Rouleau
J.:—
The
parties
in
these
proceedings
appeared
before
me
at
Toronto
on
June
6,
1994.
It
concerned
two
separate
actions
commenced
in
this
Court
by
Mr.
Brough,
on
his
own
behalf,
and
as
president
of
a
company
called
Satellite
Earth
Station
Technology
Inc.
(Satellite);
a
third
action
concerns
an
appeal
by
the
corporate
plaintiff
from
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada.
The
plaintiff
has
filed
several
motions
with
respect
to
each
of
these
matters
in
which
various
forms
of
relief,
which
I
will
refer
to
later
in
these
reasons,
are
being
sought.
The
defendant
on
the
other
hand,
raised
a
minor
matter,
that
of
experiencing
difficulty
communicating
with
the
plaintiff,
his
address
having
changed
a
number
of
times
during
the
past
month;
it
is
therefore
seeking
an
order
requesting
a
firm
address
for
the
service
of
documents
and
pleadings.
After
hearing
the
parties
I
only
ordered
the
plaintiff
to
advise
the
Court
no
later
than
June
14,
1994
of
his
new
address
for
the
service
of
documents;
which
address
should
not
change
except
by
further
order
of
this
Court.
I
reserved
judgement
on
all
the
other
matters
as
I
felt
a
complete
review
of
the
proceedings
in
these
various
files
was
in
order.
Mr.
Brough,
the
next
day,
on
June
6,
1994,
attempted
to
file
motions
for
summary
judgment
without
waiting
for
a
ruling
on
the
matters
I
had
heard
the
day
before.
I
then
further
ordered
that
the
Court
not
accept
nor
entertain
any
further
motions
from
him
until
such
time
as
I
released
my
decision
on
the
many
outstanding
issues.
I
should
point
out
from
the
outset
that
there
are
common
elements
underlying
each
of
these
files;
primarily
all
dealing
with
Satellite’s
tax
liability,
the
legality
of
a
seizure
of
an
airplane;
what
damages,
if
any,
are
the
various
plaintiffs
entitled
to.
None
of
the
outstanding
issues
has
proceeded
to
trial
and
it
is
questionable
whether
discoveries
have
been
completed,
notwithstanding
the
fact
that
these
actions
were
launched
over
three
years
ago.
It
was
for
these
reasons
that
I
decided
to
review
the
background
leading
up
to
the
institution
of
these
various
proceedings.
The
plaintiff,
David
B.Brough,
is
the
president
of
a
company
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
Ontario,
called
Satellite
Earth
Station
Technology
Inc.
(Satellite).
Satellite
was
incorporated
in
April,
1981
and
was
engaged
in
various
communications
endeavours;
principally
the
manufacture
and
sale
of
satellite
dishes;
later,
as
that
market
began
to
falter,
the
production
of
documentary
films.
Mr.
Brough
was
a
minority
shareholder
until
his
association
with
the
majority
shareholder
was
dissolved
in
October,
1986,
whereupon
all
of
the
shares
and
most
of
the
corporate
assets
were
turned
over
to
him.
In
1986,
Satellite
was
audited
with
respect
to
it's
1984,
1985
and
1986
taxation
years
and
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
a
number
of
deductions
and
expenses
which
had
been
claimed.
It
was
determined
that
Satellite
owed
taxes
in
the
amount
of
approximately
$104,000,
including
penalties.
More
particularly,
amounts
disallowed
as
expenses
was
the
purchase
of
items
such
as
an
airplane,
two
snowmobiles,
a
piano,
bagpipes,
a
flute,
video
equipment
etc.
The
Minister
found
no
rational
connection
between
the
Operation
of
a
satellite
antenna
business
and
these
expenditures.
Also
disallowed
were
deductions
made
under
section
2900
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
Regulations
in
respect
of
scientific
research
and
development,
the
cost
of
a
Caribbean
cruise,
as
well
as
various
other
personal
expenses
charged
on
the
shareholders'
visa
accounts
and
paid
by
the
corporation.
