Date:
20060922
Docket:
A-597-05
Citation:
2006 FCA 309
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
NADON J.A.
BETWEEN:
BENOIT
PAQUETTE
Applicant
and
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
[1] This application for judicial
review raises two issues:
(a) Was the applicant required to make a claim for benefits
pursuant to section 26 of the Employment Insurance Regulations,
SOR/96-332 (Regulations) during the waiting period provided for in section 13
of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23 (the Act)?
(b) Assuming that he was under such a duty, has the
applicant, who did not meet that duty within the prescribed time, shown that he
had good cause for the delay in making his claim for benefits within the
meaning of subsection 10(5) of the Act?
[2] Both issues were put before the
umpire. Surprisingly, in his decision CUB 64561, the umpire never ruled on the
first issue. As to the second one, he held, based on Attorney General of
Canada v. Albrecht, A-172-85 (F.C.A.), where it was held that ignorance of
the law or negligence do not establish good cause, that the applicant had not
met the onus on him under subsection 10(5) of the Act. But he thereby failed to
ask whether the applicant had proved the existence of a good cause by showing
that he had acted as a reasonable person in the same situation would have acted
to ensure compliance with his rights and obligations under the Act: see Albrecht,
supra and Attorney General of Canada v. Beaudin, 2005 FCA 123; Canada
(Attorney General) v. Smith, [1993] F.C.J. No. 368; Canada (Attorney
General) v. Rouleau, [1995] F.C.J. No. 1203; and Shebib v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2003] F.C.J. No. 281.
[3] For a clearer understanding of the
issues and the reasons for that decision, I set out hereunder section 6,
subsection 10(5), section 13 and sections 49 and 50 of the Act as well as
section 26 of the Regulations:
Employment Insurance Act
|
Interpretation
6. (1) In this Part,
…
“disentitled” means not
entitled under section 13, 18, 21, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 49 or 50 or under the
regulations;
|
Définitions et interprétation
6. (1) Les définitions qui suivent
s’appliquent à la présente partie.
[…]
« inadmissible »
Qui n’est pas admissible au titre des articles 13, 18, 21, 31, 32, 33, 36,
37, 49 ou 50, ou au titre d’un règlement.
|
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10.
…
(5) A claim for benefits,
other than an initial claim for benefits, made after the time prescribed for
making the claim shall be regarded as having been made on an earlier day if
the claimant shows that there was good cause for the delay throughout the
period beginning on the earlier day and ending on the day when the claim was
made.
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10.
[…]
(5) Lorsque le
prestataire présente une demande de prestations, autre qu’une demande
initiale, après le délai prévu par règlement pour la présenter, la demande
doit être considérée comme ayant été présentée à une date antérieure si
celui-ci démontre qu’il avait, durant toute la période écoulée entre cette
date antérieure et la date à laquelle il présente sa demande, un motif
valable justifiant son retard.
|
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13. A claimant is not entitled to be paid benefits in a
benefit period until, after the beginning of the benefit period, the claimant
has served a two week waiting period that begins with a week of unemployment
for which benefits would otherwise be payable.
|
13. Au cours d’une période de prestations,
le prestataire n’est pas admissible au bénéfice des prestations tant qu’il ne
s’est pas écoulé, à la suite de l’ouverture de cette période de prestations,
un délai de carence de deux semaines qui débute par une semaine de chômage
pour laquelle des prestations devraient sans cela être versées.
|
|
49. (1) A person is not entitled to receive benefits
for a week of unemployment until the person makes a claim for benefits for
that week in accordance with section 50 and the regulations and proves
that
|
49. (1) Nul n’est admissible au bénéfice des
prestations pour une semaine de chômage avant d’avoir présenté une demande de
prestations pour cette semaine conformément à l’article 50 et aux
règlements et prouvé que :
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|
(a) the person meets
the requirements for receiving benefits; and
|
a) d’une part, il remplit les conditions
requises pour recevoir des prestations;
|
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(b) no circumstances
or conditions exist that have the effect of disentitling or disqualifying the
person from receiving benefits.
