Dockets: A-147-14
A-148-14
Citation: 2014 FCA 222
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CORAM:
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TRUDEL J.A.
WEBB J.A.
BOIVIN J.A.
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Docket:A-147-14
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BETWEEN:
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HAROLD COOMBS &
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JOAN COOMBS &
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PERCY G. MOSSOP
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Appellants
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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Docket:A-148-14
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AND BETWEEN:
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HAROLD COOMBS &
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JOAN COOMBS &
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JOHN F. COOMBS &
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OLEG VOLOCHKOV &
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ANNE VOLOCHKOV
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Appellants
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
BOIVIN J.A.
[1]
This is an appeal from two decisions of Madam Justice
Kane (the Judge) of the Federal Court, both dated March 10, 2014.
[2]
Both decisions arise from the same set of facts,
are related and were heard together.
[3]
In file A-147-14, the appellants appeal the
Judge’s decision upholding Prothonotary Aalto’s decision of July 2, 2013 to
strike one of the appellants’ applications for judicial review as frivolous,
vexatious, and an abuse of process.
[4]
At issue before the Prothonotary was an
allegedly illegal search and seizure conducted by officials of the Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA), pursuant to a warrant issued by the Ontario Court of
Justice. The appellants claimed that the seizure resulted in a denial of
fundamental justice at a 2008 hearing at the Tax Court of Canada (TCC) (2008
TCC 289, 2008 DTC 4004) and that it violated their rights under section 7, 8
and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, Part 1
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (the Charter). They sought both
declaratory relief and an unspecified remedy under subsection 24(1) of the
Charter.
[5]
Before the Prothonotary, the appellants did not
challenge the legality or the validity of the search warrant but rather the
actions of the CRA officials who executed it. The Prothonotary found that the
appellants’ claim amounted to a collateral attack on the decision of the TCC
rendered in 2008 and therefore fell outside the jurisdiction of the Federal
Court. He further noted that all issues relating to the search warrant had
previously been determined and thus that the “notice of
application amounts to an abuse of process and is a frivolous and vexatious
application” and is “bereft of any chance of
success” (Prothonotary’s Order at page 5).
[6]
The appellants appealed the Prothonotary’s Order
to the Federal Court under Rule 51 of the Federal Courts Rules,
SOR/98-106. The Federal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants
failed to show that the Prothonotary relied on an improper principle or
fundamentally misapprehended the facts within the meaning of Canada v. Aqua-Gem
Investments Ltd., [1993] 2 F.C. 425 at pages 462-63 (FCA), 149
N.R. 273; Merck & Co v Apotex Inc, 2003 FCA 488, [2004] 2
F.C.R. 459.
[7]
The standard of review to be applied by this
Court on appeal from a judge sitting on appeal from a Prothonotary’s
decision was laid out by the Supreme Court in Z.I. Pompey Industrie v.
ECU-Line N.V., 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 450 at paragraph 18:
…An appellate court may interfere with the
decision of a motions judge where the motions judge had no grounds to interfere
with the prothonotary's decision or, in the event such grounds
existed, if the decision of the motions judge was arrived at on a wrong basis
or was plainly wrong: Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A., [1998] 3 F.C.
418 (C.A.), per Décary J.A., at pp. 427-28, leave to appeal refused,
[1998] 3 S.C.R. vi.
[8]
In this Court, the appellants have not persuaded
me that the Judge erred in any way. The same issues raised by the appellants
before the Prothonotary, were fully considered by the Judge and, as such, the
appellants were provided with a de novo review. While it is true that applications for judicial review may
be struck only in exceptional circumstances, the appellants had brought
fourteen applications and two actions as of March 10, 2014, based on the same
facts and alleging much the same violations (Judge’s reasons at paragraph 3). The
Judge found that this multiplicity of proceedings, including five proceedings
previously dismissed, falls within “exceptional
circumstances” and justifies that the application be struck (Judge’s reasons
at paragraph 49). I agree.
[9]
In file A-148-14, the appellants appeal the
Judge’s decision dismissing one application for judicial review as frivolous,
vexatious and an abuse of process and granting the motions of the respondent to
strike two other applications for judicial review as they are “so clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of
success” (Judge’s reasons at paragraph 78, citation omitted).
[10]
The appellants reassert substantially the same
arguments made with respect to file A‑147‑14. They also, however,
attack the Judge’s finding that there exists “no
reasonable apprehension of bias” against the Prothonotary (Judge’s
reasons at paragraph 24). They contend that the Judge
“misconstrued or misunderstood” the Prothonotary’s direction dated
February 13, 2014, (appellants’ memorandum of fact and law at paragraphs 48,
50, 70 and 71) in which he orally directed the following through the Registry: “All motions are to go before Justice Kane – Crown should
bring motions to dismiss as they intend in the additional two being added to
her list”.
[11]
The appellants also submit that Prothonotaries
cannot perform functions of judges in the Federal Court (appellants’ memorandum
of fact and law at paragraph 56). They further contend that the judge “fiercely defended” the allegedly improper behaviour by
the Prothonotary and that the hearing atmosphere was hence “not conducive to a fair hearing because of confrontational
dialogue between the judge and the appellant” (appellants’ memorandum of
fact and law at paragraphs 76-77).
[12]
The parties do not dispute that the standard of
review for alleged apprehension of bias is correctness.
[13]
After careful review of the parties’ written and
oral arguments, I am of the view that a reasonable person, fully informed and
understanding the issues before the Court, would not conclude that there was
bias (R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 193).
Indeed, the Prothonotary’s direction, dated February 13, 2014, follows the
letter sent by the respondent on January 9, 2014 regarding the Court’s process.
In that context, and properly read, I do not read the use of the word “should” in the direction to encourage the Crown to bring
motions to strike, but rather to direct before whom the motions ought to be
brought - i.e. the Judge.
[14]
Further, the appellants repeatedly attack the
integrity of the Prothonotary, of the Judge and of the Federal Court
(appellants’ memorandum of fact and law in file A-148-14 at paragraphs 28,
34-46, 50, 54, 56, 60, 63-65, 69, and 72-79; appellants’ memorandum of fact and
law in file A-147-14 at paragraphs 48, 77 and 78). The appellant’s allegations
are most serious, and such a step should not be undertaken lightly. Indeed, an
allegation of bias engages the very foundation of our judicial system. The appellants’
allegations call into question not only the personal integrity of the
Prothonotary and of the Judge, but the integrity of the entire administration
of justice (R. v. S. (R.D.), supra at paragraph 113).
[15]
On the basis of the record before the Court, the
appellants’ serious allegations are not only inappropriate and unnecessary, but
also unsupported by evidence and completely lacking in merit.
[16]
For the foregoing reasons, I propose to dismiss
the appeal in file A-147-14 without costs and I propose to dismiss the appeal
in file A-148-14 with costs. A copy of these reasons shall be placed in each of
those files.
“Richard Boivin”
“I agree
Johanne Trudel J.A.”
“I agree
Wyman W. Webb J.A.”
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