Date: 20061117
Docket: A-57-06
Citation:
2006 FCA 376
CORAM: DESJARDINS J.A.
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
PELLETIER J.A.
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
JOHANNE CAMPEAU
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
[1]
Were the Umpire and the Board of Referees
correct in determining that the respondent, Ms. Campeau, left her
employment without just cause because it was not suitable? Under the
circumstances, the response must be in the negative since their respective
conclusions reflect an error in interpreting sections 29 and 30 of the Employment
Assurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23 (the Act) and confusion in applying
sections 27, 29 and 30 of this Act.
[2]
Sections 27 to 30 of the Act are set out below:
27. (1) A claimant is disqualified from
receiving benefits under this Part if, without good cause since the
interruption of earnings giving rise to the claim, the claimant
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27. (1) Le prestataire est exclu du bénéfice
des prestations prévues par la présente partie si, sans motif valable, depuis
l’arrêt de rémunération qui est à l’origine de sa demande, selon le cas:
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(a) has
not applied for a suitable employment that is vacant after becoming aware
that it is vacant or becoming vacant, or has failed to accept the employment
after it has been offered to the claimant;
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a) il n’a pas postulé un emploi convenable
qui était vacant, après avoir appris que cet emploi était vacant ou sur le
point de le devenir, ou a refusé un tel emploi lorsqu’il lui a été offert;
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(b) has
not taken advantage of an opportunity for suitable employment;
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b) il n’a pas profité d’une occasion
d’obtenir un emploi convenable;
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(c) has
not carried out a written direction given to the claimant by the Commission
with a view to assisting the claimant to find suitable employment, if the direction
was reasonable having regard both to the claimant’s circumstances and to the
usual means of obtaining that employment; or
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c) il n’a pas suivi toutes les
instructions écrites que lui avait données la Commission en vue de l’aider à
trouver un emploi convenable, si ces instructions étaient raisonnables eu
égard à la fois à sa situation et aux moyens usuels d’obtenir cet emploi;
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(d) has
not attended an interview that the Commission has directed the claimant to
attend to enable the Commission or another appropriate agency
(i) to provide
information and instruction to help the claimant find employment, or
(ii) to identify
whether the claimant might be assisted by job training or other employment
assistance.
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d) il ne s’est pas présenté à une entrevue
à laquelle la Commission lui avait ordonné de se présenter afin de permettre
à celle‑ci ou à tout autre organisme approprié, selon le cas:
(i) de fournir
des renseignements et instructions visant à l’aider à trouver un emploi,
(ii) de décider
si des cours de formation professionnelle ou toute autre forme d’aide à
l’emploi pourraient lui être utiles.
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(1.1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving
benefits under this Part if
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(1.1) Il y a également exclusion du bénéfice des
prestations prévues par la présente partie si:
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(a) the
Commission or an authority that the Commission designates has, with the
agreement of the claimant, referred the claimant to a course or program of
instruction or training or to any other employment activity for which
assistance has been provided under employment benefits; and
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a) la Commission ou l’autorité qu’elle
désigne a dirigé le prestataire, avec son accord, vers un cours ou programme
d’instruction ou de formation ou une autre activité d’emploi à l’égard de
laquelle de l’aide lui était fournie dans le cadre d’une prestation d’emploi;
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(b) the
Commission has terminated the referral because
(i) without good
cause, the claimant has not attended or participated in the course, program
or employment activity and, in the opinion of the Commission, it is unlikely
that the claimant will successfully complete the course, program or
employment activity,
(ii) without
good cause, the claimant has withdrawn from the course, program or employment
activity, or
(iii) the
organization providing the course, program or employment activity has
expelled the claimant.
