Date: 20000921
Docket: A-340-99
DÉCARY J.A.
NOËL J.A.
BETWEEN:
JOHANNE TREMBLAY, GÉRALD FORGUES, MARIE-CLAUDE
CYR, DOMINIQUE JOLY, TARA WHELTON, CHANTAL VICTOR,
CAROLE LACOSTE, RUTH LEIMANIS, DIANE DESJARDINS-
LAGANIÈRE, MONIKA FRIEDBERG, ANNICK HÉBERT, MARIA
LUCIA, LESLIE ROY, RÉMI ST-CYR, BENOIT GUAY, ANDRÉ
BOUDREAU, GHISLAIN BOUCHARD AND LOUISE BINET,
Appellants,
- and -
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
(Revenue Canada, Health Canada and Veterans Affairs),
Respondent.
Hearing held at Ottawa, Ontario on Tuesday, September 19, 2000
Judgment from the bench at Ottawa, Ontario on Tuesday, September 19, 2000
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: ALICE DESJARDINS J.A.
Date: 20000921
Docket: A-340-99
DÉCARY J.A.
NOËL J.A.
BETWEEN:
JOHANNE TREMBLAY, GÉRALD FORGUES, MARIE-CLAUDE
CYR, DOMINIQUE JOLY, TARA WHELTON, CHANTAL VICTOR,
CAROLE LACOSTE, RUTH LEIMANIS, DIANE DESJARDINS-
LAGANIÈRE, MONIKA FRIEDBERG, ANNICK HÉBERT, MARIA
LUCIA, LESLIE ROY, RÉMI ST-CYR, BENOIT GUAY, ANDRÉ
BOUDREAU, GHISLAIN BOUCHARD AND LOUISE BINET,
Appellants,
- and -
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
(Revenue Canada, Health Canada and Veterans Affairs),
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the bench at Ottawa on Tuesday, September 20, 2000)
DESJARDINS J.A.
[1] This is an appeal from a decision of a motions judge1 which dismissed an application for judicial review from a decision by a member of the Public Service Staff Relations Board ("the Member").
[2] The issue turns on the interpretation to be given to s. 5(1.1) of the Public Sector Compensation Act ("the Act"),2 which reads as follows:
| 5. (1) Subject to section 11, every compensation plan for employees to whom this Act applies that was in effect on February 26, 1991, including every compensation plan extended under section 6, shall be extended for a period of seventy-two months beginning on the day immediately following the day on which the compensation plan would, but for this section, expire.
(1.1) Notwithstanding any provision of this Act other than subsection (1.2) or a provision of any compensation plan, no employee shall be entitled to the incremental increases, including those based on the attainment of further qualifications or the acquisition of skills, merit or performance bonuses or other similar forms of compensation that would, but for this subsection, form part of their compensation plan, during the period of twenty-four months beginning on the day on which this subsection comes into force.
(1.2) The period referred to in subsection (1.1) shall not be counted for the purposes of calculating any increase in any form of compensation referred to in that subsection that is based on years of experience.
[Emphasis added]
|
5. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 11, le régime de rémunération en vigueur le 26 février 1991 pour les salariés visés par la présente loi, notamment tout régime de rémunération prorogé en vertu de l'article 6, est prorogé de six ans à compter de la date prévue, en l'absence du présent article, pour son expiration.
(1.1) Malgré toute autre disposition de la présente loi, à l'exception du paragraphe (1.2), ou malgré toute disposition d'un régime de rémunération, les salariés n'ont pas droit aux augmentations d'échelon - qu'elles résultent de l'acquisition d'un niveau de formation ou de compétence supérieur ou soient fondées sur le mérite ou le rendement -, aux augmentations à l'intérieur des fourchettes salariales ni aux primes de rendement, ni aux autres formes de rémunération similaires que comporterait, en l'absence du présent paragraphe, leur régime de rémunération, et ce pendant la période de deux ans commençant à la date d'entrée en vigueur du présent paragraphe.
(1.2) La période visée au paragraphe (1.1) n'est pas prise en compte dans le calcul, en fonction du nombre d'années d'expérience, de l'augmentation de toute forme de rémunération visée à ce paragraphe.
[Je souligne]
|
[3] This Act, which received Royal Assent on October 2, 1991, provided for the suspension of compensation plans for a two-year period. Parliament also amended the salary rate contained in various collective agreements by expressly stipulating the percentage increase allowed for the period in question. The Act was subsequently amended, in 1993 and 1994. However, we are concerned here only with the interpretation to be given to s. 5(1.1) of the 1991 Act.
[4] The appellants' position is the same as that before the trial judge. They admit that one of the purposes of the Act was to remove the right of employees, whether full-time or part-time, to a salary increase. However, they maintain that the provision in question was not intended to interrupt their horizontal progression in the salary scale. Consequently, after a two-year freeze, from June 15, 1994 to June 14, 1996, the employee in question was entitled to receive on the dates specified in the applicable compensation plan, the pay corresponding to the salary level calculated in accordance with the progression that occurred during the freeze. In their submission, only the payment was suspended during the freeze, not the progression within the scale.
[5] We do not agree with this.
[6] The wording of s. 5(1.1) of the Act states that "no employee shall be entitled to the incremental increases . . . or other similar forms of compensation". The wording of this provision seems to the Court to be quite clear. Full-time and part-time employees were denied not only the payment of their increases but their progression within the pay scale as long as the suspension period lasted.
[7] This can be seen simply by referring to the very broad definition of the word "compensation" in the Act:
| "compensation" means all forms of pay, benefits and perquisites paid or provided, directly or indirectly, by or on behalf of an employer to or for the benefit of an employee, except those paid or provided . . .
|
"rémunération" Toute forme de salaire, de gratification ou d'avantage assuré, directement ou indirectement, par l'employeur ou en son nom à un salarié ou à son profit, à l'exception de ceux assurés en conformité avec . . .
|
[8] As to the addition of s. 5(1.2) of the Act, we would simply note that unlike merit increases, increases based on experience are not covered expressly by s. 5(1.1) and Parliament probably intended to ensure that the said subsection would not fail to cover this type of increase.
[9] We consider that the trial judge was right to accept the interpretation given to this section by the Member and that s. 5(1.1) of the 1991 Act includes a "permanent residual effect".3 The payment of compensation and progression in the salary scale were halted during the freeze. They did not recover until the end of that period.
[10] This appeal will be dismissed with costs.
Alice Desjardins
J.A.
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L. Trad. a.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
APPEAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT FILE No.: A-340-99
STYLE OF CAUSE: JOHANNE TREMBLAY et al. v. A.G.C.
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: September 19, 2000
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Desjardins, Décary & Noël JJ.A.)
DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: Noël J.A.
APPEARANCES:
Pascale-Sonia Roy for the Appellants
Michel LeFrançois for the Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Nelligan, Power for the Appellants
Ottawa, Ontario
Morris Rosenberg for the Respondent
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario
__________________
1 Tremblay et al. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1999), 174 F.T.R. 207, per Lutfy J.
2 S.C. 1991, c. 30, am. by 1994, c. 18, s. 3.
3 Parliament v. Canada (1988), 20 F.T.R. 126, per Reed J.
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