Bowman
J.T.C.C.:
—
This
appeal
is
from
an
assessment
for
the
appellant’s
1988
taxation
year
and
involves
the
refusal
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
to
allow
a
deduction
of
$475
paid
by
Mr.
Montgomery
to
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
(“A.I.C.”)
to
maintain
his
professional
membership
in
that
organization.
Mr.
Montgomery
is
an
appraiser
working
for
the
Department
of
National
Revenue.
In
addition
to
belonging
to
the
A.I.C.
he
is
also
member
of
the
Royal
Institution
of
Chartered
Surveyors.
He
makes
appraisals
of
real
estate
for
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
from
time
to
time
appears
in
court
on
behalf
of
the
Department.
His
membership
in
the
A.I.C.
is
a
necessary
qualification
if
he
is
to
appear
as
an
expert
witness
in
income
tax
appeals
in
which
the
valuation
of
real
estate
is
in
issue.
The
A.I.C.
is
an
organization
that
requires
a
considerable
period
of
both
study
and
practical
experience
before
a
person
is
entitled
to
describe
himself
or
herself
as
an
Accredited
Appraiser,
Canadian
Institute
(“A.A.C.I.”).
The
competitions
under
which
Government
of
Canada
appraisers
apply
for
a
position
in
the
Appraisal
Section
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
require
an
A.A.C.I.
designation
or
courses
resulting
in
an
equivalent
designation
by
a
recognized
professional
organization.
For
example,
in
the
competition
for
Chief,
Appraisal
Section,
in
the
Toronto
District
Office,
the
following
appears:
ESSENTIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
Successful
completion
of
secondary
school
and
successful
completion
of
a
special
course
of
studies
set
by
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
with
the
resulting
designation
of
“Accredited
Appraiser
Canadian
Institute”
(A.A.C.I.)
or
courses
resulting
in
an
equivalent
designation
by
a
recognized
professional
organization.
Considerable
experience
in
conducting
appraisals
of
a
most
complex
nature.
Substantial
experience
in
negotiating.
Extensive
supervisory
experience.
The
appellant
claims
a
deduction
in
computing
his
income
from
employment
under
subparagraph
8(
1
)(i)(i)
which
provides:
In
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(i)
amounts
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
as
(i)
annual
professional
membership
dues
the
payment
of
which
was
necessary
to
maintain
a
professional
status
recognized
by
statute.
That
the
expense
is
wholly
applicable
to
the
appellant’s
source
of
income
is
self-evident.
Equally
I
think
that
it
is
clear
that
the
annual
membership
dues
paid
by
him
are
“professional”
membership
dues.
We
have
come
a
long
way
from
the
days
when
the
only
recognized
professions
were
the
clergy
and
the
military.
Somewhat
later
law
and
medicine
became
recognized
as
“professions”.
Since
that
time
the
expression
has
come
to
cover
a
vast
variety
of
callings:
dentists,
land
surveyors,
artists,
ministers,
teachers,
nurses,
secretaries,
dancers,
therapists,
scientists,
accountants,
professors,
social
workers,
druggists,
engineers,
computer
specialists,
and
writers
to
mention
only
a
few
that
come
to
mind.
Two
of
the
definitions
given
in
the
unabridged
Oxford
Dictionary
of
the
English
Language
are
the
following:
The
occupation
which
one
professes
to
be
skilled
in
and
to
follow.
a.
A
vocation
in
which
a
professed
knowledge
of
some
department
of
learning
or
science
is
used
in
its
application
to
the
affairs
of
others
or
in
the
practice
of
an
art
founded
upon
it.
Applied
spec.
to
the
three
learned
professions
of
divinity,
law,
and
medicine;
also
to
the
military
profession.
b.
In
wider
sense:
Any
calling
or
occupation
by
which
a
person
habitually
earns
his
living.
In
the
Grand
Dictionnaire
Encyclopédique
Larousse
the
following
definition
appears:
PROFESSION
n.f.
(lat.
professio,
-onis,
de
professas,
de
profiteri,
offrir,
s'engager).
1.
Activité
rémunérée
et
régulière
exercée
pour
gagner
sa
vie;
métier
:
Nom
et
adresse
des
parents,
profession
du
père,
de
la
mère.
—
2.
Métier
de
caractère
intellectuel,
artistique,
etc.,
qui
donne
une
position
sociale
plus
ou
moins
prestigieuse
:
La
profession
d'avocat,
de
médecin.
