Date: 20080307
Dockets: A-516-06
A-517-06
Citation: 2007 FCA 91
CORAM: RICHARD
C.J.
NOËL
J.A.
SHARLOW
J.A.
A-516-06
BETWEEN:
BELL CANADA
Appellant
and
CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION BELL ALIANT REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS, LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP
BC OLD AGE PENSIONERS ORGANIZATION
THE CONSUMERS’ ASSOCIATION OF CANADA
MTS ALLSTREAM INC.
THE NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY ORGANIZATION
PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CENTRE
SASKATCHEWAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SOCIÉTÉ EN COMMANDITE TÉLÉBEC
TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC.
L’UNION DES CONSOMMATEURS and
ARCH DISABILITY LAW CENTRE
Respondents
A-517-06
BETWEEN:
THE CONSUMERS’ ASSOCIATION OF CANADA and
THE NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY ORGANIZATION
Appellants
and
CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Respondent
and
BELL ALIANT REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS,
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
BELL CANADA
ARCH DISABILITY LAW CENTRE
CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF
MTS ALLSTREAM INC.
SASKATCHEWAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TÉLÉBEC, SOCIÉTÉ EN COMMANDITE
TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC. and
TELUS COMMUNICATIONS (QUÉBEC) INC.
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SHARLOW J.A.
[1]
These are
two appeals of the decision of the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) dated February 16, 2006, entitled Telecom
Decision CRTC 2006-9, Disposition of funds in the deferral accounts (the
“Deferral Account Decision”).
[2]
Both
appeals raise issues as to the scope of the authority of the CRTC to order the
disposition of the balance of a deferral account created pursuant to a prior CRTC
order. Bell Canada says that the CRTC cannot order
it to use the balance of the account for subscriber rebates. Consumers’
Association of Canada and National Anti-Poverty Organization (collectively, the
“Consumers”) say that the CRTC must order the balance to be used for subscriber
rebates (or to improve accessibility to telecommunication services for persons
with disabilities).
[3]
For the
reasons that follow, I have concluded that both appeals should be dismissed.
[4]
For
convenience, these reasons are organized under the following headings:
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Paragraph
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1.
Statutory provisions
2. Facts
3. Standard of Review
4. Discussion
(a)
The Consumers appeal
(i)
Preliminary point – whether the Consumers appeal is too late
(ii)
Arguments in the Consumers appeal
(b)
The Bell Canada appeal
5. Costs
6.
Conclusion
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5
9
28
30
31
32
34
42
56
57
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1. Statutory
provisions
[5]
The Deferral
Account Decision is one of a series of decisions made by the CRTC in relation
to the approval of tariffs for telecommunications services for the period
commencing on June 1, 2002 and ending on May 31, 2007. The CRTC’s authority to
approve such tariffs is derived from the combined operation of sections 23, 24,
25, 27 and 32 of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38. Those
provisions read in relevant part as follows:
23.
For the purposes of this Part and
Part IV, "telecommunications service" has the same meaning as in
section 2 and includes any service that is incidental to the business of
providing telecommunications services.
|
23.
Pour l’application de la présente partie et de la partie IV, «service de
télécommunication » s’entend du service de télécommunication défini à
l’article 2, ainsi que de tout service accessoire à la fourniture de services
de télécommunication.
|
24. The
offering and provision of any telecommunications service by a Canadian
carrier are subject to any conditions imposed by the Commission or included
in a tariff approved by the Commission.
|
24.
L’offre et la fourniture des services de télécommunication par l’entreprise
canadienne sont assujetties aux conditions fixées par le Conseil ou contenues
dans une tarification approuvée par celui-ci.
|
25. (1) No
Canadian carrier shall provide a telecommunications service except in
accordance with a tariff filed with and approved by the Commission that
specifies the rate or the maximum or minimum rate, or both, to be charged for
the service.
|
25.
(1) L’entreprise canadienne doit fournir les services de télécommunication en
conformité avec la tarification déposée auprès du Conseil et approuvée par
celui-ci fixant — notamment sous forme de maximum, de minimum ou des deux —
les tarifs à imposer ou à percevoir.
|
[…]
|
[…]
|
27. (1) Every rate
charged by a Canadian carrier for a telecommunications service shall be just
and reasonable.
|
27. (1) Tous les
tarifs doivent être justes et raisonnables.
|
[…]
|
[…]
|
32. The Commission may, for
the purposes of this Part,
|
32. Le Conseil
peut, pour l’application de la présente partie :
|
[…]
|
[…]
|
(g) in the absence of any
applicable provision in this Part, determine any matter and make any order
relating to the rates, tariffs or telecommunications services of Canadian
carriers.
|
g) en l’absence de
disposition applicable dans la présente partie, trancher toute question
touchant les tarifs et tarifications des entreprises canadiennes ou les
services de télécommunication qu’elles fournissent.
