Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] 2 CTC 78

Charron J.: — The applicants seek a declaration that the definition of spouse in the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1992 and regulations thereto, as it applies to the registration of pension plans, is contrary to subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the ground that such definition infringes the rights of lesbians and gay men to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law.

The applicants Nancy Rosenberg and Margaret Evans are both employed by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE). Geraldine McGuire joins in and supports their application in her representative capacity as National Secretary-Treasurer of CUPE and chairperson of its benefits committee. Ms. Rosenberg and Ms. Evans are each involved in a stable lesbian relationship with a female partner. CUPE provides a number of benefits to its employees and members of their family. These benefits include vision, drug, dental, hospital care, supplementary health plans and life insurance. Since 1989, CUPE has recognized same-sex relationships for the purpose of entitlement to employment benefits. The partners of both Ms. Rosenberg and Ms. Evans have been recognized as their spouses for this purpose and these benefits are extended to them.

CUPE also provides a pension plan to which both employees and employer contribute. Every full-time employee must join the plan as a mandatory condition of employment. The plan provides for spousal survivor benefits which represent a significant advantage to members of the plan. Ms. Rosenberg and Ms. Evans want their partners recognized as spouses for the purpose of entitlement to survivor benefits. CUPE agrees that they should be so included and has amended the definition of spouse in its plan so as to extend spousal status to same-sex couples.

The difficulty arises from the fact that pension plans must be registered under the Income Tax Act in order for employees and employers’ contributions to the plan and the plan’s earnings to benefit from tax deferral. In order to be accepted for registration, a proposed plan must conform to certain regulations under the Act. The regulations require, amongst other conditions, that survivor benefits be payable only to a spouse, former spouse or a dependant. (The status of dependant is restricted to certain specified members of the family and the provision does not assist the applicants.) The definition of spouse in the Income Tax Act effectively restricts the recognition of spousal status to couples of the opposite sex who are either married or living in a common law relationship of some permanence. CUPE’s pension plan was already registered under the Income Tax Act. CUPE sought the approval of the Department of National Revenue for its new inclusive definition of spouse which extends to same-sex couples for registration purposes. The Department of National Revenue denied the request as the definition of spouse proposed by CUPE did not conform to that found in the applicable provision of the Income Tax Act. Hence this application was brought attacking the constitutional validity of the definition of spouse contained in subsection 252(4) of the Act. The provision reads as follows:

252(4) In this Act,

(a) words referring to a spouse at any time of a taxpayer include the person of the opposite sex who cohabits at that time with the taxpayer in a conjugal relationship and

(i) has so cohabited with the taxpayer throughout a 12 month period ending before that time, or

(ii) is a parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is a parent (otherwise than because of the application of subparagraph (2)(a)(iii))

and, for the purposes of this paragraph, where at any time the taxpayer and the person cohabit in a conjugal relationship, they shall, at any particular time after that time, be deemed to be cohabiting in a conjugal relationship unless they were not cohabiting at the particular time for a period of at least 90 days that includes the particular time because of a breakdown of their conjugal relationship;

(b) references to marriage shall be read as if a conjugal relationship between 2 individuals who are, because of paragraph (a), spouses of each other were a marriage;

(c) provisions that apply to a person who is married apply to a person who is, because of paragraph (a), a spouse of a taxpayer; and

(d) provisions that apply to a person who is unmarried do not apply to a person who is, because of paragraph (a), a spouse of a taxpayer.

I have highlighted the impugned words “of the opposite sex.” The applicants seek an order that the words “or of the same” be read in section 252(4) so that the provision would read “...words referring to a spouse at any time of a taxpayer include the person of the opposite or of the same sex...”

The applicable provisions of the Charter read as follows:

1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.

In all applications of this nature, two issues must be determined:

1. Does the definition of “spouse” in subsection 252(4) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.) as amended, infringe subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, is the infringement demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society pursuant to section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

It is important to note firstly that this court is called upon to consider the constitutionality of the definition of “spouse” contained in s.252(4) of the Income Tax Act as it pertains to the registration of private pension plans only and not in any other respect. It was presented in evidence that the provisions of the Income Tax Act and Regulations contain over 200 provisions which contain some 400 references to “spouse” and related terms such as “married” and “spousal”. It may well be that the same finding could be made with respect to them all but it would be unwise to so conclude without a consideration of each and every one of them. For example, the objective of some of the provisions may be such that entirely different constitutional considerations would come into play. A consideration of each and every reference to “spouse” and related terms is clearly beyond the scope of this application. Therefore the scope of the decision in this court must clearly be confined to what was actually considered.

