Date: 20100708
Dockets: A-351-09
Citation: 2010 FCA 184
CORAM: BLAIS
C.J.
DAWSON J.A.
STRATAS
J.A.
BETWEEN:
MERCHANT LAW GROUP, STEVENSON LAW OFFICE,
ANNE BAWTINHIMER, DUANE HEWSON,
JUDITH LEWIS, and MARCEL WOLF
Appellants
and
CANADA REVENUE AGENCY and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STRATAS J.A.
[1]
This is an
appeal from the order of Justice Kelen of the Federal Court: 2009 FC 755. The
Federal Court struck out the appellants’ amended statement of claim for failing
to state a cause of action that can succeed and for failing, in part, to plead
material facts. The issue for this Court is whether the Federal Court was
correct in law when it struck out the amended statement of claim.
A. Background
[2]
This
is a proposed class action. The appellants are two law firms and four of their
clients. The appellants allege that the respondent Canada Revenue Agency should
not have required the appellant law firms to collect or remit GST on exempt
disbursements charged to their clients. They seek amounts of GST paid by the
law firms and their clients that should not have been paid.
[3]
In
a related case, the Tax Court of Canada has already ruled on the issue of liability
for GST in Merchant Law Group v. Canada, 2008 TCC 337. The Tax Court
concluded that the Merchant Law Group, one of the appellants in this appeal,
was acting as an agent for its clients concerning all of the disbursements in
issue, excepting office supplies, and was not required to collect or remit GST
for those disbursements. This Court has reserved judgment in an appeal from
this decision: A-443-08.
[4]
The
amended statement of claim pleads two causes of action: the tort of misfeasance
in public office, and restitution or “wrongful receipt.” Later in these
reasons, more will be said about how the appellants pleaded these causes of
action.
[5]
In
articulate reasons, Justice Kelen of the Federal Court struck out the amended
statement of claim. In his view, there were three objections, fatal to the
amended statement of claim:
(i) The
objection to the restitution claim. The common law cause of action of
restitution or “wrongful receipt” is not available in these circumstances. Part
IX, of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (the “Act”) establishes
a scheme for providing compensation, and ousts any common law cause of action
in these circumstances.
(ii) The
jurisdictional objection. The appellants brought this proceeding in the
Federal Court. The proceeding, properly characterized, is a claim for GST that
was improperly charged and paid. However, the Tax Court of Canada – not the
Federal Court – has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear any appeal relating to
the recovery of any money collected as GST.
(iii) The
pleadings objection. The appellants failed to plead sufficient material
facts for the tort of misfeasance in public office.
[6]
In
this Court, the appellants submit that the Federal Court’s decision on all
three grounds was wrong in law. For the reasons below, I disagree and would
dismiss the appeal, with costs.
B. Consideration of
the issues on appeal
[7]
Before
us, there are two main issues:
(1) Have
the appellants pleaded viable causes of action?
(2) Is the
appellants’ pleading sufficient?
(1) Have the appellants
pleaded viable causes of action?
(a) The
parties’ submissions
[8]
The
appellants submit that the Federal Court erred: the causes of action are not
ousted by Part IX of the Act. In their view, both causes of action are
independent and freestanding:
(i) The
tort of misfeasance in public office. The appellants say that this is a tort,
long-recognized by the common law. For this tort, the appellants claim damages
for harm done to them and the class: not just compensatory damages respecting the
recovery of amounts of GST that were improperly collected from them, but also
aggravated and punitive damages arising from the respondents’ vindictive and
harsh conduct, including harassment.
(ii) The
cause of action in restitution. Here again, the appellants stress that this
is a longstanding, well-established, independent cause of action that is
available at common law. They also rely heavily on Kingstreet Investments
Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC
1. They submit that Kingstreet creates an independent cause of action in
restitution that is founded on constitutional principle: government is
constitutionally obligated to return taxes wrongly paid. As the tort is
constitutional in nature, it exists independently and is unaffected by Part IX
of the Act.
