Docket: T-1795-15
Citation:
2017 FC 399
Ottawa, Ontario, April 26, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
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BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Applicant
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and
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MENT ALLH MOHAM
MAHROUS
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
This is the second of three decisions related to
the citizenship applications of three members of the same family (mother,
daughter, and son), which are all being released today. While each case is
separate, the governing law is the same and need not be repeated in detail. The
cases may be read together to better understand the Court’s approach to
decisions of a similar nature. The judicial reviews of the cases of Ms. Ashmawy
(the mother) and of Ms. Mahrous (the daughter) flowed from the decisions of the
same Citizenship Judge. This judicial review concerns the decision of Ms.
Mahrous [Decision].
II.
Background
[2]
Some of the principal factual differences
between the cases of Ms. Ashmawy and Ms. Mahrous are that Ms. Mahrous applied
for citizenship on April 30, 2009, having arrived in Canada on January 7, 2006
[Relevant Period], and she declared 1,189 days of physical presence in Canada.
This left a margin of 94 days between the claimed presence in Canada and the
minimum requirement. Any variance with the claimed presence is important
because such a variance could put the Applicant outside the required period of
residence.
[3]
Ms. Mahrous claimed to have made one trip to
Egypt during the Relevant Period. There was no evidence of when she left Canada
and passport evidence covered less than two years of the Relevant Period.
As
the Applicant’s Record discloses, there were two trips to Egypt, not one. The
Citizenship Judge never addressed this second trip. Nor did the Citizenship
Judge address the existence of a Cairo address on the Respondent’s Egyptian
passport.
[4]
This case also exhibited the same issue of the
rental home on Hickling Crescent and a short-term rental in downtown Toronto.
Ms. Mahrous rented another apartment under construction but lived in Harbour
Square while also claiming to live at Hickling Crescent.
[5]
This case also raised the issue of financial
support and the absence of evidence of financial activity.
[6]
The Citizenship Judge, using similar problematic
phrasing as in the decision of Ms. Ashmawy, concluded that he did not “find solid elements to doubt the credibility of the
applicant”.
[7]
The format of the Decision was the same as that
of her mother’s – a series of bullet points of issues or topics, some with
conclusions and some without. Following the listing of issues or topics, the
Citizenship Judge makes the conclusory finding on the residency requirement.
III.
Analysis
[8]
The issues are the same as in Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Ashmawy, 2017 FC 398 [Ashmawy]:
1.
Did the Citizenship Judge err in law?
2.
Was the Decision reasonable?
3.
Should the material submitted by the Respondent
in this judicial review which was not before the Citizenship Judge be struck?
[9]
The legal principles and conclusions are the
same.
[10]
In addition to the general concerns raised in Ashmawy,
this case highlights and repeats the same deficiencies. The Citizenship Judge
failed to address all of the pertinent issues and, to the extent issues were
addressed, the articulation was incomplete.
[11]
To the extent that the Citizenship Judge relied on
evidence heard in one of the other related cases, he failed to identify what
evidence was transported into this case or, apparently, to put that evidence to
the Respondent. The evidence of supposed financial support from the Respondent’s
father is but one of those examples of incorporation without reference.
[12]
It is impossible for this Court to discern the
line of reasoning which led to the Citizenship Judge’s conclusions. If there
were answers to the issues and topics raised, they are not set forth; therefore,
this Court is unable to assess the reasonableness of the Citizenship Judge’s
decision.
IV.
Conclusion
[13]
For these reasons, this judicial review will be
granted and the Decision quashed. For reasons previously given, no costs should
be awarded.