Mr.
Brough
disputed
these
reassessments
alleging
that
the
Minister
was
trying
to
"recover"
or
"reclaim"
what
"they
lost"
when
he
declared
personal
bankruptcy
in
1985.
He
submits
that
the
audit
of
Satellite
was
malicious
and
that
it
was
negligently
performed.
These
reassessments
were
upheld
by
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
and
an
appeal
of
this
decision
is
the
subject
matter
of
one
of
the
files
before
me;
namely
Court
file
No.
T-1029-91.
The
issue
of
Satellite’s
tax
liability
aside,
the
plaintiff’s
concerns
in
the
present
case
also
relate
to
the
seizure
of
an
aircraft,
called
the
"Lake
Rene-
gade".
This
occurred
on
May
13,
1988
following
the
issuance
of
a
writ
of
fieri
acias
against
the
corporate
plaintiff,
pursuant
to
section
223
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
Act).
Mr.
Brough
alleged
that
the
Lake
Renegade
was
not,
and
never
was,
owned
by
Satellite;
that
he
was
at
all
material
times
the
beneficial
owner
and
that
the
seizure
of
the
aircraft
was
both
illegal
and
improper.
He
further
deposed
that
the
plane
was
a
crucial
tool
of
his
trade
and
was
necessary
for
the
carrying
on
of
his
business.
Mr.
Brough
sought
to
recover
the
aircraft
under
various
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
He
has
also
sought
recourse
in
this
Court;
in
fact
he
has
commenced
14
different
actions
in
this
regard
since
1988,
the
particulars
of
some
are
as
follows.
Initially,
he
sought
amongst
many
claims
for
relief,
damages
for
wrongful
seizure
of
the
aircraft
as
well
as
damages
for
lost
income
and
mental
distress.
This
action
was
initiated
on
October
31,
1988,
in
Court
file
No.
T-2198-88.
He
attempted
to
challenge
the
validity
of
the
writ
of
fieri
facias
in
Court
file
No.
T-2392-88;
this
motion
was
dismissed
by
Martin
J.
on
June
19,
1989.
Charter
relief
has
also
been
claimed;
in
Court
file
No.
T-508-89,
he
sought
an
order
under
the
Charter,
releasing
the
aircraft;
in
Court
file
No.
T-884-89
he
challenged
the
constitutionality
of
certain
provisions
of
the
Aeronautics
Act
which
permit
the
Minister
"access
to
private
property
without
the
benefit
of
a
warrant"
contrary
to
the
protection
from
unreasonable
search
and
seizure
as
guaranteed
by
section
8
of
the
Charter.
Both
these
matters
were
subsequently
dismissed.
In
June,
1989,
he
instituted
a
number
of
proceedings
against
various
Minister
of
the
Crown.
In
Court
file
No:
T-1267-89,
Mr.
Brough
attempted
to
sue
the
Minister
of
Justice
for
alleged
misconduct
and
consequent
mental
distress
in
its
dealings
with
the
plaintiff
during
his
dispute
with
Revenue
Canada.
A
claim
for
damages
in
the
amount
of
$5,000,000
was
instituted
against
the
Minister
of
Communications
for
allegedly
acting
in
bad
faith
when
it
failed
to
grant
him
licences
to
provide
various
radio
and
television
services.
This
was
the
subject
matter
of
Court
file
No
T-1268-89.
The
Minister
of
Transport
was
sued
for
$1,000,000
in
Court
file
No.
T-1269-89
on
the
grounds
that
the
Minister
negligently
allowed
the
plaintiff
to
operate
a
plane,
namely
the
Lake
Renegade
that
was
deemed
to
be
“unairworthy”
and;
last,
but
not
least,
the
Minister
of
Public
Works
was
the
defendant
in
Court
file
No:
T-1270-89,
a
suit
in
which
$5,000,000
in
damages
was
claimed
on
the
grounds
that
the
plaintiff
was
wrongfully
refused
a
grant
from
the
Atlantic
Canada
Opportunities
Agency.