[9]
The
respondents disagree. In this Court, they combine the Federal Court’s objection
to the restitution claim and the jurisdictional objection into one central
submission. The respondents say that the only permissible way to recover GST that
should not have been paid is by following the procedural rules and substantive
standards that Parliament has set out in the Act. Both of the causes of action,
restitution and the tort of misfeasance in public office, aim only to recover
GST that should not have been paid. Therefore, in these circumstances, the
causes of action in restitution and the tort of misfeasance in public office
are not available and so the amended statement of claim should be struck.
(b) Analysis:
are the causes of action viable?
[10]
I
agree with the reasons and result reached by the Federal Court. The causes of
action in the appellant’s proposed class action cannot succeed. This conclusion
is based on the validity of two propositions:
(i) The
only permissible way to recover GST that should not have been paid is by going
to the Tax Court of Canada and following the procedural rules and substantive
standards that Parliament has set out in Part IX of the Act.
(ii) The
appellant’s proposed class action, properly characterized, is nothing more than
an attempt to recover GST outside of the Act.
I shall examine each of these in turn.
(i) Part
IX of the Act as the exclusive route for the recovery of GST
[11]
The
Federal Court analyzed this issue when considering the cause of action of restitution.
In my view, this objection applies equally to the tort of misfeasance in public
office: if recovery of GST can only be had under Part IX of the Act, all causes
of action pursued outside of the Act must be barred.
[12]
The
Federal Court found that the common law cause of action of restitution was
ousted by section 312 of the Act, which appears with the marginal note
“statutory recovery rights only,” and subsection 12(1) of the Tax Court of
Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2. These provisions read as follows:
|
Statutory
recovery rights only
312. Except as specifically provided
in this Part, the Customs Act or the Financial Administration Act,
no person has a right to recover any money paid to Her Majesty as or on
account of, or that has been taken into account by Her Majesty as, tax, net
tax, penalty, interest or any other amount under this Part.
|
Droits de
recouvrement créés par une loi
312. Sauf disposition contraire
expresse dans la présente partie, dans la Loi sur les douanes ou dans
la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques, nul n’a le droit de
recouvrer de l’argent versé à Sa Majesté au titre de la taxe, de la taxe
nette, d’une pénalité, des intérêts ou d’un autre montant prévu par la
présente partie ou qu’elle a pris en compte à ce titre.
|
|
Jurisdiction
12. (1) The Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and determine references and appeals to the
Court on matters arising under the Air Travellers Security Charge Act,
the Canada Pension Plan, the Cultural Property Export and Import
Act, Part V.1 of the Customs Act, the Employment Insurance Act,
the Excise Act, 2001, Part IX of the Excise Tax Act, the Income
Tax Act, the Old Age Security Act, the Petroleum and Gas
Revenue Tax Act and the Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act,
2006 when references or appeals to the Court are provided for in those
Acts.
|
Compétence
12. (1) La Cour a compétence exclusive pour
entendre les renvois et les appels portés devant elle sur les questions
découlant de l’application de la Loi sur le droit pour la sécurité des
passagers du transport aérien, du Régime de pensions du Canada, de
la Loi sur l’exportation et l’importation de biens culturels, de la
partie V.1 de la Loi sur les douanes, de la Loi sur
l’assurance-emploi, de la Loi de 2001 sur l’accise, de la partie
IX de la Loi sur la taxe d’accise, de la Loi de l’impôt sur le
revenu, de la Loi sur la sécurité de la vieillesse, de la Loi
de l’impôt sur les revenus pétroliers et de la Loi de 2006 sur les
droits d’exportation de produits de bois d’oeuvre, dans la mesure où ces
lois prévoient un droit de renvoi ou d’appel devant elle.
|
[13]
In
support of its conclusion that the common law cause of action of restitution is
not available in light of these provisions, the Federal Court relied upon Sorbara
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 506, 98 O.R. (3d) 673, which considered
an attempt by a taxpayer to recover GST by way of a common law restitutionary
action, rather than following the procedural rules and substantive provisions
of Part IX of the Act in the Tax Court of Canada.