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[6]
Section 47 of the Telecommunications
Act is also relevant to the issues in these appeals. It reads as follows
(my emphasis):
47. The Commission shall exercise its powers and perform
its duties under this Act and any special Act
(a)
with a view to implementing the Canadian telecommunications policy
objectives and ensuring that Canadian carriers provide telecommunications
services and charge rates in accordance with section 27; and
(b)
in accordance with any orders made by the Governor in Council under section 8
or any standards prescribed by the Minister under section 15.
|
47. Le Conseil
doit, en se conformant aux décrets que lui adresse le gouverneur en conseil
au titre de l’article 8 ou aux normes prescrites par arrêté du ministre au
titre de l’article 15, exercer les pouvoirs et fonctions que lui confèrent la
présente loi et toute loi spéciale de manière à réaliser les objectifs de
la politique canadienne de télécommunication et à assurer la conformité
des services et tarifs des entreprises canadiennes avec les dispositions de
l’article 27.
|
[7]
The Canadian Telecommunications
policy objectives referred to in section 47 of the Telecommunications Act
are set out in section 7, which reads as follows:
7. It is
hereby affirmed that telecommunications performs an essential role in the
maintenance of Canada’s identity and sovereignty and that the Canadian
telecommunications policy has as its objectives
(a)
to facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada of a
telecommunications system that serves to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the
social and economic fabric of Canada and its regions;
(b)
to render reliable and affordable telecommunications services of high quality
accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural areas in all regions of Canada;
(c)
to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness, at the national and
international levels, of Canadian telecommunications;
(d)
to promote the ownership and control of Canadian carriers by Canadians;
(e)
to promote the use of Canadian transmission facilities for telecommunications
within Canada and between Canada and points outside Canada;
(f)
to foster increased reliance on market forces for the provision of
telecommunications services and to ensure that regulation, where required, is
efficient and effective;
(g)
to stimulate research and development in Canada in the field of telecommunications and to encourage
innovation in the provision of telecommunications services;
(h)
to respond to the economic and social requirements of users of
telecommunications services; and
(i) to contribute to the
protection of the privacy of persons.
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7.
La présente loi affirme le
caractère essentiel des télécommunications pour l’identité et la souveraineté
canadiennes; la politique canadienne de télécommunication vise à :
a) favoriser
le développement ordonné des télécommunications partout au Canada en un
système qui contribue à sauvegarder, enrichir et renforcer la structure
sociale et économique du Canada et de ses régions;
b) permettre
l’accès aux Canadiens dans toutes les régions — rurales ou urbaines — du
Canada à des services de télécommunication sûrs, abordables et de qualité;
c) accroître
l’efficacité et la compétitivité, sur les plans national et international,
des télécommunications canadiennes;
d) promouvoir
l’accession à la propriété des entreprises canadiennes, et à leur contrôle,
par des Canadiens;
e) promouvoir
l’utilisation d’installations de transmission canadiennes pour les
télécommunications à l’intérieur du Canada et à destination ou en provenance
de l’étranger;
f) favoriser
le libre jeu du marché en ce qui concerne la fourniture de services de
télécommunication et assurer l’efficacité de la réglementation, dans le cas
où celle-ci est nécessaire;
g) stimuler
la recherche et le développement au Canada dans le domaine des
télécommunications ainsi que l’innovation en ce qui touche la fourniture de
services dans ce domaine;
h) satisfaire
les exigences économiques et sociales des usagers des services de
télécommunication;
i) contribuer à la
protection de la vie privée des personnes.
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[8]
The
specific provisions of the Telecommunications Act relating to orders of
the CRTC are found in sections 60, 61 and 62, and read in relevant part as
follows.
60. The
Commission may grant the whole or any portion of the relief applied for in
any case, and may grant any other relief in addition to or in substitution
for the relief applied for as if the application had been for that other
relief.
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60.
Le Conseil peut soit faire droit à une demande de réparation, en tout ou en
partie, soit accorder, en plus ou à la place de celle qui est demandée, la
réparation qui lui semble justifiée, l’effet étant alors le même que si
celle-ci avait fait l’objet de la demande.
|
61. (1) The
Commission may, in any decision, provide that the whole or any portion of the
decision shall come into force on, or remain in force until, a specified day,
the occurrence of a specified event, the fulfilment of a specified condition,
or the performance to the satisfaction of the Commission, or of a person
named by it, of a requirement imposed on any interested person.
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61.
