Docket: T-626-17
Citation:
2017 FC 520
[ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, April 28, 2017
In the presence of Mr. Justice Gascon
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BETWEEN:
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TECHNOLOGIES
H2CI INC.
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Applicant
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and
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ENVIRONMENT AND
CLIMATE CHANGE CANADA
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Respondent
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ORDER
UPON motion of the
applicant, Technologies H2CI Inc., pursuant to which it solicits, by way of an ex
parte application, an interlocutory injunction ordering the respondent,
Environment and Climate Change Canada, not to proceed with the dismantling of
the House of the Future installed on the fourth floor of the Biosphère in
Montréal;
UPON REVIEW of the
applicant’s Motion Record, and after having considered the written and oral
submissions of counsel for the applicant;
CONSIDERING that the
issuance of an ex parte interim injunction by the Court is regulated by
section 374 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [the Rules] and
by case law;
CONSIDERING that an
interim injunction constitutes an extraordinary and discretionary remedy in
equity that requires special and compelling circumstances and obliges the
applicant to demonstrate that:
1.
It meets the three-stage test established by the
Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [MacDonald]. This three-stage test requires that the
applicant demonstrate to the Court that: 1) there is a serious issue to be
determined; 2) it may suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued;
and 3) the balance of convenience is in its favour.
2.
The test is conjunctive and each of its three
branches must be satisfied (Janssen Inc. v. Abbvie
Corporation, 2014 FCA 112 at
para. 19). Thus, if the applicant fails to satisfy any of the
branches of this three-stage test, its application for an injunction must be
denied.
CONSIDERING that an
interim injunction on an ex parte motion requires that in addition to
meeting the three requirements of the test in MacDonald, the applicant
must also demonstrate, either that there is an urgency to act and that no
notice could be given to the respondent, or that providing notice would cause
irreparable harm to the objective sought by the applicant;
CONSIDERING that no
situation is more likely to lead to possible injustice and abuse of the powers
of the Court than an application for an injunction on an ex parte motion
without notice to the respondent, and that the applicant has the burden of
demonstrating the existence of a situation warranting that it proceed without
providing notice;
CONSIDERING that, if the
applicant is unable to prove this urgent need, the Court will only consider an
interim injunction insofar as the adverse party has received prior notice;
CONSIDERING that it is
for the applicant to demonstrate, based on clear and compelling evidence, that
the matter is urgent enough that no notice can be given to the respondent or
that providing notice would irreparably harm the intended purpose of its
application;
CONSIDERING the following
particular factual circumstances:
1. In July 2015, the applicant entered into a partnership with the
respondent giving the applicant permission to occupy and use all the space
located on the fourth floor of the Biosphère to design and build a house
featuring environmental technologies and an attached greenhouse. The project
was known as the House of the Future.
2. Having obtained the funding required for the project, the applicant
designed and started to build the House of the Future.
3. By way of a letter dated January 17, 2017, the respondent
informed the applicant that it had decided to terminate the partnership given
the applicant’s failure to deliver the turnkey project on the agreed date and
demanded that the applicant dismantle and move the House of the Future. The
respondent gave the applicant until April 15, 2017 to get this done.
4. On April 7, 2017, the applicant allegedly sent the respondent
an email indicating that the applicant could not meet the April 15, 2017
deadline to dismantle and move the House of the Future and therefore asked the
respondent for an extension. However, the affidavit filed by the applicant in support
of its application does not contain this correspondence, nor does it explain
what occurred between the respondent’s initial request in January 2017 and the
applicant’s answer on April 7, 2017.
5. The respondent sent the applicant a letter dated April 12, 2017
indicating that it agreed to extend the deadline initially set for dismantling
and moving the House of the Future providing it received an answer from the
applicant before 2:00 p.m., April 19, 2017 regarding its
implementation plan and a commitment that the dismantling and moving work would
be completed by April 28, 2017 at 5:00 p.m.
6. In its April 12, 2017 letter, the respondent also informed the
applicant that its delay in dismantling and moving the House of the Future was
causing the respondent harm, and the situation had become critical. The
respondent also informed the applicant that unless it received a proposal
before the April 19, 2:00 p.m. deadline, the respondent would
conclude that the applicant was abandoning its House of the Future without
compensation or recourse and that its abandonment would result in a transfer of
its full legal possession to the respondent.
7. On April 19, 2017, the applicant sent its answer, but only at
4:48 p.m., and it indicated that the applicant would need to have the
deadline extended to May 5, 2017 to complete the move. Furthermore,
neither the timing nor the contents of the applicant’s answer met the
requirements set out in the respondent’s April 12 letter.
8. Counsel for the respondent sent the applicant a letter dated
April 24, 2017 indicating that the respondent had concluded from the
applicant’s late response on April 19 that the applicant had chosen to
abandon its rights, titles and other interests in the House of the Future in
favour of the federal government and that the respondent intended to dismantle
the House of the Future to clear the premises “as quickly as possible.”
9. The applicant did not provide any other details regarding the
expected date upon which the House of the Future would be dismantled by the respondent,
and the applicant did not provide any indications regarding the steps that the
respondent could have actually taken to dismantle it since the response dated
April 24, 2017.
10. Following
the respondent’s April 24, 2017 response, the applicant sent an email to
the respondent and its counsel on April 25, 2017, indicating inter alia
that it had no intention of abandoning the House of the Future to the federal
government.
11. Neither
the respondent nor its counsel provided any other information or responses after
April 25, 2017.
CONSIDERING that the
applicant did not convince the Court that it met the requirements of
section 374 of the Rules to obtain the injunction it demands without prior
notice to the respondent and that it did not provide the evidence needed to
demonstrate either that there was such an urgency to act that no notice could
be given to the respondent or that providing notice would cause irreparable
harm to the intended purpose of the application;
CONSIDERING that, given
the exchanges between the respondent and its counsel until April 25 and
the absence of evidence that there was danger in the dwelling or that the
dismantling of the House of the Future by the respondent was imminent, the
Court is not satisfied that the applicant discharged its burden regarding the
urgency and need to proceed ex parte to apply for an interim injunction;
CONSIDERING that nothing
in the Court’s decision prevents the applicant, following notice to the
respondent, from soliciting an interim or interlocutory injunction, according
to the terms specified in its notice of motion;
CONSIDERING that, given
its findings on the absence of sufficient evidence regarding to the need to
proceed ex parte, it is not appropriate for the Court to rule on the
criteria of the test in the MacDonald decision that the applicant will
have to meet to obtain the interim injunction sought, especially since service
to the respondent could lead the respondent to file a motion in response to the
applicant’s application;
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1. The applicant’s motion for an ex parte interim injunction is
dismissed, subject to the applicant’s right to renew its application after
having duly notified the respondent by serving the respondent its Motion
Record.
2. The applicant is authorized to serve its Motion Record to the
respondent, along with a copy of this order, sending all the foregoing by any
means of service, including electronic service, to counsel for the respondent.
3. Costs in the cause.
“Denis Gascon”