor”)
is
the
mother
of
the
appellant.
2.
The
transferor
filed
her
1980,
1981,
1982
and
1983
personal
tax
returns
reporting
income
received
from
a
life
interest
in
her
deceased
husband's
estate.
The
deceased
husband's
estate
consists
primarily
of
gross
Royalty
Trust
certificates
(Oil
and
Gas
Royalties).
3.
In
1984
and
subsequent
to
the
initial
assessments
of
the
transferor's
1980,
1981,
1982
and
1983
tax
returns,
the
transferor
applied
for
the
Alberta
royalty
tax
rebate
and
the
Alberta
royalty
tax
credit
in
respect
of
her
1980,
1981,
1982
and
1983
taxation
years.
4.
By
notices
of
reassessment
dated
November
8,
1984,
the
tax
returns
of
the
transferor
for
her
1980,
1981,
1982
and
1983
taxation
years
were
reassessed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("Minister")
to
allow
her
claims
for
the
Alberta
royalty
tax
rebate
and
the
Alberta
royalty
tax
credit.
A
refund
cheque
in
the
amount
of
$68,209.99
was
issued
on
November
14,
1984
in
the
name
of
the
transferor
and
the
cheque
was
deposited
to
a
bank
account
in
her
name.
The
said
notices
of
reassessment
referred
to
are
attached.
.
.
2
5.
On
or
about
September
14,
1985,
the
appellant
received
an
unsolicited
gift
(the
"property")
from
the
transferor
in
the
amount
of
$8,000.
At
the
time
of
the
transfer,
the
fair
market
value
of
the
property
was
$8,000.
6.
By
notices
of
reassessment
dated
June
20,
1986,
the
Minister
reassessed
the
transferor
in
1986
in
respect
of
her
1981,
1982,
and
1983
taxation
years
disallowing
her
claims
for
the
Alberta
royalty
tax
rebate
and
the
Alberta
royalty
tax
credit.
.
.
.
7.
By
notice
of
assessment
dated
July
26,
1990,
the
Minister
assessed
the
appellant
in
the
amount
of
$8,000
pursuant
to
section
160
of
the
(Federal)
Act
in
respect
of
the
aforesaid
transfer
of
property
to
the
appellant.
The
said
notice
of
assessment
referred
to
is
attached.
.
.
.
8.
The
appellant
served
a
notice
of
objection,
dated
October
2,
1990,
on
the
Minister
in
respect
of
the
assessment
in
the
prescribed
form
and
within
the
prescribed
time
limits
.
.
.
9.
By
notice
of
confirmation
dated
February
7,
1991,
the
Minister
confirmed
the
assessment.
.
.
.
10.
By
notice
of
appeal
dated
May
3,
1991,
the
appellant
instituted
an
appeal
of
the
assessment
to
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
pursuant
to
section
169
of
the
(Federal)
Act.
.
.
.
11.
By
notice
of
reassessment
dated
November
23,
1992,
the
respondent
has
attempted
to
reassess
the
appellant
by
attaching
an
exhibit
to
the
reassessment
which
purports
to
be
“in
addition
to
and
forms
part
of
the
attached
notice
of
assessment
dated
July
26,
1990
bearing
number
3185”
[sic],
and
sets
out
the
transferor's
and
transferee's
liability
under
the
provincial
Act.
The
said
notice
of
reassessment
referred
to
is
attached
.
.
.
.
12.
Commencing
in
the
summer
of
1986,
continuing
throughout
1987,
and
culminating
with
a
meeting
with
Revenue
Canada
in
the
spring
of
1988,
the
lawyer
and
accountants
for
the
transferor
discussed
the
tax
matters
of
the
transferor
with
Revenue
Canada
and
advised
Revenue
Canada
that,
in
contemplation
of
an
operation,
the
transferor
had
transferred
the
property
to
the
appellant
and
to
her
other
children
and
grandchildren
in
September
of
1985
and
thereafter
to
June
of
1986.
Revenue
Canada
continued
with
collection
discussions
with
the
transferor's
accountant
and
the
appellant
thereafter.
