Christie
A.C.J.T.C.C.:—This
appeal
is
governed
by
the
informal
procedure
prescribed
by
section
18
and
following
sections
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Act.
The
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
is
liable
to
a
penalty
under
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
’’Act")
in
respect
of
his
1990
taxation
year.
The
notice
of
appeal
reads:
Please
accept
this
letter
as
my
official
request
for
an
appeal
hearing
by
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada,
under
the
informal
procedure
method.
This
case
involves
some
unpaid
taxes
for
the
taxation
year
1990.
This
discrepancy
was
identified
to
me
by
the
audits
division
of
Revenue
Canada
in
February
1994.
Since
that
time
I
have
attempted
to
explain
this
matter,
from
my
perspective,
so
that
the
issue
can
be
resolved
as
quickly
as
possible,
but
to
no
avail
and
I
must
now
seek
your
assistance
in
this
matter.
You
must
understand
that
an
individual
such
as
myself
does
not
have
a
lawyer
or
accountant
on
retainer
to
look
after
my
affairs,
consequently
all
of
my
knowledge
of
procedures
are
the
result
of
directions
given
me
by
staff
at
Revenue
Canada.
The
details
concerning
this
case
from
my
point
of
view
are
as
follows.
During
the
period
when
1990
tax
returns
were
being
prepared
(spring
1991)
I
was
out
of
the
country
on
an
extended
vacation.
Knowing
this
I
asked
Revenue
Canada
just
what
does
one
do
about
his
income
tax.
I
was
advised
that
it
MUST
be
submitted
and
it
MUST
be
signed.
As
I
was
’’moving
around’’
on
vacation
I
would
not
be
able
to
collect
all
the
necessary
forms
to
complete
my
return.
Therefore
I
left
all
of
the
details
with
another
member
of
the
family-plus
a
signed
tax
form-as
directed
by
Revenue
Canada.
After
waiting
a
reasonable
length
of
time,
close
to
filing
date,
they
assumed
that
all
of
the
necessary
forms
(T4,
T5
etc.)
had
been
received
and
therefore
completed
my
return
and
submitted
same.
They
were
unaware
that
a
T4
would
not
be
issued
for
the
missing
amount
and
although
the
cheque
stubs
were
available
the
person
did
not
know
the
correct
procedures
and
therefore
missed
submitting
them.
The
individual
was
inexperienced
in
this
area.
After
receiving
the
notice
of
assessment
which
agreed
with
the
original
tax
return
it
was
assumed
that
everything
was
"OK".
That
omission
was
solely
the
result
of
inexperience
and
not
the
result
of
GROSS
NEGLIGENCE
nor
was
there
a
KNOWING
attempt
to
avoid
paying
taxes.
In
retrospect
my
signing
the
document
before
hand,
as
directed
by
Revenue
Canada,
seems
to
be
the
major
cause
of
the
problem.
Revenue
Canada
position
is
that
I
signed
it
then
I’m
responsible
for
the
detail.
My
personal
opinion
at
this
stage
of
the
proceedings
is
that
Revenue
Canada
having
discovered
the
omission
has
deemed
me
"guilty"
and
the
onus
is
on
me
to
prove
my
innocence.
The
decision
to
stand
by
this
new
assessment
was
made
prior
to
any
discussion
with
me.
Having
made
this
decision
it
is
difficult
for
Revenue
Canada
to
"change"
it.
I
initially
submitted
my
objection
to
the
fairness
committee
only
to
be
advised
that
my
particular
case
cannot
be
handled
by
the
committee.
This
original
submission
to
the
fairness
committee
was
also
done
at
the
direction
of
Revenue
Canada.
Information
Circular
92-2
contains
some
guidelines
pertaining
to
cases
such
as
this
and
my
appeal
is
based
on
some
of
the
detail
contained
in
that
circular.
(1)
My
record
of
meeting
my
tax
obligations
is
excellent.
(2)
I
quickly
tried
to
resolve
the
discrepancy
by
submitting
the
missing
amount
immediately.
(3)
I
did
not
KNOWINGLY
allow
this
oversight
to
exist.
(4)
I
have
always
exercised
reasonable
care
and
have
not
been
negligent
or
careless
in
conducting
my
affairs
under
the
self-
assessment
system.
My
track
record
speaks
for
itself
and
I
feel
this
should
be
given
the
utmost
consideration.
Paragraphs
1
to
5
inclusive
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
read:
1.
He
denies
all
allegations
of
fact
in
the
notice
of
appeal.
2.
In
computing
income
for
the
1990
taxation
year,
the
appellant
failed
to
include
income
in
the
amount
of
$8,050
(the
"amount").
3.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
assessed
the
appellant
for
the
1990
taxation
year
by
notice
of
assessment
mailed
on
May
2,
1991.
