Docket: A-115-15
Citation:
2016 FCA 45
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CORAM:
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RYER J.A.
WEBB J.A.
RENNIE J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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DMITRI SHERMAN
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Appellant
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE
QUEEN
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on
February 9, 2016).
RYER J.A.
[1]
This is an appeal by Mr. Dmitri Sherman (the
“Taxpayer”) from a decision of Justice David Graham of the Tax Court of Canada
(the “Judge”), dated February 9, 2015, in Tax Court Docket 2014-2081(GST)I. The
Judge dismissed the Taxpayer’s appeal from an assessment, dated April 12, 2013
(the “Assessment”), made by the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”)
under the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (the “Act”), c. E-15, disallowing
the Taxpayer’s claim for a rebate of goods and services tax pursuant to
subsection 254(2) (the “New Housing Rebate”) in respect of the purchase by the
Taxpayer of a property located at 24 Thomas Cook Avenue in Vaughan, Ontario
(the “Property”). In these reasons, unless otherwise indicated, all statutory
references are to the corresponding provisions of the Act.
[2]
Subsection 254(2) contains a number of
requirements that must be met before an individual will be entitled to the New
Housing Rebate. In this appeal, only the requirements in paragraphs 254(2)(b)
and (g) are in issue. Those provisions read as follows:
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254(2) Where
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254(2) Le ministre verse un remboursement à un
particulier dans le cas où, à la fois :
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…
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[…]
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(b) at the
time the particular individual becomes liable or assumes liability under an
agreement of purchase and sale of the complex or unit entered into between
the builder and the particular individual, the particular individual is
acquiring the complex or unit for use as the primary place of residence of
the particular individual or a relation of the particular individual,
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b) au
moment où le particulier devient responsable ou assume une responsabilité aux
termes du contrat de vente de l’immeuble ou du logement conclu entre le
constructeur et le particulier, celui-ci acquiert l’immeuble ou le logement
pour qu’il lui serve de lieu de résidence habituelle ou serve ainsi à son
proche;
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…
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[…]
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(g) either
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g) selon
le cas :
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(i) the
first individual to occupy the complex or unit as a place of residence at any
time after substantial completion of the construction or renovation is
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(i) le
premier particulier à occuper l’immeuble ou le logement à titre résidentiel,
à un moment après que les travaux sont achevés en grande partie, est :
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(A) in
the case of a single unit residential complex, the particular individual or a
relation of the particular individual, and
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(A) dans
le cas de l’immeuble, le particulier ou son proche,
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(B) in
the case of a residential condominium unit, an individual, or a relation of
an individual, who was at that time a purchaser of the unit under an
agreement of purchase and sale of the unit, or
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(B) dans
le cas du logement, le particulier, ou son proche, qui, à ce moment, en était
l’acheteur aux termes d’un contrat de vente,
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(ii) the
particular individual makes an exempt supply by way of sale of the complex or
unit and ownership thereof is transferred to the recipient of the supply
before the complex or unit is occupied by any individual as a place of
residence or lodging,
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(ii) le
particulier effectue par vente une fourniture exonérée de l’immeuble ou du
logement, et la propriété de l’un ou l’autre est transférée à l’acquéreur de
cette fourniture avant que l’immeuble ou le logement n’ait été occupé à titre
résidentiel ou d’hébergement.
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[3]
In the reply to the Taxpayer’s notice of appeal
from the Assessment, the Minister assumed that the Taxpayer did not intend to
reside in the Property and did not occupy the Property.
[4]
In his reasons, the Judge determined that the
key issue was the requirement in paragraph 254(2)(b). He determined that
the Taxpayer failed to demolish the Minister’s assumption that the Taxpayer did
not have the intention to occupy the Property as his primary place of
residence, and that this failure was a sufficient reason to dismiss the appeal
from the Assessment. In reaching this conclusion, the Judge found that the
evidence of the Taxpayer and his cousin lacked credibility and did not satisfy
him that the Taxpayer had the requisite intention to occupy the Property, as
required by paragraph 254(2)(b).
[5]
In support of this conclusion, the Judge made a
number of findings including that:
a) the Taxpayer gave inconsistent explanations with respect to his
occupancy of the Property;
b) the Taxpayer provided the Canada Revenue Agency with inconsistent
moving expense invoices without a plausible explanation of their differences;
c) the Taxpayer implausibly urged the Judge to believe that he occupied
the Property but did not consume any water during a significant portion of the
period of such occupancy; and
d) the Taxpayer’s evidence that he sold the Property because he was not
able to live alone, for medical reasons, was belied by his purchase of another
residential property, before the date of that sale, in respect of which he also
claimed the New Housing Rebate.
[6]
In appellate review of a decision of the Tax
Court of Canada, the standard of review of questions of law is correctness.
Questions of fact and mixed fact and law, in respect of which there is no
readily extricable question of law, are reviewed on the standard of palpable
and overriding error (Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 at paragraphs 8,
10, 36, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235).
[7]
In this appeal, the Taxpayer takes issue with
the Judge’s factual findings referred to above and offers explanations as to
why it would have been open to the Judge to make different findings. In effect,
we are urged to reweigh the evidence that was before the Judge and to reach
conclusions more favourable to the Taxpayer. This we cannot do. In our view,
there was ample evidence before the Judge that supports his conclusions.
Moreover, this Court owes considerable deference to a trial judge who makes
credibility findings based upon the evidence and demeanor of the witnesses who
testify before him or her.
[8]
Counsel for the Taxpayer asserts that the Judge
erred in making his credibility findings by failing to consider the state of
the Taxpayer’s mental health. The Judge’s reasons clearly indicate that he was
aware of the Taxpayer’s assertions with respect to his mental health and memory
issues. In that regard, the Judge observed that the Taxpayer testified that his
medication was not properly balanced until 2014. In our view, there was no
evidence before the Judge that ought to have led him to conclude that the
Taxpayer was unable to meaningfully participate in the appeal before the Judge
by virtue of his mental condition or concerns with respect to his memory. In
addition, pursuant to the order of Justice Webb, dated July 15, 2015, the
Taxpayer’s motion for leave to introduce new medical evidence on this appeal
was denied.
[9]
It is important to recall that the testimony of
the Taxpayer that the Judge found lacking in consistency and credibility was
given by the Taxpayer on February 4, 2015. The evidence of the Taxpayer’s
cousin recounted his recollections of the Taxpayer’s condition during the years
2010 to 2013, a period considerably earlier than the date that the Judge
assessed the Taxpayer’s credibility (Appeal Book at page 153). Indeed, the Taxpayer’s
own evidence appears to indicate that he had been “okay”
since 2014 (Appeal Book at page 150 and 151). Thus, the Taxpayer’s
medical issues in the years 2010 to 2013 were not shown to have had any bearing
upon the issue of the Judge’s assessment of the Taxpayer’s credibility when he
gave evidence on February 4, 2015.
[10]
In conclusion, we are of the view that the Judge
made no palpable and overriding error when he found that the evidence presented
to him was not sufficient to demolish the Minister’s assumption that the
Taxpayer did not have the intention to occupy the Property as his primary place
of residence and, in addition, that the Taxpayer did not occupy the Property.
Additionally, the Judge was correct in his conclusion that the Taxpayer’s
failure to meet the requirements of either of paragraphs 254(2)(b) and (g),
was a sufficient reason to uphold the Assessment. Accordingly, the appeal will
be dismissed with costs.
"C. Michael Ryer"