Relevant Jurisprudence

On May 25 of this year, the Supreme Court of Canada released a trilogy of section 15 Charter equality rights decisions, two of which are of particular relevance to this case. (The third is Thibodeau v. R., [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2132 (T.C.C.) and does not directly impact on this application.)

In Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 643, the Supreme Court of Canada, by a 5-4 majority decision (Chief Justice Lamer and Justices LaForest, Gonthier and Major dissenting), ruled that the 1980 standard automobile policy under Ontario’s Insurance Act violated subsection 15(1) of the Charter by limiting accident benefits to legally married spouses of policy holders and denying those benefits to common-law spouses. (The statutory provision has been amended to include commonlaw spouses in 1990.) The decision is of interest to the determination of this matter because of analogous issues it considered. It is also of direct pertinence to this application since the Court, by majority ruling, adopts a particular analytical framework on the question of what constitutes section 15 discrimination.

In Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609, the Supreme Court of Canada, again by a 5-4 majority decision (Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Cory, McLachlin and Iacobucci dissenting on this one), ruled that the federal Old Age Security Act which provides a spousal allowance only to a “spouse” of the opposite sex does not violate the right to equal benefit of the law of same-sex couples. Obviously this case is of utmost relevance to the issues at hand.

These latest decisions reveal that the Supreme Court is divided over what constitutes “discrimination” under subsection 15(1) of the Charter. Four of the nine justices favour what is in essence a more deferential approach and find that there is no discrimination under subsection 15(1) if the ground on which equal treatment is denied is relevant to the legislative goal or “functional values” underlying the impugned law provided of course that the goal or values of the law are not themselves discriminatory. The remaining five justices are of the view that this type of analysis does not belong under a subsection 15(1) analysis where the onus is on the claimant to prove discrimination but properly belongs under section 1 of the Charter where the onus is on the government to justify the discrimination as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society.

This division in judicial approach gives interesting results in Egan, supra. Mr. Justice LaForest of the majority (Lamer C.J., Gonthier and Major JJ. concurring) adopted the more deferential approach set out by Gonthier J. in Miron, supra, and stated that an analysis under .15 involves three steps at page 531 (D.L.R. 621)):

The first step looks to whether the law has drawn a distinction between the claimant and others. The second step then questions whether the distinction results in disadvantage, and examines whether the impugned law imposes a burden, obligation or disadvantage on a group of persons to which the claimant belongs which is not imposed on others, or does not provide them with a benefit which it grants others...

The third step assesses whether the distinction is based on an irrelevant personal characteristic which is either enumerated in s. 15(1) or one analogous thereto.

Justice LaForest held that the first two steps were satisfied, he was also of the view that sexual orientation is an analogous ground under subsection 15(1). He held however that the third step was nevertheless not satisfied since, in his view, the distinction made by Parliament was relevant to the functional values underlying the law. He therefore concluded that there was no breach of subsection 15(1). He added that, had there been an infringement of subsection 15(1), he would still have upheld the impugned legislation under section 1 of the Charter for the consideration set forth in his reasons in McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 545.

Justice Sopinka, who was also part of the majority, wrote separate reasons. He agreed with the reasons of Cory J. (who wrote part of a dissenting judgment) that the definition of spouse did infringe subsection 15(1) of the Charter by excluding same-sex spouses. However, Justice Sopinka sided with the majority in finding that such infringement is saved under s.l. In adopting the reasoning set out by Justice Cory, Justice Sopinka favoured a two-step approach to the question of whether there is a subsection 15(1) discrimination. Justice Cory stated in Egan, supra, at page 584 (D.L.R. 661):

The first step is to determine whether, due to a distinction created by the questioned law, a claimant’s right to equality before the law, equality under the law, equal protection of the law or equal benefit of the law has been denied. During this first step, the inquiry should focus upon whether the challenged law has drawn a distinction between the claimant and others, based on personal characteristics.

Not every distinction created by legislation gives rise to discrimination. Therefore, the second step must be to determine whether the distinction created by the law results in discrimination. In order to make this determination, it is necessary to consider first, whether the equality right was denied on the basis of a personal characteristic which is either enumerated in subsection 15(1) or which is analogous to those enumerated, and second, whether that distinction has the effect on the claimant of imposing a burden, obligation or disadvantage not imposed upon others or of withholding or limiting access to benefits or advantages which are available to others.

This two-step analysis does not involve any consideration of the relevancy of the distinction to the underlying functional values of the legislation. Justice Cory was one of four Justices who dissented in three separate sets of reasons. All dissenting justices found that sexual orientation was an analogous ground included in subsection 15(1), that the definition of spouse infringed section 15, and that the infringement was not saved under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law.

