Kempo,
J.T.C.C.
(orally):—
This
informal
procedure
appeal
concerns
Ms.
Templin's
1988
taxation
year.
The
matter
proceeded
to
hearing
today
on
agreed
facts
as
reflected
in
the
pleadings
except
for
those
alleged
in
paragraph
4(b)
of
the
respondent's
reply
to
notice
of
appeal.
The
notice
of
appeal,
paragraphs
headed
"Statement
of
Facts”,
"Reason
for
Appeal”,
“Relief
Sought"
and
"Sections
of
the
Act
Relied
On”,
alleged
the
following:
Statement
of
facts
1.
The
appellant
filed
a
T1
Personal
Income
Tax
Return
for
the
1988
taxation
year.
2.
In
making
an
original
assessment
of
the
appellant's
1988
T1
Return
the
respondent
levied
federal
and
provincial
tax
and
interest.
The
respondent
also
levied
a
penalty
pursuant
to
162(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
3.
The
appellant
filed
a
notice
of
objection
to
the
original
assessment,
specifically
with
respect
to
the
penalty
levied
pursuant
to
subsection
162(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
4.
In
responding
to
the
notice
of
objection
the
respondent
vacated
the
penalty
levied
pursuant
to
subsection
162(2).
Additionally,
in
responding
to
the
notice
of
objection
the
respondent
levied
a
penalty
pursuant
to
subsection
162(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Reason
for
appeal
The
appellant
appeals
the
imposition
of
a
penalty
pursuant
to
subsection
162(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
making
an
original
notice
of
assessment
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
did
not
levy
a
penalty
pursuant
to
subsection
162(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
so
this
penalty
was
not
included
in
the
notice
of
objection
filed
by
the
appellant.
Subsection
165(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
stipulates
that
in
responding
to
a
notice
of
objection
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
may
reconsider
and
vacate,
confirm
or
vary
the
assessment
or
reassess.
The
appellant
therefore
submits
that
in
responding
to
the
notice
of
objection
the
Minister
is
precluded
from
levying
a
penalty
pursuant
to
subsection
162(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
this
would
constitute
a
fresh
assessment
and
not
reconsideration
of
the
original
assessment.
Relief
sought
1.
The
appellant
requests
the
deletion
of
the
penalty
levied
pursuant
to
subsection
162(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
2.
The
appellant
seeks
the
costs
of
this
action.
Sections
of
the
Act
relied
on
1.
The
appellant
relies
on
subsection
165(3)
and
Regulation
900(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
respondent's
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
paragraphs
1-7
inclusive
read:
1.
He
admits
the
facts
stated
in
paragraphs
1,
2
and
3
under
the
heading
“Statement
of
Facts”
in
the
notice
of
appeal.
2.
He
denies
all
other
allegations
of
fact
stated
in
the
notice
of
appeal.
3.
In
reassessing
the
appellant
for
the
1988
taxation
year,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
assessed
a
late
filing
penalty
in
the
amount
of
$60.55.
4.
In
so
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
the
appellant’s
return
of
income
for
the
1988
taxation
year
(the
"return")
was
required
to
be
filed
with
the
Minister
on
or
before
April
30,
1989;
(b)
on
October
5,
1989
the
Minister
served
on
the
appellant
a
demand
for
the
return
under
subsection
150(2)
of
the
Act;
(c)
the
return
was
not
filed
with
the
Minister
until
July
27,
1992;
(d)
the
amount
of
total
tax
and
Canada
Pension
Plan
contribution
for
the
1988
taxation
year
that
was
unpaid
when
the
return
was
required
to
be
filed
was
$426.20
and
the
total
credits
for
federal
sales
tax
and
instalments
were
$175
as
detailed
in
the
true
copy
of
the
notice
of
assessment
attached
hereto
and
marked
as
Appendix
"1".
5.
The
issue
is
whether
the
late
fi
ing
penalty
was
properly
assessed
in
accordance
with
section
162
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
"Act").
6.
He
relies
on
sections
3,
150
and
162
and
165
of
the
Act
as
amended
for
the
1988
taxation
year.
7.
He
submits
that
the
return
was
not
filed
with
the
Minister
as
and
when
required
by
subsection
150(1)
of
the
Act,
that
the
appellant
was
liable
to
pay
a
late
filing
penalty
for
the
1988
taxation
year
pursuant
to
subsection
162(1)
of
the
Act,
and
that
the
appellant
was
properly
reassessed
at
the
objection
stage
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
subsection
165(3)
of
the
Act.
As
stated
earlier
paragraph
4(b)
was
not
admitted
and
both
parties
agreed
it
was
not
material
to
the
issue.
In
my
opinion
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
was
not
precluded
by
the
operation
of
subsection
163(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
Regulation
900(4)
from
reassessing
Ms.
Templin
under
subsection
162(1)
of
the
Act
as
was
done.
No
question
arises
here
with
respect
to
time
limitations
as
the
Minister
was
well
within
the
statutory
three-year
period
and
no
quarrel
was
taken
with
the
fact
that
Ms.
Templin's
situation
fully
supported
the
applicability
of
subsection
162(1)
of
the
Act.
Accordingly
her
liability
for
the
penalty,
as
assessed,
arose
out
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
itself;
it
did
not
arise
simply
because
the
Minister,
acting
pursuant
to
his
administrative
duties,
had
issued
and
sent
a
piece
of
paper
notifying
her
of
that
liability.
Stone,
J.A.,
speaking
for
the
Court
in
the
case
of
Riendeau
v.
M.N.R.,
[1991]
2
C.T.C.
64,
91
D.T.C.
5416
(F.C.A.),
confirmed
at
page
64
(D.T.C.
5417)
a
longstanding
principle
of
fiscal
law
in
this
way:
As
the
cases
and
statutory
provisions
which
were
cited
by
[the
trial
judge]
well
show,
liability
for
tax
is
created
by
the
Income
Tax
Act,
not
by
a
notice
of
assessment.
A
taxpayer's
liability
to
pay
tax
is
just
the
same
whether
a
notice
of
assessment
is
mistaken
or
is
never
sent
at
all.
In
our
view,
the
Minister’s
mental
process
in
making
an
assessment
cannot
affect
a
taxpayer's
liability
to
pay
the
tax
imposed
by
the
Act
itself.
He
may
correct
a
mistake.
Accordingly,
for
the
reasons
given,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.