Couture,
C.J.T.C.C.:—This
appeal
concerns
the
appellant’s
1990
taxation
year.
He
acted
for
himself
and
asked
to
proceed
under
the
informal
procedure.
The
facts
giving
rise
to
the
Minister’s
assessment
of
February
13,
1993
are
relatively
straightforward.
Since
mid-June
1989
he
and
his
ex-wife
have
lived
apart.
The
appellant
owns
a
three-apartment
house
and
his
ex-wife
lives
in
one
of
these
apartments
with
two
of
their
children,
occupying
about
50
per
cent
of
the
house's
floor
space.
The
other
half
is
leased.
In
1989
the
appellant’s
ex-wife
admitted
in
a
document
duly
dated
and
signed,
a
copy
of
which
was
filed,
that
she
received
$13,271.91
as
alimony
from
the
appellant
in
the
1989
taxation
year.
This
sum
represented
weekly
payments
and
the
portion
of
expenses
relating
to
upkeep
of
the
apartment
occupied
by
her
and
her
children.
This
amount
was
deducted
by
the
appellant
in
calculating
his
income
for
the
1989
taxation
year
and
was
allowed
by
the
Minister.
For
the
1990
taxation
year
the
appellant
deducted
$14,608
in
calculating
his
income.
This
amount
was
eventually
changed
following
a
notice
of
objection
and
set
at
$13,000,
but
this
was
also
disallowed
by
the
Minister
as
a
deduction.
This
deduction
was
disallowed
on
the
ground
that
the
alimony
was
not
paid
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
subsection
60.1(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
On
September
5,
1989,
the
appellant
and
his
ex-wife
signed
a
"consent
regarding
interim
relief",
and
this
consent
was
approved
in
a
judgment
by
Bernard
Gratton,
J.
of
the
Supreme
Court,
confirming
the
agreement
between
the
parties.
Unfortunately
no
reference
was
made
in
that
judgment
to
the
provisions
of
the
Act
regarding
the
treatment
of
the
alimony
by
the
parties
for
the
purposes
of
the
Act.
For
reasons
which
were
not
disclosed
by
the
evidence,
the
appellant’s
ex-wife
refused
to
recognize
and
admit
that
the
amount
the
appellant
actually
spent
for
her
in
1990,
as
in
1989,
was
on
account
of
alimony.
It
should
be
noted
that
the
document
signed
by
the
parties
in
September
1989
clearly
stipulated
that
the
sum
of
$13,271.91
had
been
received
by
the
appellant’s
ex-wife
as
alimony
between
June
and
December
1989.
The
provisions
of
the
Act
allowing
the
deduction
of
alimony
in
calculating
a
taxpayer's
income
are
contained
in
paragraph
60(b).
Additionally,
when
money
paid
as
alimony
is
paid
to
a
third
party
for
the
benefit
of
the
person
designated,
the
deduction
is
subject
to
the
provisions
of
60.1(2),
which
reads:
60.1(2)
Agreement.—For
the
purposes
of
paragraph
60(b),
(c)
and
(c.1),
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
(a)
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
an
amount
(other
than
an
amount
to
which
paragraph
60(b),
(c)
or
(c.1)
otherwise
applies)
paid
by
a
taxpayer
in
a
taxation
year,
pursuant
to
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
or
pursuant
to
a
written
agreement,
in
respect
of
an
expense
(other
than
an
expenditure
in
respect
of
a
self-contained
domestic
establishment
in
which
the
taxpayer
resides
or
an
expenditure
for
the
acquisition
of
tangible
property
that
is
not
an
expenditure
on
account
of
a
medical
or
educational
expense
or
in
respect
of
the
acquisition,
improvement
or
maintenance
of
a
self-contained
domestic
establishment
in
which
the
person
described
in
subparagraph
(i)
or
(ii)
resides)
incurred
in
the
year
or
in
the
immediately
preceding
taxation
year
for
maintenance
of
a
person
who
is
(i)
the
taxpayer’s
spouse
or
former
spouse,
or
(ii)
where
the
amount
is
paid
pursuant
to
an
order
made
by
a
competent
tribunal
after
February
10,
1988
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
a
province,
an
individual
of
the
opposite
sex
who
(A)
before
the
date
of
the
order
cohabited
with
the
taxpayer
in
a
conjugal
relationship,
or
(B)
is
the
natural
parent
of
a
child
of
the
taxpayer,
or
for
the
maintenance
of
children
in
the
person's
custody
or
both
the
person
and
those
children
if,
at
the
time
of
the
expense
was
incurred
and
throughout
the
remainder
of
the
year,
the
taxpayer
was
living
apart
from
that
person
exceeds
(b)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
(i)
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
an
amount
included
in
the
aggregate
determined
under
paragraph
(a)
in
respect
of
the
acquisition
or
improvement
of
a
self-contained
domestic
establishment
in
which
that
person
resides,
including
any
payment
of
principal
or
interest
in
respect
of
a
loan
made
or
indebtedness
incurred
to
finance,
in
any
manner
whatever,
such
acquisition
or
improvement
exceeds
(ii)
the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
an
amount
equal
to
'/s
of
the
original
principal
amount
of
a
loan
or
indebtedness
described
in
subparagraph
(i)
shall,
where
the
decree,
order,
judgment
or
written
agreement,
as
the
case
may
be,
provides
that
this
subsection
and
subsection
56.1(2)
shall
apply
to
any
payment
made
pursuant
thereto,
be
deemed
to
be
an
amount
paid
by
the
taxpayer
and
received
by
that
person
as
an
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis.
Unfortunately
for
the
appellant,
as
the
judgment
confirming
the
"consent
regarding
interim
relief"
does
not
provide
that
subsections
60.1(2)
and
56.1(2)
will
apply
to
any
payment
made
pursuant
to
that
judgment,
and
further,
as
the
appellant’s
ex-wife
refused
to
recognize
that
these
payments
were
made
as
alimony
for
the
1990
taxation
year,
I
have
no
choice
but
to
affirm
the
assessment
made
by
the
Minister.
The
reason
that
the
Act
requires
reference
to
be
made
to
subsections
60.1(2)
and
56.1(2)
in
a
judgment
or
document
providing
for
the
payment
of
alimony
is
precisely
in
order
to
avoid
any
possible
discussion
between
the
parties
as
to
the
nature
of
the
payment
for
the
purposes
of
the
Act.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.