Christie
A.C.J.T.C.:—
This
is
a
motion
on
behalf
of
the
respondent
seeking
an
order:
(a)
requiring
a
knowledgeable
officer,
director,
member
or
employee
of
the
appellant
to
resubmit
to
an
examination
for
discovery
of
the
appellant
and
answer
the
questions
that
the
appellant's
representative
did
not
properly
answer
at
the
oral
examination
for
discovery
held
on
April
28
and
29,
1994,
(set
out
in
Schedule
"A"
hereto)
and
any
further
uestions
arising
as
a
consequence
of
the
answers
given
by
the
representative
of
the
appellant
to
those
questions;
and
(b)
requiring
the
appellant
to
pay
the
costs
of
this
applicationand
the
respondent's
costs
of
reattending
at
an
examination
for
discovery
forthwith
in
any
event
of
the
cause.
The
respondent
also
asks
for
an
order:
(c)
requiring
the
appellant
to
fulfil
the
undertakings
(set
out
in
Schedule
“B”
hereto)
entered
into
at
the
oral
discovery
on
April
28
and
29,
1994.
What
is
sought
in
paragraph
(c)
can
be
quickly
disposed
of
because
that
request
is
uncontested.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
concedes
that
there
is
an
obligation
on
his
client
to
honour
25
of
the
26
undertakings
described
in
Schedule
"B".
Undertaking
numbered
8
has
been
disposed
of
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
respondent.
Mr.
Chalmers
said
that
efforts
have
been
made
and
will
continue
to
be
made
by
counsel
in
fulfilment
of
the
commitments
made.
It
appears
that
there
has
been
some
difficulty
in
securing
the
necessary
assistance
from
Mr.
Michael
J.
Stenyk
the
sole
director,
officer,
shareholder
and
employee
of
the
appellant.
The
only
thing
to
be
done
is
to
set
a
date
by
which
the
undertakings
shall
be
fulfilled.
At
the
hearing
I
selected
August
29,
1994,
as
that
date.
With
reference
to
additional
discovery
it
is
noted
that
subsection
95(1)
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Rules
(General
Procedure)
("the
General
Rules")
requires
that
a
person
examined
for
discovery
shall
answer,
to
the
best
of
that
person's
knowledge,
information
and
belief,
any
proper
question
relating
to
any
matter
in
issue
in
the
proceedings.
Reference
is
also
made
to
Sydney
Steel
Corp.
v.
The
"Omisalj"
(1992),
52
F.T.R.
144,
[1992]
2
F.C.
193,
wherein
Mr.
Justice
MacKay
of
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division
said
at
page
147
(F.T.R.):
Counsel
for
the
parties
are
essentially
agreed
that
the
standard
for
propriety
of
a
question
asked
in
discovery
is
less
strict
than
the
test
for
admissibility
of
evidence
at
trial
and
the
appropriate
standard
is
whether
the
information
solicited
by
a
question
may
be
relevant
to
the
matters
which
at
the
discovery
stage
are
in
issue
on
the
basis
of
pleadings
filed
by
the
parties.
As
noted
by
the
defendants
the
test
is
as
set
out
by
Norris
D.J.A.,
in
Me
Keen
&
Wilson
Ltd.
v.
Gulf
of
Georgia
Towing
Co.
Ltd.,
[1965]
2
Ex.
C.R.
480,
at
page
482:
.
.
.the
questions
objected
to
may
raise
matters
which
are
relevant
to
issues
raised
on
the
pleadings.
This
is
all
that
the
defendants
are
required
to
show.
As
to
whether
or
not
they
are
relevant
and
admissible
at
the
trial
is
a
matter
for
the
learned
trial
judge.
And
at
page
148:
.
.
.when
objection
is
taken
that
a
question
is
not
properbecause
it
is
not
relevant
for
reasons
given,
the
party
asking
the
question
must
satisfy
the
Court
that
the
information
it
seeks
may
be
relevant
to
a
fact
in
issue.
That
standard
is
not
likely
to
be
difficult
to
meet
in
light
of
the
goal
of
openness
which
the
rules
seek
to
foster
in
pretrial
proceedings,
particularly
discovery,
a
goal
which
is
the
same
whether
discovery
be
oral
or
by
written
questions.