[14]
In
Sorbara, the Court of Appeal for Ontario observed (at
paragraph 7) that a superior court has jurisdiction to entertain any common law
claim unless that “jurisdiction is specifically, unequivocally and
constitutionally removed by Parliament.” The same is true for the Federal Court,
with the only qualification (not material here) being that the jurisdiction of
the Federal Court, a statutory federal court, is conferred by the Federal
Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 and constrained by the Constitution Act,
1867, section 101. The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that Part
IX of the Act and section 12 of the Tax Court of Canada Act did qualify
as a specific, unequivocal and constitutional removal of the superior court’s
jurisdiction (at paragraphs 9 and 11):
The Excise Tax Act provides a
complete statutory framework with respect to a taxpayer’s claim for a rebate of
GST paid under Part IX of the Excise Tax Act. This framework also
establishes the procedure that must be followed to challenge the validity of
the assessment made by the Minister. That challenge must be by way of a
Notice of Objection to the Minister and ultimately an appeal to the Tax Court.
…
The statutory provisions considered as a
whole along with the explicit language in s. 12 of the Tax Court of Canada
Act leave no doubt that Parliament has given the Tax Court exclusive
jurisdiction to deal with claims arising out of GST assessments and taxpayers’
claims for rebates of GST paid.
As a result, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the
plaintiffs’ action to recover GST by way of a common law restitutionary action.
[15]
The
Federal Court regarded the Sorbara decision as highly persuasive and
directly on point. I agree.
[16]
The
Federal Court also correctly considered itself bound by Canada v. Addison
& Leyen Ltd., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 793, 2007 SCC 33. In that case, a
taxpayer attempted to circumvent the
system of tax appeals established by Parliament and the jurisdiction of the Tax
Court by launching an application for judicial review. The Supreme Court held
that the application could not succeed. The taxpayer has to seek relief within
the system of tax assessments and appeals that Parliament has established (at
paragraph 11):
The integrity and efficacy of the system
of tax assessments and appeals should be preserved. Parliament has set up
a complex structure to deal with a multitude of tax-related claims and this
structure relies on an independent and specialized court, the Tax Court of
Canada.
This definitive pronouncement from the Supreme
Court of Canada applies directly to the case at bar.
[17]
As
the Federal Court also noted, the statutory language in this case is
determinative. Section 312 of the Act has very specific language: it removes
any “right to recover any money paid [as]…tax” except as provided by Part IX of
the Act, the marginal note declares that there are “[s]tatutory rights only,”
and subsection 12(1) of the Tax Court of Canada Act provides that the
Tax Court has “exclusive” jurisdiction over matters arising under Part IX of
the Act.
[18]
As
is apparent from the above, I agree with the Federal Court’s analysis of and
reliance on these authorities and provisions. I conclude that the only
permissible way for the appellants to recover GST is to proceed to the Tax
Court of Canada and follow the procedural rules and substantive standards set
out in Part IX of the Act.
(ii) The
Kingstreet
decision
[19]
As
mentioned above, a central part of the appellants’ oral and written submissions
in this Court concerns the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Kingstreet,
supra. The appellants urge that Kingstreet makes the recovery of
wrongly paid taxes a constitutional right, and so, despite my conclusion in the
preceding section of these reasons, the appellants need not proceed under Part
IX of the Act.
[20]
I
disagree. From beginning to end in its decision, the Supreme Court spoke only
of the common law cause of action of restitution for ultra vires taxes. In
the first line of its analysis in Kingstreet (at paragraph 12), the
Supreme Court of Canada declared that the question before it was “whether restitution is available
for the recovery of monies collected under legislation that is subsequently
declared to be ultra vires.” It then immediately answered that question: the cause of
action of “restitution was generally available.” However, it found (also at
paragraph 12) that the normal “unjust enrichment analysis [was] ill-suited to deal with the issues raised by
ultra vires taxes,” and instead developed an analysis based on constitutional
principles. It did
so because the taxpayer “has recourse to a remedy as a matter of constitutional
right” (at paragraph 34). In Kingstreet, the right was constitutional
because the provision that imposed the tax had been declared to be
unconstitutional and ultra vires. But the constitutional aspect in that
case did not change the nature of the cause of action, which remained
restitution. This is confirmed by observations made by the Supreme Court at the
end of its analysis (at paragraph 40): the Court made it clear that the cause
of action before it remained what it called “[r]estitution for ultra vires
taxes.”