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b) la Commission a mis fin à l’affectation
du prestataire parce que, selon le cas:
(i) le
prestataire, sans motif valable, n’a pas suivi le cours ou programme ou n’a
pas participé à l’activité et elle estime qu’il est peu probable qu’il les
termine avec succès,
(ii) le
prestataire, sans motif valable, a abandonné le cours, le programme ou
l’activité,
(iii) le
prestataire a fait l’objet d’une expulsion par l’organisme responsable du
cours, du programme ou de l’activité en cause.
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(2) For the
purposes of this section, employment is not suitable employment for a
claimant if
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(2) Pour
l’application du présent article, un emploi n’est pas un emploi convenable
pour un prestataire s’il s’agit:
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(a) it
arises in consequence of a stoppage of work attributable to a labour dispute;
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a) soit d’un emploi inoccupé du fait d’un
arrêt de travail dû à un conflit collectif;
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(b) it is
in the claimant’s usual occupation either at a lower rate of earnings or on
conditions less favourable than those observed by agreement between employers
and employees, or in the absence of any such agreement, than those recognized
by good employers; or
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b) soit d’un emploi dans le cadre de son
occupation ordinaire à un taux de rémunération plus bas ou à des conditions
moins favorables que le taux ou les conditions appliqués par convention entre
employeurs et employés ou, à défaut de convention, admis par les bons
employeurs;
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(c) it is
not in the claimant’s usual occupation and is either at a lower rate of
earnings or on conditions less favourable than those that the claimant might
reasonably expect to obtain, having regard to the conditions that the
claimant usually obtained in the claimant’s usual occupation, or would have obtained
if the claimant had continued to be so employed.
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c) soit d’un emploi d’un genre différent
de celui qu’il exerce dans le cadre de son occupation ordinaire, à un taux de
rémunération plus bas ou à des conditions moins favorables que le taux ou les
conditions qu’il pourrait raisonnablement s’attendre à obtenir, eu égard aux
conditions qui lui étaient habituellement faites dans l’exercice de son
occupation ordinaire ou qui lui auraient été faites s’il avait continué à
exercer un tel emploi.
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(3) After a
lapse of a reasonable interval from the date on which an insured person
becomes unemployed, paragraph (2)(c) does not apply to the employment
described in that paragraph if it is employment at a rate of earnings not
lower and on conditions not less favourable than those observed by agreement
between employers and employees or, in the absence of any such agreement,
than those recognized by good employers.
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(3) Après un
délai raisonnable à partir de la date à laquelle un assuré s’est trouvé en
chômage, l’alinéa (2)c) ne s’applique pas à l’emploi qui y est visé
s’il s’agit d’un emploi à un taux de rémunération qui n’est pas plus bas et à
des conditions qui ne sont pas moins favorables que le taux ou les conditions
appliqués par convention entre employeurs et employés ou, à défaut de
convention, admis par les bons employeurs.
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28. (1) A disqualification under
section 27 is for the number of weeks that the Commission may determine,
but
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28. (1) Lorsque le prestataire est exclu du
bénéfice des prestations en vertu de l’article 27, il l’est pour le
nombre de semaines que la Commission détermine. Toutefois, le nombre de
semaines d’exclusion dans les cas visés:
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(a) the
number of weeks of a disqualification arising under paragraph 27(1)(a)
or (b) shall be not fewer than 7 or more than 12; and
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a) aux alinéas 27(1)a) et b)
est d’au moins sept et ne peut dépasser douze;
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(b) the
number of weeks of a disqualification arising under paragraph 27(1)(c)
or (d) or subsection 27(1.1) shall be not more than 6.
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b) aux alinéas 27(1)c) et d)
et au paragraphe 27(1.1) ne peut dépasser six.
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(2) Subject to
subsections (3) to (5), the weeks of disqualification are to be served during
the weeks following the waiting period for which benefits would otherwise be
payable if the disqualification had not been imposed and, for greater
certainty, the length of the disqualification is not affected by any
subsequent loss of employment by the claimant during the benefit period.
