Date: 20170426

Docket: T-1105-16

Citation: 2017 FC 405

[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

Ottawa, Ontario, April 26, 2017

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Roy

BETWEEN:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Applicant

and

IRMA THÉRIAULT

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

[1]               The Attorney General of Canada is seeking a judicial review of a decision rendered by the Social Security Tribunal of Canada – Appeal Division [SST-AD] on June 8, 2016. The application for judicial review is pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, 1985, c. F-7.

[2]               The situation is rather incongruent in that the applicant is without an opponent before this Court, while the issue is a narrow one. Should the SST-AD have granted leave to appeal?

I.                    Preliminary Issue

[3]               Ms. Thériault chose not to participate in this application for judicial review. Furthermore, she did not concede the appeal, with the result being that the hearing before this Court would have meant hearing the Attorney General of Canada alone. This somewhat unusual situation does not prevent the judicial review from being heard, however. What must also be understood is that the burden is on the shoulders of the applicant in judicial reviews and that, if the burden is not discharged, the application for judicial review will be dismissed despite the absence of a respondent. I would add that the representative of the Attorney General acted with all the consideration expected under such circumstances.

II.                 The facts

[4]               Ms. Thériault, now 61 years old, was seeking disability benefits through the Canada Pension Plan, RSC (1985), c. C-8. She completed 12 years of schooling and two years of post-secondary studies. She worked at a funeral home as a housekeeper and office assistant until she stopped working in July 2011 due to pain. She claimed that her medical condition arising from fibromyalgia, osteoarthritis, and irritable bowel syndrome rendered her disabled under subsection 42(2) of the Canada Pension Plan. Some medical reports were filed on the record. It is not necessary to elaborate on them because Parliament has recognized that jurisdiction for disposing of pension applications resides with administrative tribunals. To determine whether judicial review should be granted, this Court is not required to consider the merit of the pension application.

[5]               According to the department that administers the pension plan, Ms. Thériault was not incapable of holding a substantially gainful occupation. As a result, her benefit claims were denied.

III.               Relevant decisions for resolving the dispute

A.                 SST-AD Decision

[6]               On November 28, 2015, the Social Security Tribunal of Canada – General Division [SST-GD] rendered its decision on Ms. Thériault’s application against the Minister of Employment and Social Development’s decision not to allow her claim for disability benefits.

[7]               After briefly summarizing the evidence and considering more closely the medical opinions in support of the claim, the SST-DG found that the alleged disability was not severe enough to warrant benefits (para 23). Paragraph 17 of the decision contains a very brief summary under the heading [translation] “severity”:

[TRANSLATION]

[17]      The appellant has a Grade 12 education, post-secondary training, and transferable skills. She did not attempt to return to work, retrain, or find another occupation. The medical evidence shows a mild condition, and only conservative treatments were prescribed. The appellant testified that she is able to perform some housekeeping duties, subject to modifications and at her own pace.

[8]               The paragraph of the SST-GD’s decision that is problematic is paragraph 18; it contains the statement made by the SST-GD with respect to the test that should be applied. The paragraph reads as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

[18]      The Tribunal recognizes that the appellant has limitations due to her condition; however, a finding of severe disability may only be granted until attempts to work in all types of occupations are unsuccessful due to her health condition.

[9]               Without ever making any link between the description of the test to be applied that is outlined in paragraph 18, the SST-GD follows with three paragraphs that, in my view, appear to merely be templates. Thus, it states that the severity of the disability is assessed in a “real world” context that takes into consideration age, education level, language proficiency, and past work and life experience. Villani v Canada (Attorney General), 2001 FCA 248 [Villani] is cited to support this proposition.

[10]           Labour market conditions would be irrelevant in a determination of disability. In this case, reference was made to Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v Rice, 2002 FCA 47. Finally, if the individual is fit to work, Inclima v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCA 117 [Inclima] teaches that claimants shall establish that their attempts to find and maintain an occupation have been unsuccessful as a result of their health condition.