[21]
In summary,
in Kingstreet, the Supreme Court did not create a new, sweeping
constitutional remedy to recover tax assessed under a misapplication or
misinterpretation of a taxing statute. It certainly did not create a new,
sweeping constitutional remedy that would allow aggrieved taxpayers to bypass
all of the legislative schemes in force across the country that govern the
recovery of tax assessed under a misapplication or misinterpretation of a
taxation statute. Rather, the Supreme Court based the taxpayer’s recovery on
the common law cause of action for restitution, changing the analysis somewhat
to reflect the fact that an ultra vires taxing provision was involved.
[22]
The
Court of Appeal in Sorbara, supra, interpreted Kingstreet
the same way. It held that Kingstreet does not create a constitutional
right in taxpayers to recover tax assessed under a misapplication or
misinterpretation of a taxation statute. It held that such recovery must be
done in accordance with applicable statutory provisions. I agree. As the
appellants’ claim does not seek the recovery of GST under an ultra vires
provision, Kingstreet does not apply.
(iii) The
proper characterization of the appellants’ proposed class action
[23]
In
paragraphs 11 to 18, above, I found that GST may only be recovered in the Tax
Court of Canada, in accordance with Part IX of the Act. Now it is necessary to
consider whether the appellants’ proposed class action does this. Is the
appellants’ proposed class action nothing more than an attempt to recover GST
outside of Part IX of the Act, and thus barred? Or it is properly characterized
as something that does not fall under Part IX of the Act, and can be brought in
the Federal Court? In my view, the appellants’ proposed class action is just an
attempt to recover GST outside of Part IX of the Act, and, therefore, is barred.
[24]
This
is shown by comparing the compensatory relief sought in the proposed class
action with the compensatory relief that can be sought under Part IX of the Act.
The former and the latter are the same, and are aimed only at recovering GST:
(i) Relief
sought under the proposed class action. The appellant law firms have paid
GST and are now of the view that the GST was not owing. When they rendered
accounts to clients, they included the GST amounts. The appellants, comprised
of law firms and clients, have brought a proposed class action against the
respondents, seeking these GST amounts. They want to be placed in the position
they would have been in had the GST never been charged.
(ii) Relief
that can be sought under Part IX of the Act. The law firms could have
challenged the Minister’s assessment under the procedures and standards in the
Act and, in fact, the Merchant Law Group has done exactly that. If the
challenge succeeds, the assessments would change and any GST that was wrongly
paid would be refunded to the law firms. The law firms, as fiduciaries, would then
be obligated to make their clients whole. To the extent that this does not
happen, the clients have the right to claim a rebate for GST paid that should
not have been charged: section 261 of the Act. The appellants would then be in
the position they would have been in had the GST never been charged.
[25]
In
the proposed class action, the appellants also seek aggravated and punitive
damages. They say they are entitled to these damages because the “Government”
engaged in “substantial disturbances and harassment of the [law firms]
resulting in confusion, frustration, desperation and helplessness in the
process of providing legal services”: amended statement of claim, paragraph 14.
In addition, it froze the bank accounts of the appellant, Merchant Law Group,
and “pursued, threatened, misinformed and cajoled the collection of GST”:
amended statement of claim, paragraphs 15 to 17.
[26]
Does
the claim for aggravated and punitive damages change my characterization of the
proposed class proceeding as merely an attempt to recovery GST outside of Part
IX of the Act? I think not. The appellants do not seek compensatory damages for
this alleged conduct. As a result, the characterization of the proposed class action
remains the same: it still seeks the recovery of GST outside of the Act, but with
an added penalty due to the respondents’ conduct.
[27]
This
conclusion can be tested. If one takes the amended statement of claim and
removes everything that concerns the recovery of GST, in substance what is
left? Only a complaint about harassment remains, without any claim for compensatory
damages and without sufficient material facts and particulars that would
establish a viable cause of action. This test confirms that the appellants’ claims
for aggravated and punitive damages are mere ornaments on a pleading that is aimed
at recovering GST outside of Part IX of the Act.
[28]
Therefore,
I conclude that the appellant’s proposed class action, properly characterized,
is nothing more than an attempt to recover GST outside of the procedures and
standards prescribed by the Act, which is forbidden. Therefore, the causes of
action in the appellant’s proposed class action cannot succeed.