4.
In
reassessing
the
appellant
for
the
1990
taxation
year,
by
notice
of
reassessment
mailed
on
April
18,
1994,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
included
the
amount
in
income,
and
imposed
a
penalty
pursuant
to
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
5.
In
so
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assump-
tions
of
fact:
(a)
the
amount
was
received
by
the
appellant
in
the
1990
taxation
year;
(b)
the
amount
was
received
by
the
appellant
in
respect
of
contract
work
he
performed
in
the
1990
taxation
year
for
Bell
Canada
International
Inc.;
(c)
the
amount
is
substantial
in
relation
to
the
appellant’s
other
income
in
the
1990
taxation
year;
(d)
the
appellant
knowingly,
or
under
circumstances
amounting
to
gross
negligence,
in
carrying
out
a
duty
or
obligation
imposed
under
the
Act,
made
or
participated
in,
assented
to
or
acquiesced
in
the
making
of
false
statements
or
omissions
in
the
income
tax
return
filed
for
the
1990
taxation
year,
as
a
result
of
which
the
tax
that
would
have
been
payable
assessed
on
the
information
provided
in
the
appellant’s
income
tax
return
filed
for
that
year,
was
less
than
the
tax
in
fact
payable
by
the
amount
of
$2,197.70.
Subsections
163(2)
and
(3)
of
the
Act
provide:
163(2)
Every
person
who,
knowingly,
or
under
circumstances
amounting
to
gross
negligence
in
the
carrying
out
of
any
duty
or
obligation
imposed
by
or
under
this
Act,
has
made
or
has
participated
in,
assented
to
or
acquiesced
in
the
making
of,
a
false
statement
or
omission
in
a
return,
form,
certificate,
statement
or
answer
(in
this
section
referred
to
as
a
’’return”)
filed
or
made
in
respect
of
a
taxation
year
as
required
by
or
under
this
Act
or
a
regulation,
is
liable
to
a
penalty
of
[the
method
of
calculating
the
penalty
follows]
(3)
Where,
in
any
appeal
under
this
Act,
any
penalty
assessed
by
the
Minister
under
this
section
is
in
issue,
the
burden
of
establishing
the
facts
justifying
the
assessment
of
the
penalty
is
on
the
Minister.
The
only
witness
to
testify
at
the
hearing
was
the
appellant.
He
was
called
to
the
witness
stand
by
counsel
for
the
respondent.
His
evidence
is
that
he
knew
he
would
be
in
the
United
States
at
the
time
when
his
return
of
income
should
be
filed
so
he
signed
a
return
in
blank
and
requested
his
son,
Steven,
an
adult,
to
complete
and
file
the
return.
The
return
is
dated
March
11,
1991,
which
is
well
before
the
filing
deadline.
A
T4
in
respect
of
the
$8,050
had
not
been
received
by
Steven
and
this
is
why
that
amount
was
not
included
in
the
return.
In
Farm
Business
Consultants
Inc.
v.
Canada,
[1994]
2
C.T.C.
2450,
46
D.T.C.
200
(T.C.C.),
Bowman
J.T.C.C.
said
at
page
2457
(D.T.C.
205):
A
Court
must
be
extremely
cautious
in
sanctioning
the
imposition
of
penalties
under
subsection
163(2).
Conduct
that
warrants
reopening
a
statute-
barred
year
does
not
automatically
justify
a
penalty
and
the
routine
imposition
of
penalties
by
the
Minister
is
to
be
discouraged.
Conduct
of
the
type
contemplated
in
subparagraph
152(4)(a)(i)
may
in
some
circumstances
also
be
used
as
the
basis
of
a
penalty
under
subsection
163(2),
which
involves
the
penalizing
of
conduct
that
requires
a
higher
degree
of
reprehensibility.
In
such
a
case
a
court
must,
even
in
applying
a
civil
standard
of
proof,
scrutinize
the
evidence
with
great
care
and
look
for
a
higher
degree
of
probability
than
would
be
expected
where
allegations
of
a
less
serious
nature
are
sought
to
be
established.
Moreover,
where
a
penalty
is
imposed
under
subsection
163(2)
although
a
civil
standard
of
proof
is
required,
if
a
taxpayer’s
conduct
is
consistent
with
two
viable
and
reasonable
hypotheses,
one
justifying
the
penalty
and
one
not,
the
benefit
of
the
doubt
must
be
given
to
the
taxpayer
and
the
penalty
must
be
deleted.
Using
this
approach
I
have
concluded
that
the
burden
of
establishing
the
facts
justifying
the
assessment
of
the
penalty
has
not
be
discharged.
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
penalty
imposed
in
respect
of
1990
is
vacated.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
party-and-party
costs
if
he
has
incurred
any.
Appeal
allowed.