[11]           There is a flurry of these propositions. They only lead to the general conclusion that Ms. Thériault did not have a severe disability preventing from holding a substantially gainful occupation.

B.                 The SST-AD’s decision

[12]           The focus of the appeal before the SST-AD is on paragraph 18 of the SST-GD’s decision. However, the decision in the case at hand is one preceding a decision on the merits.

[13]           Specifically, the SST-AD’s decision relates to leave to appeal the SST-GD’s decision. The Department of Employment and Social Development Act, SC 2005 c. 34 [the Act] does not provide for appeal as of right before the SST-AD. Rather, this appeal is subject to a screening process that requires that a person seeking to appeal an SST-DG decision must satisfy the SST-AD that one of the grounds of appeal is present and leave should be refused if it is satisfied that the appeal has no chance of success on the reasons given.

[14]           Thus, section 56 of the Act specifically states that “[a]n appeal to the Appeal Division may only be brought if leave to appeal is granted.” Section 58 applies here to establish the permitted grounds of appeal; it is therefore relevant to reproduce the first four paragraphs of section 58:

An individual who wishes to appeal the decision must therefore claim one of the three grounds of appeal, and the Appeal Division must be satisfied that leave to appeal should not be refused because the appeal has no reasonable chance for success. Subsection 58(2) is clearly a safety valve to prevent the appeal from being heard, even though it has no reasonable chance of success, due to the presence of a ground of appeal. But the refusal to allow the appeal despite the presence of a ground of appeal shall only be allowed if there is no chance of success. As soon as there is a reasonable chance of success, the appeal must be heard.

[15]           It is clear that the SST-AD was not satisfied that the appeal did not have a reasonable chance of success. The SST-AD found that the appeal should proceed because [translation] “the appeal has a reasonable chance of success” (para 27). It was on this decision that the Government sought a judicial review.

[16]           The SST-AD notes that the appeal is not a new hearing on the merits of the disability claim. Simply repeating the arguments will not be sufficient to establish that one of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable chance of success. It also seems to be quite clear that there was a lack of precision in the grounds of appeal.

[17]           Thus, even though Ms. Thériault did not specify how the SST-GD’s decision was vitiated by an error of law, the SST-AD appears to have found one. Reproducing paragraph 18 of the SST-GD’s decision, the SST-AD underlined the second part of the paragraph, namely:

[TRANSLATION]

            […] a finding of severe disability may only be granted until attempts to work in all types of occupations are unsuccessful due to her health condition.

[Emphasis added]

It should be understood that it is the underlined part that [translation] “is problematic” (para 25).

[18]           Without further explanation, the SST-AD states that, despite the reference to Inclima, [translation] “applying case law to the present facts seems to be erroneous.” Thus, the SST-AD passes directly from the underlined excerpt said to be problematic, while the SST-AD clearly tries to draw attention to its finding that there is a reasonable chance of success because the SST-GD did not apply the relevant case law to the facts. If we stopped here, one could believe that this was a blatant example of an error of mixed fact and law. However, at para 27, the SST-AD instead mentions an error of law described in the preceding paragraphs.

[19]           On this basis alone, the SST-AD finds that the appeal has a reasonable chance of success, as required under section 58 of the Act. No explanation is given in addition to the fact that, according to the SST-AD, such an error could result in the impugned decision being set aside. Leave to appeal is granted.

IV.              Argument and analysis

[20]           The Attorney General is seeking a judicial review of the SST-AD’s finding that paragraph 18 of the SST-GD contains an error of law. The Attorney General, who, as noted above, does not have an opponent before this Court, submitted that the decision to allow an appeal to proceed to the SST-AD is unreasonable. Two arguments are presented. First, it would be unreasonable to see a reasonable chance of success if there was an error of law in the wording of paragraph 18 of the SST-DG’s decision. Second, said decision is not justified, transparent, or intelligible and strays from the range of possible acceptable outcomes (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir], at para 47).

