Docket: A-37-16
Citation:
2016 FCA 258
|
CORAM:
|
NADON J.A.
DAWSON J.A.
WOODS J.A.
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
ECOLOGY ACTION
CENTRE and
|
|
LIVING OCEANS
SOCIETY
|
|
Appellants
|
|
and
|
|
MINISTER OF THE
ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, MINISTER OF HEALTH and
|
|
AQUABOUNTY
CANADA INC.
|
|
Respondents
|
REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
DAWSON J.A.
[1]
For reasons cited as 2015 FC 1412, a judge of
the Federal Court dismissed an application for judicial review of two
Ministerial decisions. On this appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court,
the appellants put in issue one decision only: the decision of the then
Minister of the Environment and Climate Change to publish in the Canada
Gazette, a Significant New Activity Notice pursuant to the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33 in respect of a
genetically modified Atlantic salmon known as the AquAdvantage Salmon. On this
appeal the appellants argue that the Federal Court erred in its application of
the reasonableness standard of review to the Minister’s decision.
[2]
Notwithstanding the able submissions of Mr. McAnsh,
I would dismiss this appeal for the following reasons.
[3]
The relevant facts are fully developed in the
reasons of the Federal Court. For the purpose of this appeal it is sufficient
to note that:
1.
A biotechnology company submitted a notification
to Environment Canada and Health Canada under subsection 106(1) of the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act (Act) with respect to the manufacture of
triploid, or sterile, eyed-eggs at a facility in Prince Edward Island for the
commercial production, or grow-out, of sterile, all-female AquAdvantage Salmon
(AAS) at a facility located in Panama. The respondent AquaBounty Canada Inc.
will be the manufacturer-seller of the AAS eggs in Canada.
2.
After a toxicity assessment was conducted, the
respondent Ministers determined that the AAS is not toxic, as defined under the
Act, nor capable of becoming toxic if the proposed activities are carried out
in a properly contained facility.
3.
The Ministers also determined that new
activities with the AAS conducted outside of contained facilities may result in
the living organism becoming toxic.
4.
In order to mitigate this risk, the Minister of
the Environment (Minister) exercised her discretion and caused the Significant
New Activity Notice (SNAc Notice) to be published under section 110 of the Act
in order to restrict the use of the AAS by AquaBounty and others. Should an
entity wish to conduct an activity with the AAS outside of the parameters set
out in the SNAc Notice, a new notification must be submitted.
5.
The SNAc Notice permitted a broader range of
uses of the AAS than those conferred on AquaBounty in two respects.
6.
First, while the AAS notification had not contemplated
or referenced the commercial grow-out of the AAS in Canada, the SNAc Notice
permits the commercial grow-out of female triploid AAS within a contained
facility, provided the female triploids are euthanized before leaving the
facility.
7.
Second, the Minister states, and the Federal
Court agreed, that subsection 106(10) of the Act restricts AquaBounty to using
the AAS at its facility in Prince Edward Island. However, the SNAc Notice
permits persons to use the AAS at any contained facility in Canada that meets
the containment criteria set out in the Notice.
[4]
On this appeal, the appellants argue that:
1.
The Minister’s decision to permit the commercial
grow-out of the AAS in Canada was unreasonable.
2.
The Minister’s decision to permit the AAS to be
used at any contained facility as defined in the SNAc Notice was unreasonable.
3.
The finding of the Federal Court that the
manufacture, import and use of the AAS by AquaBounty is limited to its facility
in Prince Edward Island is incompatible with its finding that the SNAc Notice
is reasonable.
4.
The Federal Court breached the duty of
procedural fairness when it interpreted Part 6 of the Act in a manner not
argued by the parties.
[5]
The Federal Court rejected the argument that the
SNAc Notice was unreasonable insofar as it permits the use of the AAS at any
contained facility. I see no error in the analysis of the Federal Court that
warrants intervention by this Court. Specifically, section 104 of the Act
defines a significant new activity to include, in respect of a living organism,
any activity that results, or may result in:
|
(a) the entry or release of the living organism into the
environment in a quantity or concentration that, in the Ministers’ opinion,
is significantly greater than the quantity or concentration of the living
organism that previously entered or was released into the environment; or
|
a) soit à la pénétration ou au rejet d’un organisme vivant dans
l’environnement en une quantité ou concentration qui, de l’avis des
ministres, est sensiblement plus grande qu’antérieurement;
|
|
(b) the entry or release of the living organism into the
environment or the exposure or potential exposure of the environment to the
living organism in a manner and circumstances that, in the Ministers’
opinion, are significantly different from the manner and circumstances in
which the living organism previously entered or was released into the
environment or of any previous exposure or potential exposure of the
environment to the living organism. (nouvelle activité)
|
b) soit à la pénétration ou au rejet d’un organisme vivant dans
l’environnement ou à l’exposition réelle ou potentielle de celui-ci à un tel
organisme, dans des circonstances et d’une manière qui, de l’avis des
ministres, sont sensiblement différentes. (significant
new activity)
|
|
(emphasis added)
|
(soulignement ajouté)
|
[6]
The Ministers may issue a notice with respect to
significant new activity when “they suspect that a
significant new activity in relation to that living organism may result in the
living organism becoming toxic” (subsection 110(1)). The legislation
thus confers significant discretion on the Ministers. The exercise of that
discretion is informed by their appreciation of the facts and by policy. Their
decision is therefore entitled to deference.