(1) Le Conseil peut, dans
ses décisions, prévoir une date déterminée pour leur mise à exécution ou
cessation d’effet — totale ou partielle — ou subordonner celle-ci à la
survenance d’un événement, à la réalisation d’une condition ou à la bonne
exécution, appréciée par lui-même ou son délégué, d’obligations qu’il aura
imposées à l’intéressé.
|
(2) The
Commission may make an interim decision and may make its final decision
effective from the day on which the interim decision came into effect.
|
(2) Le Conseil peut rendre une décision provisoire et rendre effective,
à compter de la prise d’effet de celle-ci, la décision définitive.
|
(3) The
Commission may make an ex parte decision where it considers that the circumstances
of the case justify it.
|
(3) La
décision peut également être rendue ex parte si le Conseil estime
que les circonstances le justifient.
|
62. The Commission
may, on application or on its own motion, review and rescind or vary any
decision made by it or re-hear a matter before rendering a decision.
|
62. Le Conseil peut,
sur demande ou de sa propre initiative, réviser, annuler ou modifier ses
décisions, ou entendre à nouveau une demande avant d’en décider.
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2. Facts
[9]
The Deferral
Account Decision was preceded by Telecom Decision CRTC 2002-34 (the “Price Caps
Decision”) dated May 30, 2002. The Price Caps Decision established various
pricing constraints and formulae that would apply to the regulated services of
Bell Canada and other incumbent local
exchange carriers (“ILECs”) for the four year period from June 1, 2002 to May
31, 2006. In Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-69, dated December 16, 2005, the CRTC
extended the price cap regime for another year, to May 31, 2007.
[10]
The
application of the specific pricing formula that the Price Caps Decision established
for residential telephone services in non-high cost serving areas (“non-HCSAs”,
which I understand to mean, generally, urban areas) would have resulted in a rate
decrease in any year in which inflation was lower than 3.5%. However, the CRTC
did not order a reduction in rates for that class of subscriber, because it was
concerned about the impact of such price reductions on emerging local
competition in urban areas (the theory being that rates that are too low are a
barrier to new entrants to the market). Instead, the CRTC required the ILECs to
keep track of the rate reductions that would have been required under the
formula, and to add those amounts to a deferral account. The CRTC is permitted to
require telecommunication service providers to adopt a particular method of
accounting (paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Telecommunications
Act).
[11]
The CRTC
did not require the ILECs to maintain the deferral accounts as a trust account
or a separate fund. It is undisputed that each ILEC is the legal owner of the
funds credited to its deferral account. A deferral account is simply an
accumulation of accounting entries. The balance in an ILEC’s deferral account
represents an asset of the ILEC that is subject to a contingent liability, to
be discharged in the manner the CRTC may lawfully direct.
[12]
In
paragraph 412 of the Price Caps Decision, the CRTC indicated how the balance in
an ILEC’s deferral account might be dealt with, without excluding other
possibilities. That paragraph reads as follows:
412. The Commission anticipates that an adjustment to the
deferral account would be made whenever the Commission approves rate
reductions for residential local services that are proposed by the ILECs as a
result of competitive pressures. The Commission also anticipates that the
deferral account would be drawn down to mitigate rate increases for
residential service that could result from the approval of exogenous factors
or when inflation exceeds productivity. Other draw downs could occur, for
example, through subscriber rebates or the funding of initiatives that would
benefit residential customers in other ways.
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[13]
The Price
Caps Decision left certain issues outstanding in relation to the setting of
rates for ILECs for the relevant period. It was contemplated that further
submissions would be made in respect of those outstanding issues. In order to
ensure that any rate changes arising from events occurring after June 1, 2002
could be implemented retroactively as of that date, all ILEC rates were
designated as interim rates as of June 1, 2002.
[14]
No one
sought leave to appeal the Price Caps Decision.
[15]
In Telecom
Decision CRTC 2003-15 dated March 18, 2003, the CRTC dealt with some rating
issues that were outstanding after the Price Caps Decision. All outstanding issues
relating to the rates for residential local subscribers in non-high cost
service areas were settled at that time, and those rates were declared to be final.
Paragraph 65 of Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-15 reads in relevant part as follows
(my underlining):
65. In light of
the foregoing:
· the Commission directs Bell Canada to:
-- include the $29.1 million in savings
allocated to residential local services in non-[high cost service areas] in
the price cap deferral account;
[…]
· the Commission approves, on a
final basis, the remainder of Bell Canada's rates other than [two categories of rates that are
not in issue in this appeal];
· the Commission directs that the approved
rates, other than those associated with the contract options for DNA links,
are to take effect on 1 June 2002. […]
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[16]
As I
understand Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-15, it is the final determination of the
CRTC that the rates then approved for residential local services in non-high
cost service areas were just and reasonable. However, those final rates
remained subject to the obligation of the ILECs to maintain the deferral
accounts as directed in the Price Caps Decision, pending a final determination
by the CRTC on the disposition of the balance in those accounts.
