McArthur
J.T.C.C.:—This
appeal
was
heard
in
London,
Ontario,
under
the
informal
procedure
of
this
Court
for
the
appellant’s
1991
taxation
year.
The
respondent
sets
out
the
following
assumptions
of
fact
in
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
which
were
not
in
dispute:
Instalment
interest
(a)
during
the
1991
taxation
year,
the
appellant’s
net
income
was
$24,991;
(b)
the
appellant’s
chief
source
of
income
was
neither
farming
nor
fishing;
(c)
during
the
1991
taxation
year,
no
amounts
were
deducted
from
the
appellant's
income
at
source;
(d)
the
appellant’s
tax
payable
for
the
1991
taxation
year
was
$1,630.06;
(e)
the
appellant's
tax
payable
for
the
year
prior
to
1991
taxation
year
was
$1,083.32;
(f)
the
appellant
was
required
to
pay
instalments
of
tax
in
respect
of
the
1991
taxation
year
in
the
amount
of
$1,233.58
and
failed
to
so;
(g)
prescribed
interest
in
respect
of
instalments
for
the
1991
taxation
year
up
to
the
date
of
assessment
amounts
to
$110.20;
Arrears
interest
(h)
the
appellant’s
income
tax
return
for
the
1991
taxation
year
(the
"1991
return")
was
required
to
be
filed
on
April
30,
1992;
(i)
the
federal
tax
and
penalty
payable
by
the
appellant
for
the
1991
taxation
year
which
was
unpaid
on
April
30,
1992
amounted
to
$2,788.53
(the
"excess");
(j)
prescribed
interest
on
the
excess
from
April
30,
1992
to
the
date
of
assessment
amounts
to
$252.90;
Penalty
(k)
the
appellant’s
1991
return
was
not
filed
with
the
Minister
until
April
23,
1993,
being
more
than
11
months
after
the
required
date
referred
to
in
subparagraph
(h)
above;
(l)
the
appellant
failed
to
file
his
1991
return
of
income
as
and
when
required
under
subsection
150(1)
of
the
Act;
(m)
for
the
1991
taxation
year,
the
Minister
served
a
demand
on
the
appellant
under
subsection
150(2)
of
the
Act;
(n)
before
the
time
of
the
failure
referred
to
in
subparagraph
4(m)
above,
a
penalty
was
payable
under
subsection
163(1)
of
the
Act
or
under
subsection
162(2)
of
the
Act
in
respect
of
a
return
of
income
for
any
of
the
three
preceding
taxation
years;
and
(o)
the
penalty
for
late
filing
the
1991
return
amounts
to
$1,158.47.
The
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
is
liable
to
pay
interest
and
penalty
for
late
filing
for
1991
taxation
year
pursuant
to
section
161
and
subsection
162(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
The
appellant
testified
that
he
had
suffered
serious
emotional
and
mental
distress
which
he
set
out
in
his
notice
of
appeal
as
follows:
In
1987
I
became
self-employed
in
the
same
line
of
work
which
I
had
been
doing
for
six
to
seven
years
previous.
In
the
spring
of
1988
I
went
through
a
devastating
marriage
break-up
under
circumstances
under
which
I
had
absolutely
no
control.
In
my
opinion,
when
a
spouse
decides
a
relationship
has
ended
and
the
same
spouse
takes
your
children,
which
you
dearly
love
and
sets
you
on
a
course
of
litigation
and
asset
division
and
limited
access
to
your
children,
the
effect
is
far
more
devastating
than
a
death
of
a
family
member
who
is
dead
and
nothing
you
can
do
about.
A
marriage
can
be
dead
but
people
still
alive.
In
many
respects,
a
divorce
which
you
do
not
want,
and
the
inability
to
secure
custody
of
your
children
without
going
into
a
vicious
mud-slinging
situation,
is
devastating,
worse
than
death
and
I
have
experienced
death
of
a
family
member.
Divorce
is
worse.
The
subsequent
result
was
business
failure,
substantial
legal
fees
and
support
payments
which
could
not
be
met
from
a
low
cash
flow.
The
ongoing
stress,
pressure
and
distress
resulted
in
serious
emotional
and
mental
anguish
and
a
suicide
attempt
on
my
part,
following
which
I
secured
psychological
therapy
for
my
strained
emotions
that
resulted
in
working
back
through
a
great
deal.