The
issue
in
this
appeal
is
whether
the
appellant
is
liable
to
pay
an
amount
of
$8,000
pursuant
to
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
in
respect
of
the
transferor's
tax
liability
determined
by
the
Alberta
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.A.
1980,
c.
A-31
("Alberta
Act"),
which,
at
section
11,
provided
for
the
royalty
tax
rebates
and
credits.
On
September
14,
1985,
the
relevant
portions
of
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
read
as
follows:
160(1)
Where
a
person
has,
on
or
after
the
1st
day
of
May,
1951,
transferred
property,
either
directly
or
indirectly,
by
means
of
a
trust
or
by
any
other
means
whatever,
to
(c)
a
person
with
whom
he
was
not
dealing
at
arm's
length,
the
following
rules
apply:
(d)
the
transferee
and
transferor
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
a
part
of
the
transferor's
tax
under
this
Part
for
each
taxation
year
equal
to
the
amount
by
which
the
tax
for
the
year
is.
greater
than
it
would
have
been
if
it
were
not
for
the
operation
of
section
74,
75
or
75.1,
as
the
case
may
be,
in
respect
of
any
income
from,
or
gain
from
the
disposition
of,
the
property
so
transferred
or
property
substituted
therefor;
and
(e)
the
transferee
and
transferor
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
under
this
Act
an
amount
equal
to
the
lesser
of
(i)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
fair
market
value
of
the
property
at
the
time
it
was
transferred
exceeds
the
fair
market
value
at
that
time
of
the
consideration
given
for
the
property,
and
(ii)
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
an
amount
that
the
transferor
is
liable
to
pay
under
this
Act
in
respect
of
the
taxation
year
in
which
the
property
was
transferred
or
of
any
preceding
taxation
year,
(2)
The
Minister
may
at
any
time
assess
a
transferee
in
respect
of
any
amount
payable
by
virtue
of
this
section
and
the
provisions
of
this
Division
are
applicable
mutatis
mutandis
in
respect
of
an
assessment
made
under
this
section
as
though
it
had
been
made
under
section
152.
At
the
time
of
the
transfer
of
funds
in
1985
the
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
read
as
follows:
Subsection
70(2)
.
.
.
and
sections
159
and
160
of
the
federal
Act
apply,
with
all
necessary
modifications,
in
respect
of
the
payment
of
tax
under
this
Act
for
a
taxation
year
by
a
taxpayer
subject
to
tax
under
this
Act
to
whom
those
provisions
apply
in
respect
of
tax
payable
under
the
federal
Act
for
the
same
taxation
year.
Section
24
was
repealed
in
1990
(S.A.
1990
c.
7,
section
8).
In
its
place
was
added
section
19:
(1)
Subsections
70(2)
and
104(2),
paragraph
104(23)
(e)
and
sections
155,
156,
158,
159,
160,
160.1,
160.2,
160.3
and
161
except
subsection
(4)
of
the
federal
Act
apply
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act.
.
.
.
The
appellant's
position
is
clear;
it
is
with
the
Minister’s
position
that
I
had
difficulty.
The
appellant
states
quite
simply
and
clearly
that
the
transferor
had
been
assessed
under
the
provision
of
the
Alberta
Act
and
thus
was
liable
for
tax
under
that
statute.
Nevertheless
the
Minister
assessed
the
appellant
pursuant
to
a
provision
of
the
federal
Act,
section
160,
on
the
basis
the
transferor
of
the
property
was
liable
to
pay
an
amount
under
the
federal
Act.
The
facts
surrounding
the
trial
in
this
matter
were
confusing.
Things
did
not
get
any
clearer
as
the
trial
continued.
In
the
notice
of
assessment
sent
to
the
appellant
on
July
26,
1990
she
was
informed
the
assessment
was
issued
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
160(2)
of
the
federal
Act
with
respect
to
a
transfer
of
funds
from
Margaret
Levietta
Phillips
to
her
on
June
14,
1986.
In
her
notice
of
appeal
the
appellant
acknowledged
receiving
the
funds
"on
or
about
June
14,1986".
According
to
the
agreed
statement
of
facts,
which
is
the
only
evidence
before
me,
the
transfer
of
property
took
place
“on
or
about
September
14,
1985".
