Docket: T-1851-17
Citation: 2018 FC 991
Ottawa, Ontario, October 4, 2018
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Mactavish
BETWEEN:
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PRAIRIES TUBULARS (2015) INC.
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Applicant
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and
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CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY AND PRESIDENT CANADA BORDER SERVICE AGENCY AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondents
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
By this consolidated application for judicial review, Prairies Tubulars (2015) Inc. seeks judicial review of 22 decisions made by the Canada Border Services Agency pursuant to the provisions of the Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-15 (SIMA). These decisions assessed anti-dumping duties on “oil country tubular goods”
imported into Canada by the applicant.
[2]
The respondents seek an order striking the application. Relying on section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, they assert that the Federal Court has no jurisdiction in this matter, as its jurisdiction has been ousted by the comprehensive statutory scheme established in the SIMA for challenges to assessments of anti-dumping duties.
[3]
The applicant acknowledges the existence of the statutory appeal process in the SIMA. In order to be able to access this process, however, the SIMA requires that importers seeking to challenge assessments of anti-dumping duties must first pay all of the duties owing on the imported goods in issue. The applicant claims that it does not have the financial resources necessary to pay the assessed duties, with the result that it cannot access the SIMA appeals process. In the absence of an accessible statutory appeal mechanism, the applicant submits that it should have recourse in this Court.
[4]
I agree with the respondents that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in relation to challenges to assessments of anti-dumping duties is ousted by the provisions of section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act. In the absence of a constitutional challenge to the applicable provisions of the SIMA, that statutory regime governs the applicant’s challenge to the assessments in issue. It follows from this finding that the applicant’s application for judicial review is so clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of success and that it must, accordingly, be struck out.
I.
Legislative Regime
[5]
In order to put the parties’ arguments into context, it is necessary to have an understanding of the legislative scheme established for challenges to duties assessed under the SIMA. The full text of the legislative provisions referred to in these reasons is included as an appendix to this decision.
[6]
The purpose of the SIMA is to protect domestic manufacturers against the marketing in Canada of foreign-made articles at unreasonably low prices, a practice known as “dumping”
: GRK Fasteners v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 198 at para. 5, [2011] F.C.J. No. 233. Dumping occurs when goods are sold to importers in Canada at prices that are lower than the price at which comparable goods are sold in the country of export, or where goods are sold in Canada at unprofitable prices. In order to protect Canadian manufacturers, the margin of dumping on imported goods may be off-set by the imposition of anti-dumping duties on the goods in question.
[7]
“Countervailing duties”
may also be imposed where the cost of manufacturing foreign goods has been subsidized in the exporting country. For the purposes of these reasons, the two types of duties will be referred to collectively as “anti-dumping duties”
.
[8]
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) are jointly responsible for administering the SIMA. After receiving a complaint from a Canadian manufacturer, the CBSA may conduct an investigation. If it arrives at a preliminary determination that dumping has occurred and considers that the imposition of provisional duties is necessary to prevent injury, retardation or threat of injury, it may impose provisional duties: SIMA subsection 8(1). If the CITT subsequently concludes that dumping has caused injury to the relevant Canadian industry, such a finding provides the authority for the CBSA to impose anti-dumping duties: SIMA sections 55 and 56.
[9]
An assessment of anti-dumping duties by a designated CBSA officer is final: SIMA, subsection 56(1). That said, subsection 56(1.01) of the SIMA provides that within ninety days after the making of the determination, the importer of the goods in question may apply in writing to a designated officer for a re-determination of the duties owing. However, subsection 56(1.01) of the SIMA provides that to be eligible for any such re-determination, the importer must have paid all of the duties owing on the imported goods. The parties agree that there is no provision in the SIMA allowing the CBSA to waive this requirement.
