Wong
J
(orally):—The
four
of
you
have
been
found
guilty
by
a
jury
of
perpetrating
five
counts
of
income
tax
fraud
on
the
Federal
Government
amounting
to
almost
17
and
a
half
million
dollars
arising
out
of
two
purported
scientific
research
projects
financed
by
the
sale
of
income
tax
credits.
The
fraudulent
schemes
were
conducted
under
the
short-lived
scientific
research
tax
credit
plan
of
the
Federal
Government
in
late
1983.
The
program
was
designed
to
stimulate
new
technology
research
and
development
in
Canada
but
lasted
for
only
ten
months
before
it
was
withdrawn
by
the
Government
as
being
unsatisfactory
in
terms
of
implementing
actual
research.
The
fraudulent
scheme
was
elaborate.
It
involved
creation
of
the
beginnings
of
a
research
infrastructure
by
expenditure
of
initial
seed
money,
attraction
of
investment
money
from
third
party
sources
through
the
sale
of
income
tax
credit
certificates,
creation
of
an
escrow
arrangement
to
hold
potential
tax
liability
funds
in
the
event
research
obligations
were
not
incurred,
use
of
inflated
and
bogus
equipment
acquisition
invoices
together
with
bogus
promissory
notes,
and,
finally,
false
representations
to
secure
release
of
the
escrow
funds.
The
research
projects
were
then
abruptly
abandoned
and
the
research
monies
were
then
divided
and
pocketed
amongst
the
main
players.
The
scheme
involved
the
expenditure
of
a
great
deal
of
thought,
preparation,
skill,
and
determination.
It
incorporated
the
use
of
legal,
accounting,
and
business
knowledge
skills
of
the
various
accused.
Because
of
your
professional
standing
and
ostensible
impression
as
responsible,
upstanding
members
of
the
community,
the
fraud
was
facilitated.
The
enormity
and
scale
of
this
fraud
of
public
funds
was
morally
monstrous.
Capitalizing
on
the
fact
that
the
income
tax
system
relies
primarily
on
voluntary
compliance,
you
also
took
advantage
of
that
trust
to
syphon
the
public
purse.
Public
confidence
with
respect
to
continued
voluntary
conformity
to
our
income
tax
system
and
expectation
that
the
law
will
deal
severely
with
those
who
abuse
that
trust
must
be
upheld.
Even
though
all
of
you
have
previous
unblemished
backgrounds,
an
exemplary,
denunciatory
custodial
sentence
with
a
major,
general
deterrent
component
must
be
imposed.
Rehabilitation
is
not
a
concern
here
and,
in
any
event,
must
be
secondary
in
this
case
to
the
principle
of
general
deterrence.
Specific
deterrence
in
light
of
the
fact
that
these
offences
were
discovered
and
the
ruinous
effect
that
fraud
convictions
will
have
as
to
your
future
professional
careers
and
business
activities
need
not
be
emphasized.
The
length
of
the
sentence,
applying
these
principles,
must
then
be
proportionate
to
the
gravity
of
the
offence
and
its
circumstance
and
commensurate
to
the
extent
of
each
individual’s
culpability.
From
the
evidence,
I
am
satisfied
that
Messrs.
Lawrence,
Richards,
and
Johnson
were
some
of
the
main
players
in
concocting
and
perpetrating
this
elaborate
fraud.
There
is
little
to
distinguish
the
extent
of
their
respective
culpabilities.
Mr.
Byerlay
appears
to
be
a
minor
player
who,
for
perhaps
$70,000,
was
prepared
to
lend
his
technical
credentials
in
order
to
advance
the
credibility
of
this
fraudulent
scheme.
The
extent
of
his
culpability
is
clearly
considerably
less
than
that
of
the
other
accused.
Even
though
all
of
the
accused
are
first
time
criminal
offenders
at
middle
and
mature
ages,
a
deterrent
custodial
sentence
is
inescapable.
The
maximum
penalty
provided
under
the
Criminal
Code
for
fraud
is
ten
years'
imprisonment.
I
propose
to
approach
the
imposition
of
sentence
on
a
global
base
of
totality.
Each
count,
basically,
was
a
series
of
repeated
representations
of
the
same
fraud.
From
a
review
of
the
sentencing
authorities
both
in
this
province
and
in
other
parts
of
Canada,
a
sentencing
range
for
frauds
of
this
magnitude
under
the
Criminal
Code,
depending
upon
the
circumstances
and
involvement,
is
somewhere
between
four
to
nine
years’
imprisonment.
The
circumstances
of
this
case
warrant
a
custodial
sentence
towards
the
high
end
of
this
range
for
the
main
players.
I
have
also
been
referred
to
British
Columbia
cases
in
which
custodial
sentences
have
been
below
this
range:
See
The
Queen
v.
Bio-Terra
Products
Ltd.,
et
al,
unreported,
case
number
CC891584
in
the
Vancouver
Registry,
an
unreported
decision
rendered
on
December
14,
1990,
a
decision
of
this
Court
and
the
decision
of
The
Queen
v.