By
notice
dated
February
7,
1991,
the
Minister
confirmed
the
assessment
was
made
in
accordance
with
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
as
a
result
of
the
transfer
of
property
taking
place
on
or
about
June
12,
1986.
The
notice
of
reassessment,
dated
November
23,
1992,
continues
to
purport
to
assess
the
appellant
under
the
provisions
of
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
with
respect
to
a
transfer
of
property
which
took
place
on
June
14,
1986.
Attached
to
this
notice
of
reassessment
is
Exhibit
"A",
entitled
“
Particulars
of
Assessment".
Exhibit
"A"
refers
to
transferor's
liability
of
$8,000
"as
of
July
26,
1990”,
and
refers
to
the
appellant's
liability
of
$8,000
by
virtue
of
section
19
of
the
Alberta
Act.
In
1985,
section
19
of
the
Alberta
Act
provided
for
payment
of
tax
by
farmers
and
fishermen
and
is
not
relevant
to
any
assessment
before
me.
Exhibit
"A"
informs
the
appellant
that:
[t]his
attachment
is
in
addition
to
and
forms
part
of
the
attached
notice
of
assessment
dated
July
26,
1990
bearing
#3196.
Counsel
for
the
Minister
explained
the
Minister's
initial
position
as
pleaded:
The
position
of
the
Department
.
.
.
with
respect
to
the
pleadings
is
that
the
amount
that
arises
by
virtue
of
the
Alberta
royalty
tax
credit
or
the
Alberta
royalty
tax
rebates
is
an
amount
payable
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
(of
Canada)
by
virtue
of
the
incorporation
in
the
Alberta
Income
Tax
Act.
However,
counsel
conceded
that
he
was
"not
sure”
that
this
is
a
correct
position
in
law.
He
stated
the
"fact
may
well
be
that
an
amount
is
owing
under
the
provisions
of
the
provincial
Act,
and
then
get
[sic]
into
the
interplay
between
the
two
Acts
to
that
extent,
the
assumption
that
(money)
is
owing
under
the
federal
Act
would
be
incorrect".
Counsel
then
submitted
“the
issue
is
whether
or
not
the
provincial
legislation
incorporating
section
160
.
.
.
charges
the
section
to
make
it
applicable
not
only
to
amounts
payable
under
the
federal
statute,
but
also
to
amounts
payable
under
the
provincial
statute
.
.
.".
In
other
words,
as
I
understand
counsel's
submission,
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
is
modified
by
a
provincial
legislature
to
grant
the
Minister
the
power
to
assess
a
transferee
of
property
under
section
160
in
respect
of
the
transferor's
liability
for
provincial
tax.
The
Minister’s
counsel
summarized
his
argument
as
follows:
My
submission
would
still
remain,
sir,
that
the
appropriate
means
of
applying
section
160
is
to
first
define
a
liability
under
subsection
(1).
And
whether
that
liability
comes
out
of
the
provincial
statute
or
the
federal
statute,
by
virtue
of
section
24,
it’s
imported
into
160(1),
and
you
end
up
with
a
liability
under
160(1),
whether
by
virtue
of
provincial
statute
or
not.
And
the
assessment
of
that
under
subsection
160(2)
is
an
assessment
of
liability
under
the
section,
not
federal
and
not
provincial,
just
under
the
section.
By
that
interpretation,
I
would
submit
the
Minister
has
proceeded
absolutely
correctly
in
this
case
because
the
liability
in
the
hands
of
the
transferee
is
for
neither
federal
nor
provincial
amounts;
it’s
for
the
lesser
of
a
tax
payable
and
a
gift,
whichever
is
lesser.
And
that
is
the
liability
we're
talking
about.
My
submission
to
you
is
that
160(2),
the
assessment
power
does
not
hang
on
where
the
liability
arises;
it
hangs
on
whether
there's
a
liability
under
subsection
(1).
And
in
applying
subsection
(1)
by
virtue
of
section
24,
you
have
that
liability.
But
the
assessment
is
still
out
of
160(2).
In
his
written
submissions,
Mr.