[10]
In accordance with section 57 of the SIMA, a designated CBSA officer may re-determine a determination made under section 56 of the Act. Section 58 of the Act provides that any such re-determination is final and conclusive. However, paragraph 58(1.1)(a) of the SIMA provides that the importer of the goods in issue may apply to the President of the CBSA for a further re‑determination, once again, only after paying any outstanding duties. Applications to the President of the CBSA on such re-determinations are governed by section 59 of the Act.
[11]
Importers can then appeal to the CITT from decisions of the President of the CBSA in accordance with the provisions of section 61 of the SIMA. Subsection 61(3) of the Act provides that decisions of the CITT are final and conclusive, subject only to an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal on a question of law in accordance with section 62 of the Act.
II.
Factual Background
[12]
The applicant sells “oil country tubular goods”
(OCTG) and other related goods to drilling companies operating in Alberta’s oil and gas industry. The vast majority of the OCTG sold by the applicant are imported from manufacturers in China and Thailand.
[13]
In 2010, the President of the CBSA made a final determination of dumping with respect to OCTG originating in or exported from China. The CITT subsequently determined that the OCTG had been both dumped and subsidized, and that this had caused injury to the domestic industry. As a result of the CITT’s finding, certain OCTG became subject to anti-dumping duties. Goods imported after the CITT’s decision were then reviewed to ensure that the correct amount of anti-dumping duties had been imposed.
[14]
Pursuant to subsection 57(b) of the SIMA, the CBSA issued detailed adjustment statements in October and November of 2017 in relation to 22 importations of OCTG by the applicant. The goods in question were imported into Canada in December of 2016 and January of 2017. According to the applicant’s Notice of Application, the total amount of the anti-dumping duties assessed as owing by the applicant was $18,829,412.40.
[15]
The applicant did not agree with these assessments. In accordance with paragraph 58(1.1)(a) of the SIMA, it had 90 days from the date of each of the detailed adjustment statements to apply to the President of the CBSA for a re-determination.
[16]
The applicant did not pay the duties owing, nor did it seek re-determinations by the President of the CBSA under this provision. As noted earlier, it submits that it does not have the financial resources to pay the anti-dumping duties in issue. As payment of the outstanding anti-dumping duties is a precondition to the use of the SIMA’s review scheme, the applicant submits that it is unable to access the statutory re-determination and appeal mechanisms necessary to contest the various detailed adjustment statements. In the absence of an accessible statutory recourse mechanism, the applicant instead sought judicial review of the assessments in this Court.
III.
The Applicant’s Application for Judicial Review
[17]
The applicant originally commenced 22 applications for judicial review with respect to each of the detailed adjustment statements issued by a CBSA Compliance Officer during the period in issue. The applicant submits that these decisions were “arbitrary, based on an incomplete record and an erroneous belief regarding the exporter”
. It further maintains that it did not have the opportunity to be heard with respect to a fundamental and erroneous finding in one of the detailed adjustment statements, namely that the applicant’s logistics agent was in fact its exporter.
[18]
The applicant acknowledges the existence of a statutory recourse mechanism under section 58 of the SIMA in its Notice of Application. However, it states at paragraph 41 of the Notice of Application that it “does not have sufficient funds to pay the assessment[s]”
in order to appeal them. As a result, it asserts at paragraph 43 of its Application that it cannot access the statutory review process, and that its only option is to seek redress from the Federal Court.
[19]
By way of relief, the applicant seeks orders quashing or setting aside the detailed adjustment statements in issue, as well as orders referring the matters back to the CBSA in accordance with any directions that the Court considers appropriate. The applicant further seeks costs of the applications, and such other relief as Counsel may request and the Court deem just.
[20]
Pursuant to an order of a Case Management Prothonotary, the 22 applications for judicial review were subsequently consolidated, continuing together as file T‑1851-17.
IV.
The Test on Motions to Strike Notices of Application
[21]
The first point that must be addressed is the test to be applied on a motion to strike a Notice of Application.
