Tremblay
J.T.C.C.:-This
appeal
was
heard
pursuant
to
the
informal
procedure
on
March
28,
1994,
in
Québec
City,
Quebec.
1.
Point
at
issue
The
point
at
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
had
to
include
in
1987
the
sum
of
$9,524
in
her
income
as
a
result
of
the
expropriation
by
the
city
of
Jonquière
of
a
land
belonging
to
her
for
which
she
allegedly
received
$15,000.
It
was
alleged
that
this
sum
was
originally
payable
to
La
Compagnie
de
Rebuts
et
pièces
usagées
du
Saguenay
Ltée
(hereinafter
called
"the
corporation")
for
the
relocation
of
the
business
which
used
the
said
lot.
According
to
the
respondent,
the
corporation
asked
the
city
to
make
the
payment
to
the
appellant,
which
was
done.
The
appellant
was
a
shareholder
and
employee
of
the
corporation.
The
respondent
argued
that
the
appellant
received
a
benefit
conferred
on
a
shareholder
[subsection
15(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")]
or
alternatively
an
employment
benefit
[subsection
6(1)].
The
appellant
contended
that
the
respondent
erred
in
fact
and
in
law.
2.
Burden
of
proof
2.01
The
burden
is
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
reassessment
is
incorrect.
This
burden
arises
from
a
number
of
judicial
decisions,
including
a
judgment
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Johnston
v.
M.N.R.,
[1948]
S.C.R.
486,
[1948]
C.T.C.
195,
3
D.T.C.
1182.
2.02
The
facts
assumed
by
the
respondent
in
the
instant
case
are
described
at
subparagraphs
(a)
to
(1)
of
paragraph
3
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal.
The
appellant
admitted
or
denied
them
as
indicated.
They
read
as
follows:
3.
In
particular,
the
Minister
took
the
following
facts
for
granted
in
order
to
make
this
reassessment:
(a)
the
appellant
was
a
shareholder
and
employee
of
La
Cie
des
Rebuts
et
Pièces
Usagées
du
Saguenay
Ltée
("the
corporation")
during
the
1987
taxation
year;
[admitted]
(b)
the
appellant
is
the
wife
of
the
corporation’s
principal
shareholder,
Joseph-Henri
Savard;
[admitted]
(c)
the
city
of
Jonquière
expropriated
lands
in
order
to
widen
Boulevard
St-François
during
1987;
[admitted]
(d)
one
of
the
lands
in
question
was
the
property
of
the
appellant;
[admitted]
(e)
the
said
land
is
known
and
designated
as
part
of
lot
31B
in
Range
IV,
Township
of
Jonquière,
having
an
area
of
846.5
square
feet;
[admitted]
(f)
La
Cie
des
Rebuts
et
Pièces
Usagées
du
Saguenay
Ltée
located
its
business
on
that
land;
[admitted]
(g)
the
appellant
had
purchased
the
said
land
from
her
husband
Joseph-
Henri
Savard
in
1971
for
the
price
of
$1;
[admitted
but
to
be
completed]
(h)
the
proceeds
of
expropriation
paid
directly
to
the
appellant
during
1987
by
the
city
of
Jonquière
break
down
as
follows:
-$5,476
for
the
846.5
square
feet
part
of
the
land;
-$9,524
for
damages
caused
to
the
business
(relocation
of
La
Cie
des
Rebuts
et
Pièces
Usagées
du
Saguenay
Ltée);
[denied]
(i)
La
Cie
des
Rebuts
et
Pièces
Usagées
du
Saguenay
Ltée
issued
a
draft
agreement
dated
June
19,
1987,
to
the
effect
that
the
amount
of
$9,524,
which
was
owed
it
by
the
city
of
Jonquière
for
damages
caused
to
the
business
as
a
result
of
the
expropriation
of
the
land,
could
be
paid
directly
to
the
appellant;
[denied]
(j)
despite
repeated
requests
by
the
Minister’s
officials,
no
appraisal
report
of
the
land’s
fair
market
value
was
provided
by
the
appellant;
[did
not
know]
(k)
the
documents
filed
by
the
appellant
do
not
make
it
possible
to
determine
whether
the
total
amount
of
$15,000
paid
by
the
city
of
Jonquiére
was
solely
for
the
disposition
of
the
said
land;
[false]
(l)
the
corporation
conferred
a
$9,524
benefit
on
the
appellant
in
her
capacity
as
a
shareholder
during
the
period
in
question.
[denied]
[Translation.]
3.
Facts
adduced
in
evidence
3.01
The
appellant,
aged
75,
defended
herself.