[21]           The Attorney General therefore argues that it is unreasonable to establish an error of law because the decision would stray from the range of possible acceptable outcomes; the decision would be unreasonable in this respect. It would also be unreasonable because it would not meet the criteria of justification, intelligibility, and transparency. The Attorney General is therefore attacking the two aspects of reasonableness, i.e. the decision itself and how that decision was reached.

[22]           The Court found that the decision itself with respect to an error of law falls within the range of possible acceptable outcomes. According proper deference to the decision, the Court concludes that an error of law could have been found. Furthermore, there is a lack of justification, transparency, and intelligibility.

A.                 Error of law

[23]           Indeed, I believe that the applicant clearly identified the difficulty that was raised by the SST-AD. In paragraph 34 of his memorandum of fact and law, the Attorney General stated that the SST-AD was reminded by the concept used in paragraph 18 of the SST-GD’s decision to find a potential error. This paragraph states that severe disability giving rise to compensation “may only be granted until attempts to find some sort of occupation are unsuccessful due to her health condition.” The Attorney General is correct in emphasizing the words “some type of occupation.” This may not correspond to the state of the law since the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Villani. Moreover, the difficulty posed by these words is well described by the Attorney General in paragraph 34 of his memorandum. In this paragraph, he noted that the words could be indicative of [translation] “a potential error due to the SST-GD’s reference to attempts to work in some type of occupation rather than in occupations that may correspond to her own characteristics, such as age, education, work experience, etc.” In my view, this is indeed the question.

[24]           Not ending there, the applicant relied on paragraph 19 of the SST-GD’s decision, in which the Tribunal referred to Villani. The applicant submitted that this was sufficient to establish that Villani was indeed relevant to the case at hand. Moreover, according to the Attorney General, the question does not truly arise in this case because the evidence reportedly revealed that Ms. Thériault made no effort to find and maintain an occupation. It is contended that this is an essential condition for receiving a pension and that this makes the reasons purely academic; as a result, there could be no reasonable chance of success. No authority was provided to support the assertion that the reviewing court could examine the evidence to be satisfied of the mootness of an appeal.

[25]           The applicant is correct that the decision to grant leave to appeal in this appeal is governed by the reasonableness standard (Canada (Attorney General) v Bernier, 2017 FC 120). I also believe that the difficulty identified by the SST-AD is indeed the SST-GD’s reference to an understanding of severe disability that requires that attempts to work in some type of occupation are unsuccessful as a result of her condition. It appears that such a conception has been part of a line of thought. But the state of the law has apparently been established elsewhere. Thus, such a statement could be contrary to the state of the law since Villani.

[26]           In that case, the Federal Court of Appeal had to interpret subsection 42(2) of the Canada Pension Plan. This provision defines many term used in that Act. Paragraph 42(2)(a) is relevant to this case and reads as follows:

In the case at hand, only paragraph (i) had to be interpreted. The issue of prolonged disability was not considered.

[27]           In Villani, the Court of Appeal had to decide between two lines of thought regarding the degree of disability required under the Act to have a disability giving rise to compensation. According to one line of thought, it was necessary to establish an impediment to perform any physical activity or work. This line of thought was not endorsed by the Court of Appeal. Thus, paragraph 38 of the decision reads as follows:

[38]      This analysis of subparagraph 42(2)(a)(i) strongly suggests a legislative intention to apply the severity requirement in a “real world” context. Requiring that an applicant be incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation is quite different from requiring that an applicant be incapable at all times of pursuing any conceivable occupation. Each word in the subparagraph must be given meaning and when read in that way the subparagraph indicates, in my opinion, that Parliament viewed as severe any disability which renders an applicant incapable of pursuing with consistent frequency any truly remunerative occupation. In my view, it follows from this that the hypothetical occupations which a decision-maker must consider cannot be divorced from the particular circumstances of the applicant, such as age, education level, language proficiency and past work and life experience.

[28]           It seems rather clear to me that the test is not the inability of an individual to hold any occupation, as the SST-DG seems to state. If this was the test that was applied, it could constitute an error of law.