McNary
stated
that
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
applies
the
power
to
assess
created
by
subsection
160(2)
but
is
not
itself
an
assessment
section.
He
added
"the
power
to
assess
relied
upon
is
subsection
160(2),
not
section
24”.
This,
he
concluded,
is
distinct
from
the
situation
where
the
legislation
"incorporates
by
reference”,
and
it
is
submitted
that
the
usual
cases
arising
therefrom
do
not
apply.
Mr.
McNary
also
informed
the
Court
in
his
written
submissions
that
at
time
of
the
transfer
of
funds,
Margaret
Levietta
Phillips
was
indebted
in
the
amount
of
$4,189
under
the
federal
Act
with
respect
to
a
1981
reassessment
for
federal
tax.
This
fact
was
not
raised
in
the
pleadings
nor
was
it
included
in
the
agreed
statement
of
facts.
Mr.
McNary
acknowledged
that
at
trial
the
submission
was
that
the
liability
was
entirely
provincial.
I
cannot
allow
this
disclosure
to
be
part
of
the
evidence.
(The
respondent
has
not
made
any
application
to
reopen
the
evidence.)
Appellant's
counsel
made
several
submissions.
Among
them
were
the
following:
(a)
Section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
incorporates
into
the
provincial
statute
section
160
of
the
federal
Act.
The
conditions
and
rules
as
well
as
the
power
of
the
Minister
to
assess
a
transfer
of
property
under
section
160
of
the
federal
statute
apply
to
the
payment
of
tax
under
the
Alberta
Act
under
certain
conditions.
Such
assessment
is
an
assessment
under
the
Alberta
Act,
as
authorized
by
section
24
of
that
Act.
Section
24
was
not
intended
to
apply
section
160,
in
a
modified
form,
to
attribute
to
transferees
a
new
liability
for
tax.
Section
24
applies
only
in
the
situation
most
common
where
the
taxpayer's
liability
under
the
federal
Act
is
increased
as
a
result
of
an
assessment
under
section
160,
to
the
proportion
and
extent
of
his
or
her
provincial
liability
is
increased.
Pursuant
to
section
24,
section
160
applies
with
all
necessary
modifications,
in
respect
of
the
payment
of
tax
under
the
Alberta
Act
for
a
taxation
year
by
a
taxpayer
subject
to
tax
under
the
Alberta
Act
to
whom
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
applies
in
respect
of
federal
tax
payable
for
the
same
taxation
year.
On
facts
similar
to
those
present
in
this
appeal,
an
assessment
of
tax
under
subsection
160(2)
is
not
an
assessment
for
a
particular
taxation
year.
(b)
The
transferor
of
the
property
is
liable
to
the
province
of
Alberta
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act.
The
debt
cannot
be
said
to
be
a
liability
under
the
federal
Act.
Accordingly
no
tax
can
be
assessed
against
the
appellant
pursuant
to
subsection
160(2)
of
the
federal
Act
itself:
the
assessment,
if
it
is
a
proper
assessment,
was
made
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act
and
this
Court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
determine
tax
liability
under
provincial
statute:
Wallace
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
2341,
91
D.T.C.
1135,
Larocque
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
2151,
91
D.T.C.
899,
McConnachie
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
2072,
91
D.T.C.
873.
The
procedure
to
appeal
an
assessment
issued
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act
is
set
down
in
that
statute,
not
the
federal
Act,
and
this
Court
is
not
the
forum
to
hear
such
appeal.
(c)
Since
the
liability
of
the
transferee
arose
upon
the
reassessment
of
Margaret
Levietta
Phillips
it
is
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act,
as
it
read
in
1985,
that
applies.
However
even
if
section
19,
which
came
into
force
in
1990
applies,
the
interpretation
still
fits.
Section
160
does
not
render
a
transferee
liable
for
a
transferor's
tax
liability
under
the
Alberta
Act.
Clearly,
more
specific
and
clearer
wording
is
required
to
create
a
liability
than
that
in
the
wordings
of
sections
19
and
24.
