Bell
J.T.C.C.:-This
case
was
heard
under
the
informal
procedure
of
this
Court.
The
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
is
entitled,
in
her
1982
taxation
year,
to:
A.
include
in
income,
as
reported
by
her,
a
"taxable
dividend"
(as
defined
in
subsection
89(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
in
the
amount
of
$5,998.80,
B.
deduct
a
dividend
tax
credit,
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
section
121
of
the
Act,
in
the
amount
of
$1,359.73
in
respect
of
the
dividend
described
above,
C.
a
deduction
in
the
maximum
amount
of
$1,000
pursuant
to
subsection
110.1
of
the
Act
in
respect
of
interest
and
grossed-up
dividends
included
in
her
income
for
the
1982
taxation
year,
D.
deduct
an
allowable
capital
loss
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
111(2),
paragraphs
39(b),
38(b),
54(h),
and
section
3
of
the
Act
in
the
amount
of
$2,000,
and
E.
deduct
the
amount
of
$600
as
interest
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
paragraph
20(1
)(c)
of
the
Act
or
as
an
investment
counsel
fee
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
paragraph
20(1
)(bb)
of
the
Act.
The
appellant,
who
appeared
on
her
own
behalf,
gave
direct
evidence,
all
of
which
is
set
forth
on
one
page
only
in
the
official
transcript
of
the
hearing.
On
cross-examination,
her
evidence
included
the
statements
that
she
paid
$600
to
Mr.
Schellenberg,
that
Aldergrove
Investments
had
held
no
meetings,
that
she
relied
upon
Mr.
Schellenberg
to
take
care
of
the
transaction,
that
she
never
acquired
any
share
certificates
and
that
she
did
not
remember
if
the
transactions
had
been
explained
to
her.
She
identified
her
return
of
income
tax
for
the
1982
taxation
year
when
it
was
produced
by
respondent’s
counsel,
stated
that
she
had
claimed
a
loss
of
$4004.20,
that
she
had
advanced
no
funds
other
than
$600
to
Mr.
Schellenberg,
that
she
was
unaware
of
any
personal
liability
that
may
have
been
assumed
by
her
and
that
she
had
no
other
information
on
the
nature
of
the
transactions.
She
did
not
cross-examine
the
respondent’s
two
witnesses,
one
being
an
official
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
the
other
being
her
own
accountant,
Mr.
A.L.
Schellenberg.
The
appellant
failed
to
adduce
any
evidence
respecting
the
transaction
in
her
direct
examination.
As
stated
above,
she
answered
questions
on
cross-examination
respecting
some
aspects
of
the
transactions.
Respondent’s
counsel
presented
evidence
describing
that
transaction
in
detail.
The
appellant,
in
her
argument,
stated
only
that
she
entered
into
a
financial
investment
with
Mr.
Leon
Schellenberg
and
paid
a
fee
for
his
advice
and
professional
services
in
the
sum
of
$600.
She
added
that
Mr.
Schellenberg
handled
all
the
investment
activities
and
reported
to
her
that
she
had
received
dividend
income
for
the
1982
taxation
year
and
sustained
a
capital
loss
from
share
redemption
in
that
year.
She
said
that
she
was
advised
by
Mr.
Schellenberg
that
she
had
made
a
bona
fide
investment.
At
the
commencement
of
the
hearing
when
I
was
explaining
the
procedure
to
the
appellant,
I
advised
her
that
the
onus
was
on
her
to
dislodge
the
assessment
and
that
the
onus
was
not
on
the
respondent
to
show
that
the
assessment
was
correct.
I
restated
this
proposition
later
during
the
hearing.
The
question
of
onus
on
an
appellant
was
one
of
the
subjects
of
a
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Johnston
v.
M.N.R.,
[1948]
S.C.R.
486,
[1948]
C.T.C.
195,
3
D.T.C.
1182.
Mr.
Justice
Rand,
in
delivering
the
judgment
in
this
regard,
said
at
page
489
(C.T.C.
202;
D.T.C.
1183):
For
that
purpose
he
might
bring
evidence
before
the
Court
notwithstanding
that
it
had
not
been
placed
before
the
assessor
or
the
Minister,
but
the
onus
was
his
to
demolish
the
basic
fact
on
which
the
taxation
rested.
And
at
page
490
(C.T.C.
203;
D.T.C.
1183-84)
the
learned
justice
said,
Since
the
taxpayer
in
this
case
must
establish
something,
it
seems
to
me
that
something
is
the
existence
of
facts
or
law
showing
an
error
in
relation
to
the
taxation
imposed
on
him.
Although
respondent’s
counsel
presented
evidence
describing
what
took
place,
the
appellant
failed
to
advance
any
argument
as
to
how
the
facts
established
by
such
evidence
could
be
construed
to
assist
her
in
meeting
the
onus
of
demolishing
the
basis
of
the
assessment.
Further,
she
presented
no
argument
in
law
to
show
an
error
in
relation
to
the
taxation
imposed
upon
her.
Having
failed
to
meet
the
onus
of
showing
an
error
in
relation
to
the
taxation
imposed
upon
her,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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