Her
principal
witness,
Jean-Jacques
Angers,
today
a
building
contractor,
had
represented
her
as
counsel
in
the
expropriation
action
brought
by
the
city
of
Jonquière
against
her
in
respect
of
the
expropriated
land
which
resulted
in
the
$15,000
compensation.
He
was
present
only
as
a
witness,
but
in
light
of
the
appellant’s
age
and
the
fact
that
she
was
deaf,
the
Court
asked
Mr.
Angers
to
assist
her
as
an
agent.
3.02
At
the
start
of
the
expropriation
proceeding,
the
city
offered
the
appellant
$3,000
as
compensation.
The
latter
requested
$28,000.
She
ultimately
agreed
to
settle
for
$15,000
six
months
later.
3.03
According
to
Mr.
Angers
who
took
part
in
the
discussions
with
the
other
attorney
representing
the
city,
the
latter
nevertheless
objected
to
paying
this
sum
because
of
the
many
other
lands
expropriated
at
the
same
time
as
that
of
the
appellant
in
order
to
widen
Boulevard
St-
Francois.
It
was
hardly
justifiable
for
the
city
to
pay
this
price,
which
was
equivalent
to
$17.72
per
square
foot
($15,000
*
846.5
square
feet).
However,
since
the
appellant
held
out
for
her
price
and
the
city
was
in
a
pre-election
period,
it
was
best
to
settle
the
expropriations
as
soon
as
possible.
Since
a
business
was
under
lease
on
the
land
in
issue,
however,
it
was
decided
to
divide
the
claim
between
the
appellant
and
the
corporation.
The
$15,000
payment
could
thus
be
more
easily
explained
with
regard
to
the
other
expropriated
parties.
3.04
By
a
resolution
of
July
13,
1987,
the
city
accepted
the
draft
agreements
[sic]
of
June
19,
1987
made
by
the
appellant
and
the
corporation.
The
relevant
excerpt
of
that
resolution
reads
as
follows:
but
with
the
circumstances
and
the
appurtenances,
for
a
total
price
of
$15,000,
including
$5,476
to
cover
the
expropriated
part
of
her
property
and
$9,524
as
compensation
for
the
relocation
of
La
Compagnie
de
rebuts
et
pièces
du
Saguenay
Limitée
payable
in
cash
upon
signing
of
the
notarial
instrument,
the
whole
pursuant
to
the
terms
and
conditions
of
the
aforementioned
offer
of
sale
dated
June
19,
1987,
reference
to
which
is
made
to
have
effect
as
if
stated
at
length....
[Translation.]
Also
confirming
what
had
been
provided
in
the
agreements
[sic],
the
city’s
resolution
added
the
following:
THAT
the
treasurer
be
hereby
authorized
to
issue
a
cheque
in
the
amount
of
$15,000
to
the
order
of
Rose-Alice
Tremblay-Savard
as
final
payment
for
the
said
property
and
of
the
aforementioned
compensation.
[Translation.]
The
business’s
draft
agreement
of
June
19,
1987
(Exhibit
1-4)
reads
in
part
as
follows:
It
is
understood
that
the
amount
owed
to
the
business
may
be
paid
in
full
to
the
order
of
Rose-Alice
Tremblay-Savard.
[Translation.]
Furthermore,
after
setting
the
compensation
at
$5,476,
the
appellant’s
draft
agreement
provides
as
follows:
However,
this
offer
is
accepted
on
the
condition
that
the
following
clauses
be
complied
with:
(A)
The
total
amount
of
the
compensation
of
Rose-Alice
Tremblay-
Savard
and
of
La
Compagnie
de
Rebuts
&
Pieces
du
Saguenay
Ltée,
that
is
$15,000,
is
paid
solely
to
the
order
of
Rose-Alice
Tremblay-
Savard.
(B)
All
damage
caused
to
the
rest
of
the
property
during
the
work
shall
be
repaired
so
that
the
whole
is
returned
to
its
original
state.
[Translation.]
3.05
The
offers,
counter-offers
and
agreements
may
be
summarized
as
follows:
|
Detailed
|
Out-of-court
|
|
|
claim
settlement
|
Difference
|
|
Alice
Savard
|
|
|
Land
|
$
2,965
$
2,540
|
($
425)
|
|
|
Improvements
|
|
|
to
land
|
1,223
|
1,353
|
130
|
|
|
Other
damages
|
3,611
|
1,583
|
(2,028)
|
|
|
7,799
5,476
|
(2,323)
|
|
|
La
Cie
de
rebuts
et
|
|
|
pièces
usagées
du
|
|
|
Saguenay
Ltée
|
|
|
Other
damages
|
8,782
|
9,524
|
742
|
|
|
Total
|
|
3.06
On
November
4,
1987,
the
following
statement
(part
of
Exhibit
I-2)
was
filed
in
the
Expropriation
Division:
|
CANADA
|
EXPROPRIATION
|
DIVISION,
|
QUÉBEC
|
SECTION
|
|
PROVINCE
OF
QUEBEC
|
|
|
DISTRICT
OF
CHICOUTIMI
|
|
|
C.E.-02-34-000473-865
|
|
CITY
OF
JONQUIERE,
a
legally
constituted
municipal
corporation
having
its
headquarters
at
2890
Place
Davis,
city
of
Jonquiére,
District
of
Chicoutimi,
Expropriating
authority
v.