[17]
On
December 2, 2003, Bell Canada filed an application with the CRTC for
approval to use the balance in its deferral account to expand high-speed
broadband internet service to remote and rural communities. On March 24, 2004,
the CRTC issued Review and disposition of deferral accounts for the second
price cap period, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2004-1. That notice initiated
a public proceeding for which proposals were invited for the disposition of the
ILECs’ deferral accounts. Bell Canada’s broadband expansion proposal
was incorporated into that proceeding. That proceeding concluded with the
release of the Deferral Account Decision, the decision under appeal, on
February 16, 2006.
[18]
In the
Deferral Account Decision, the CRTC directed the ILECs, including Bell Canada, to allocate a minimum of 5% of the balance
in their deferral accounts to improve access to telecommunication services for
persons with disabilities. As to the remaining 95% of the balance in the ILECs’
deferral accounts, the CRTC said this:
112. The Commission notes that in the price
cap decisions, rebates to consumers in [non-high cost service areas] were
identified as a possible use for the funds in the deferral accounts. The
Commission considers that subscriber rebates would be consistent with section
7 of the Act and the objectives set out in the price cap decisions.
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113. The Commission does not consider that
providing one-time rebates to subscribers would be equivalent to lowering the
ILECs' primary local exchange service rates or that it would defeat the
purpose of establishing the deferral accounts. The Commission considers that
a one-time rebate will not have a sustained impact on the development of
competition in the residential local services market.
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114. However, the Commission has concerns
with respect to the implementation of any rebates and the potential
inter-generational inequity issues associated with the disposition of the
funds in the deferral accounts. The Commission considers that it would be
overly complex and not cost-effective to try to estimate a rebate amount
proportionate to the amount contributed by an individual subscriber to the
deferral accounts. The Commission also considers that the cost of attempting
to locate those residential subscribers who were customers during the current
price cap period but are no longer customers would likely outweigh any
benefits that might be derived from such an exercise.
|
115. As indicated earlier in this Decision,
the Commission intends to clear the funds in the deferral accounts in a
manner that contributes to achieving the objectives of the current price
regulation framework, including balancing the interests of the three main
stakeholders in the telecommunications markets. The Commission considers that
initiatives to expand broadband services and to improve accessibility to
telecommunications services for persons with disabilities will provide
longer-term and more permanent benefits than a one-time rebate.
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116. Accordingly, the Commission concludes
that each ILEC should, to the greatest extent possible, use funds in their
deferral accounts for initiatives to expand broadband services to rural and
remote communities and to improve accessibility to telecommunications
services for persons with disabilities. The Commission also concludes that
should any accumulated balance remain in the ILEC's deferral account after
these initiatives have been approved by the Commission, this amount will be
rebated to the ILEC's residential local subscribers in [non-high cost service
areas].
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[19]
In paragraph
197 of the Deferral Account Decision, the CRTC also directed any ILEC wishing
to pursue broadband expansion within its serving territory to file, by June 30,
2006, a detailed proposal in compliance with certain conditions.
[20]
In Telecom
Decision CRTC 2008-1 dated January 17, 2008, the CRTC considered Bell Canada’s proposal to use its
deferral account balance for broadband expansion, but approved it only in part.
As a result, the CRTC required Bell Canada to submit, by March 25, 2008, a plan for
rebating the balance of its deferral account to residential subscribers in
non-high cost serving areas of record as of January 17, 2008.
[21]
In
practical terms, it is helpful to think of the balance in an ILEC’s deferral
account as an amount representing the amount of a contingent obligation of the
ILEC to use a certain portion of the rates collected from residential local
subscribers in non-high cost service areas in the manner that the CRTC would
direct. I emphasize that there is no overpayment in fact or in law. The ILECs
acted lawfully in charging and collecting the rates permitted by the CRTC.
However, but for the need, perceived by the CRTC, to encourage competitors to
enter the market for residential local subscribers in non-high cost service
areas, the permitted rate would have been lower.
[22]
The effect
of the Deferral Account Decision is that each ILEC is obliged to spend 5% of the
balance in its deferral account on improved accessibility for disabled persons.
Each ILEC could choose whether or not to invest the remaining 95% in broadband
expansion in rural and remote communities. An ILEC wishing to invest in such
broadband expansion would be obliged to submit its investment proposal to the
CRTC. If the broadband expansion as finally approved would cost at least 95% of
the balance in the deferral account, nothing would be rebated to subscribers.
If the broadband expansion as finally approved would cost less than 95% of the balance
in the deferral account, then an amount equal to the remainder would be rebated
to residential local subscribers in non-high cost service areas. An ILEC
choosing not to invest in broadband expansion would be obliged to rebate 95% of
the balance in its deferral account to residential local subscribers in
non-high cost service areas.