—
3.
Ensemble
des
personnes
exerçant
un
même
métier
:
Toute
la
profession
est
touchée
par
cette
mesure.
-
4.
Activité
rémunératrice,
de
caractère
régulier,
mais
qui
se
situe
en
général
en
dehors
de
la
loi;
source
de
profit
:
La
profession
d'escroc
lui
irait
très
bien.
—
5.
De
profession,
par
état,
par
métier;
professionel
:
Acteur
de
profession.
Escroc
de
profession.
Unquestionably
the
calling
of
real
estate
appraiser
is
a
profession
and
the
dues
paid
are
“professional
membership
dues”.
The
matter
was
discussed
at
some
length
by
Thorson
P.
in
Bower
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
[1949]
C.T.C.
77,
49
D.T.C.
554
at
pages
84-85
(D.T.C.
557-58)
and
Minister
of
National
Revenue
v.
Montgomery,
[1970]
C.T.C.
115,
70
D.T.C.
6080
(Ex.
Ct.).
The
central
question
is
whether
the
professional
status
of
membership
in
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
is
“recognized
by
statute”.
The
French
version
of
subparagraph
8(l)(i)(i)
uses
the
words
“reconnu
par
la
loi”,
a
broader
concept
than
“recognized
by
statute”.
The
question
has
arisen
before
in
Stewart
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1982]
C.T.C.
2746,
82
D.T.C.
1767
where
the
Tax
Review
Board
held
that
the
appraisal
institute
was
not
statutorily
recognized.
In
Laithwaite
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1995]
2
C.T.C.
2738,
95
D.T.C.
710
(T.C.C.)
Watson
D.J.T.C.C.
denied
a
deduction
of
fees
paid
to
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada
in
the
1988
taxation
year.
He
referred
to
the
decision
of
Rouleau
J.
in
R.
v.
Mousseau
(sub
nom.
Canada
v.
Mousseau),
[1995]
2
C.T.C.
431,
95
D.T.C.
5089
(F.C.T.D.)
where
the
deduction
in
1987
of
fees
paid
to
the
A.I.C.
was
denied.
At
pages
433-34
(D.T.C.
5091)
Rouleau
J.
said:
The
issue
here
is
whether
the
fourth
requirement,
that
the
professional
status
the
dues
were
paid
to
maintain,
was
recognized
by
statute
in
effect
during
the
1987
taxation
year.
The
fact
is
Mr.
Mousseau
paid
the
dues
in
question
to
maintain
his
accreditation
of
A.A.I.C.,
a
registered
appraiser,
with
the
A.I.C.
It
is
that
professional
status
therefore,
which
must
have
statutory
recognition.
The
legislative
enactments
in
effect
in
1987,
relied
on
by
the
defendant,
contain
reference
to
“competent
valuators”
and
“independent
appraisers”.
However,
he
was
unable
to
present
the
Court
with
any
legislation
in
effect
during
the
relevant
taxation
year
which
makes
reference
to
the
designation
of
A.A.C.I.
The
statutes
which
do
so
came
into
effect
after
1987.
In
fact
the
B.C.
Expropriation
Act
referred
to
appraisals
made
“by
a
person
who
has
been
accredited
by
an
institute
or
body
prescribed
by
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council”.
In
the
Laithwaite
case
Judge
Watson
was,
unlike
Rouleau
J.,
dealing
with
the
1988
taxation
year.
He
dealt
with
the
change
in
legislation
and
the
jurisprudence
as
follows:
The
Appellant
submits
that
the
Expropriation
Act,
S.B.C.
c.
23
at
subsection
19(2)
states
as
follows:
(2)
The
appraisal
report
shall
be
prepared
by
a
person
who
has
been
accredited
by
an
institute
or
body
prescribed
by
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council....
Paragraph
8(a)
of
the
Expropriation
Act
General
Regulation,
assented
to
on
January
28,
1988
states
as
follows:
8.
For
the
purpose
of
section
19(2)
of
the
Act,
the
following
persons
may
prepare
appraisal
reports:
(a)
a
person
designated
A.A.C.I.
by
the
Appraisal
Institute
of
Canada....
Counsel
for
the
Minister
referred
to
the
case
of
Minister
of
National
Revenue
v.
Montgomery,
[1970]
C.T.C.
115,
70
D.T.C.
6083
(Ex.