[22]
Applications for judicial review are intended to be summary proceedings, and motions to strike Notices of Application add greatly to the cost and time required to deal with such matters. As a consequence, the Federal Court of Appeal has determined that applications for judicial review should not be struck out prior to a hearing on the merits, unless the applications are “so clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of success”
: David Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc., [1995] 1 F.C. 588 at page 600, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1629 (C.A.).
[23]
As the Federal Court of Appeal put it in Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc., 2013 FCA 250 at paragraph 47, [2013] F.C.J. No. 1155, in order to strike out an application for judicial review at a preliminary stage of the process “[t]here must be a ‘show stopper’ or a ‘knockout punch’ - an obvious, fatal flaw striking at the root of this Court’s power to entertain the application”
: citing Rahman v. Public Service Labour Relations Board, 2013 FCA 117 at para. 7; Donaldson v. Western Grain Storage By-Products, 2012 FCA 286 at para. 6; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959.
[24]
The Federal Court of Appeal has further stated that “[s]uch cases must be very exceptional and cannot include cases ... where there is simply a debatable issue as to the adequacy of the allegations in the notice of motion”
: David Bull, above at para. 15.
[25]
Unless a moving party can meet this very stringent standard, the “direct and proper way to contest an originating notice of motion which the respondent thinks to be without merit is to appear and argue at the hearing of the motion itself”
: David Bull, above at para. 10. See also Addison & Leyen Ltd. v. Canada, 2006 FCA 107 at para. 5, [2006] F.C.J. No. 489 (Addison & Leyen FCA), rev’d on other grounds 2007 SCC 33, [2007] S.C.J. No. 33.
[26]
On a motion to strike an application for judicial review, the facts asserted by the applicant in its Notice of Application must be presumed to be true: Toyota Tsusho America Inc. v. Canada (Border Services Agency), 2010 FC 78 at para. 13, [2010] F.C.J. No. 67 (Toyota Tsusho), aff’d 2010 FCA 262, [2010] F.C.J. No. 1271 (Toyota Tsusho (FCA)); Addison & Leyen FCA, above at para. 6. Notices of Application should, moreover, be read as generously as possible, in a manner that accommodates any inadequacies in the allegations that are merely the result of deficiencies in the drafting of the document: Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Canadian Forces), 2007 FC 1147 at para. 33, 287 D.L.R. (4th) 35.
[27]
Finally, the Court must read the Notice of Application “holistically and practically without fastening onto matters of form”
in order to gain “‘a realistic appreciation’ of the application’s ‘essential character’”
: JP Morgan, above at para. 50.
V.
Analysis
[28]
Applying these principles to the present case, it is evident from a review of the applicant’s Notice of Application that its “essential character”
is a challenge to the validity of determinations made by a CBSA Compliance Officer assessing anti-dumping duties on OCTG imported into Canada by the applicant.
[29]
The applicant submits that, in contrast to parties in many of the cases relied upon by the respondents, it is not seeking to avoid the statutory appeals process contained in the SIMA. It asserts that it wants to use the SIMA’s statutory appeals process to challenge the validity of the CBSA’s assessment of anti-dumping duties, but that it is precluded from doing so by virtue of its inability to pay the assessed duties.
[30]
The applicant further submits that it has a good argument that the detailed adjustment statements in issue in this case are flawed, as demonstrated by the fact that an earlier challenge to the assessment of anti-dumping duties brought by the applicant was resolved in its favour in a re‑determination by the President of the CBSA.
[31]
According to the applicant, the absence of a statutory provision allowing for exemption from the payment requirement operates as a fee that effectively bars access to the statutory review process. Citing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 59, [2014] S.C.J. No. 59, the applicant submits that litigants’ common law right of access to the Courts cannot be denied by exorbitant hearing fees.
[32]
The applicant further submits that access to the Courts is fundamental to the rule of law, which is threatened in the absence of an accessible public forum for the adjudication of disputes: Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at para. 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87; British Columbia Government Employees' Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 at para. 26, [1988] S.C.J. No. 76.