Zink,
Court
of
Appeal
Registry
number
014179,
unreported,
May
15,
1992.
That
is
a
decision
of
the
British
Columbia
Court
of
Appeal.
1
distinguish
those
cases
on
the
basis
that
those
prosecutions
were
under
the
tax
evasion
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
which
the
maximum
custodial
penalty
is
limited
to
one
half
of
that
provided
by
the
Criminal
Code
for
fraud,
and
the
Crown
chose
not
to
cross-appeal
the
lesser
sentence
imposed
in
the
Zink
case.
It
was
properly
conceded
by
the
Crown
that
Mr.
Byerlay's
lesser
involvement
warrants
a
lesser
custodial
sentence
of
provincial
time.
In
arriving
at
the
duration,
I
have
also
given
consideration
to
Mr.
Byerlay’s
age,
his
health,
and
the
health
needs
of
his
dependent
wife.
The
Crown
also
requested,
in
addition,
the
imposition
of
a
$20,000
fine
on
Mr.
Byerlay.
I
have
given
consideration
to
that
request,
but
after
taking
into
account
Mr.
Byerlay’s
age
of
65
years,
his
limited
fixed
income,
and
relatively
modest
financial
means,
I
have
concluded
that
an
additional
financial
penalty
is
inappropriate.
Messrs.
Lawrence
and
Johnson
were
also
convicted
on
Count
9
of
possession
of
proceeds
of
crime,
namely,
the
funds
obtained
fraudulently
and
then
deposited
in
their
various
bank
accounts.
Since
a
substantial
custodial
sentence
will
be
imposed
on
the
fraud
convictions,
I
think
a
totality
approach
of
a
reasonable,
aggregate
sentence
limits
imposition
of
substantial
additional
custodial
time
on
this
count;
however,
the
principle
that
separate
crimes
call
for
separate
penalties
must
also
be
followed.
The
imposition
of
a
substantial
fine
is
not
an
appropriate
alternative.
Lawrence
and
Johnson
have
dependent
families.
A
substantial
financial
penalty
at
this
time
would
adversely
affect
their
families’
immediate
needs.
It
would
either
devastate
them
or
leave
Messrs.
Lawrence
and
Johnson
with
the
unenviable
dilemma
of
either
paying
the
fine,
thus
harming
their
families
further,
or
serving
additional
time
in
default,
which
would
have
to
be
additional
substantial
time.
Therefore,
I
have
concluded
that
one
year’s
additional
imprisonment
to
what
I
am
about
to
impose
would
be
sufficient.
On
Count
10,
Mr.
Lawrence
and
his
then
company,
Mid-Pacific
Services
Inc.,
purchased
his
present
home
at
1075
Millstream
Road
in
West
Vancouver
with
proceeds
from
this
fraud.
It
currently
has
an
assessed
value
for
property
tax
purposes
of
over
$1,000,000.
Mid-Pacific
is
the
registered
owner.
The
Crown
sought
to
forfeit
this
property
under
section
462.37
of
the
Criminal
Code.
The
motion
is
opposed
by
Mr.
Sean
Morriss
and
Hydro
Fuels
Inc.
who
are
civil
judgment
creditors
of
a
$15M
unjust
enrichment
award
against
the
main
player
accused
with
a
specific
vesting
order
in
the
Millstream
Road
property
in
their
favour.
Mr.
Hilliker,
on
behalf
of
Mr.
Morriss
and
Hydro
Fuels,
submitted
that
section
462.37
provides
for
forfeiture
of
property.
He
pointed
out
that
the
purpose
of
the
section
is
that
persons
should
not
be
entitled
to
retain
the
fruits
of
their
criminal
endeavours.
However,
he
further
submitted
that
in
order
for
a
forfeiture
to
take
place,
the
property
must
be
the
property
of
the
accused.
If
the
property
was
transferred
to
a
third
party
before
the
forfeiture
hearing,
and
if
there
was
no
prior
restraint
order,
then
the
property
cannot
be
forfeited.
He
relied
upon
the
authority
from
the
Alberta
Queen's
Bench
of
The
Queen
v.
Gagnon,
an
unreported
decision
rendered
on
September
22,
1992,
under
the
Alberta
Registry
number
of
9103-1067C3.
The
Gagnon
decision
was
later
cited
with
approval
in
the
Ontario
Court
of
Appeal
decision
of
The
Queen
v.
Wilson,
unreported,
on
October
27,1993
in
the
Registry
number
of
C8174.
The
Crown
has
now
conceded
that
in
light
of
subsection
462.37(3),
Mr.
Hilliker’s
position
is
unanswerable.
I
agree
and,
therefore,
rule
that
1075
Millstream
Road
is
not
available
for
forfeiture.
Although
subsection
462.37(3)
also
permits
a
court
to
impose
a
fine
equivalent
to
the
amount
of
the
proceeds
of
crime
used
for
the
purchase,
I
decline
to
do
so
for
the
reasons
and
concern
expressed
earlier
as
to
the
effect
on
Mr.