Ct.)
in
which
Kerr
J.
states
at
page
6083
the
following:
The
subsection
was
enacted
in
a
framework
of
circumstances
so
as
to
deal,
income
tax-wise,
with
a
known
state
of
affairs,
and
we
must
try
to
reach
the
common
sense
meaning
of
the
subsection,
taken
as
a
whole,
in
the
light
of
the
circumstances
with
reference
to
which
it
was
enacted
and
the
object,
appearing
from
those
circumstances
and
the
words
used,
which
Parliament
had
in
mind
and
intended.
Parliament
had
in
mind,
I
feel
sure,
the
present
day
concept
of
organized
societies
and
associations
of
doctors,
dentists,
lawyers,
engineers,
chartered
accountants
and
other
professional
persons,
which
have
been
given
a
special
status
by
statute
and
have
the
power
to
make
regulations
governing
the
issue
of
certificates
and
licenses
to
practice
the
profession,
examinations
of
candidates
for
membership
and
the
right
to
practice,
discipline
of
members,
and
a
variety
of
other
matters,
including
the
regulation
of
the
practice
and
the
professional
conduct
of
its
members.
Further
in
the
case
of
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
v.
Robert
B.
Swingle,
77
D.T.C.
5301
at
page
5307,
Collier
J.
states
as
follows:
To
my
mind
the
defendant
has
not
proved
one
essential
matter,
quite
necessary
before
the
so-called
main
issue
can
be
met.
The
defendant
is
a
chemist
or
an
analyst,
or
perhaps
both.
If
he
is
viewed
as
a
chemist,
it
has
not,
as
I
see
it,
been
shown,
on
the
materials
before
me,
that
the
professional
status
of
a
chemist
is
one
“recognized
by
statute”.
I
am
convinced
the
defendant
has
indeed
a
“professional”
status
in
his
particular
field
-
just
as
much
as
a
doctor
or
lawyer.
But
no
statutes
recognizing
that
professional
status
were
put
before
me,
nor
cited.
Pursuant
to
the
Assessment
Authority
Act,
R.S.
c.
22
at
subsections
9(b)
and
(c),
the
B.C.
Assessment
Authority
may
make
rules
for
its
own
activity.
Likewise
in
subsection
19(2)
of
the
Expropriation
Act
cited
above
and
paragraph
8(a)
of
the
Regulation
mentioned
above,
deal
with
the
operation
of
expropriations
in
British
Columbia
but
do
not
authorize
the
setting
up
of
the
profession
of
AACI.
In
my
view,
the
Appellant
has
not
established
that
the
“annual
professional
membership
dues
the
payment
of
which
was
necessary
to
maintain
a
professional
status
recognized
by
statute”.
The
reference
to
the
AACI
in
paragraph
8(a)
of
the
Regulation
made
pursuant
to
the
Expropriation
Act
of
British
Columbia
is
not
equivalent
to
the
recognition
by
statute
of
the
Appellant’s
professional
status
as
required
by
subparagraph
8(l)(i)(i)
of
the
Act.
The
view
expressed
by
Watson
D.J.T.C.C.
in
reliance
on
the
views
expressed
by
Kerr
J.
in
Montgomery
is
that
the
expression
“recognized
by
statute”
(“reconnu
par
la
loi”)
is
confined
only
to
statutes
setting
up
self
governing
professional
bodies.
This
interpretation
does
not
appear
to
be
consistent
with
the
approach
to
statutory
interpretation
enunciated
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Québec
(Communauté
urbaine)
c.
Corp
Notre-Dame
de
Bonsecours,
[1994]
3
S.C.R.
3,
[1995]
1
C.T.C.
241,
95
D.T.C.
5017,
which
was
decided
over
20
years
after
the
decision
in
Montgomery.
There
is
no
reason
why
a
professional
status
that
is
given
statutory
recognition
by
a
provincial
statute
should
not
be
sufficient
to
confer
upon
a
person
the
right
to
deduct
under
paragraph
8(1
)(i)
fees
paid
to
an
organization
so
recognized.
The
plain
wording
of
the
B.C.
statute
and
the
regulation
compels
this
conclusion.
To
deny
the
deduction
is
to
put
a
judicial
gloss
on
an
obvious
legislative
intent
and
to
impose
a
restriction
unwarranted
by
the
statutory
language.
The
appeal
is
allowed.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
his
costs,
if
any.
Appeal
allowed.