In summary, all nine justices were unanimous in finding that sexual orientation falls with the ambit of section 15 of the Charter protection as being analogous to the enumerated grounds of discrimination in that provision. Five justices were of the view that the definition of spouse under the Old Age Security Act contravened subsection 15(1) of the Charter because it excluded same-sex couples. A different combination of five Justices held that the discrimination constituted a reasonable limit under subsection (1) and consequently that the legislative provision was constitutionally valid.

On this application, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada took the position that the judgment in Egan, supra is determinative of the outcome in this case since the matter at hand cannot be meaningfully distinguished and that the impugned legislation should be similarly upheld. However, in light of the split in reasoning in the Supreme Court judgment, the respondent conceded that the definition of spouse under the Income Tax Act contravenes subsection 15(1) of the Charter but maintained that the legislation could be saved under section 1. The applicants argued that this matter is distinguishable from Egan and that the rights violation cannot be justified as a reasonable limit under section 1.

Does the definition of “spouse” in subsection 252(4) of the Income Tax Act infringe subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

This case cannot be distinguished from Egan, supra with respect to the section 15 issue of discrimination. Although the definition of “spouse” contained in the Old Age Security Act differs from that found in the Income Tax Act, the impugned language is the same. It is that fact that the definition of spouse restricted the status to couples “of the opposite sex” thereby excluding lesbians and gay men which was at issue in Egan, supra and the same issue is raised in this case.

If one considers the strict application of the doctrine of stare decisis, it is debatable whether courts of inferior jurisdiction, in a subsequent case which cannot be distinguished, are bound by the finding made by five of the nine Justices on the subsection 15(1) issue since only one of these five Justices formed part of the ultimate majority who governed the final out- come of the case. [1] However when once considers Egan, supra in combination with Miron, supra, it is clear that by majority ruling the Supreme Court has adopted a two-step analysis to the question of section 15 discrimination. This approach, set out as a proposition of law by the Supreme Court of Canada, is authoritative and binding on this court. When one applies this analysis to the case at bar, one inevitably arrives at the same conclusion as did Justice Sopinka and the four dissenting Justices: the definition of spouse, in restricting spousal status to persons of the opposite sex, infringes subsection 15(1) of the Charter. In my view, the Attorney General of Canada rightly conceded this point. On this issue, I would adopt the reasoning of Justice Cory in Egan v. Canada and rule that subsection 252(4) of the Income Tax Act does infringe the applicants’ rights under subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Is the infringement demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society pursuant to section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

This issue turns on whether or not the case at bar can be distinguished from the decision in Egan, supra. All five Justices of the majority ruled “yes” on this issue in Egan, all essentially for considerations set forth in the earlier case of McKinney, supra, thereby upholding the constitutional validity of the legislation. Although it is true that four of the five Justices of the majority did not have to deal with this issue since they were of the view that there was no subsection 15(1) infringement and, strictly speaking, their ruling in this respect constitutes obiter dicta, it remains a considered opinion of the majority of the Court which is also authoritative and binding. [2] } Can this case be distinguished from Egan, supra?

The legislative provisions in both Egan and this case form part of an overall federal retirement income system. The system consists of three main elements: public pensions (Old Age Security), mandatory earnings- related pension plans (Canada Pension Plan and the parallel Quebec Pension Plan) and private arrangements including employer-sponsored pension plans and individual savings of Canadians. The overall objective of this legislative scheme is to alleviate poverty in the elderly and ensure a certain level of income for Canadians in their years of retirement.

No meaningful distinction in the context of this constitutional debate can be drawn from the fact that Egan was concerned with the denial of a direct cash outlay by way of benefit as opposed to the benefit in question in this case, the tax deferral which flows from registration of a pension plan. Nor does the fact that an additional objective of the legislative provision in this case is to provide an incentive to Canadian employees to make their own savings for their later years for their own benefit and that of their family provide sufficient grounds to distinguish the case. In either case, the justification (or lack thereof) for excluding same-sex couples in my view would have to be the same.

Nor do I see the logic of drawing a meaningful distinction on the basis that this case involves mandatory contributions by the applicants to a pension plan whose terms in some aspects discriminate against them on the basis of sexual orientation. I am unable to see how this fact in any way would have affected the reasoning of any of the Justices in Egan, supra.

The element of cost is not so different in this case so as to provide any meaningful distinction either. It is not as if cost was a major factor in Egan which contributed in any significant way in the decision of the Court. The evidence of cost in Egan was not afforded much weight by any of the Justices who dealt with the issue. Nor could the evidence in this case be of much consequence. In fact, the respondent conceded that it did not rely on this factor to justify the legislative provision. Much as was found by Justice Iacobucci in Egan and Nesbit, I would ultimately conclude in this case that the evidence as to the cost of including same-sex couples is “highly speculative and statistically weak and thus incorporat[ing] guesswork”.