All
of
these
actions
were
subsequently
dismissed
at
various
times
and
by
various
judges
of
this
Court
on
the
oasis
that
they
disclosed
no
reasonable
cause
of
action,
or
alternatively
they
were
scandalous,
frivolous
and
vexatious
or
otherwise
an
abuse
of
the
process
of
this
Court.
With
respect
to
these
various
actions,
the
plaintiff
was
ordered
to
pay
costs
in
the
amount
of
$2,100.
Notwithstanding
the
above,
Mr.
Brough
did
meet
with
some
degree
of
success.
On
November
28,
1988,
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
ordered
the
release
of
the
"Lake
Renegade”.
On
the
same
day
however,
the
Crown
applied
ex
parte
to
this
Court
and
obtained
a
"jeopardy
order"
under
subsection
225.2(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
maintaining
the
seizure.
This
prompted
Mr.
Brough
to
institute
further
proceedings;
by
notice
of
motion
dated
December
22,
1988
in
Court
file
No
T-2308-88,
he
sought
to
have
this
Order
reviewed
and
set
aside.
The
motion
was
successful
and
on
October
29,
1989,
MacKay
J.
ordered
the
release
of
the
aircraft
because
he
was
not
satisfied
that
the
collection
of
all
or
part
of
the
debt
owed
to
the
Minister
would
be
jeopardized
if
they
failed
to
maintain
the
seizure.
Having
repossessed
his
aircraft,
Mr.
Brough
is
still
seeking
damages
for
what
he
believes
to
be
an
illegal
seizure;
in
addition,
he
alleges
that
the
Lake
Renegade
was
damaged
while
held
as
security;
he
alleges
that
prior
to
the
seizure,
it
had
a
value
of
approximately
$300,000
and
because
of
neglect,
it
has
deteriorated
to
a
point
where
it
is
now
worth
considerably
less,
between
$30,000
and
$50,000.
From
November,
1989
through
to
March,
1990,
he
retained
counsel
in
an
attempt
to
get
the
defendant
to
restore
the
aircraft
to
its
former
condition.
It
would
appear
from
the
record
that
Mr.
Brough
received
some
compensation
in
this
regard;
however
it
is
also
apparent
that
he
is
not
satisfied
with
the
amount
received
to
date
and
asserts
that
negotiations
have
broken
down.
In
this
action,
Court
file
No
T-2842-90,
which
was
commenced
on
October
25,
1990,
Mr.
Brough
alleges
that
the
defendant
improperly
commenced
an
investigation
of
Satellite’s
affairs
"based
on
antipathy
and
prejudice,
and
without
reasonable
grounds”.
In
the
originating
statement
of
claim,
he
claims
the
following
relief:
(a)
damages
for
seizure
of
his
Lake
in
the
amount
of
$1
million,
(b)
damages
for
the
loss
of
his
Ultimate
in
the
amount
of
$100,000,
(c)
loss
of
income
in
the
amount
of
$500,000,
(d)
damages
for
the
damage
to
the
Lake
in
the
amount
of
$250,000,
(c)
loss
of
recreation
in
the
amount
of
$100,000,
(d)
damage
to
reputation
and
mental
duress
in
the
amount
of
$1
million,
(e)
legal
fees
and
court
costs
spent
in
the
attempt
to
reclaim
and
restore
his
Lake
in
the
amount
of
$20,000,
(f)
his
costs,
(g)
such
other
and
further
relief
as
this
Court
deems
just.
This
statement
of
claim
was
subsequently
amended
on
February
14,
1991,
May
13,
1991
and
June
24,1991
and
he
is
presently
claiming
"general
damages
for
abuse
of
power,
misfeasance
and
negligence
in
the
amount
of
$5
million;
special
damages
in
the
amount
of
$5
million;
and
exemplary
damages
in
the
amount
of
$2
million”.