Sections
19
and
24
are
best
interpreted
as
“computation
of
taxable
income”
paragraphs
which
apply
only
in
assisting
in
the
calculation
of
the
Alberta
income
tax
owing
on
the
formula
referred
to
in
the
combined
application
of
paragraphs
160(1)(d)
and
(e)
to
create
the
total
amount
owing.
Paragraph
160(1
)(e)
only
applies
when
there
is
income
attribution
referred
to
in
paragraph
(d)
or
other
federal
tax
owing.
It
does
not
create
a
new
tax
liability
of
a
transferee
for
provincial
taxes.
(d)
The
assessment
of
the
appellant
is
void
for
failure
to
provide
the
essential
information
to
the
taxpayer:
Leung
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
2268,
91
D.T.C.
1020.
I
agree
in
substance
with
the
appellant's
submissions.
I
have
great
difficulty
in
conceiving
how
a
provincial
legislature
may
amend
a
federal
statute;
this
is
what
the
Minister
declares
has
taKen
place.
Somehow,
he
appears
to
say,
the
peculiar
wording
of
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
transforms
a
provincial
liability
into
a
liability
that
may
be
assessed
under
the
federal
Act
as
if
it
was
a
liability
under
the
federal
Act.
Section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
provides
that
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
applies,
with
all
necessary
modifications,
in
respect
of
the
payment
of
tax
under
the
Alberta
Act
for
a
taxation
year
by
a
taxpayer
subject
to
tax
under
the
Alberta
Act
to
whom
section
160
of
the
Act
applies
in
respect
of
tax
payable
under
the
federal
Act
for
the
same
taxation
year.
Thus,
in
short,
section
24
will
apply
with
respect
to
payment
of
tax
by
a
taxpayer
to
the
Alberta
fisc
if
section
160
applies
in
respect
of
tax
payable
by
that
taxpayer
to
the
federal
fisc
as
a
result
of
a
particular
event.
The
power
to
assess
under
subsection
160(2)
is
not
necessarily
with
respect
to
a
taxation
year.
At
the
same
time
the
application
of
section
160
to
the
Alberta
Act
requires
some
fact
common
to
both
sections
160
and
24,
and
that,
in
my
view,
is
a
common
event
giving
rise
to
the
tax
liabilities.
Thus
a
necessary
modification
to
the
application
of
section
160
to
section
24
is
that
references
to
a
“taxation
year"
and
"same
taxation
year"
are
to
be
dropped.
It
is
useful
to
compare
the
language
used
by
the
provincial
legislators
in
drafting
subsection
47(1)
of
the
Alberta
Act,
R.S.A.
1980
c.
A-31,
which
also
purports
to
incorporate
a
provision
of
the
federal
Act
into
the
Alberta
Act:
47(1)
Section
232
of
the
federal
Act
applies,
with
all
necessary
modifications,
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act
where,
in
the
same
or
similar
circumstances,
that
section
is
or
would
be
applicable
for
the
purposes
of
the
federal
Act.
If
the
legislature
had
intended
for
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
to
apply
on
a
provincial
level
whether
or
not
a
federal
tax
liability
existed
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
would
have
been
drafted
in
the
same
manner
as
subsection
47(1)
of
the
Alberta
Act.
The
significant
contrast
in
the
language
used
in
the
two
provisions
leads
to
the
conclusion
that
the
strict
criterion
of
pre-existing
federal
tax
liability
was
intended
to
govern
the
incorporation
of
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
into
the
Alberta
Act.
Section
160
cannot
be
incorporated
into
the
Alberta
Act
in
the
present
case
as
the
transferor
had
no
federal
tax
liability.
Her
liability
was
specifically
determined
under
the
provincial
statute.
Crown's
counsel
submits
that
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
operates
to
modify
section
160
which
in
turn
empowers
the
federal
government
to
assess
transferees
in
respect
of
a
transferor's
provincial
tax
liability.