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(2) Sous réserve
des paragraphes (3) à (5), l’exclusion doit être purgée au cours des semaines
de la période de prestations du prestataire qui suivent le délai de carence
pour lesquelles il aurait sans cela droit à des prestations. Il demeure par
ailleurs entendu que la durée de cette exclusion n’est pas touchée par la
perte subséquente d’un emploi au cours de la période de prestations.
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(3) Any portion of the disqualification
that has not been served when the claimant’s benefit period ends shall,
subject to subsections (4) and (5), be served in any benefit period subsequently
established within two years after the event giving rise to the
disqualification.
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(3) Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), la
partie de l’exclusion qui n’a pas été purgée au moment où prend fin la
période de prestations l’est au cours de toute période de prestations établie
dans les deux ans suivant la date de l’événement à l’origine de l’exclusion.
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(4) No weeks of
disqualification shall be carried forward against a claimant who has had 700
or more hours of insurable employment since the event giving rise to the
disqualification.
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(4) Aucune
semaine d’exclusion ne peut être reportée à une période ultérieure à
l’encontre du prestataire si, depuis la date de l’événement à l’origine de
l’exclusion, il a exercé un emploi assurable durant au moins sept cents
heures.
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(5) The
Commission shall defer the serving of the disqualification if the claimant is
otherwise entitled to special benefits or benefits by virtue of
section 25.
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(5) La
Commission est tenue de reporter l’obligation de purger l’exclusion dans les
cas où le prestataire a droit à des prestations spéciales ou à des
prestations en raison de l’article 25.
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(6) For the
purposes of this Part, benefits are deemed to be paid for the weeks of
disqualification.
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(6) Pour
l’application de la présente partie, des prestations sont réputées avoir été
versées pour les semaines d’exclusion.
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(7) Subsection
(6) does not apply to prevent a claimant from requesting that a benefit
period established for the claimant as a minor attachment claimant be cancelled
under subsection 10(6) and that a benefit period be established for the
claimant as a major attachment claimant to enable the claimant to receive
special benefits.
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(7) Le
paragraphe (6) n’a pas pour effet d’empêcher le prestataire de demander
qu’une période de prestations établie à son profit à titre de prestataire de
la deuxième catégorie soit annulée en vertu du paragraphe 10(6) et qu’une
période de prestations soit établie à son profit à titre de prestataire de la
première catégorie de façon à lui permettre de recevoir des prestations
spéciales.
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29. For the purposes of sections 30
to 33,
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29. Pour l’application des articles 30
à 33:
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(a)
“employment” refers to any employment of the claimant within their qualifying
period or their benefit period;
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a) « emploi » s’entend de tout
emploi exercé par le prestataire au cours de sa période de référence ou de sa
période de prestations;
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(b) loss
of employment includes a suspension from employment, but does not include
loss of, or suspension from, employment on account of membership in, or
lawful activity connected with, an association, organization or union of
workers;
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b) la suspension est assimilée à la perte
d’emploi, mais n’est pas assimilée à la perte d’emploi la suspension ou la
perte d’emploi résultant de l’affiliation à une association, une organisation
ou un syndicat de travailleurs ou de l’exercice d’une activité licite s’y
rattachant;
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(b.1)
voluntarily leaving an employment includes
(i) the refusal
of employment offered as an alternative to an anticipated loss of employment,
in which case the voluntary leaving occurs when the loss of employment
occurs,
(ii) the refusal
to resume an employment, in which case the voluntary leaving occurs when the
employment is supposed to be resumed, and
(iii) the
refusal to continue in an employment after the work, undertaking or business