(2) Is the appellants’
pleading sufficient?
[29]
Since
the causes of action in the appellants’ proposed class action cannot succeed,
it is not necessary to consider the sufficiency of the appellants’ pleading of
the tort of misfeasance in public office. But we have received full argument on
the issue, the Federal Court considered and determined the issue, and this is
an issue of general importance. Therefore, I think it appropriate that I offer
some comments on the issue.
[30]
The
Federal Court concluded that the appellants failed to plead sufficient material
facts concerning the tort of misfeasance in public office. I agree.
[31]
Rule
174 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 requires that a pleading
“contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies…”.
[32]
In
paragraph 12 of the amended statement of claim, the appellants pleaded the tort
of misfeasance in public office as follows:
Since 1992,
the Government sought collection contrary to legislation, regulation, and its
own policies, knowing that its conduct was unlawful and likely to injure the
Class. In particular, for the purposes of harassing and injuring the Collector
Subclass, and in bad faith, the Government ignored P-182R, P-209, and other
interpretation and policy instruments.
[33]
Paragraph
5 of the amended statement of claim defines “Government” very broadly. “Government”
is the Attorney General of Canada, all of the Canada Revenue Agency, and
potentially a wide range of additional, unascertained Crown officials: “their employees,
agents, and other departments of the government of Canada who were the
alter ego” of the Attorney General of Canada and the Canada Revenue Agency.
[34]
I
agree with the Federal Court’s observation (at paragraph 26) that paragraph 12
of the amended statement of claim “contains a set of conclusions, but does not
provide any material facts for the conclusions.” When pleading bad faith or
abuse of power, it is not enough to assert, baldly, conclusory phrases such as
“deliberately or negligently,” “callous disregard,” or “by fraud and theft did
steal”: Zundel v. Canada, 2005 FC 1612, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 635; Vojic
v. Canada (M.N.R.), [1987] 2 C.T.C. 203, 87 D.T.C. 5384 (F.C.A.). “The bare
assertion of a conclusion upon which the court is called upon to pronounce is
not an allegation of material fact”: Canadian Olympic Association v. USA
Hockey, Inc. (1997), 74 C.P.R. (3d) 348, 72 A.C.W.S. (3d) 346 (F.C.T.D.). Making
bald, conclusory allegations without any evidentiary foundation is an abuse of
process: AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Limited, 2010 FCA 112 at
paragraph 5. If the requirement of pleading material facts did not exist in Rule
174 or if courts did not enforce it according to its terms, parties would be
able to make the broadest, most sweeping allegations without evidence and
embark upon a fishing expedition. As this Court has said, “an action at law is
not a fishing expedition and a plaintiff who starts proceedings simply in the
hope that something will turn up abuses the court’s process”: Kastner v.
Painblanc (1994), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 502, 176 N.R. 68 at paragraph 4 (F.C.A.).
[35]
To
this, I would add that the tort of misfeasance in public office requires a
particular state of mind of a public officer in carrying out the impunged
action, i.e., deliberate conduct which the public officer knows to be
inconsistent with the obligations of his or her office: Odhavji Estate v.
Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69 at paragraph 28. For this tort,
particularization of the allegations is mandatory. Rule 181 specifically
requires particularization of allegations of “breach of trust,” “wilful
default,” “state of mind of a person,” “malice” or “fraudulent intention.”
[36]
The
Federal Court also found (at paragraph 23) that the pleading was deficient
because the Crown’s liability is vicarious (see section 10 of the Crown
Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50) and so the identity of
the particular individuals who are alleged to have engaged in misfeasance in
public office must be named. As noted above, in this case, paragraphs 5 and 12
of the amended statement of claim implicate entire departments and potentially
others in the Government of Canada. The pleading fails to identify, with any
particularity, the officials allegedly involved in the misfeasance.
[37]
In
this Court, the respondents submit that plaintiffs pleading this tort must always
state the actual name of the individuals who committed the alleged misfeasance.
In my view, such a requirement, if applied strictly in every case, would impose
too onerous a burden upon plaintiffs in some cases. In addition, it would go beyond
the level of particularity necessary to fulfil the purposes of pleadings in
civil proceedings.