[33]
In these circumstances, the applicant contends that the Court should either deal with its application for judicial review or, alternatively, direct the CBSA to waive the payment requirement pending the applicant’s exhaustion of the statutory appeals process.
[34]
There appeared to be some confusion at the hearing of the respondents’ motion to strike with respect to the legal basis for the motion. It is therefore important to understand what the respondents are arguing in support of their motion, and just as importantly, what they are not arguing.
[35]
There are two arguments potentially available to a respondent in a case such as this. The first is that in accordance with section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act, the Federal Court has no jurisdiction to review the validity of assessments of anti-dumping duties. Section 18.5 provides:
18.5 Despite sections 18 and 18.1, if an Act of Parliament expressly provides for an appeal to the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court Martial Appeal Court, the Tax Court of Canada, the Governor in Council or the Treasury Board from a decision or an order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal made by or in the course of proceedings before that board, commission or tribunal, that decision or order is not, to the extent that it may be so appealed, subject to review or to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with, except in accordance with that Act.
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18.5 Par dérogation aux articles 18 et 18.1, lorsqu’une loi fédérale prévoit expressément qu’il peut être interjeté appel, devant la Cour fédérale, la Cour d’appel fédérale, la Cour suprême du Canada, la Cour d’appel de la cour martiale, la Cour canadienne de l’impôt, le gouverneur en conseil ou le Conseil du Trésor, d’une décision ou d’une ordonnance d’un office fédéral, rendue à tout stade des procédures, cette décision ou cette ordonnance ne peut, dans la mesure où elle est susceptible d’un tel appel, faire l’objet de contrôle, de restriction, de prohibition, d’évocation, d’annulation ni d’aucune autre intervention, sauf en conformité avec cette loi.
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[36]
The second argument potentially available to a respondent in these circumstances is that the Court should decline to entertain the applicant’s application on the ground that there is an adequate alternate remedy available to it under the SIMA.
[37]
There is an important distinction between the two arguments. Where it applies, section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act acts as a statutory bar, depriving the Federal Court of the jurisdiction to set aside a detailed adjustment statement for any reason: Fritz Marketing Inc. v. Canada, 2009 FCA 62 at para. 33, [2009] F.C.J. No. 323. That is, the Federal Court has no power to review assessment decisions, even if it wanted to do so: Spike Marks Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FCA 406 at paras. 19 and 21, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1756.
[38]
The existence of an alternate statutory recourse mechanism can also operate as a bar to judicial review. There are a number of principles underlying the adequate alternate remedy rule, the most important of which for our purposes is the need to respect specialized statutory appeals processes created by Parliament: JP Morgan, above at para. 85.
[39]
However, unlike situations where the Court is deprived of jurisdiction by virtue of section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act, the availability of an alternate recourse mechanism is a discretionary bar to judicial review. That is, Courts have the power to entertain applications for judicial review in exceptional circumstances, notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy: Canada (Border Services Agency) v. C.B. Powell Limited, 2010 FCA 61 at para. 31, [2011] 2 F.C.R. 332; JP Morgan, above at para. 84.
[40]
It is clear from both the respondents’ Notice of Motion and their memorandum of fact and law that they are arguing that section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act deprives this Court of jurisdiction to review the validity of the CBSA’s assessments of anti-dumping duties. They are not arguing that the applicant has an adequate alternate remedy available to it through the statutory appeals process. The respondents confirmed that this was the case at the hearing of the motion.
[41]
There is a substantial body of jurisprudence dealing with the operation of section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act in cases involving the assessment of taxes or duties. While many of these cases (including the Fritz Marketing and Spike Marks decisions cited earlier in these reasons) arise under the provisions of the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.) rather than the SIMA, the similarity of the appeal schemes in the two Acts makes cases decided under the Customs Act applicable to the present case: Toyota Tsusho, above at paras. 17 and 20.