of the employer is transferred to another employer, in which case the
voluntary leaving occurs when the work, undertaking or business is
transferred; and
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b.1) sont assimilés à un départ volontaire
le refus:
(i) d’accepter
un emploi offert comme solution de rechange à la perte prévisible de son
emploi, auquel cas le départ volontaire a lieu au moment où son emploi prend
fin,
(ii) de
reprendre son emploi, auquel cas le départ volontaire a lieu au moment où il
est censé le reprendre,
(iii) de
continuer d’exercer son emploi lorsque celui‑ci est visé par le
transfert d’une activité, d’une entreprise ou d’un secteur à un autre
employeur, auquel cas le départ volontaire a lieu au moment du transfert;
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(c) just
cause for voluntarily leaving an employment or taking leave from an
employment exists if the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leaving or
taking leave, having regard to all the circumstances, including any of the
following:
(i) sexual or
other harassment,
(ii) obligation
to accompany a spouse, common-law partner or dependent child to another
residence,
(iii)
discrimination on a prohibited ground of discrimination within the meaning of
the Canadian Human Rights Act,
(iv) working
conditions that constitute a danger to health or safety,
(v) obligation
to care for a child or a member of the immediate family,
(vi) reasonable
assurance of another employment in the immediate future,
(vii)
significant modification of terms and conditions respecting wages or salary,
(viii) excessive
overtime work or refusal to pay for overtime work,
(ix) significant
changes in work duties,
(x) antagonism
with a supervisor if the claimant is not primarily responsible for the
antagonism,
(xi) practices of
an employer that are contrary to law,
(xii)
discrimination with regard to employment because of membership in an
association, organization or union of workers,
(xiii) undue
pressure by an employer on the claimant to leave their employment, and
(xiv) any other
reasonable circumstances that are prescribed.
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c) le prestataire est fondé à quitter
volontairement son emploi ou à prendre congé si, compte tenu de toutes les
circonstances, notamment de celles qui sont énumérées ci‑après, son
départ ou son congé constitue la seule solution raisonnable dans son cas:
(i) harcèlement,
de nature sexuelle ou autre,
(ii) nécessité
d’accompagner son époux ou conjoint de fait ou un enfant à charge vers un
autre lieu de résidence,
(iii)
discrimination fondée sur des motifs de distinction illicite, au sens de la
Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne,
(iv) conditions
de travail dangereuses pour sa santé ou sa sécurité,
(v) nécessité de
prendre soin d’un enfant ou d’un proche parent,
(vi) assurance
raisonnable d’un autre emploi dans un avenir immédiat,
(vii)
modification importante de ses conditions de rémunération,
(viii) excès
d’heures supplémentaires ou non‑rémunération de celles‑ci,
(ix)
modification importante des fonctions,
(x) relations
conflictuelles, dont la cause ne lui est pas essentiellement imputable, avec
un supérieur,
(xi) pratiques
de l’employeur contraires au droit,
(xii)
discrimination relative à l’emploi en raison de l’appartenance à une
association, une organisation ou un syndicat de travailleurs,
(xiii)
incitation indue par l’employeur à l’égard du prestataire à quitter son
emploi,
(xiv) toute
autre circonstance raisonnable prévue par règlement.
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30. (1) A claimant is disqualified from
receiving any benefits if the claimant lost any employment because of their
misconduct or voluntarily left any employment without just cause, unless
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30. (1) Le prestataire est exclu du bénéfice
des prestations s’il perd un emploi en raison de son inconduite ou s’il
quitte volontairement un emploi sans justification, à moins, selon le cas:
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(a) the
claimant has, since losing or leaving the employment, been employed in
insurable employment for the number of hours required by section 7 or
7.1 to qualify to receive benefits; or
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a) que, depuis qu’il a perdu ou quitté cet
emploi, il ait exercé un emploi assurable pendant le nombre d’heures requis,
au titre de l’article 7 ou 7.1, pour recevoir des prestations de
chômage;
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(b) the
claimant is disentitled under sections 31 to 33 in relation to the
employment.
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b) qu’il ne soit inadmissible, à l’égard
de cet emploi, pour l’une des raisons prévues aux articles 31 à 33.