He
is
also
seeking
a
declaration
that
the
"Lake
Renegade”
is
the
property
of
David
B.
Brough
and
not
Satellite,
as
well
as
costs
on
a
solicitor-client
basis.
Court
file
no.
T-389-91,
the
second
matter
before
me,
relates
to
an
action
commenced
on
February
14,
1991
in
which
the
pleadings
are
identical
to
those
in
the
present
instance
except
that
Satellite
is
the
plaintiff.
As
stated
earlier
in
these
reasons,
the
third
matter
presently
before
this
Court,
court
file
no.
T-1029-91,
is
an
appeal
from
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
upholding
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue’s
reassessments
of
the
corporate
plaintiff.
After
having
instituted
these
new
proceedings,
Mr.
Brough
appeared
before
Giles,
A.S.P.
on
June
24,
1991
requesting
permission
to
act
on
behalf
of
the
corporate
plaintiff
in
court
files
nos.
T-389-91
and
T-1029-91.
This
request
was
ranted
with
the
proviso
that
Mr.
Brough
is
to
be
held
personally
responsible
for
any
costs
awarded
against
the
corporate
plaintiff.
It
would
also
appear
that
the
defendant
also
consented
at
that
time
to
discoveries
by
way
of
written
examination.
The
record
indicates
that
discoveries
commenced
on
August
2,
1991,
when
the
defendant
was
served
by
facsimile
with
what
was
purported
to
be
"Questions
on
Written
Examination
for
Discovery”.
This
document
was
deficient
in
several
ways;
it
was
served
on
one
continuous
page,
the
questions
had
numerous
errors
in
their
numbering,
and
several
questions
were
printed
illegibly.
Additionally,
I
am
informed
that
there
were
over
600
questions
on
this
list
including
questions
directed
to
individuals
who
were
never
in
the
employ
of
the
defendant
Minister
and
questions
relating
to
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
and
the
appeal
in
Court
file
No.
T-1029-91.
On
September
19,
1991,
the
defendant
sought,
and
obtained,
an
order
striking
out
those
irrelevant
questions
and
an
order
requiring
the
Written
Discovery
to
be
prepared
on
consecutively
numbered
pages
with
questions
properly
numbered.
The
defendant
was
then
given
ninety
days
within
which
to
respond
to
these
new
questions.
Two
years
pass
and
it
now
appears
that
Mr.
Brough
is
not
satisfied
with
the
way
discoveries
have
progressed.
On
January
26,
1994,
he
filed
a
notice
of
motion
in
these
proceedings
as
well
as
in
court
files
nos.
T-389-91
and
T-1029-91
for
an
order
striking
the
defence;
in
the
alternative
an
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
submit
to
an
oral
discovery
and
that
the
defendant
be
ordered
to
pay
the
entire
costs
of
the
discovery.
He
also
sought
an
order
allowing
the
plaintiff
leave
to
call
a
witness
at
a
forthcoming
motion
as
well
as
an
order
consolidating
this
matter
with
that
in
court
file
no.
T-389-90.
These
motions
were
heard
by
Giles
A.S.P.
on
January
31,
1994.
There
having
been
no
memorandum
or
affidavit
filed
in
support
indicating
the
plaintiff's
position
with
respect
to
each
of
the
several
hundred
questions
answered
or
refused
by
the
defendant
on
discovery;
most
matters
were
adjourned
to
enable
the
plaintiff
to
file
written
submissions
and
the
motion
was
then
to
proceed
in
writing
under
Rule
324.
Those
issues
in
the
motion
dealing
with
leave
to
call
a
witness
to
testify
at
a
forthcoming
motion
and
for
an
order
consolidating
this
matter
with
court
file
no.
T-389-90
were
dismissed.
On
February
3,
1994,
Mr.
Brough
served
his
written
submissions
with
respect
to
the
written
discovery
questions
and
February
15,
1994
was
a
date
fixed
to
hear
the
defendant's
oral
submissions.