[23]
The word
“rebate” normally means a refund or repayment of money to the person who paid
it. However, in the Deferral Account Decision the word “rebate” is used in a
slightly different sense, to connote a method, yet to be determined, whereby
the amount to be “rebated” is used to benefit the relevant class of subscribers
as it is constituted on some date after May 31, 2007 (in the case of Bell
Canada, the chosen date in January 17, 2008; see Telecom Decision CRTC 2008-1).
For example, a “rebate” might be made by a one-time credit, after May 31, 2007,
to the accounts of persons who as of some future date are residential local
subscribers in non-high cost service areas. Alternatively, a “rebate” might be
made by means of a reduction in the rates payable by those subscribers for some
future period.
[24]
Even if this
matter progresses to the point where the CRTC approves a particular rebate
methodology to be used by Bell Canada, a person who was a residential local
subscriber in a non-high cost service area between June 1, 2002 and May 31,
2007, but who is not a subscriber on January 17, 2008, will not benefit from
the “rebate”. The benefit to a particular subscriber may or may not reflect
that subscriber’s proportionate share of the balance in the deferral account.
[25]
In Appeal
A-516-06, Bell Canada (supported by the respondents
Bell Alliant Regional Communications Limited Partnership and Arch Disability
Law Centre) seeks an order quashing the part of the Deferral Account Decision that
requires Bell Canada to rebate a portion of its deferral
account to local subscribers in non-high cost serving areas. Bell Canada has never challenged the part of the
Deferral Account Decision that requires a portion of its deferral account to be
used to improve accessibility to telecommunications services for persons with
disabilities. The Bell Canada appeal is opposed by the CRTC, National
Anti-Poverty Organization, Consumers’ Association of Canada, and Public
Interest Advocacy Centre.
[26]
In Appeal A-517-06,
the Consumers seek an order quashing the part of the Deferral Account Decision
that requires a portion of the deferral accounts to be used to expand broadband
services to rural and remote communities. The Consumers also seek an order directing
the CRTC to order a rebate of the balance in the deferral accounts (except the
5% that the CRTC ordered to be used to improve accessibility to
telecommunications services to persons with disabilities). The Consumers appeal
is opposed by the CRTC and by Bell Canada, Telus Communications Inc., Telus
Communications (Québec) Inc. and MTS Allstream Inc.
[27]
The
Consumers originally sought an order requiring the full balance of the deferral
accounts to be rebated, including the 5% that the CRTC ordered to be used to improve
accessibility to telecommunications services for persons with disabilities. However, at
the hearing of their appeal, the Consumers abandoned their challenge to the
legal authority of the CRTC to direct that a portion of the deferral accounts
be used to improve accessibility to telecommunications services for persons
with disabilities. All parties now agree that the CRTC had the jurisdiction to
make that order.
3. Standard of Review
[28]
Both appeals raise issues of statutory
interpretation going to the jurisdiction of the CRTC to make the Deferral
Account Decision. All parties submit that the standard of review is correctness,
relying on a number of cases, including ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta
(Energy and Utilities Board), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140, at paragraph 32 (per Justice
Bastarache, writing for the majority), Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian
Cable Television Assn., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 1, at paragraphs 9 to 19 (per
Justice Gonthier, writing for the majority). ATCO Gas and Barrie
Public Utilities were decided by the Supreme Court of Canada after Pushpanathan
v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R.
982. In
this case I am prepared to accept the common view of all parties that the
standard of review is correctness.
[29]
However,
it should be noted that, with respect to the determination
of the standard of review on questions of statutory interpretation like those
raised in this appeal, this case may not be distinguishable from the more
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Council of Canadians with
Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650. In that case
Justice Abella, writing for the majority, held that in the case of an appeal
from the Canadian Transportation Agency on a question of the interpretation of
the Agency’s governing statute, the standard of review is reasonableness (see paragraphs
98 to 100; see also Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Canadian
Transportation Agency, 2008 FCA 42).
4. Discussion
[30]
In
the discussion below, I deal first with the Consumers appeal, and then with the
Bell Canada appeal.
(a) The Consumers appeal
[31]
The
Consumers argue that the CRTC has no legal authority to order the establishment
of deferral accounts at all, but having done so it was not entitled to order
the balance of the deferral accounts to be used for anything but rebates to the
local residential subscribers in non-high cost service areas (and, given the
concession at the hearing of the appeal, for improved accessibility to
telecommunication services for persons with disabilities).
(i) Preliminary point – whether the
Consumers appeal is too late
[32]
The
CRTC argues that it is not open to the Consumers at this stage to argue that
the CRTC had no legal authority to order the creation of the deferral accounts,
because that point was finally determined in the Price Caps Decision. There is
considerable merit in this argument. However, for the reasons that follow, I do
not accept it.