Counsel for the applicants in oral submissions urged this court to adopt the reasoning of the judgment written by both Justices Cory and lacobucci in Egan, supra. Indeed a court could essentially apply the exact same reasoning to the facts and issues in the case at bar. But, unfortunately for the applicants, the converse of that proposition is equally true. Any court who would be so inclined could equally well apply the reasoning of either judgment constituting the majority in Egan and Nesbit to this case.

I am unable to distinguish this case from the principles set out in Egan within the context of this constitutional debate. The facts and the issues are too closely related. My own views on the matter are irrelevant. I am bound to follow the same result and rule that the infringement of the applicants’ subsection 15(1) rights is justified under section 1 of the Charter. Consequently, the impugned legislation is constitutionally valid and the application is dismissed.

Counsel may make written submissions as to costs within 30 days of the release of this decision and may respond to each other’s submissions within 10 days thereafter if they so choose.

Appeal dismissed.

[INDEXED AS: VANCOUVER SOCIETY OF

Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. Minister of National Revenue

Federal Court of Appeal (Strayer, Décary, Linden, J J. A.), March 6, 1996 (Court File No. A-552-94) on appeal from a decision of the Minister of National Revenue.

Income tax — Federal — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp) - 149.1,

The case involved an appeal from the Minister’s denial of an application for charitable tax status under sections 149.1 and 248(1). The applicant had a number of purposes which included providing educational forums to immigrant women, carry on political activities ancillary to these purposes, raising funds for the above purposes and providing other services for these purposes.

HELD:

Décary J.A. (Strayer and Linden, J J. A., concurring):

Appeal dismissed.

The basic difficulty was that the applicant’s purposes and activities were so indefinite and vague as to prevent the court from determining with some degree of certainty what the activities were, who were the true beneficiaries of the activities and whether the beneficiaries were persons in need of charity as opposed to merely being in need of help. The provision of services and workshops to the community, while laudable, was not necessarily charitable at law and activities and objects of general public utility are not always charitable in the legal sense. The applicant, in being too many things to too many people, opened the door to purposes beyond the legal definition of “charity”.

David W. Mossop for the appellant.

Roger Leclaire for the respondent.

Cases cited:

Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, (sub nom.

Special Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel), [1891] A.C. 531, [1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 28;

Native Communications Society of B.C. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue),

[1986] 2 C.T.C. 170, 86 D.T.C. 6353;

Everywoman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. R. (sub nom. Everywoman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. Canada), [1991] 2 C.T.C. 320, 92 D.T.C. 6001; D’Aguiar v. Guyana Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1970) T.R. 31;

Legislation cited:

Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,

1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.)

Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II,

No. 5 —

91(24)

Constitution Act, 1982, [en. by the Canada Act, 1982 (UK) c. 11, s. 1 reprinted

R.S.C. 1985, App II, No. 44] -

35

Income tax - Federal — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp) -

149.1

248(1)

Décary J.A — The Minister of National Revenue has denied the appellant’s application for charitable tax status under sections 149.1 and 248(1) of the Income Tax Act in a decision-letter dated October 14, 1994.

The purposes of the Society, as appears from its amended constitution, are the following:

a. to provide educational forums, classes, workshops and seminars to immigrant women in order that they may be able to find or obtain employment or self employment; b. to carry on political activities provided such activities are incidental and ancillary to the above purposes and provided such activities do not include direct or indirect support of, or opposition to, any political party or candidate for public office; and c. to raise funds in order to carry out the above purposes by means of solicitations of funds from governments, corporations and individuals, d. (deleted) e. to provide services and to do all such things that are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above stated objects, including the seeking of funds from governments and/or other sources for the implementation of the aforementioned objectives.

At issue, essentially, is whether the Society’s activities come within the conceptual ambit of the well-established divisions of charity as originally laid down by Lord Macnaghten in Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, (sub nom. Special Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel), [1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 28 (H.L.) or within the evaluation and development by common law courts of that conceptual ambit as a result of regarding the law of charity as a “moving subject” (see Native Communications Society of B.C. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1986] 2 C.T.C. 170, 86 D.T.C. 6353 (F.C.A.), and Every woman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. R, (sub nom. Everywoman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. Canada), [1991] 2 C.T.C. 320, 92 D.T.C. 6001 (F.C.A.). The divisions of charity with which we are concerned here are the second head of Lord Macnaghten’s definition, ie. advancement of education, and the fourth head, ie., whether the purpose is beneficial to the community in a way which the law regards as charitable.