Lawrence's
family.
Count
10
is
a
continuation
of
Count
9
by
conversion
of
the
earlier
proceeds
to
residential
real
estate.
For
that
reason,
a
concurrent
sentence
on
that
count
is
proper.
Mid-Pacific,
as
the
earlier
corporate
vehicle,
will
be
subject
to
a
modest
fine.
The
Crown
also
applies
under
section
725
of
the
Criminal
Code
for
a
compensation
order
in
the
amount
of
$1M
each
against
Messrs.
Lawrence,
Richards,
and
Johnson.
The
jury
found
fraud
had
taken
place
to
the
extent
of
17
and
a
half
million
dollars.
There
has
been
no
recovery
of
those
funds.
I
have
concluded
such
an
order
is,
indeed,
appropriate
for
the
following
reasons:
1.
A
jury
in
an
eight-month
criminal
trial
found
on
a
criminal
standard
of
proof
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt
that
fraud
by
these
main
players
was
perpetrated
on
the
federal
government
of
17
and
a
half
million
dollars.
The
public
purse
should
not
be
tapped
to
establish
that
again
in
a
civil
court.
Section
725
was
designed
by
Parliament
to
prevent
that
duplication.
2.
Although
these
three
convicts
may
not
have
present
exigible
assets
in
Canada,
the
evidence
at
trial
disclosed
that
each
accused
had
at
one
time
at
their
personal
disposal
several
millions
of
dollars.
With
the
exception
of
Mr.
Johnson,
much
of
those
monies
went
to
overseas
bank
accounts
in
Hong
Kong
and
London.
Whether
they
are
still
available
as
potentially
exigible
assets
on
a
reciprocal
foreign
judgment
enforcement
basis
remains
to
be
seen.
3.
Unlike
a
fine,
a
compensation
order
is,
in
essence,
a
civil
judgment
available
for
execution
in
the
event
exigible
assets
surface
in
the
future.
In
the
event
that
there
is
no
reasonable
future
prospect
as
to
satisfying
the
judgment,
that
burden
can
later
be
removed
under
the
auspices
of
the
Bankruptcy
Act.
A
compensation
order
imposed
at
this
time
will
not,
therefore,
financially
cripple
these
individuals
or
their
families.
Accordingly,
there
will
be
an
order
of
$1M
compensation
against
each
of
the
individuals,
Lawrence,
Richard,
and
Johnson
in
favour
of
Her
Majesty
The
Queen
in
Right
of
Canada.
Michael
Richards,
Roger
Lawrence,
and
Ronald
Johnson,
on
Counts
1
and
2,
which
pertain
to
the
Bio-Mass
counts,
Count
1,
l
sentence
each
of
you
to
three
years'
imprisonment.
On
Count
2,
three
years’
concurrent.
On
Counts
3,
4,
and
5,
which
pertain
to
the
Fly
Ash
projects,
on
Count
3,
I
sentence
each
of
you
to
three
years'
imprisonment
consecutive.
Counts
4
and
5
will
also
be
imposed
three
years,
which
will
be
concurrent.
Gerald
Byerlay,
on
Count
1,
I
sentence
you
to
one
year's
imprisonment.
On
Counts
2
to
5,
respectively,
there
will
be
one
year's
imprisonment
concurrent
with
the
first.
There
will
also
be
a
recommendation
on
the
warrant
of
committal
that
you
be
considered
for
electronic
monitoring.
On
Count
9,
which
is
the
count
of
proceeds
of
crime
possession,
Roger
Lawrence
and
Ronald
Johnson,
I
sentence
each
of
you
to
one
year's
imprisonment
consecutive
to
the
other
sentence.
On
Count
10,
which
pertains
to
the
possession
of
1075
Millstream
Road,
Roger
Lawrence,
I
sentence
you
to
one
year’s
imprisonment
concurrent
with
the
other
sentences.
There
will
be
a
fine
of
$1,000
imposed
upon
Mid-Pacific
or
in
default
distress.
In
the
result,
Michael
Richards
will
serve
an
aggregate
term
of
six
years’
imprisonment.
Messrs.
Lawrence
and
Johnson,
seven
years'
imprisonment.
Mr.
Byerlay,
one
year's
imprisonment,
with
the
recommendation
for
electronic
monitoring.
Mid-Pacific
will
be
subject
to
a
fine
of
$1,000.
There
is
also
a
compensation
order
of
$1M
against
each
of
the
following
individuals:
Roger
Lawrence,
Michael
Richards,
and
Ronald
Johnson.
I
also
direct
that
the
Registrar
of
this
Court
include
with
the
warrant
of
committal
copies
of
the
pre-sentence
reports
to
assist
the
classification
authorities.
I
would
think
that
these
individuals
are
eligible
for
classification
under
minimum
security
arrangements.
Madam
Registrar,
you
may
adjourn
Court.
Order
accordingly.