[33]
The
Consumers have appealed one decision in a series of related decisions issued by
the CRTC. The CRTC chose that procedure for obvious practical reasons, but the
result is to create a difficulty for potential appellants who may not be prejudiced by the determination
of a specific issue in one decision in the series, but may be prejudiced by a
subsequent decision in the series based on that determination. In my view, in
the unusual circumstances of this case, the Consumers did not act unreasonably
in awaiting the Deferral Account Decision before seeking leave to appeal, and
then raising their arguments about the propriety of the creation of the
deferral account. That is because, until the Deferral Account Decision was
issued, it remained uncertain what the CRTC would order in relation to the
disposition of the deferral account balance.
(ii) Arguments in the Consumers appeal
[34]
I
summarize as follows the argument of the Consumers. In setting rates that are
“just and reasonable” as required by subsection 27(1) of the Telecommunications
Act, the CRTC must take into account what is necessary, but only what is
necessary, to ensure that the rates are fair to the consumer and will result in
a fair rate of return to the telecommunication service provider. In the Price
Caps Decision, the CRTC determined that for residential telephone services in
non-high cost serving areas, the pricing formula in the Price Caps Decision
would result in a price decrease in any year in which inflation was lower than
3.5%. That was tantamount to finding that the pricing formula resulted in a
rate that was not just and reasonable for those subscribers. In failing to
order that the rates be decreased accordingly, and in ordering instead that
deferral accounts be established to accumulate the excess rates, the CRTC erred
in law because, in relying on a consideration that is irrelevant to rating (the
encouragement of competitors), it fixed rates in excess of what it had
determined was “just and reasonable”. Then, in permitting that excess to be
used for broadband expansion for remote and rural communities, rather than requiring
the excess to be rebated to the same class of subscribers who paid the rates,
the CRTC erred in law again by taking into account a consideration that is irrelevant
to a rating decision.
[35]
In my
view, the Consumers argument fails at the first step. Because of the combined
operation of section 47 and section 7 of the Telecommunications Act
(quoted above), the CRTC’s rating jurisdiction is not limited to considerations
that have traditionally been considered relevant to ensuring a fair price for
consumers and a fair rate of return to the provider of telecommunication
services. Section 47 of the Telecommunications Act expressly requires
the CRTC to consider, as well, the policy objectives listed in section 7 of the
Telecommunications Act. What that means, in my view, is that in rating decisions
under the Telecommunications Act, the CRTC is entitled to consider any
or all of the policy objectives listed in section 7.
[36]
In the
Price Caps Decision, the CRTC justified its determination not to order the
suggested 3.5% reduction, and instead to order the creation of deferral
accounts, on the basis that this would enhance competitiveness (paragraph 7(c)
of the Telecommunications Act) and foster increased reliance on market
forces (paragraph 7(f) of the Telecommunications Act). In the later
Deferral Account Decision, when the CRTC permitted the balance in the deferral
accounts to be used for broadband expansion in remote and rural areas, it did
so as a measure that would tend to increase access to high quality
telecommunications services in rural areas (paragraph 7(b) of the Telecommunications
Act). Thus, in both instances, the CRTC based its decision on factors that
it is permitted by section 7 to take into account.
[37]
In my
view, none of the jurisprudence cited by the Consumers casts doubt on my
conclusions as to the scope of the CRTC’s jurisdiction in rate setting. To
illustrate that point, I will discuss the two principal cases upon which the Consumers
rely.
[38]
The first case
is Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. City of Edmonton, [1929] S.C.R. 186. The
issue in that case was whether a utility rate setting authority had chosen a
rate of return that was too high because it relied on evidence that should not
have been admissible, or acted on insufficient evidence. The case generally is
cited for this statement at page 192-3 (per Lamont J.):
The duty of the Board
was to fix fair and reasonable rates; rates which, under the circumstances,
would be fair to the consumer on the one hand, and which, on the other hand,
would secure to the company a fair return for the capital invested. By a fair
return is meant that the company will be allowed as large a return on the
capital invested in its enterprise (which will be net to the company) as it
would receive if it were investing the same amount in other securities
possessing an attractiveness, stability and certainty equal to that of the
company’s enterprise.
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This statement confirms the classic definition of “fair and
reasonable” in the context of a common form of rate-setting regime.
[39]
The second
case is ATCO Gas (cited above), which the Consumers say is an example of
an unsuccessful attempt by a rate-setting body to use an irrelevant consideration
in setting rates. In that case Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority,
said this at paragraph 71:
The Board was seeking
to rectify what it perceived to be a historic over-compensation to the
utility by ratepayers. There is no power granted in the various statutes for
the Board to execute such a refund in respect of an erroneous perception of
past over-compensation.