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(2) The
disqualification is for each week of the claimant’s benefit period following
the waiting period and, for greater certainty, the length of the
disqualification is not affected by any subsequent loss of employment by the
claimant during the benefit period.
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(2) L’exclusion
vaut pour toutes les semaines de la période de prestations du prestataire qui
suivent son délai de carence. Il demeure par ailleurs entendu que la durée de
cette exclusion n’est pas affectée par la perte subséquente d’un emploi au
cours de la période de prestations.
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(3) If the event
giving rise to the disqualification occurs during a benefit period of the
claimant, the disqualification does not include any week in that benefit
period before the week in which the event occurs.
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(3) Dans les cas
où l’événement à l’origine de l’exclusion survient au cours de sa période de
prestations, l’exclusion du prestataire ne comprend pas les semaines de la
période de prestations qui précèdent celle où survient l’événement.
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(4)
Notwithstanding subsection (6), the disqualification is suspended during any
week for which the claimant is otherwise entitled to special benefits.
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(4) Malgré le
paragraphe (6), l’exclusion est suspendue pendant les semaines pour
lesquelles le prestataire a autrement droit à des prestations spéciales.
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(5) If a
claimant who has lost or left an employment as described in subsection (1)
makes an initial claim for benefits, the following hours may not be used to
qualify under section 7 or 7.1 to receive benefits:
(a) hours
of insurable employment from that or any other employment before the
employment was lost or left; and
(b) hours
of insurable employment in any employment that the claimant subsequently
loses or leaves, as described in subsection (1).
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(5) Dans les cas
où le prestataire qui a perdu ou quitté un emploi dans les circonstances
visées au paragraphe (1) formule une demande initiale de prestations,
les heures d’emploi assurable provenant de cet emploi ou de tout autre emploi
qui précèdent la perte de cet emploi ou le départ volontaire et les heures
d’emploi assurable dans tout emploi que le prestataire perd ou quitte par la
suite, dans les mêmes circonstances, n’entrent pas en ligne de compte pour
l’application de l’article 7 ou 7.1.
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(6) No hours of
insurable employment in any employment that a claimant loses or leaves, as
described in subsection (1), may be used for the purpose of determining the
maximum number of weeks of benefits under subsection 12(2) or the claimant’s
rate of weekly benefits under section 14.
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(6) Les heures
d’emploi assurable dans un emploi que le prestataire perd ou quitte dans les
circonstances visées au paragraphe (1) n’entrent pas en ligne de compte pour
déterminer le nombre maximal de semaines pendant lesquelles des prestations
peuvent être versées, au titre du paragraphe 12(2), ou le taux de
prestations, au titre de l’article 14.
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(7) For greater
certainty, but subject to paragraph (1)(a), a claimant may be
disqualified under subsection (1) even if the claimant’s last employment
before their claim for benefits was not lost or left as described in that
subsection and regardless of whether their claim is an initial claim for
benefits.
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(7) Sous réserve
de l’alinéa (1)a), il demeure entendu qu’une exclusion peut être
imposée pour une raison visée au paragraphe (1) même si l’emploi qui précède
immédiatement la demande de prestations — qu’elle soit initiale ou non —
n’est pas l’emploi perdu ou quitté au titre de ce paragraphe.
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THE FACTS AND THE PROCEEDING
[3]
The Court is not unsympathetic to the
respondent’s situation. She had worked as a cook’s helper at the Centre de
jeunesse de Montréal for over 22 years before leaving her employment to
accompany her husband with whom she had just reconciled. They moved to the
Outaouais.
[4]
The respondent immediately started looking for
employment. She accepted housekeeping work at the rate of $8.50 an hour. Once
she began working there, she realized two things: first, she was replacing a
person and was temporarily serving that person’s clients and second, despite
the employer’s promises, she was only called upon to work for a few hours,
which generated little income. The first week, her gross pay was $75.17, the
second, $141.97.
