Watson
D.J.T.C.C.:—
This
appeal
concerning
the
1991
taxation
year
was
heard
in
Sherbrooke,
Quebec
on
January
10,
1994
pursuant
to
the
informal
procedure
of
this
Court.
In
computing
his
net
income
for
the
1991
taxation
year,
the
appellant
claimed
an
amount
as
alimony
and
another
amount
of
$6,324.84
as
other
deductions.
The
other
deductions
were
as
follows:
On
December
29,
1992,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
("the
Minister")
issued
a
new
notice
of
assessment
disallowing
this
amount
of
$6,324.84.
In
that
appeal,
the
appellant
did
not
object
to
the
Minister’s
disallowance
of
the
$1,872
deduction
for
mortgage
payments,
the
$500
deduction
for
moving
expenses
or
the
miscellaneous
expenses
in
the
amount
of
$1,000.
|
Children’s
expenses
|
$2,952.84
|
|
Mortgage
payments
|
$1,872.00
|
|
Moving
|
$
500.00
|
|
Miscellaneous
|
$1,000.00
|
The
Minister
took
the
following
facts
for
granted
in
order
to
make
this
new
notice
of
assessment:
(a)
the
appellant
was
living
apart
from
his
wife
Diane
Côté
pursuant
to
an
interim
order
signed
on
September
13,
1990
by
Mr.
Justice
Jean
Marquis
S.C.J.;
(b)
under
a
judgment
delivered
by
Mr.
Justice
Jean
Frappier
S.C.J.
dated
September
12,
1991
in
response
to
a
petition
for
alimony,
the
appellant
was
compelled
to:
(i)
pay
the
cost
of
orthodontia
expenses
to
be
incurred
for
his
son
Martin;
(ii)
pay
his
children’s
sports
and
recreation
costs,
the
whole
to
stand
in
lieu
of
payment
of
alimony;
and,
(iii)
the
alimony
was
fixed
at
$230
per
week;
(c)
neither
the
judgment
for
alimony
of
September
12,
1991
nor
the
preceding
judgments
provided
that
subs.
60.1(2)
and
subs
56.1(2)
of
the
Act
applied,
that
is
to
say
that
every
payment
made
pursuant
to
those
judgments
was
deemed
to
be
an
amount
paid
by
the
appellant
and
received
by
his
former
spouse
as
an
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis;
(d)
the
children’s
expenses
of
$2,952.84
claimed
by
the
appellant
were
not
paid
to
the
appellant’s
former
spouse.
.
.
.
[Translation.]
The
appellant
admitted
all
these
paragraphs
at
the
hearing
of
the
appeal.
The
question
to
be
decided
is
whether
the
appellant
was
entitled
to
deduct
the
amount
of
$2,952.84
representing
children's
expenses
as
alimony
for
the
1991
taxation
year.
At
the
hearing,
the
appellant
testified
openly
and
honestly
and
showed
that
he
had
acted
in
good
faith
as
a
prudent
administrator
at
all
times.
Unfortunately,
however,
the
evidence
and
the
admissions
show
that
the
payments
in
the
amount
of
$2,952.84
for
the
sports
and
recreational
purchases
of
his
children
were
not
periodically
payable
to
his
former
wife
and
that
there
was
no
mention
of
subsection
56.1(2)
or
60.1(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
in
the
interim
order
signed
on
September
13,
1990
or
in
the
judgment
dated
September
12,
1991.
The
appellant
stated
the
following
at
the
second
paragraph
of
his
notice
of
appeal:
If
two
or
three
words
must
be
added
in
a
judgment
for
it
to
satisfy
you,
I
want
a
judge
to
hear
me
and
to
be
able
to
add
those
two
or
three
words.
Since
I
feel
aggrieved
by
theinterpretation
which
you
make
of
that
judgment,
I
therefore
wish
to
institute
an
appeal.
[Translation.]
I
am
of
the
view
that
this
Court
is
not
competent
to
revise
or
amend
the
judgment
of
the
Superior
Court
of
Quebec
in
respect
of
a
petition
for
alimony.
Since
the
appellant
was
unable
to
discharge
his
burden
of
showing
that
the
amount
of
$2,952.84
represented
alimony
pursuant
to
the
criteria
of
subsection
60(b)
or
60(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
appeal
is
therefore
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.