The
day
before,
on
February
14,
the
Crown
tabled
a
motion
for
an
order
that
the
plaintiff
deliver
a
more
accurate
and
complete
affidavit
of
documents.
This
latter
application
was
dismissed
because
it
was
not
supported
by
affidavit
evidence;
costs
were
awarded
to
the
plaintiff
and
have
yet
to
be
assessed.
On
February
15,
1994,
the
date
set
for
the
hearing
of
oral
submissions
with
respect
to
the
written
discoveries,
Mr.
Brough
attempted
to
file
a
further
motion
in
which
he
sought,
amongst
other
things,
an
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
provide
a
revised
affidavit
of
documents.
He
also
was
seeking
an
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
deliver
at
its
expense
copies
of
all
documents
in
its
possession;
in
the
alternative,
requiring
the
defendant
to
submit
a
proper
Notice
of
Inspection
allowing
the
plaintiff
access
to
its
documents
upon
one
day’s
notice.
This
not
being
a
regular
motions
day,
no
matter
could
be
set
down
without
leave
nor
was
the
motion
supported
by
affidavits;
as
a
result,
it
was
adjourned
sine
die,
to
be
brought
on,
on
any
regular
motions
day
after
February
22
and
before
May
25.
The
hearing
proceeded
with
respect
to
the
motion
dealing
with
the
sufficiency
of
answers
to
the
questions
in
the
written
discovery.
Although
he
had
already
filed
written
submissions,
Mr.
Brough
was
allowed
to
reply
to
the
defendant's
oral
reply.
As
the
prothonotary
notes
in
his
reasons,
it
became
apparent
quite
early
in
the
proceedings
that
a
great
number
of
the
plaintiff's
allegations
in
his
written
submissions
to
the
effect
that
the
answers
provided
were
either
evasive,
unanswered
or
“bald-faced
lies",
were
not
substantiated.
Mr.
Brough,
at
one
stage,
tendered
a
number
of
supplementary
or
follow-up
questions
which
the
prothonotary
refused
to
allow;
Mr.
Brough
is
then
on
record
as
having
objected
to
the
proceedings
and
he
abruptly
left
the
courtroom.
The
learned
prothonotary
proceeded
to
rule
on
each
of
the
questions
having
due
regard
to
Mr.
Brough's
written
submissions
and
the
oral
response
of
counsel
for
the
Crown.
Before
they
had
terminated
this
hearing,
and
while
still
in
session,
Mr.
Brough
sent
a
facsimile
transmission
to
the
Court
in
which
he
indicated
that
he
intended
to
appeal
these
orders
and
he
requested
that
written
reasons
be
provided
by
the
Prothonotary.
By
order
dated
February
15,
1994,
the
prothonotary
ruled
that
several
questions
in
the
written
examination
for
discovery
required
no
further
answer;
that
a
limited
number
of
other
questions
should
be
clarified
or
amplified.
He
also
adjourned
sine
die
the
plaintiff's
ongoing
motion
with
respect
to
striking
the
statement
of
defence,
which
also
sought,
in
the
alternative,
that
the
defendant
submit
to
oral
discoveries;
all
this
pending
the
filing
of
appropriate
affidavit
evidence
by
the
plaintiff.
His
observations
at
page
7
of
his
reasons
dated
February
28,
1994,
bear
repeating:
In
summary:
1.
It
is
my
view
that
there
is
no
right
to
file
supplementary
or
follow-up
written
questions
when
conducting
a
discovery
in
writing
because
Rule
466,1
requires
one
list
of
questions.
2.
Additional
discoveries
are
not
normally
ordered
until
the
original
discovery
is
completed.
3.
An
additional
discovery
will
not
be
ordered
except
in
exceptional
circumstances
of
which
there
must
be
proof
by
affidavit
filed
for
the
purpose
of
the
motion
seeking
such
additional
discovery.
It
was
for
these
reasons
that
I
refused
supplementary
or
follow-up
written
questions
and
I
have
adjourned
the
motion
for
an
additional
discovery
to
be
brought
on
with
evidence.