In
counsel's
view,
as
I
see
it,
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
operates
to
effect
the
following
change
in
the
wording
of
section
160
of
the
federal
Act:
160(1)
Where
a
person
has,
on
or
after
the
1st
day
of
May,
1951,
transferred
property,
either
directly
or
indirectly,
by
means
of
a
trust
or
by
any
other
means
whatever,
to
(c)
a
person
with
whom
he
is
not
dealing
at
arm's
length,
the
following
rules
apply:
(e)
the
transferee
and
transferor
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
an
amount
equal
to
the
lesser
of
(i)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
fair
market
value
of
the
property
at
the
time
it
was
transferred
exceeds
the
fair
market
value
at
that
time
of
the
consideration
given
for
the
property,
and
(ii)
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
an
amount
that
the
transferor
is
liable
to
pay
under
the
Alberta
Income
Tax
Act
in
or
in
respect
of
the
taxation
year
in
which
the
property
was
transferred
or
any
preceding
taxation
year.
.
.
.
[Emphasis
added.]
In
the
view
of
the
respondent's
counsel,
the
words
"under
this
Act",
in
subparagraph
160(1)(e)(ii)
of
the
federal
Act
should
be
interpreted
to
mean
under
the
Alberta
Income
Tax
Act"
when
read
in
conjunction
with
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act.
At
the
same
time,
he
says
that
the
same
terms
in
paragraph
160(1)(e)
should
continue
to
mean
"under
the
Income
Tax
Act’.
The
words,
“this
Act”,
will
thus
have
a
different
meaning
in
different
places
to
suit
this
interpretation.
This
argument
is
not
tenable
and
is
contrary
to
the
plain
meaning
of
section
24.
It
is
apparent
from
plain
readings
of
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
and
section
160
of
the
federal
Act
that
the
federal
government
does
not
have
the
power
to
assess
transferees
in
respect
of
a
transferor's
provincial
tax
liability.
This
power
is
reserved
for
the
provincial
government
where
the
criteria
set
out
in
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act
are
met
by
the
particular
circumstances
surrounding
the
transfer.
I
wish
to
comment
on
the
purported
notices
of
assessment
and
reassessment.
These
notices,
informing
the
appellant
of
assessments
on
July
26,
1990
and
November
23,
1992,
not
only
lack
information
with
respect
to
the
relevant
assessment
but,
taken
together,
are
confusing.
The
notice
in
1990
refers
to
subsection
160(2)
of
the
federal
Act.
One
would
therefore
assume
the
assessment
was
made
under
the
federal
statute.
The
notice
advises
the
transfer
of
property
took
place
on
June
14,
1986;
this
is
a
different
date
than
that
referred
to
in
the
agreed
statement
of
facts.
The
notice
of
1992
also
refers
to
subsection
160(2)
of
the
federal
Act
and
June
14,
1986
as
the
date
of
the
transfer
of
property.
However
the
latter
notice
refers
to
an
attachment
of
particulars
of
the
assessment.
The
attachment
of
particulars
refers
to
section
19
of
the
Alberta
Act,
which
had
no
relevance
in
1985
to
any
transfer
of
property,
and
also
informs
the
appellant
that
the
attachment
forms
part
of
the
"attached
notice
of
assessment
dated
July
26,
1990
.
.
.”
although
it
was
actually
attached
to
the
notice
of
reassessment
dated
November
23,
1992.
This
is
just
plain
sloppiness
on
the
part
of
the
Minister.
I
cannot
reasonably
satisfy
myself
that
the
notice
of
assessment
of
July
26,
1990
was
not
an
assessment
issued
by
virtue
of
subsection
160(2)
of
the
federal
Act.
There
is
no
reference
on
the
notice
to
the
Alberta
Act.
I
am
not
prepared
to
accept
the
attachment
to
a
purported
notice
of
reassessment
issued
one
and
a
half
years
later
to
be
part
of
a
notice
to
a
previous
assessment,
even
if
the
attachment
states
it
is.
In
her
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal,
the
respondent
alleged
that
in
assessing,
the
Minister
assumed,
amongst
other
things,
that:
.
.
.
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
that
the
transferor
was
liable
to
pay
under
the
federal
Act
in
or
in
respect
of
the
taxation
years
in
which
the
property
was
transferred
or
any
preceding
taxation
year
was
$104.643.07.
The
respondent,
in
her
reply,
does
not
refer
to
the
Alberta
Act
or
any
liability
of
the
transferor
with
respect
to
that
Act.