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b) d’autre part, il n’existe aucune
circonstance ou condition ayant pour effet de l’exclure du bénéfice des
prestations ou de le rendre inadmissible à celui-ci.
|
|
(2) The Commission shall
give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant on the issue of whether any
circumstances or conditions exist that have the effect of disqualifying the
claimant under section 30 or disentitling the claimant under
section 31, 32 or 33, if the evidence on each side of the issue is
equally balanced.
|
(2) La
Commission accorde le bénéfice du doute au prestataire dans la détermination
de l’existence de circonstances ou de conditions ayant pour effet de le
rendre inadmissible au bénéfice des prestations aux termes des
articles 31, 32 ou 33, ou de l’en exclure aux termes de
l’article 30, si les éléments de preuve présentés de part et d’autre à
cet égard sont équivalents.
|
|
(3) On receiving a claim
for benefits, the Commission shall decide whether benefits are payable to the
claimant for that week and notify the claimant of its decision.
|
(3) Sur réception
d’une demande de prestations, la Commission décide si des prestations sont
payables ou non au prestataire pour la semaine en cause et lui notifie sa
décision.
|
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50. (1) A claimant who fails to fulfil or comply with a
condition or requirement under this section is not entitled to receive
benefits for as long as the condition or requirement is not fulfilled or
complied with.
|
50. (1) Tout prestataire qui ne remplit pas
une condition ou ne satisfait pas à une exigence prévue par le présent
article n’est pas admissible au bénéfice des prestations tant qu’il n’a pas
rempli cette condition ou satisfait à cette exigence.
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(2) A claim for benefits
shall be made in the manner directed at the office of the Commission that
serves the area in which the claimant resides, or at such other place as is
prescribed or directed by the Commission.
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(2) Toute
demande de prestations est présentée de la manière ordonnée au bureau de la
Commission qui dessert le territoire où réside le prestataire ou à tout autre
endroit prévu par règlement ou ordonné par la Commission.
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(3) A claim for benefits shall be made by completing a
form supplied or approved by the Commission, in the manner set out in
instructions of the Commission.
|
(3) Toute
demande de prestations est présentée sur un formulaire fourni ou approuvé par
la Commission et rempli conformément aux instructions de celle-ci.
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(4) A claim for benefits for a week of unemployment in a benefit
period shall be made within the prescribed time.
|
(4) Toute demande de prestations pour une semaine de
chômage comprise dans une période de prestations est présentée dans le délai
prévu par règlement.
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(5) The Commission may at
any time require a claimant to provide additional information about their
claim for benefits.
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(5) La Commission
peut exiger d’autres renseignements du prestataire relativement à toute
demande de prestations.
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(6) The Commission may
require a claimant or group or class of claimants to be at a suitable place
at a suitable time in order to make a claim for benefits in person or provide
additional information about a claim.
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(6) La
Commission peut demander à tout prestataire ou à tout groupe ou catégorie de
prestataires de se rendre à une heure raisonnable à un endroit convenable
pour présenter en personne une demande de prestations ou fournir des
renseignements exigés en vertu du paragraphe (5).
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(7) For the purpose of
proving that a claimant is available for work, the Commission may require the
claimant to register for employment at an agency administered by the Government
of Canada or a provincial government and to report to the agency at such
reasonable times as the Commission or agency directs.
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(7) Pour obtenir
d’un prestataire la preuve de sa disponibilité pour le travail, la Commission
peut exiger qu’il s’inscrive comme demandeur d’emploi à un organisme de
placement fédéral ou provincial et qu’il communique avec cet organisme à des
moments raisonnables que la Commission ou l’organisme lui fixera.
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(8) For the purpose of
proving that a claimant is available for work and unable to obtain suitable
employment, the Commission may require the claimant to prove that the
claimant is making reasonable and customary efforts to obtain suitable
employment.
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(8) Pour obtenir
d’un prestataire la preuve de sa disponibilité pour le travail et de son
incapacité d’obtenir un emploi convenable, la Commission peut exiger qu’il
prouve qu’il fait des démarches habituelles et raisonnables pour trouver un
emploi convenable.
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(9) A claimant shall
provide the mailing address of their normal place of residence, unless
otherwise permitted by the Commission.
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(9) Tout
prestataire est tenu, sauf autorisation contraire de la Commission, de
fournir l’adresse postale de sa résidence habituelle.
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(10) The Commission may
waive or vary any of the conditions and requirements of this section or the
regulations whenever in its opinion the circumstances warrant the waiver or
variation for the benefit of a claimant or a class or group of claimants.
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(10) La
Commission peut suspendre ou modifier les conditions ou exigences du présent
article ou des règlements chaque fois que, à son avis, les circonstances le
justifient pour le bien du prestataire ou un groupe ou une catégorie de
prestataires.