By
notice
of
motion
dated
May
28,
1994
the
plaintiff
is
now
seeking
the
following
relief:
1.
An
order
striking
the
defence,
or
in
the
alternative;
2.
An
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
provide
a
revised
affidavit
of
documents
forthwith;
3.
An
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
copy
and
deliver,
at
its
expense,
its
documents
to
the
plaintiff
forthwith,
and
in
the
alternative;
4.
An
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
submit
a
proper
Notice
of
Inspection;
5.
In
the
alternative,
an
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
allow
the
plaintiff
access
to
the
defendant's
documents
upon
one
day's
notice.
6.
An
order
consolidating
this
matter
with
file
T-389-91;
7.
An
order
varying
the
order
dismissing
the
plaintiff's
request
for
leave
to
examine
outside
parties
to
be
adjourned
to
allow
the
plaintiff
to
serve
the
other
parties
and
to
provide
support
for
the
request;
8.
An
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
produce
certain
documents
and
manuals
respecting
the
conduct
of
audits,
delivery
of
reassessments,
conduct
of
collections
proceedings,
department
appeals
and
the
conduct
of
matters
under
section
252
of
the
Act.
9.
An
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
turn
over
the
exhibits
named
in
its
motion
of
February
14,
1994;
10.
Setting
the
costs
awarded
to
the
plaintiff
on
February
14,
1994;
11.
An
order
allowing
the
listing
of
this
matter
for
trial
without
the
costs
being
paid
until
the
trial;
and
21.
Costs
of
this
motion,
including
punitive
costs.
With
this
background
in
mind,
I
would
like
to
deal
first
with
the
issue
of
discoveries.
Mr.
Brough
elected
written
discoveries
and
on
August
2,
1991
he
submitted
a
preliminary
list
of
questions
to
be
answered;
some
of
these
questions
were
deleted
by
Order
of
this
Court
dated
September
19,
1991.
On
February
11,
1992,
the
plaintiff
was
served
with
the
defendant's
written
responses
to
these
questions.
The
plaintiff
was
not
satisfied
with
these
answers
and
in
a
subsequent
motion
the
learned
prothonotary
painstakingly
reviewed
the
list
of
questions
and
determined
that
the
plaintiff's
allegations
of
evasiveness
were
unsubstantiated;
those
questions
which
required
clarification,
have
now
been
answered.
There
is
no
evidence
before
me
to
substantiate
any
suggestion
that
the
defendant
has
interfered
with,
or
obstructed
the
conduct
of
these
discoveries
so
as
to
warrant
striking
the
statement
of
defence
or
requiring
the
defendant
to
resubmit
to
an
examination
for
discovery
as
contemplated
by
Rule
261.
The
plaintiff
was
served
with
the
defendant's
affidavit
of
documents
sometime
in
November,
1991
and
I
note
that
183
documents
are
listed
in
Schedule
1.
I
am
satisfied
that
this
is
a
complete
and
accurate
listing.
The
notice
to
inspect
is
in
proper
form
and
allows
for
inspection,
by
appointment,
during
business
hours.
I
am
satisfied
from
the
record
that
Mr.
Brough
has
been
given
ample
opportunity
to
inspect
these
documents;
that
a
week
in
January,
1994
was
actually
set
aside
for
this
express
purpose
and
that
88
pages
of
documents
have
been
photocopied
and
are
available
to
be
picked
up
upon
payment
of
the
photocopying
fees.
I
am
also
satisfied
that
the
plaintiff
has
been
given
reasonable
opportunity
to
inspect
all
documents
in
the
defendant's
control
and
no
order
shall
issue
in
this
regard.
Furthermore,
I
am
not
prepared
to
issue
an
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
copy
and
deliver,
at
its
expense,
other
documents
requested
by
the
plaintiff,
in
particular
the
exhibits
referred
to
in
the
defendant's
motion
of
February
14,
1994;
namely
the
plaintiff's
affidavit
of
documents
sworn
August
8,
1991
and
a
transcript
of
his
examination
for
discovery
need
not
be
produced
by
the
defendant.