[42]
As Justice Tremblay-Lamer held in Toyota Tsusho, the scheme of re-determinations and appeals under the SIMA “is complete and, in enacting it, Parliament has clearly expressed its intention to oust the jurisdiction of this Court to review decisions taken under the authority of that statute”
: above, at para. 20. She went on to observe that the privative clauses in the SIMA are clear, and that the only way to challenge an assessment of anti-dumping duties “is to follow the procedures set out in the SIMA itself”
: above, at para. 20.
[43]
The Federal Court of Appeal agreed that the statutory appeal scheme in the SIMA effectively excluded the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to entertain an application for judicial review of an assessment of anti-dumping duties: Toyota Tsusho (FCA), above at para. 2. See also Spike Marks, above, Fritz Marketing, above at para. 33; 1099065 Ontario Inc. (c.o.b. Outer Space Sports) v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2006 FC 1263 at para. 38, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1584, aff’d 2008 FCA 47, [2008] F.C.J. No. 177; Jockey Canada Co. v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2010 FC 396 at para. 31, [2010] F.C.J. No. 454.
[44]
These decisions thus clearly establish that the effect of the statutory appeals regime in the SIMA, coupled with the provisions of section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act, is to oust the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to entertain challenges to the legal validity of assessments of anti-dumping duties and similar charges.
[45]
It is true that earlier jurisprudence suggested that section 18.5 only bars applications for judicial review with respect to challenges to CITT decisions, and that it does not apply to bar applications brought in this Court challenging detailed adjustment statements: Abbott Laboratories, Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.), 2004 FC 140 at para. 36, [2004] F.C.J. No. 410. However, it appears that the jurisprudential authority of this decision has been overtaken by more recent cases.
[46]
By way of example, the Toyota Tsusho decision discussed above involved an application for judicial review of a detailed adjustment statement issued by a CBSA officer, as was also the case in Fritz Marketing. Even though neither case involved challenges to CITT decisions, the Federal Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act applied to deprive this Court of jurisdiction. Similarly, Spike Marks involved a challenge to a decision by the President of the CBSA, rather than the CITT. The Federal Court of Appeal was nevertheless satisfied that the existence of a right of appeal to the CITT operated to deprive this Court of jurisdiction.
[47]
Insofar as the applicant’s access to justice argument is concerned, it is important to note that the Trial Lawyers case relied upon by the applicant involved a constitutional challenge to a legislative provision imposing fees on litigants seeking to try cases in the British Columbia Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the hearing fee scheme was unconstitutional, as it violated section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, by impermissibly infringing on the core jurisdiction of the superior courts by denying some people access to the courts.
[48]
The applicant has not challenged the appeal provisions of the SIMA on constitutional grounds, and in the absence of a constitutional challenge to the legislation, this Court is bound to apply the law: JP Morgan, above at para. 35.
VI.
Conclusion
[49]
I am mindful of the cautionary comments in JP Morgan where the Federal Court of Appeal stated that this Court should not strike a Notice of Application if it is uncertain whether section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act applies to bar the application in question: above, at para. 91. That said, given that the essential nature of the application is a challenge to the assessment of anti-dumping duties, it is clear from the jurisprudence discussed in these reasons that section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act operates to oust the jurisdiction of this Court in the present case, with the result that the applicant’s application for judicial review is bereft of any chance of success. Consequently, the applicant’s Notice of Application is struck out and the application for judicial review is dismissed.
[50]
The respondents acknowledge that it remains open to the applicant to commence a constitutional challenge to the legislative scheme contained in the SIMA. In the exercise of my discretion, the applicant shall have leave to file an amended Notice of Application within 30 days of the date of this decision advancing its challenge to the relevant provisions of the SIMA on constitutional grounds, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to bring such further motions they may deem appropriate.
VII.
Costs
[51]
In accordance with the agreement of the parties, the respondents are entitled to their costs fixed in the amount of $2,000.00, inclusive of GST and disbursements.