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Employment Insurance Regulations
|
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Claim for Benefits
26. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a claim for
benefits for a week of unemployment in a benefit period shall be made by a
claimant within three weeks after the week for which benefits are
claimed.
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PRESTATIONS DE CHÔMAGE
Demande de prestations
26. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2),
le prestataire qui demande des prestations pour une semaine de chômage
comprise dans une période de prestations présente sa demande dans les
trois semaines qui suivent cette semaine.
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(2) Where a claimant has not
made a claim for benefits for four or more consecutive weeks, the first claim
for benefits after that period for a week of unemployment shall be made
within one week after the week for which benefits are claimed.
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(2) Le
prestataire qui n’a pas demandé de prestations durant quatre semaines
consécutives ou plus et qui en fait la demande par la suite pour une semaine
de chômage présente sa demande dans la semaine qui suit cette dernière.
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Duty to make a claim for benefits during
the waiting period in section 13 of the Act
[4] Section 13 provides that a person
who qualifies for a benefit period is not entitled to be paid benefits for a
two week period that begins with a week of unemployment for which, had it not
been for this disentitlement, he or she would have received benefits. This is
what is referred to as the waiting period.
[5] The applicant’s counsel submitted
before us, as he did before the umpire, that this Court has previously held, in
Attorney General of Canada v. Kachman, A-757-85 (F.C.A.), that the
statutory provisions then in force did not require “that
a claim for benefit be made for a week for which an applicant for benefit has
been disqualified or disentitled” (my emphasis). This decision by this
Court, where there was both a disqualification for a six week period and a
disentitlement for non-availability, was followed in Bennett, CUB
25520A, March 21, 1995, and in Johnston, CUB 31135, October 27, 1995.
[6] The parties
agree that the statutory provisions found in the Employment Insurance Act
of 1996 are, in essence and for all practical purposes, the same as those of
the Unemployment Insurance Act that was in force when Kachman was
handed down.
[7] The
respondent’s counsel strove to restrict the scope of that holding solely to
cases of disqualification, but unsuccessfully because, in my view, the holding
likewise clearly covers cases of disentitlement.
[8] This Court has
acknowledged that it would be easier for the Commission to follow up on
compliance with the conditions for entitlement to benefits if a claim for
benefits other than an initial claim was submitted for each week in which the
claimant is disqualified for or disentitled to benefits. But it has been unable
to find any statutory basis for making this a requirement. At page 5 of Kachman,
Chief Justice Thurlow wrote, on behalf of a unanimous Court:
The submission, as I understand it, was that
the effect of these provisions was to require the respondent not only to prove
at some point that he was unemployed and available for work in each week of the
six weeks for which he had been disqualified for benefit, even though he had
accepted the disqualification and did not appeal therefrom, but to prove such
facts weekly by filing a claim for benefit on a form provided by the
Commission, and this even though because of the disqualification he no longer
expected or could expect such a claim to be accepted. It is quite correct that
the notice of disqualification expressly warned the respondent to send in
claims for each of the weeks of disqualification. It is not inconceivable
that for each claimant to do so would help the Commission to determine whether
the claimant was otherwise qualified to receive benefit and whether the
particular week was to be one of the weeks of disqualification. But, in my
opinion, it is not a requirement that can be found in or read into subsection
43(1) or subsection 54(1) or section 55 or any of the other provisions of the
Act or the Regulations to which the Court was referred. Indeed, such an
interpretation would seem rather out of harmony with subsection 54(2) which
provides that
54. (2) Upon receiving a claim for benefit, the Commission shall
decide whether or not benefit is payable to the claimant for that week and
notify him of its decision.
a procedure that seems superfluous when
the person seeking benefit has already been told he is disqualified and will
not receive it.
[Emphasis
added]
[9] To qualify for
benefits for a week of unemployment, a claimant must, under section 49 of the
Act, make a claim for that week. He must do so within the time provided for in
section 26 of the Regulations. As section 49 of the Act requires, he must also
establish that there are no circumstances or conditions that disentitle him
from receiving benefits. Now, section 13 of the Act provides for one
circumstance that specifically does disentitle him for a period of two weeks.
Thus, he cannot, under the Act, receive benefits for each of those two weeks.
It is superfluous and unnecessary, then, for a claimant to try to obtain benefits
since, to paraphrase the Chief Justice in Kachman, he already knows that
he is disentitled to benefits and will not receive them for that period.