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[40]
ATCO
Gas involved
an order made by the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board to approve the sale of
an asset of a gas utility, subject to the condition that the proceeds of sale were
to be used in part to benefit ratepayers by way of a future reduction in the
rate base. It was clear that the Board had the authority under subsection 26(2)
of the Gas Utilities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. G-5, to approve or disapprove
the sale of the asset. However, the utility argued that the Board had no
jurisdiction to impose a condition directing the use of the proceeds of sale as
it did. Although there was no provision in the Gas Utilities Act that
permitted the Board to attach conditions to an order under subsection 26(2)
approving the sale of an asset, the Board argued that the requisite authority
was implicit in paragraph 15(3)(d) of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board
Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-17, which said that, with respect to any order made
by the Board, it could “make any further order and impose any additional conditions
that the Board considers necessary in the public interest”. Justice Bastarache held
that the Board had erred in interpreting paragraph 15(3)(d) of the Alberta
Energy and Utilities Board Act as importing into subsection 26(2) of the Gas
Utilities Act the power to impose conditions on an order approving a sale.
[41]
In my
view, Northwestern Utilities and ATCO Gas are distinguishable
from this case because they deal with statutory schemes that contain nothing analogous
to sections 7 and 47 of the Telecommunications Act. As explained above,
in those provisions, Parliament has expressly given the CRTC the mandate, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction to approve rates for telecommunications
services, to take into consideration the Canadian telecommunications policy
objectives listed in section 7. The range of considerations that are relevant
to CRTC rating decisions is considerably broader than the range of
considerations expressed or implicit in the statutory schemes considered in Northwestern
Utilities or ATCO Gas. It follows that that the Consumers appeal
must fail.
(b) The Bell Canada appeal
[42]
The Bell
Canada appeal is based on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722 (Bell Canada 1989). Bell Canada cites that case as authority for the
proposition that the CRTC has no jurisdiction to engage in retrospective rate
making with respect to final rates, and argues that the Deferral Account
Decision is retrospective rate making.
[43]
The CRTC
says that the Deferral Account Decision is not retrospective rate making
because it does not revise or revisit prior approved rates. The CRTC
characterizes the Deferral Account Decision as prospective in nature and effect,
the culmination of the procedure laid out in the Price Caps Decision, in which
the CRTC indicated that the deferral accounts were to be established and dealt
with as the CRTC would direct in a subsequent decision.
[44]
If the
CRTC’s characterization of the Deferral Account Decision is correct, it cannot
be challenged on the basis of Bell Canada (1989) and the present Bell Canada appeal must fail. Therefore,
it is necessary to consider Bell Canada (1989) in some detail.
[45]
When Bell
Canada (1989) was decided, the statutory
scheme for the regulation of rates for telecommunication services consisted of
the Railway Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-3, and the National Transportation
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-20. That statutory scheme included provisions
analogous to sections 24, 25, 27, 61 and 62 of the Telecommunications Act,
but nothing analogous to section 47 or section 7 of the Telecommunications
Act.
[46]
In 1984, Bell Canada applied to the CRTC for a general rate
increase to prevent a serious deterioration in its financial situation. On
December 19, 1984, the CRTC granted a 2% rate increase on an interim basis
effective January 1, 1985, reflecting a rate of return of 13.7%. At that time
the CRTC also indicated that the rates would be reviewed when complete
financial information was available for 1985 and 1986. In 1985 Bell Canada’s financial situation
improved. Nevertheless Bell Canada asked the CRTC to give the 2% rate
increase immediate final approval. The CRTC refused final approval and
indicated that it would investigate further.
[47]
Ultimately
the CRTC was not persuaded that the 2% increase was justified and, in a
decision dated August 14, 1985, required Bell Canada to file revised tariffs effective
September 1, 1985 to suspend the increases. At that stage, the rates for the period
from January 1 to August 31, 1985, as well as the rates for September 1, 1985
to December 31, 1986, were interim rates.
[48]
In October
of 1985, Bell Canada discontinued its application for a
general rate increase. However, the CRTC determined that it would nevertheless
continue with its review of the rates for 1985 and 1986, and in particular
would consider Bell Canada’s cost of equity for those
years and 1987. Those issues were the subject of hearings in 1986, resulting in
a decision dated October 14, 1986 (Decision 86-17), in which the CRTC determined
that Bell Canada had excess revenues for 1985 and 1986 totalling $206 million
and would have further excess revenues in 1987. The CRTC also determined that
Bell Canada could not retain the $206 million excess revenue, and ordered the
excess amount for 1985 and 1986 to be credited to subscribers of record as of
October 14, 1986 (I will refer to that as the “rebate order”). The estimated
excess revenue for 1987 was dealt with through a general rate reduction for
1987.