[7]
The appellants have not shown it was
unreasonable for the Minister to conclude that given adequate physical and
biological containment in a land-based facility the potential for exposure to
the environment could be prevented. It is to be remembered that a risk
assessment prepared by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and subjected to
an independent peer review process concluded that “the
risks to the Canadian environment associated with the manufacture and
production of AAS is concluded to be low with reasonable certainty under the
proposed use scenario specified in the notification by AquaBounty.” The
containment measures specified in the SNAc Notice and enhanced those specified
by AquaBounty.
[8]
With respect to the permitted commercial
grow-out, at paragraph 81 of its reasons, the Federal Court wrote:
… when the Certified Tribunal Record is read
as a whole, it is clear that the Minister of the Environment’s functional
approach to the SNAc Notice led her to conclude that “the containment measures
required by the AAS SNAc Notice will work equally well regardless of whether
the AAS are being grown out for research, reproduction or commercial grow-out.”
Adult AAS leaving the contained facility in Canada are required to have been
euthanized. There is no evidence in the record that euthanized AAS are a danger
to the environment. Moreover, they cannot be used for human consumption unless
approved by Health Canada, which, if called upon to issue an approval, would
examine risk to human health. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the scope of
the SNAc Notice was overly broad and unreasonable.
The appellants have
not demonstrated any error in this analysis.
[9]
Next, the appellants assert that the SNAc Notice
is absurd because it permits a wider range of uses for persons other than
AquaBounty.
[10]
The Federal Court noted that Part 6 of the Act
refers to three ways in which living organisms may be dealt with: manufacture,
importation and use. At paragraphs 75 through 77 of the reasons, the Federal
Court interpreted the relevant legislative provisions and concluded that “even though a SNAc Notice was issued that permits use
at a contained facility, any person seeking to manufacture or import
AAS must still file a Notification under subsection 106(1). This includes even
AquaBounty who, because it received a waiver under paragraph 106(8)(b), is
limited by subsection 106(10) to using and manufacturing AAS at its PEI
Facility, and so cannot manufacture elsewhere without undergoing further
assessment”.
[11]
The Federal Court went on to reason that:
[79] The impact of Part 6 of CEPA on
persons other than AquaBounty is that they must file a Notification under
subsection 106(1) in order to be permitted to manufacture or import AAS and, if
they are proposing a use that is a significant new activity, they must file a
Notification under subsection 106(4).
[80] What impact does
this interpretation have on the alleged absurdity outlined above? It causes it
to disappear. In particular, it demonstrates that AquaBounty is not placed in
an unequal position by the operation of subsection 106(10). Like AquaBounty,
all persons are required to submit a Notification if they wish to manufacture
or import AAS. As part of their Notification, they can request a waiver. If,
like AquaBounty, they request a waiver pursuant to subsection 106(8)(b), then
their use, manufacture, and import of AAS will be limited to the location
specified in their request for a waiver, pursuant to subsection 106(10). If, on
the other hand, they do not request a waiver, then their use will only be
constrained by the scope of the SNAc Notice. In this way, AquaBounty is placed
on equal footing with everyone else. There is therefore no absurdity, nor any
unreasonableness, in the Minister issuing a SNAc Notice that permits a wider
range of uses of AAS than that permitted by subsection 106(10). The applicants’
objection dissolves.
[12]
The appellants accept the correctness of the
Federal Court’s interpretation of the legislative scheme. The restriction on
use in relation to SNAc Notices, contained in subsection 106(4), and the
restriction in relation to waiver, contained in subsection 106(10), were shown
to apply rationally to AquaBounty, in a manner consistent with the presumption
of overlap. This presumption applies when two legislative principles apply
equally without conflict to the same set of facts. It follows there was no
absurdity which rendered the SNAc Notice unreasonable.
[13]
Finally, the Federal Court did not breach the
duty of procedural fairness by arriving at its own interpretation of the
legislation. While procedural fairness requires that parties be able to make
submissions about the issues of statutory interpretation, the Court’s ability
to decide those issues correctly is not constrained by the submissions of the
parties.
[14]
For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal,
with the appellants paying one set of costs in this Court to the respondent Ministers
and one set of costs in this Court to AquaBounty Canada Inc.
“Eleanor R. Dawson”
|
“I agree.
|
|
Nadon J.A.”
|
|
“I agree.
|
|
Woods J.A.”
|