[29]           The applicant’s attempt to recover from this error of law is to refer to the following paragraph in the SST-GD’s decision where reference is made to Villani. This difficulty with this argument is that the decision-maker does not make any connection between the paragraphs. Furthermore, paragraph 19 is merely a template, just as the following paragraphs appear to be. With no connection to paragraph 18, it is difficult to see how the mere statement of understanding of Villani mitigates what appears to be the error of law in paragraph 18. Some might argue that this only emphasizes the misunderstanding of the SST-GD. In fact, the wording “some sort of occupation” is also found in paragraph 15 of the SST-GD’s decision, which states that the respondent (the Crown) claims ineligibility because [translation] “the medical information on file does not establish that her limitations prevent her from performing some type of occupation.” Thus, the wording, “some type of occupation” does not seem to me to have been made by mistake.

[30]           The reasonableness test applies to a decision to grant leave of appeal that will be refused only if the Appeals Division is satisfied that the appeal has no reasonable chance of success. Clearly, the SST-AD has broad discretion that translates into ample flexibility. The broadens the range of options available to the decision-maker (Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities) v Jagjit Singh Farwaha, 2014 FCA 56, Philipos v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 79). Put another way, the range of possible acceptable outcomes is broad for this type of decision. The SST-AD must establish whether there may have been an error of law. It is not seeking a definitive finding at this preliminary stage. Is it a possible acceptable outcome that an error of law was made by the SST-GD? The statement of the wrong test thus constituting an error of law seems to me to be one of the possible acceptable outcomes. Seeing an error of law is far from an impossibility: it is certainly a possible outcome on the face of the terms used in para 18.

[31]           The contention that the evidence does not establish that Ms. Thériault made an effort to find or maintain an occupation seems premature to me in trying to determine whether we are in the presence of a ground of appeal that is one of the possible acceptable outcomes. Analytically, one should avoid addressing both together, even though the Act places them in two different stages. This is not the issue at this stage. Specifically, we are at the stage of a decision on a possible error of law. Such a decision involves deference for the decision-maker. The SST-AD did not have to weigh the evidence to establish whether the test in section 42 was met. First and foremost, it was necessary to set the bar. However, placing this bar at “some sort of occupation” is substantially too high and is unrealistic within the meaning of Villani. The error of law involves stating that the standard to be applied is the attempt to work in some sort of occupation—which is not the state of the law since Villani. If this is that test was used, it is wrong.

[32]           The applicant submitted that despite the possible error of law, the SST-AD should have nevertheless refused the leave of appeal because the appeal was doomed to fail. However, the SST-AD would still have had to be satisfied of the lack of a reasonable chance of success; this decision also deserves deference. According to the applicant, the SST-AD should have agreed that there was no attempt to find an occupation. The problem with question on the efforts to find or maintain an occupation is its absolutist nature, as submitted by the applicant. In Inclima, the Court of Appeal appears to be limited to “… as here, there is evidence of work capacity, must also show that efforts at obtaining and maintaining an occupation have been unsuccessful by reason of that health condition.” This relativism is improved by Villani, which states that a claimant’s particular circumstances have an impact on hypothetical occupations. Added to this is Klabouch v Canada (Social Development), 2008 FCA 33, subsequent to the two others, which includes the following statement: “I would add that the issue as to whether the applicant attempted to find alternative work or lacked motivation to do so was clearly a relevant consideration in determining whether his disability was ‘severe’ [emphasis added] (at para 21).”

[33]           To succeed on the mootness of the entire case because leave should have been refused because the appeal allegedly has no chance of success, the applicant has to ask the Court to weigh this evidence, even though neither the SST-GD nor the SST-AD did so thoroughly. As the applicant said himself in his memorandum, citing this Court in Osaj, “‘having a reasonable chance of success’ in this context (subsection 58(2) of the DESDA) means having some arguable ground upon which the proposed appeal might succeed (Osaj v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 155).” I would myself have advanced the proposition that the SST-AD must be satisfied that despite the identified ground of appeal, there is no arguable case that the proposed appeal could have succeeded. The Court must resist the invitation to take the place of the specialized administrative tribunals to which the task of reviewing the facts has been delegated by Parliament. In my view, the problem with subsection 58(2) is elsewhere.