Moreover,
it
is
settled
that
where
there
is
doubt
as
to
whether
the
question
need
be
answered
the
benefit
of
that
doubt,
in
light
of
the
principal
goal
of
openness,
favours
requiring
the
answer
to
be
given:
(Royal
Specialty
Sales
v.
Mayda
Industries
Ltd.
(1986),
4
ET.R.
77,
10
C.P.R.
(3d)
131
(F.C.T.D.)
per
Madame
Justice
Reed
at
page
79).
I
adopt
these
two
propositions
in
the
reasons
for
judgment
delivered
by
Chilcott
J.,
in
Algoma
Central
Railway
v.
Herb
Fraser
and
Associates
Ltd.
et
al.
(1988),
36
C.P.C.
(2d)
8,
66
O.R.
(2d)
330
(Div.
Ct.).
He
was
sitting
as
a
member
of
the
Divisional
Court
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Ontario
on
an
appeal
from
an
order
of
Montgomery
J.
First,
there
is
a
broader
standard
of
relevance
regarding
questions
asked
at
the
discovery
stage
of
proceedings
than
at
trial.
Second,
questions
asked
on
examination
for
discovery
may
be
proper
bearing
in
mind
that
issues
of
admissibility
and
weight
to
be
assigned
to
evidence
at
trial
are
for
the
trial
judge
to
determine.
I
shall
deal
with
each
of
the
six
refusals
in
turn.
1.
Refusal
to
provide
the
names
and
addresses
of
individuals
who
are
knowledgable
or
may
be
knowledgable
about
the
events
which
are
in
issue
in
this
case,
either
the
transactions
which
we
have
discussed
in
detail
or
the
alleged
research
and
development
itself.
Counsel
agreed
this
should
be
amended
to
read,
as
follows:
1.
Refusal
to
provide
the
names
and
addresses
of
individuals
who
might
reasonably
be
expected
to
have
knowledge
about
the
events
which
are
in
issue
in
this
case,
either
the
transactions
which
we
have
discussed
in
detail
or
the
alleged
research
and
development
itself.
This
wording
is
in
line
with
subsection
95(4)
of
the
General
Rules.
Mr.
Chalmers
told
the
Court
that
the
paragraph
as
amended
would
be
answered.
2.
Refusal
to
advise
whether
the
appellant
continues
to
own
the
patents
it
acquired
in
one
of
the
transactions
in
issue
and
if
the
appellant
does
not
own
them,
the
details
of
any
transfer
which
has
taken
place,
including
to
whom
they
were
conveyed,
the
circumstances
under
which
they
were
conveyed,
and
for
how
much.
This
should
be
answered.
3.
Refusal
to
produce
any
documents
within
the
appellant’s
control
which
relate
to
the
contract
with
Gerotor
Motor
(sic)
Systems,
including
the
negotiation
of
the
contract,
the
establishment
of
the
terms,
and
reporting
letters
from
counsel.
This
exchange
between
counsel
occurred
at
the
examination
for
discovery
of
Mr.
Stenyk
on
April
29,
1994.
MS
BROWN:
And,
in
fact,
I
ask
you
to
make
best
efforts
to
produce
any
documents
within
the
appellant’s
control
which
relate
to
the
contract
with
Gerotor
Power
Systems
and
to
the
payments
of
the
contract.
MR.
BIRLEY:
Well,
you've
—MS
BROWN:
I’ve
asked
you
for
background
about
the
contract
—MR.
BIRLEY:
—
got
the
contract.
MS
BROWN:
—
which
might
be
in
Mr.
Weir's
—
yes,
but
any
documentation
which
relates
to
the
negotiation
of
the
contract,
the
establishment
of
the
terms,
the
reporting
letters
from
counsel
and,
as
well,
I’m
asking
for
any
documentation
which
goes
to
show
that
the
amounts
were,
in
fact,
paid.
MR.
BIRLEY:
Well,
I
don't
think
that
any
documents
related
to
the
negotiation
of
the
contract
are
relevant.
Once
the
contract’s
been
entered
into,
it
is
the
agreement.
If
I
can
locate
a
reporting
letter,
I
will
take
it
under
advisement
as
to
whether
or
not
I'll
make
that
available
to
you.
These
documents
and
questions
about
them
may
raise
matters
that
are
relevant
to
issues
raised
on
the
pleadings.
On
being
further
examined
Mr.