The
plaintiff's
request
for
an
order
requiring
the
defendant
to
produce
certain
documents
and
internal
manuals
respecting
the
conduct
of
audits
and
collection
proceedings
is
likewise
denied.
The
request
that
I
vary
the
prothonotary's
order
of
January
31,
1994
in
which
he
dismissed
an
application
for
leave
to
call
an
outside
witness
is
denied.
The
plaintiff
has
repeatedly
requested
an
order
consolidating
this
matter
with
file
T-389-91,
and
I
gather
from
the
record
that
the
defendant
has
consistently
opposed
this
request.
However,
I
am
prepared
to
grant
this
relief
because
I
think
that
it
is
in
the
interest
of
justice
that
I
so
order;
this
could
expedite
the
resolution
of
these
matters
and
avoid
the
confusion
caused
by
the
filing
of
duplicate
documents
in
the
various
files.
Mr.
Brough
also
seeks
an
order
allowing
the
fixing
of
this
matter
for
trial
without
the
prescribed
tariff
being
paid
until
trial.
There
are
no
provisions
in
the
Rules
for
proceeding
in
forma
pauperis
and
it
has
already
been
established
that
the
Court
has
no
authority
to
waive
the
fees
and
charges
provided
for
in
Tariff
A:
Magrath
v.
National
Parole
Board,
[1979]
2
F.C.
757
(F.C.T.D.).
The
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
costs
as
per
the
order
of
the
prothonotary
dated
February
14,1994
and
I
hereby
confirm
the
order
that
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
costs
in
this
and
the
related
proceedings,
in
the
amount
of
$50.
This
application
is
otherwise
dismissed
and
costs
of
$200
are
awarded
to
the
defendant
in
respect
of
all
three
motions,
payable
forthwith.
Finally,
I
am
hereby
invoking
Rule
5
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
which
is
often
referred
to
as
the
"gap"
rule
and,
relying
on
Rules
56.01
and
57.03
of
the
Ontario
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure,
I
hereby
order
that
no
further
proceedings
from
the
plaintiff
will
be
entertained
by
this
Court
until
such
time
as
the
plaintiff
has
paid
the
defendant
its
costs
in
these
motions
as
well
as
the
outstanding
costs
of
$2,100
arising
out
of
the
various
other
actions
commenced
and
dismissed
by
the
Court.
I
am
satisfied
that
most
are
vexatious
and
frivolous.
In
closing,
I
would
urge
counsel,
on
behalf
of
the
Crown
to
exercise
a
more
aggressive
approach.
Mr.
Brough
feels
that
he
has
been
wronged
and
is
seeking
redress
through
the
courts;
he
has
instituted
numerous
proceedings
and
it
is
apparent
that
whenever
he
fails
to
et
the
relief
sought,
he
initiates
a
new
cause
of
action.
The
scarce
resources
of
this
Court
have
been
taxed
by
these
multiple
proceedings.
It
appears
to
me
in
the
two
actions
before
me,
this
Court
has
no
authority
to
grant
most
of
the
relief
being
sought
and
some
aspects
of
the
relief
claimed
may
already
be
res
judicata.
I
would
also
like
to
point
out
that
there
are
presently
two
other
actions
instituted
by
Mr.
Brougnthat
are
presently
outstanding
before
this
Court;
namely
court
files
nos.
T-1775-89
and
T-391-91.
Since
this
matter
came
before
me
on
June
6,
1994,
the
Registry
of
this
Court
has,
on
two
occasions
and
in
both
files,
received
directives
in
which
the
plaintiff
complained
about
the
fact
that
no
decision
had
yet
been
rendered
and
sought
to
withdraw
his
appeal
from
the
order
of
the
Prothonotary
as
well
as
the
motion
before
me.
These
withdrawals
are
rejected.
Application
dismissed.
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