The Minister’s decision reads as follows:

As you are aware, in order to be eligible for registration as a charity, an organization must be constituted exclusively for charitable purposes and must devote substantially all its resources to charitable activities. Your communication of May 20 does not alleviate the concerns discussed in our previous letter and it is therefore our decision to deny registration.

We have considered your analogy between aboriginal people and immigrant women as disadvantaged groups in society. We do not believe the Native Communications Society of B.C. case applies as the emphasis of that decision was placed on the special legal position in Canadian society occupied by the native people. The judge in that case stated his reasoning as follows: “...A cursory examination of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6 as amended reveals the extent of state involvement.... From this elaborate set of provisions it may be seen that the state has assumed a special responsibility for the welfare of the Indian people.” Women do not meet this criteria; the courts have not considered women simply by virtue of their gender or racial origin to be in special need of charitable relief. Decisions in common law, upon which the law of charities evolves, originate in the courts; the Department only administers the law as it now stands.

With reference to the amended objects stated in the Society’s Certificate of Change in Constitution dated May 10, 1994, our letter of January 25, 1994 advised that Object 2.(a), to be charitable, must be achieved through activities that are considered to be advancing education within the meaning of charity law. The submission on the whole, however, has not demonstrated that the Society’s programs fall into the education category or that its method of operation and activities have been altered to pursue the revised objective.

Our January letter also advised that Object 2.(b) was not acceptable. In explanation, this is a political purpose and an organization created for political purposes, whether in whole or in part, cannot be charitable.

I refer also to the statement of Yasmin Jamal in her letter of May 4, 1994, on behalf of the Society, which explains that “advocacy” consists of “..assisting women in employment related activity - specifically giving information on community services, teaching job search techniques, assisting with resume writing, etc.” I would advise that although some of the activities carried on by the Society may appear to be charitable, the submission has not demonstrated that the organization devotes substantially all its resources to charitable activities. Activities such as networking, referral services, liaising for accreditation of credentials, soliciting job opportunities and maintaining a job skills directory as described in the Society’s May 1993 Report are not charitable activities.

Consequently, it is my determination that the objectives and activities of the Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women do not meet the requirements necessary for charitable status and registration as a charity is therefore denied.

As previously mentioned, the Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women might qualify for exemption from tax as a non- profit organization under paragraph 149 (1)(L) of the Act.

We find no reversible error in this decision in the circumstances of the present case and in view of the documentation that was made available to us.

With respect to the second head - advancement of education - purpose (a) as well as the activities of the Society described in the material are not sufficiently structured and articulated as to respond to the requirements set out by the jurisprudence.

With respect to the fourth head - benefit to the community - we are of the view that the comparison with aboriginal people simply does not withstand scrutiny: aboriginal people have a distinct constitutional status quite apart from the Charter, being referred to in subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Charter arguments advanced at the hearing before us are not persuasive. It may well be that charitable organizations in assisting those in need will generally deal with persons specifically protected by the equality provisions of the Charter, but the focus when deciding whether or not to grant charitable status is not so much, to start with, on the answer to the question “who are those who are most likely to benefit?” as on the answer to the question “do the proposed purposes and activities constitute charitable activities within the ambit of the law of charities?” Providing a benefit to those who are in a position to invoke Charter rights will not in itself result in an activity falling within the fourth head.

The basic difficulty we find with the Society’s application for charitable tax status is that its purposes and activities are so indefinite and vague as to prevent the Minister, and this Court, from determining with some degree of certainty what the activities are, who are the true beneficiaries of the activities and whether these beneficiaries are persons in need of charity as opposed to merely being in need of help. The provision of services and workshops to the community, while laudable, is not necessarily charitable at law and activities and objects of general public utility are not always charitable in the legal sense. Lord Wilberforce, in D "Aguiar v. Guyana Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1970), T.R. 31 (Privy Council), cautioned the courts against granting charity status where the language used was “so vague as to permit the property to be used for non-charitable purposes” (at page 34) and where the purpose was not “sufficiently definite and specific” to enable the Court to be satisfied that the organization will be administered “in a manner recognized as charitable”.

The Society, in our view, in being too many things to too many people has opened the door to purposes beyond the legal definition of “charity”. It is sufficient in that regard to refer to the description of its membership: “About 300 members from all walks of life seeking employment opportunities and general support for integration into Canadian life”, to realize how difficult the control of the charitable nature of its activities would be.

In our view, therefore, the Minister has not erred in denying the appellant’s application and the appeal will be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.