Stenyk
shall
answer
questions
regarding
the
existence
of
any
documents
pertaining
to
the
contract,
including
the
negotiation
of
the
contract,
the
establishment
of
the
terms,
and
reporting
letters
from
counsel.
Such
of
these
documents
that
exist
shall
be
produced
at
the
further
examination
and
questions
regarding
them
shall
be
answered.
A
list
of
them
shall
be
served
on
the
respondent
prior
to
the
further
examination
for
discovery.
If
solicitor-client
privilege
is
invoked
with
reference
to
one
or
more
of
these
documents
and
there
is
a
dispute
about
this
the
issue
can
be
settled
at
the
trial
unless
counsel
for
the
respondent
considers
it
necessary
to
make
a
further
interlocutory
application
in
this
regard.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
did
not
hear
from
Mr.
M.C.
Birley
about
the
existence
of
a
reporting
letter.
At
the
hearing
Mr.
Chalmers
was
asked
from
the
Bench
about
the
existence
of
reporting
letters.
He
was
unable
to
reply,
but
undertook
to
ascertain
the
answer.
The
trial
is
scheduled
to
commence
at
9:30a.m.
on
November
16,
1994
and
I
expect
there
may
be
much
to
do
by
way
of
preparation.
For
this
reason
I
wish
to
deal
with
this
motion
expeditiously
and
the
order
will
be
made
without
waiting
further
to
hear
from
Mr.
Chalmers
4.
Refusal
to
provide
the
financial
statements
of
the
appellant
for
the
years
subsequent
to
the
1988
taxation
year.
This
exchange
between
counsel
occurred
at
the
examination
for
discovery
on
April
29,
1994.
MS
BROWN:
Can
you
produce
for
me,
please,
the
financial
statements
and
tax
returns
of
the
appellant
for
years
subsequent
to
1988?
MR.
BIRLEY:
Why?
MS
BROWN:
Because
as
I
understand,
there's
been
activity
ongoing
throughout
the
continued
progress
of
this
so-called
R&D
project
that
is
relevant
to
the
appeal.
MR.
BIRLEY:
It's
not
relevant
to
the
appeal
and
I
won't
produce
it.
These
documents
may
be
relevant
to
issues
between
the
parties.
On
being
further
examined
Mr.
Stenyk
shall
answer
questions
regarding
the
existence
of
any
financial
statements
or
income
tax
returns
of
the
appellant
for
years
subsequent
to
1988.
Such
of
these
documents
that
exist
shall
be
produced
at
the
further
examination
and
questions
regarding
them
shall
be
answered.
A
list
of
these
documents
shall
be
served
on
the
respondent
prior
to
the
further
examination
for
discovery.
5.
Refusal
to
advise
whether
the
witness,
the
sole
director,
officer,
shareholder
and
employee
of
the
appellant,
has
been
involved
in
any
activity
involving
the
Gerotor
Motor
outside
the
context
of
the
appellant.
As
I
understand
it
counsel
for
the
appellant
suggested
at
the
hearing
that
the
answers
are
to
be
found
in
the
transcript
of
the
examination
for
discovery
and,
in
particular,
at
pages
29
to
47.
I
do
not
find
the
answers
there.
There
was
some
discussion
at
the
hearing
about
the
precise
meaning
of
the
words
"in
the
context
of
the
appellant".
I
believe
that
it
would
be
more
accurate
and
understandable
to
word
the
paragraph
in
this
way:
5.
Refusal
to
advise
whether
the
witness
has
been
involved
in
any
activity
involving
the
Gerotor
Motor
other
than
in
his
capacity
as
the
sole
director,
officer,
shareholder
and
employee
of
the
appellant.
Paragraph
5
as
amended
should
be
answered.
6.
Refusal
to
describe
the
efforts
to
raise
funds
for
the
appellant
since
September,
1985.
This
should
be
answered.
Mr.
Stenyk
shall
reattend
to
be
further
examined
for
discovery.
The
further
examination
for
discovery
shall
be
conducted
at
a
date
to
be
agreed
upon
by
counsel.
If
there
is
no
agreement
it
will
take
place
not
later
than
August
31,
1994.
In
any
event
of
the
cause
the
respondent
is
entitled
to
costs
of
this
motion
and
costs
for
reattending
at
the
further
examination
for
discovery.
These
costs
shall
be
paid
not
later
than
October
1,
1994.
Motion
granted.