[5]
The respondent went to a local employment
centre, where she learned there were daycare jobs available at the Centres de
la petite enfance in Papineauville. It was then, she says, that she discovered
she was probably entitled to Employment Insurance benefits, and filed a claim.
[6]
There is a difference of opinion as to when this
claim was made. According to the Board of Referees, the respondent left her
employment in the Outaouais before filing her Employment Insurance claim.
However, the documentary evidence in the file clearly shows that the claim was
made on October 27, 2003, and that the respondent’s second week of employment
ended on November 6, 2003: see the respondent’s record at pages 11, 31 and 33.
[7]
The respondent stated in her Employment Insurance
claim that she had not worked during the previous 52 weeks, thus failing to
mention the employment in the Outaouais that she had held briefly. She was
declared eligible for benefits as of October 26, 2003.
[8]
In June 2004, the Employment Insurance
Commission (the Commission) discovered that the respondent had left her
employment in the Outaouais. The Commission reviewed the respondent’s file and
concluded that she had left this employment without just cause, which
disqualified her from receiving benefits under section 30 of the Act. This
resulted in an overpayment of $5,408.
[9]
The respondent successfully appealed this
decision to the Board of Referees (the Board). On the other hand, the appeal by
the Commission to the Umpire was dismissed. The Commission’s application for
judicial review of that decision is before us.
THE DECISION
BY THE BOARD OF REFEREES
[10]
Four aspects of this decision should be noted,
as they demonstrate the Board’s tortuous reasoning and the resulting ambiguity.
[11]
First, the Board cited Canada (Attorney
General) v. Tremblay, [1994] F.C.J. No. 896 and Astronomo v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1025, which deal with the issue of
leaving employment without just cause under section 30 of the Act. That was the
issue raised by the Commission before the Board. The Board found that the
respondent had just cause to leave her employment.
[12]
Next, the Board referred to a person’s right to
refuse employment that is not suitable, a right provided a contrario in
section 27 of the Act. The Board decided that the respondent’s employment was
not suitable because the employer did not offer her enough hours to enable her
to support herself. In the Board’s opinion, leaving was the only reasonable
alternative in the circumstances. The Board thus returned to the criteria in
sections 29 and 30 of the Act.
[13]
Third, the Board concluded by citing the
following statement written by Umpire Muldoon almost 20 years ago regarding the
right to refuse employment that is not suitable:
A claimant seeking suitable employment is, after a
short time (not defined) of trying out the offered job, just as entitled to
raise just cause for voluntary leaving if it be not suitable employment, as the
claimant who refuses the job because it is not suitable employment is entitled
to raise good cause for refusal.
[14]
I conclude from the Board’s decision that it
considered suitability of employment just cause for leaving employment under
section 30 of the Act.
[15]
Finally, section 27 of the Act is the yardstick
for measuring whether an employment is suitable. Subsection 27(2) defines
employment that is not suitable. Section 28 limits the duration of the
disqualification under section 27. In this case, there is no evidence on which
the Board of Referees could determine the suitability of the employment based
on the criteria and the definition in section 27. As mentioned earlier, the
decision by the Commission that was appealed to the Board referred to a
disqualification under section 30, not section 27, of the Act.
THE DECISION
BY THE UMPIRE
[16]
The Umpire agreed with the Commission “that
there is a consistent line of authority that a claimant who leaves employment
because it does not offer an adequate salary has not established just cause for
doing so within the meaning of the Employment Insurance Act.” However,
he relied on the precedent created by Umpire Muldoon and cited by the Board on
the issue of suitable employment. He added that the Board was responsible for
assessing the evidence and testimony submitted to it, that the Umpire could not
substitute his opinion for that of the Board, and that his role was limited to
deciding whether the view of facts taken by the Board was reasonably open to it
on the record.