[38]
I
do agree that the individuals involved should be identified. The plaintiff is obligated
under Rule 174 to plead material facts and the identity of the individual who
are alleged to have engaged in misfeasance is a material fact which must be
pleaded. But how particular does the identification have to be? In many cases,
it may be impossible for a plaintiff to identify by name the particular individual
who was responsible. However, in cases such as this, a plaintiff should be able
to identify a particular group of individuals who were dealing with the matter,
one or more of whom were allegedly responsible. This might involve identifying job
positions, an organizational branch, an office, or a building in which those dealing
with the matter worked. Often such information is readily available from the
oral and written communications and dealings among the parties that gave rise
to the claim. In cases such as this, identification at least at this level of
particularity, will usually be sufficient. The purposes of pleadings will be
fulfilled: the issues in the action will be defined with reasonable precision,
the respondents will have enough information to investigate the matter and the
respondents will be able to plead adequately in response within the time limits
set out in the Rules.
[39]
The
appellants submit that section 69 of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C.
1999, c. 17 makes the Agency liable directly, not just vicariously.
Accordingly, they say that it was not necessary for them to particularize the
individuals. In the context of the tort of misfeasance in public office, I
disagree. Section 69 provides that legal proceedings may be “brought against
the Agency in the name of the Agency” concerning “any…obligation incurred by
the Agency.” This simply makes the Agency a suable entity. It does not relieve the
appellants from the requirement to plead material facts under the Rules,
including the identification of the identification of the individuals allegedly
involved in the tort of misfeasance in public office, as explained above.
[40]
Finally,
in an overarching submission, the appellants suggest that this Court should
relax the rules of pleading whenever it has a proposed class action before it. The
appellants submit that any deficiencies in the amended statement of claim can
be addressed in the motion to certify the action as a class action. Related to
this, the appellants suggest that this Court should view the pleading not as it
has been drafted but rather “as how it might be drafted.” The appellants cite no
authority in support of these propositions. I reject them. A motion to strike
may be brought at any time against a statement of claim in a proposed class
action for failure to comply with the rules of pleading or for failure to state
a viable cause of action: Pearson v. Canada, 2008 FC 62, [2008] 4 F.C.R.
373 per Prothonotary Aalto. The launching of a proposed class action is
a matter of great seriousness, potentially affecting many class members’ rights
and the liabilities and interests of defendants. Complying with the Rules is
not trifling or optional; mandatory and essential it truly is.
[41]
For
the foregoing reasons, I agree with the Federal Court that the pleading of the
tort of misfeasance in public office in the amended statement of claim is
insufficient and should be struck on this ground as well.
C. The
motion
[42]
At
the hearing of this appeal, at the end of the appellant’s reply submissions, counsel
for the appellants suddenly presented the Court with a handwritten annotation
of page 2 of the amended statement of claim. Two changes were made: section 69
of the Canada Revenue Agency Act was written into paragraph 2 of the
amended statement of claim and the definition of “Government” in paragraph 5 of
the amended statement of claim was narrowed to the Attorney General of Canada,
the Canada Revenue Agency and two named employees of the Canada Revenue Agency.
At counsel’s request, this Court was prepared to accept the annotated page as a
motion to amend the amended statement of claim. The Court received submissions
on the motion.
[43]
I
would dismiss the motion. The circumstances behind this impromptu motion were
known to counsel long ago. The appellants offered no explanation for the delay.
The end of reply submissions in an appeal, long after the decision at first
instance and long after service of a notice of motion to strike a pleading, is
not an appropriate time to ask for an amendment: R. v. Brooks,
2010 SKCA 55 at paragraphs 15 and 16. Further, the Federal Court had already
struck the pleading and so in this Court there was nothing left to amend.
Finally, in any event, the proposed amendments, quite limited in nature, would
not have supplied all of the material facts necessary for this pleading to
survive.
D. Proposed
disposition
[44]
For
the above reasons, I would dismiss the motion and the appeal, with costs.
"David
Stratas"
“I
agree
Pierre Blais C.J.”
“I
agree
Eleanor R. Dawson J.A.”
Email this Content