During
this
period
of
time,
which
extended
from
two-and-a-half
to
three
years,
I
was
unable
to
generate
sufficient
income
to
support
myself,
never
mind
meeting
my
support
obligations
and
dealing
with
my
other
financial
obligations.
I
would
be
willing
to
provide
a
doctor's
report
as
well
as
a
report
from
my
psychologist
if
that
was
necessary
in
your
opinion,
to
gain
a
favourable
decision
on
my
behalf
concerning
this
appeal.
During
this
period
of
serious
emotional
distress,
I
was
not
able
to
deal
with
many
of
my
responsibilities
in
my
life.
I
did,
however,
make
the
decision
that
I
would
not
declare
bankruptcy
and
I
would
not
apply
to
have
my
support
arrears
reduced.
I
was
of
the
opinion
that
I
would
be
back
on
track,
up
and
running,
on
stream
and
would
be
able
to
pick
up
and
take
care
of
my
financial
responsibilities
to
my
creditors
and
to
pay
the
moneys
to
my
ex-spouse
and
my
children,
which
they
certainly
could
use,
despite
my
feelings
regarding
the
marriage
break-up.
The
appellant
did
not
dispute
the
assessment
or
the
quantum
of
the
instalment
and
arrears
interest
and
penalty.
The
appellant’s
position
was
that
the
penalties
and
interest
should
be
waived
having
reference
to
Information
Circular
92-2,
paragraph
5(d)
and
subsection
220(3.1)
of
the
Act.
The
respondent's
position
is
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
has
the
discretion
to
waive
or
cancel
the
penalty
and
or
interest
and
this
Court
does
not
have
jurisdiction
to
decide
whether
the
interest
and
penalty
ought
to
be
waived
or
cancelled.
Subsection
220(3.1)
(known
as
the
fairness
package)
and
Information
Circular
92-2,
paragraph
5(d)
read
as
follows:
220(3.1)
Waiver
of
penalty
or
interest—
The
Minister
may
at
any
time
waive
or
cancel
all
or
any
portion
of
any
penalty
or
interest
otherwise
payable
under
this
Act
by
a
taxpayer
or
partnership
and,
notwithstanding
subsections
152(4)
to
(5),
such
assessment
of
the
interest
and
penalties
payable
by
the
taxpayer
or
partnership
shall
be
made
as
is
necessary
to
take
into
account
the
cancellation
of
the
penalty
or
interest.
5.
Penalties
and
interest
may
be
waived
or
cancelled
in
whole
or
in
part
where
they
result
in
circumstances
beyond
a
taxpayer's
or
employer's
control.
For
example,
one
of
the
following
extraordinary
circumstances
may
have
prevented
a
taxpayer
a
taxpayer's
agent,
the
executor
of
an
estate,
or
an
employer
from
making
a
payment
when
due,
or
otherwise
complying
with
the
Income
Tax
Act:
(d)
serious
emotional
or
mental
distress
such
as,
death
in
the
immediate
family.
Analysis
This
Court
derives
its
powers
from
enabling
statutes
and
is
not
a
Court
of
equity.
The
Tax
Court
of
Canada
does
not
have
the
jurisdiction
to
substitute
its
own
opinion
for
that
of
the
Minister
in
respect
of
the
Minister’s
finding
pursuant
to
subsection
220(3.1).
The
Court
was
referred
to
the
case
of
Floyd
Estate
v.
M.N.R.,
[1993]
2
C.T.C.
322,
93
D.T.C.
5499.
This
was
an
application
under
the
Federal
Court
Act
for
judicial
review.
The
Court
stated
at
page
324
(D.T.C.
550):
At
the
outset,
I
should
point
out
that
it
is
not
for
the
Court
to
decide
whether
the
interest
otherwise
payable
by
the
taxpayer
ought
to
be
waived
or
cancelled.
It
is
within
the
discretion
of
the
Minister.
The
function
of
the
Court
in
this
judicial
review,
as
I
understand
it,
is
to
determine
whether
or
not
the
Minister
failed
to
observe
procedural
fairness
or
erred
in
law
in
making
his
decision,
as
outlined
under
subsection
18.1(4)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act.
The
Court
refused
to
analyze
the
substantive
question
of
whether
or
not
the
decision
was
fair
to
the
taxpayer.
This
Court
will
not
second
guess
the
Minister’s
decision.
The
decision,
on
the
merits
of
the
appellant’s
application
under
subsection
220(3.1)
is
at
the
discretion
of
the
Minister.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.