ROSE-ALICE
TREMBLAY-SAVARD,
domiciled
and
residing
at
3355
Boul.
St-Francois,
city
of
Jonquiére,
District
of
Chicoutimi,
Expropriated
party
and
LA
COMPAGNIE
DE
REBUTS
ET
PIECES
USAGÉES
DU
SAGUENAY
LTÉE,
(SAGUENAY
SCRAP
&
PARTS
CO.
LTD.),
a
legally
constituted
corporation
having
its
principal
place
of
business
at
3357
Boul.
St-Francois,
city
of
Jonquiére,
District
of
Chicoutimi,
duly
represented
herein,
as
witnessed
by
a
certified
copy
of
a
resolution
of
the
Board
of
Directors
duly
signed
by
its
Chairman
Henri
Savard,
Expropriated
tenant.
STATEMENT
OF
OUT-OF-COURT
SETTLEMENT
The
expropriating
authority,
the
city
OF
JONQUIÈRE,
the
expropriated
parties
ROSE-ALICE
TREMBLAY-SAVARD
and
LA
COMPAGNIE
DE
REBUTS
ET
PIECES
USAGEES
DU
SAGUENAY
LTEE
inform
the
Expropriation
Division,
Québec
Section,
that
a
transaction
has
occurred
concerning
the
instant
expropriation
case
for
a
total
amount
of
$15,000
paid
to
the
expropriated
parties
as
follows:
|
-
Land
|
$
2,540.00
|
|
-
Improvements
to
land
|
$
1,353.00
|
|
-
Other
damages
|
$
11,107.00
|
|
-
TOTAL
|
$
15,000.00
|
|
Fees
paid
to
the
appraiser
|
|
|
of
the
expropriated
parties:
|
$
2,190.00
|
The
parties
declare
the
instant
case
settled
for
all
purposes
of
law.
SIGNED
AT
THE
CITY
OF
JONQUIERE,
THIS
NOVEMBER
4,
1987.
CITY
OF
JONQUIÈRE
Per:
Alain
Ouellet,
attorney
DULY
AUTHORIZED
BY
THE
EXPROPRIATING
AUTHORITY,
CITY
OFJONQUIÈRE
ROSE-ALICE
TREMBLAY-SAVARD
PER:
Rose-Alice
Tremblay-Savard
LA
COMPAGNIE
DE
REBUTS
ET
PIÈCES
USAGÉES
DU
SAGUENAY
LTÉE
Per:
Henri
Savard,
president
DULY
AUTHORIZED
HEREIN
JEAN-JACQUES
ANGERS
Per:
Jean-Jacques
Angers
ATTORNEY
FOR
THE
EXPROPRIATED
PARTIES
[Translation.]
3.07
The
respondent
included
the
sum
of
$9,524
in
the
appellant’s
income
(Exhibit
I-5).
Despite
the
appellant’s
objection,
the
respondent
confirmed
the
assessment
by
explaining
that
the
whole
was
consistent
with
the
provisions
of
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
3.08
Two
contracts
filed
as
Exhibit
1-7
provided
that
the
appellant
had
purchased
the
first
part
of
the
land
in
issue
from
Joseph-Henri
Savard
for
the
sum
of
$1
on
October
13,
1971,
and
the
second
part
from
her
sons
Gilles
and
Gaston
Savard
for
the
price
of
$5,366.95
on
November
17,
1978.
The
land
has
a
total
area
of
106,600
square
feet.
3.09
The
land
in
issue
was
commercially
zoned
at
the
time
of
the
expropriation.
Part
of
Exhibit
1-3
was
the
leasing
agreement
signed
between
the
appellant
(lessor)
and
La
Compagnie
de
Rebuts
et
pièces
usagées
du
Saguenay
Ltée
(lessee)
on
January
1,
1984.
It
was
further
to
the
lease
signed
on
May
1,
1973,
but
not
filed
at
the
hearing
of
the
instant
appeal.
