Docket: T-983-19
Citation: 2020 FC 555
Ottawa, Ontario, April 27, 2020
PRESENT: Mr. Justice James W. O'Reilly
| BETWEEN:
|
| S.R.
|
| Applicant
|
| and
|
| THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
| Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
The applicant, SR, a citizen of Iran, became a permanent resident of Canada after arriving in the 1990s with his parents. About 20 years later, he applied for Canadian citizenship. While his application was pending, a panel of the Immigration Division found SR to be inadmissible to Canada on security grounds and issued a removal order against him.
[2]
SR sought judicial review of the ID’s decision and the Federal Court granted him leave. Shortly thereafter, the officer who was seized with SR’s citizenship application sent him a letter explaining that he was ineligible for citizenship while subject to a removal order (pursuant to s 5(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29; (Act), see Annex for all provisions cited).
[3]
In response, counsel for SR informed the officer of the pending judicial review and asked the officer to hold SR’s application in abeyance until the Federal Court rendered a decision. The officer refused. The officer pointed out that a citizenship application could be suspended only when awaiting the results of an investigation into an applicant’s eligibility for citizenship, which did not apply to SR (citing s 13.1 of the Act).
[4]
SR now seeks judicial review of the officer’s refusal to suspend consideration of his citizenship application. He argues that the officer had a discretion to delay processing of the application and that the decision not to do so was unfair given the status of his challenge to the removal order. He asks me to quash the officer’s decision and order another officer to reconsider his request.
[5]
I can find no basis for overturning the officer’s decision. The officer’s discretion was circumscribed by the provisions of the Citizenship Act, which did not allow him to suspend SR’s application pending judicial review of a removal order. I will, therefore, dismiss this application for judicial review. I note that SR can now reapply for citizenship since the removal order against him was quashed by Justice Elizabeth Walker in August 2019 (2019 FC 1118).
[6]
The sole issue is whether the officer erred in refusing to hold SR’s citizenship application in abeyance until the Federal Court ruled on his application for judicial review of the removal order.
II.
Did the officer err in refusing to hold SR’s citizenship application in abeyance?
[7]
SR argues that the officer had a discretion to adjourn consideration of SR’s citizenship application in order to ensure a fair process (Prassad v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 560). That discretion exists, according to SR, even if it is not explicitly recognized in a statute or regulation.
[8]
I agree with SR that the officer may have a discretion to adjourn a proceeding in certain circumstances. However, that discretion is limited by the statutory framework within which the officer is acting.
[9]
Here, the Citizenship Act states the general proposition that citizenship cannot be granted to a person who is subject to a removal order (s 5(1)(f)). Further, a removal order remains in effect until it is finally overturned by a tribunal or court (s 2(2)(c)). SR was under a removal order at the time his citizenship application was under consideration. The fact that the removal order was being challenged in this Court did not have any effect on the validity of the order. Those two statutory realities could not be altered by the citizenship officer.
[10]
SR asked the officer to hold his application in abeyance until the Federal Court had ruled on his application for judicial review. The officer consulted the Citizenship Act and noted that his sole power to suspend consideration of an application for citizenship derived from s 13.1, which provides that an application may be suspended for as long as necessary to receive the results of an investigation or inquiry into the applicant’s eligibility, or other related issues.
[11]
In my view, the officer correctly concluded that he had no authority to suspend or hold in abeyance an application for citizenship except in the circumstances described in s 13.1.
[12]
The applicant appropriately cites Prassad for the proposition that administrative decision-makers have a discretion to grant adjournments to ensure fairness. But Prassad itself recognizes limits on that discretion.
[13]
In Prassad, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the general proposition that administrative decision-makers are “masters in their own house”
in the “absence of specific rules laid down by statute or regulation”
(para 16). Within those parameters, adjournments are within the discretion of decision-makers. In addition, the Court stated that a decision-maker is not required to adjourn an inquiry to await the outcome of another proceeding (para 23). If that were so, it would amount to the creation of an automatic stay not contemplated by the legislative scheme (para 24).
[14]
Here, the officer was constrained by the applicable provisions of the Citizenship Act. SR was the subject of a removal order that was considered valid until overturned. A person in those circumstances cannot be granted citizenship. An officer cannot suspend consideration of a citizenship application unless it is necessary to allow an investigation to be completed. In effect, SR was asking the officer for a stay, which the officer had no authority to grant.
[15]
Accordingly, the officer did not err in refusing to hold SR’s application in abeyance pending the outcome of his application for judicial review.
III.
Conclusion and Disposition
[16]
The officer correctly denied SR’s request to hold his application for citizenship in abeyance. The officer had no authority to grant that request. I must, therefore, dismiss this application for judicial review. Neither party proposed a question of general importance to be certified, and none is stated.
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