The
reader
of
the
reply
alone
would
conclude
the
transferor
of
the
property
was
liable
only
under
the
federal
Act.
However
the
opening
statements
of
counsel,
the
agreed
statement
of
facts
and
the
closing
submissions
of
counsel
at
trial
were
directed
solely
to
the
transferor's
liability
under
the
Alberta
Act
and
that
was
the
issue
that
was
joined
at
trial.
The
facts
agreed
to
by
the
parties
in
the
agreed
statement
of
facts
demolish
any
basic
fact
assumed
by
the
Minister
in
assessing
to
the
extent
that
the
fact
assumed
is
contrary
to
that
agreed
by
the
parties.
The
agreed
statement
of
facts
lack
any
reference
to
a
liability
of
Margaret
Levietta
Phillips
under
the
federal
Act
in
1985.
The
only
evidence
before
me
was
that
the
transferor
was
liable
only
under
the
Alberta
Act.
I
would
therefore
dismiss
the
appeal
from
the
assessment,
notice
of
which
is
dated
July
26,
1990.
At
time
of
trial
the
appellant
had
not
amended
her
appeal
from
the
assessment,
notice
of
which
is
dated
July
26,
1990,
by
joining
thereto
an
appeal
of
the
purported
reassessment,
notice
of
which
is
dated
November
23,
1992.
I
instructed
the
deputy
registrar
to
write
counsel
inquiring
if
such
an
amendment
was
forthcoming
and
advise
I
would
be
predisposed
to
grant
the
amendment,
with
consent
of
counsel
for
the
respondent.
By
letter
dated
April
6,
1993,
counsel
for
the
appellant,
Mr.
Ludwig,
applied
for
such
amendment
advising
that
respondent's
counsel,
Mr.
McNary,
consented
to
the
application.
Mr.
Ludwig
informed
the
Court
that:
Mr.
McNary
had
raised
this
issue
with
our
office
shortly
after
the
November,
1992
reassessment
notices
were
issued.
He
indicated
his
consent
at
that
time
to
an
application
on
our
behalf
to
join
the
reassessment
notice
in
accordance
with
the
Act.
At
that
time,
our
view
was
that
we
could
not
amend
our
appeal
by
joining
the
notice
because
to
do
so
would
be
to
"mix
jurisdictions":
i.e.,
that
the
original
assessment
was
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
by
attempting
to
amend
the
notice
by
including
a
provincial
liability,
it
was
our
view
that
Revenue
Canada
was
"trying
to
do
the
impossible”,
as
far
as
jurisdiction
is
concerned.
It
is
apparent,
however,
that
in
order
for
that
very
issue
to
best
be
determined,
the
appropriate
course
would
be
to
amend
the
appeal
by
joining
the
reassessment
notice.
.
.
.
I
appreciate
counsel's
concern
in
not
immediately
amending
his
client's
notice
of
appeal.
I
agree
that
I
ought
to
consider
the
reassessment
so
that
it
will
not
be
left
in
abeyance
to
the
extent
it
may
be
considered
a
reassessment
under
the
federal
Act.
Accordingly
I
granted
leave
to
amend
the
appellant's
pleadings.
I
must
therefore
decide
if,
as
a
result
of
the
amendment,
the
reassessment
of
November
23,1992
was
made
pursuant
to
the
federal
Act
or
the
Alberta
Act.
If
it
was
made
pursuant
to
the
federal
Act,
then
the
earlier
assessment,
notice
of
which
is
dated
July
26,
1990,
is
no
longer
before
me,
having
been
superseded
and
I
am
to
consider
the
reassessment.
If
the
reassessment
was
made
by
the
Minister
as
agent
of
Alberta
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act,
then,
of
course,
I
have
no
jurisdiction;
the
procedure
in
opposing
the
reassessment
is
set
out
in
the
Alberta
Act
and
any
appeal
would
lie
in
the
Alberta
Court
of
Queen's
Bench.
As
I
mentioned
earlier,
the
comments
on
the
notices
of
assessment
and
reassessment,
and
Exhibit
"A"
to
the
latter
notice,
are
confusing.