[34]           It must therefore be concluded that the SST-AD identified a description of the test that may not comply with Villani. I find it difficult to imagine that the error in the wording of the test could be corrected by the template paragraphs. The identification of this question of law constitutes a possible acceptable outcome in light of the law since Villani.

B.                 Reasons for decision

[35]           The final question that needs to be addressed is whether the SST-AD’s reasons are sufficient. In my view, it is in this regard that the applicant must succeed in his judicial review.

[36]           As it is now well established, the mere insufficiency of the reasons is not a reason to set aside the decision of an administrative tribunal. In Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, the Court noted:

[14] Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir as standing for the proposition that the “adequacy” of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses — one for the reasons and a separate one for the result.

[37]           In fact, what is required is that the reviewing court can “understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes” (para 16).

[38]           The SST-AD’s decision is extremely thin; one must literally read between the lines to understand that the question of law that would give rise to an appeal is the reference to paragraph 18 of the SST-GD’s reasons to the wrong test for establishing what constitutes severe disability. In fact, the SST-AD also talks about applying case law to the facts, which does not constitute an error of law but rather a mixed error. Relying on Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union is at the limits of acceptable. It seems to me that there should have been another articulation of the error of law in addition to underlining the deficient wording to find that, somewhere, there was allegedly an error of law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada instructs judicial review judges to examine the record to assess the reasonableness of the outcome (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union, para 15). In fact, the Court cited with approval an excerpt from one of submissions in that case which presented the proposition as follows:

When reviewing a decision of an administrative body on the reasonableness standard, the guiding principle is deference. Reasons are not to be reviewed in a vacuum – the result is to be looked at in the context of the evidence, the parties’ submissions and the process. Reasons do not have to be perfect. They do not have to be comprehensive.

(Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union, at para 18)

[39]           What is lacking in the case at hand is any articulation of the reasons for which the SST-AD found that the appeal should proceed. Section 58 reproduced in paragraph 14 includes two elements: the only grounds that can be invoked on appeal and the refusal of an application for leave despite the presence of a ground of appeal under the Act.

[40]           The Department of Employment and Social Development Act requires “written reasons for its decision” (subsection 58(4)) be provided even to grant leave to appeal. Here, no motivation is provided. At best, the SST-AD stated that there was an error of law, or a mixed error of law and fact. Where are the reasons for granting or refusing leave? The English version of subsection 58(4) is eloquent: “must give written reasons for its decision to grant or refuse leave.” Furthermore, it continues to be proper that the reviewing court, to review the legality of a decision, be able to assess the reasons. Perfection is not required; the reviewing court can even look for reasons. But it cannot take the place of an administrative tribunal. Speculation and rationalization are not allowed. In Lloyd v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 115, the Court of Appeal stated the following:

[24]      In light of the adjudicator’s findings, even on a generous application of the principles in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, the basis upon which the 40-day suspension was justified cannot be discerned without engaging in speculation and rationalization. As I noted in Komolafe v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431 (CanLII), at para. 11:

Newfoundland Nurses is not an open invitation to the Court to provide reasons that were not given, nor is it licence to guess what findings might have been made or to speculate as to what the tribunal might have been thinking. This is particularly so where the reasons are silent on a critical issue. It is ironic that Newfoundland Nurses, a case which at its core is about deference and standard of review, is urged as authority for the supervisory court to do the task that the decision maker did not do, to supply the reasons that might have been given and make findings of fact that were not made. This is to turn the jurisprudence on its head. Newfoundland Nurses allows reviewing courts to connect the dots on the page where the lines, and the direction they are headed, may be readily drawn. Here, there were no dots on the page.

[41]           Here, it must be understood that the SST-AD believed that the articulation of the test by the SST-GD was not in accordance with the law. However, it is far from clear. But how this error of law does not fall within the exception in paragraph 58(2) remains impossible to identify. On the one hand, the error of law is not articulated or identified and, on the other hand, the reason that it reportedly has no chance of success is in no way outlined. Stating that an appeal must be allowed and that the appeal has a reasonable chance of success is not the same as providing reasons for the decision.