[49]
The Supreme
Court of Canada held that the rebate order was lawful because it was made when the
1985 and 1986 rates were interim rates. Justice Gonthier, writing for the
Court, described as follows the issue before the Court (at page 1749 – my emphasis):
As indicated above,
the [CRTC] has examined the period during which interim rates were in force,
i.e. from January 1, 1985 to October 14, 1986, for the purpose of
ascertaining whether these interim rates were in fact just and reasonable.
Following a factual finding that these rates were not just and reasonable,
the one-time credit order now contested before this Court was made in order
to remedy this situation. Thus, the effect of Decision 86-17 was not
retroactive in nature since it does not seek to establish rates to replace or
be substituted to those which were charged during that period. The one-time
credit order is, however, retrospective in the sense that its purpose is
to remedy the imposition of rates approved in the past and found in the final
analysis to be excessive. Thus, the question before this Court is whether
the appellant has jurisdiction to make orders for the purpose of remedying
the inappropriateness of rates which were approved by it in a previous
interim decision.
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[50]
There is a
critical distinction between the facts of this case and the facts considered in
Bell Canada (1989). In that case, the rebate
order was made to remedy a situation that arose when the rates established for
1985 and 1986 were later found to exceed what was just and reasonable. In
theory, if those rates had been designated “final rates” prior to the rebate
order, Bell Canada could have argued that the CRTC had fulfilled its mandate to
determine the just and reasonable rates for 1985 and 1986, and could not change
them retroactively or employ the device of a subscriber rebate to achieve the
same result. However, those were not the facts before the Court. In fact, when the
CRTC finally determined the rates to be excessive, the rates were still interim
rates, and there had been no determination that they were just and reasonable.
For that reason, it was open to the CRTC to use the rebate order to deprive
Bell Canada of the excess.
[51]
Bell Canada (1989) does not deal with the
situation that arose in this case. The order in this case is intended to dispose
of the balance of a mandatory deferral account. That account is derived from a
portion of rates that were designated final (Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-15),
which meant that they have been finally determined to be just and reasonable.
However, the designation of those rates as final did not and could not detract
from the Price Caps Decision, which remained in effect.
[52]
The Price
Caps Decision required Bell Canada to credit a portion of its final
rates to a deferral account, which the CRTC had clearly indicated would be
disposed of in due course as the CRTC would direct. There is no dispute that
the CRTC is entitled to use the device of a mandatory deferral account to
impose a contingent obligation on a telecommunication service provider to make expenditures
that the CRTC may direct in the future. It necessarily follows that the CRTC is
entitled to make an order crystallizing that obligation and directing a
particular expenditure, provided the expenditure can reasonably be justified by
one or more of the policy objectives listed in section 7 of the Telecommunications
Act.
[53]
It was
clear from the outset that Bell Canada would be obliged to use the balance of
its deferral account in accordance with the CRTC’s subsequent direction, and
that the subsequent direction could include one or more different uses for the
money, including a subscriber rebate. Under the deferral account regime as it
finally evolved, Bell Canada had the opportunity to propose a use for the
balance in its deferral account that would accord with a specific policy
objective designated by the CRTC (broadband expansion in remote and rural
areas), failing which it would be obliged to make a subscriber rebate.
[54]
As I read
the Deferral Account Decision, the subscriber rebate was a secondary
alternative that was made when Bell Canada did not make an acceptable proposal for
an expenditure on broadband expansion. The CRTC said that in these
circumstances, a subscriber rebate would be consistent with section 7 of the Telecommunications
Act and the objectives set out in the Price Cap Decisions (Deferral Account
Decision, paragraph 112). It has not been suggested that the CRTC has
misinterpreted or misapplied section 7.
[55]
It might
be said that an order designating a rate as an interim rate, and an order
designating a rate as a final rate but imposing a deferral account obligation
like the one imposed in this case, have the same practical effect if the
deferral account is ultimately used to fund a subscriber rebate. In broad
terms, either technique may involve a determination as to whether or not the
telecommunication service provider should be permitted to use some part of its
own money as it sees fit. However, they are technically different. Bell Canada (1989) illustrates the lawful use of
an interim rate decision as a basis for a retrospective rate reduction. In my
view, this case illustrates the lawful use of a deferral account as the
foundation for a later order as to a required or approved expenditure. The
subscriber rebate in this case did not, in intent or in effect, reduce
retrospectively any rates that had been determined to be just and reasonable.
It was therefore entirely prospective. It follows that the Bell Canada appeal
must fail.
5. Costs
[56]
At the
hearing of the appeals, all parties indicated that they are not seeking costs.
6. Conclusion
[57]
I would
dismiss both appeals without costs.
“K.
Sharlow”
“I
agree.
J. Richard C.J.”
“I
agree.
Marc Noël J.A.”