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION BY THE
UMPIRE CONFIRMING THE DECISION BY THE BOARD OF REFEREES
[17]
At the outset, it should be noted that the issue
before the Umpire was not a question of fact, but a question of law, i.e. what
constitutes just cause under section 30 of the Act. In Tanguay v. Canada
(Unemployment Insurance Commission), [1985] F.C.J. No. 910, at page 2, Mr.
Justice Pratte wrote for the Court:
It is true that it is sometimes said that the question
of whether an employee was justified in leaving his employment is one of fact. However, it is clear
that where the question is as to the definition that must be given to the words
“just cause” in s. 41(1), this is purely a question of law. It follows
that if a decision is made which cannot be reconciled with this definition, the
decision is vitiated by an error of law.
Subsection 41(1)
is now subsection 30(1).
[18]
Under paragraph 29(c) of the Act, a
claimant is justified in leaving an employment if, having regard to all the
circumstances, he or she had no reasonable alternative. Paragraph 29(c)
is neither restrictive nor exhaustive, but subparagraphs (i) to (xiv) delineate
the type of circumstances that must be considered. As Mr. Justice Décary stated
in Canada (Attorney General) v. Côté, 2006 FCA 219, at paragraph 11,
“all types of ‘just cause’ set out by Parliament in paragraph 29(c)
of the Act, except for those specified in subparagraphs (vi) (‘reasonable
assurance of another employment in the immediate future’) and (xiv) (‘any other
reasonable circumstances that are prescribed’) assume third‑party
intervention.” Like him, I am reticent to add by jurisprudential means a “just
cause” which would depend on the claimant in each case evaluating whether an
employment is suitable for him or her. In Côté, the “just cause”
referred to by Décary J.A.. depended on whether the claimant wanted to return
to his or her studies or continue them.
[19]
Moreover, “just cause” within the meaning of
section 30 is not necessarily synonymous with “reason” or “motive”: see Côté
and Tanguay, above. Accordingly, good cause for failing to accept a suitable
employment under section 27 is not necessarily just cause for leaving one under
section 30.
[20]
In this case, section 27 did not apply because,
according to the situations set out in that section, the respondent did not
refuse suitable employment, or fail to take an opportunity to obtain such
employment. The applicable provisions are in sections 29 and 30, which deal
with voluntarily leaving an employment where the circumstances are such that
leaving is the only reasonable alternative. The respondent here could have kept
her job, received benefits adjusted to her income and looked for a new job.
This was the reasonable alternative for her and for the Employment Insurance
system, which would then have been called upon to play the supportive role
mandated by Parliament, rather than being compelled to assume all the costs
incurred without just cause as a result of the respondent’s act.
[21]
The respondent works and was working the first
time she came into contact with the Employment Insurance system. A good part of
the difficulties she now faces stem from her lack of knowledge of the Act and
the system. She was sincere and wanted to work in a region where employment
prospects were more limited. In fact, she took some training (while unemployed
and receiving benefits) and found a new job. The job she left did not give her
an adequate income. But sincerity and inadequate income do not constitute just
cause under section 30 of the Act, allowing her to leave her employment and
making the Employment Insurance system bear the cost of supporting her: see Canada
(Attorney General) v. Tremblay, above.
[23]
There is no doubt that the result is deplorable
for the respondent whose lack of knowledge of the system and her inexperience
in this area caused her misadventure. I deplore it, but I must apply the Act
and I am bound the precedents of our Court.
[24]
For these reasons, the application for judicial
review will be allowed without costs, the Umpire’s decision will be set aside,
and the matter will be referred to the Chief Umpire or his or her designate for
redetermination on the basis that the appeal by the Commission should be
allowed, and the respondent should be disqualified from receiving benefits
because she voluntarily left an employment without just cause within the
meaning of section 30 of the Act.
“Gilles Létourneau”
“I concur.
Alice Desjardins J.A.”
“I concur.
J.D. Denis Pelletier J.A.”
Certified true
translation
Mary Jo Egan, LLB