[10] Subsection 49(1)
of the Act and subsection 26(1) of the Regulations correspond to subsection
54(1) of the old Unemployment Insurance Act and subsection 34(1) of the
old Regulations. As to these provisions on the basis of which the payment of
benefits was denied in Kachman, the Chief Justice wrote:
Its basis is the failure to file a claim for
benefit for the weeks of disentitlement and disqualification and to do so
within the time prescribed by subsection 34(1) of the Regulations for filing a
claim for benefit. Subsection 54(1) is a negative provision which restricts the
substantive rights to benefit conferred by subsection 17(1) and section 19 of
the Act. It denies a claimant's right to benefit for a week of unemployment
until he makes a claim for benefit for that week and proves that he is entitled
to benefit and is not disqualified. It neither says nor implies that a claimant
who is disqualified must nevertheless make a claim for benefit which would be
foredoomed to failure because he simply could not prove that he was not
disqualified. Subsection 34(1) of the Regulations does nothing more than prescribe
a time limit for making a claim for benefit for a week.
[11] The respondent’s
counsel submitted that the disentitlement imposed by the section differs from
the other sorts or forms of disentitlement provided for elsewhere in the Act,
and that, therefore, if the Kachman doctrine extends to disentitlement,
it does not cover the section 13 waiting period disentitlement. The difficulty
with this argument is that Parliament did not consider it appropriate to
recognize this kind of distinction with respect to the waiting period
disentitlement. On the contrary, it made it similar to the others. For the
purposes of the Act, in effect, it defined disentitlement in section 6 and this
definition covers the section 13 disentitlement in relation to the waiting period.
[12] In short, I am
not persuaded that this case is distinguishable factually and legally from Kachman.
Therefore, the umpire should not have intervened and set aside the decision of
the board of referees.
Has the applicant proved the existence of good cause for the delay in making his claim for benefits for the period from
December 20, 2003 to January 4, 2004?
[13] Since I have held that the applicant
did not have to make such claims for the period concerned, it is unnecessary to
address this issue. I will just say that if I had had to do so, I would have
held like umpire Stevenson in the Bennett case, supra, and
approved the following reasons that he gave at page 2 of his decision:
It is not a case of a claimant failing to
file an initial claim. It is a case of a claimant failing to return his report
card with respect to his waiting period because he immediately thereafter
became employed and was thus not entitled to receive a benefit. It is not
unreasonable or imprudent for a person in that situation to do what Mr. Bennett
did. The established benefit period had not expired nor had it been cancelled
or terminated. It was merely suspended during the claimant's re-employment.
Having acted as any reasonably prudent person would have done, Mr. Bennett has
shown good cause for any delay in filing the report card.
[14] For these
reasons, I would allow the application for judicial review with costs, I would
set aside the decision of the umpire and I would refer back the matter to the
Chief Umpire or the person he will appoint for redetermination on the basis
that the Commission’s appeal from the decision of the board of referees, dated
September 20, 2004, at Montréal, must be dismissed.
J.A.
“I concur
Robert Décary J.A.”
“I concur
M. Nadon J.A.”
Certified true
translation
François Brunet,
LLB, BCL
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET:
A-597-05
STYLE OF CAUSE:
Benoît Paquette v. The Attorney General of Canada
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal,
Quebec
DATE OF HEARING:
September 13, 2006
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: Létourneau J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY: Décary
J.A.
Nadon
J.A.
DATED: September
22, 2006
APPEARANCES:
|
Michel Letreiz
|
FOR THE
APPLICANT
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Carole
Bureau
|
FOR THE
RESPONDENT
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
|
Michel Letreiz
|
FOR THE
APPLICANT
|
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John H. Sims,
Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec
|
FOR THE
RESPONDENT
|
Date:
20060922
Docket:
A-597-05
Ottawa, Ontario, September 22, 2006
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
NADON J.A.
BETWEEN:
BENOIT
PAQUETTE
Applicant
and
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
JUDGMENT
The
application for judicial review is allowed with costs. The decision of the
umpire is set aside and the matter is referred back to the Chief Umpire or the
person he will appoint for redetermination on the basis that the Commission’s
appeal from the decision of the board of referees, dated September 20, 2004, at
Montréal, must be dismissed.
J.A.
Certified true
translation
François Brunet,
LLB, BCL
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