The
agreement
signed
in
1984
provided
for
rent
of
$10,000
per
year
and
made
the
following
stipulation:
Continuing
employment
and
remuneration
for
Rose-Alice
Tremblay-Savard
[the
appellant]
pursuant
to
an
agreement
in
principle
between
the
two
parties.
[Translation.]
3.10
The
corporation’s
shareholders
are
the
appellant,
her
husband
and
their
four
children.
3.11
According
to
the
appellant’s
evidence,
the
corporation’s
business
was
never
relocated.
It
is
still
on
the
land
in
1994.
According
to
Mr.
Angers,
the
expropriated
part
of
the
land
served
at
most
as
parking
for
a
few
automobiles.
4.
Act-Analysis
4.01
Act
The
provision
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
involved
in
the
instant
case
is
subsection
15(1),
which
reads
as
follows:
15(1
)
Appropriation
of
property
to
shareholder.-Where
in
a
taxation
year
(a)
a
payment
has
been
made
by
a
corporation
to
a
shareholder
otherwise
than
pursuant
to
a
bona
fide
business
transaction,
(b)
funds
or
property
of
a
corporation
have
been
appropriated
in
any
manner
whatever
to,
or
for
the
benefit
of,
a
shareholder,
or
(c)
a
benefit
or
advantage
has
been
conferred
on
a
shareholder
by
a
corporation,
otherwise
than
(d)
on
the
reduction
of
capital,
the
redemption,
cancellation
or
acquisition
by
the
corporation
of
shares
of
its
capital
stock
or
the
winding-up,
discontinuance
or
reorganization
of
its
business,
or
otherwise
by
way
of
a
transaction
to
which
section
88
applies,
(e)
by
the
payment
of
a
dividend
or
a
stock
dividend,
(f)
by
conferring
on
all
holders
of
common
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
the
corporation
a
right
to
buy
additional
common
shares
thereof,
or
(g)
by
an
action
described
in
paragraph
84(1
)(c.
1
)
or
(c.2),
the
amount
or
value
thereof
shall,
except
to
the
extent
that
it
is
deemed
to
be
a
dividend
by
section
84,
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
the
shareholder
for
the
year.
4.02
Analysis
4.02.1
If
the
appellant
had
proceeded
before
the
Expropriation
Division
alone,
could
she
have
obtained
the
amount
of
$15,000?
Considering
the
very
small
area
of
the
land
expropriated
(846.5
square
feet)
and
the
fact
that
there
was
no
need
to
relocate
the
corporation’s
business
(3.11),
the
Court
doubts
it
very
much.
However,
no
evidence
of
an
appraisal
of
the
land
was
filed
before
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada.
Furthermore,
this
Court
is
bound
by
the
figures
of
the
agreement,
just
as
it
is
bound
by
the
expropriated
parties
that
appear
in
the
official
agreement
of
November
4,
1987,
entered
in
the
record
of
the
Expropriation
Division
(3.06),
that
is
Rose-Alice
Savard
(expropriated
party)
and
La
Compagnie
de
Rebuts
et
pièces
usagées
du
Saguenay
Ltée
(expropriated
tenant).
What
might
have
occurred
if
the
parties
had
proceeded
otherwise
is
of
little
importance.
The
Court
is
bound
by
what
was
in
fact
done,
thus
applying
the
principle
invoked
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
The
Queen
v.
Bronfman
Trust,
[1987]
1
S.C.R.
32,
[1987]
1
C.T.C.
117,
87
D.T.C.
5059,
at
page
55
(C.T.C.
129,
D.T.C.
5067-68).
According
to
that
principle:
the
courts
must
deal
with
what
the
taxpayer
actually
did,
and
not
what
he
might
have
done:
Matheson
v.
The
Queen,
[1974]
C.T.C.
186,
74
D.T.C.
6176
(F.C.T.D.),
per
Mahoney
J.,
at
page
189
(D.T.C.
6179).
4.02.2
The
official
agreement
does
not
distinguish
between
the
compensation
to
be
paid
to
each
of
the
expropriated
parties
(3.06).
It
was
the
evidence
before
this
Court
that,
to
a
large
degree,
provided
them
for
us.
This
evidence
is
detailed
above
(3.04,
3.05)
allotting
$5,476
to
the
appellant
and
$9,524
to
the
corporation.
That
is
the
actual
situation.
The
fact
that
the
ultimate
intention
of
the
expropriated
parties
was
to
hand
over
the
entire
compensation
to
the
appellant
is
another
situation.
It
is
this
other
situation
that
falls
under
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
the
application
of
subsection
15(1).
The
Court
need
not
elaborate
on
this
point.
The
evidence
is
clear;
the
assessment
was
valid.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.