The
notice
of
reassessment
refers
to
Exhibit
"A"
attached
to
it
but
Exhibit
"A"
refers
only
to
the
notice
of
assessment
of
July
26,
1990.
It
appears
to
me
that
the
Minister
attempted
to
correct
his
failure
to
provide
the
necessary
information
to
the
appellant
when
assessing
her
in
1990
by
sending
to
her
in
1992
the
notice
of
reassessment
and
particulars
of
assessment",
that
is,
Exhibit
"A"
to
the
notice.
I
have
held
that
the
assessment
of
1990
was
issued
pursuant
to
the
federal
Act,
notwithstanding
the
particulars
of
assessment
sent
to
the
appellant
in
1992.
To
the
extent
that
the
reassessment
of
1992
may
be
considered
to
have
been
issued
pursuant
to
the
federal
Act,
the
appellant's
appeal
would
succeed
for
the
same
reasons
as
her
appeal
against
the
earlier
assessment.
The
Minister,
under
authority
of
the
so-called
Collection
Agreement
between
the
governments
of
Canada
and
Alberta,
assesses
tax
under
the
Alberta
Act
as
agent
of
the
Alberta
government
and
sends
notice
of
assessment
for
the
year
or
otherwise
for
such
taxes
to
residents
of
Alberta
for
both
federal
and
provincial
taxes.
When
conditions
set
out
in
subsection
160(1)
of
the
federal
Act
are
present
with
respect
to
a
taxpayer's
liability
under
the
Alberta
Act,
the
Minister
may
apply
section
24
of
the
Alberta
Act,
as
it
read
in
1985,
and
assess
the
transferee
of
property
received
in
1985
from
the
transferor
who
was
liable
under
the
Alberta
Act
at
the
time
of
the
transfer.
Section
160
of
the
federal
Act
applies
to
the
Alberta
Act
by
virtue
of
section
24.
Any
such
assessment
is
an
assessment
for
provincial
tax.
The
taxpayer
so
assessed
must
be
notified
the
assessment
was
made
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act.
In
assessing
the
appellant
in
1992,
the
Minister
realized
an
assessment
must
be
made
pursuant
to
the
provincial
taxing
statute.
He
failed
to
so
assess
in
1990
and
attempted
to
rectify
the
situation
in
1992,
by
issuing
a"
reassessment".
I
am
satisfied
the"
reassessment"
was
not
issued
in
accordance
with
the
federal
Act.
The
attachment
of
Exhibit
"A"
to
the
notice
—
notwithstanding
the
confusion
whether
the
particulars
apply
to
the
notice
to
which
the
Exhibit
is
attached
or
to
the
notice
sent
to
the
appellant
in
1990
—
indicates
the
assessment
has
been
issued
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act.
Perhaps
the
Minister,
in
reassessing
the
way
he
did,
wished
to
inform
the
appellant
in
1992,
that
the
assessment
of
1990
was
actually
issued
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act:
this
may
be
the
reason
Exhibit
"A"
reads
in
the
manner
it
does.
In
any
event
the
probability
is
that
the
reassessment,
notice
of
which
was
dated
November
23,
1992,
was
issued
by
the
Minister
as
agent
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act.
If
this
is
the
case
—
and
in
the
circumstances
I
believe
it
is
—
the
appellant's
appeal
from
the
reassessment
will
have
to
be
quashed.
Since
the
reassessment
was
not
an
assessment
under
the
federal
Act
the
original
assessment
has
not
been
superseded.
Therefore
since
I
have
found
the
assessment
of
1990
to
be
issued
pursuant
to
the
federal
Act
and
the
reassessment
of
1992
to
be
issued
pursuant
to
the
Alberta
Act,
(a)
the
appeal
from
the
assessment,
notice
of
which
is
dated
July
26,
1990,
will
be
allowed
and
the
assessment
vacated;
and
(b)
the
appeal
from
the
reassessment,
notice
of
which
is
dated
November
23,
1992,
will
be
quashed.
The
appellant
shall
be
entitled
to
costs
on
a
party-and-party
basis.
Appeal
allowed.