[42]           In the case at hand, the SST-GD indeed noted, in the paragraph preceding the paragraph found to be legally problematic, that Ms. Thériault [translation] “did not attempt to return to work, retrain, or find another job. The medical evidence shows a mild condition, and only conservative treatments were prescribed” (para 17, SST-GD decision).

[43]           In as much as attempts to find an occupation are necessary to succeed or are simply an important factor, in accordance with both subsection 58(4) and the principles of administrative law, it would have been necessary to provide the reasons for which, despite the error of law, the SST-AD did not dismiss the application for leave because the appeal had no chance of success.

[44]           In my view, subsection 58(2) is part of the decision on leave to appeal. The reasons must be given not only on the existence of permitted grounds of appeal but also on the decision to let this appeal to proceed. It may be thought that the party opposing leave to appeal would argue its reasons for which the appeal would be doomed despite the presence of a ground of appeal.

[45]           I find no indication that written reasons must be developed. Already when the question is posed clearly, a portion of the process is already completed. It may even, perhaps, be quite obvious that the question is not frivolous and that it has a reasonable chance of success, or better.

[46]           But Parliament has clearly been adamant that decisions on leave to appeal be given consideration. It requires the discipline of writing. The syllogism for reaching an appeal appears to be the following: (1) only certain grounds of appeal can receive leave to appeal; (2) despite the presence of a ground of appeal, leave may be refused; (3) decisions on leave must be reasoned; (4) and they are written reasons. The appeal is only allowed under these circumstances. Clearly, it will not be in all cases that a valid ground of appeal under subsection 58(1) is present that the appeal must be allowed.

[47]           Both the Act and the rules of administrative law regarding judicial review require minimal reasoning for the reviewing court to perform its duties. It is difficult to judicially review an administrative decision if its reason cannot be identified. It is one of the most fundamental prerogatives of reasonableness that “process and the outcome fit comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility…” (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, at para 59). With respect, in my view this is why this matter must be referred back to the SST-AD.

V.                 Conclusion

[48]           What has been lacking in this case is the rigour of identifying the issues and disposing of them. The SST-GD uses template paragraphs. This is not forbidden, but it should be done wisely. Given the articulation of the test in paragraph 18 of its decision, the templates only lead to confusion. As for the SST-AD, some interpretation is required to understand the error of law that it appears to have detected. But the decision to be rendered is not simply identifying a question of law, but also that leave should not be refused because the appeal has no reasonable chance of success, or else the leave for appeal will be allowed. In any event, this decision to refuse or allow the leave to appeal based on its chance of success must be reasoned. The SST-AD did not provide any reasons.

[49]           Thus, the matter must be referred back to the SST-AD, differently constituted, for the question of law to be reconsidered. Permission to leave should be refused if the SST-AD is satisfied that the appeal has no chance of success. The decision on leave shall be substantiated in writing. If it can be accepted that the SST-AD’s decision was one of the possible acceptable outcomes, i.e. that there was an error of law, this constitutes merely half of the test in accordance with section 58. Dunsmuir also requires that for a decision to be reasonable, the decision-making process must be justified, transparent and intelligible. That is what has been lacking, and this is all the more true since the Act requires a reasoned and written decision.

[50]           Therefore, the application for judicial review is allowed, without costs.

JUDGMENT in T-1105-16

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is allowed in order for the Social Security Tribunal – Appeals Division, differently constituted, to reconsider whether the error of law qualifies under subsection 58(2) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act.

Without costs.

“Yvan Roy”

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:		T-1105-16
STYLE OF CAUSE:		ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA v IRMA THÉRIAULT
PLACE OF HEARING:	Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING:	April 10, 2017
JUDGMENT AND REASONS	ROY J.
DATE:	APRIL 26, 2017

APPEARANCES:

Sylvie Doire

FOR THE APPLICANT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

William F. Pentney Deputy Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Ontario

FOR THE RESPONDENT