Date: 20000906
Docket: A-678-98
CORAM: LINDEN J.A.
McDONALD J.A.
SHARLOW J.A.
BETWEEN:
THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Appellant
(Respondent)
- and -
ROBERT LAVIGNE
Respondent
(Applicant)
AND BETWEEN:
ROBERT LAVIGNE
Appellant by Cross Appeal
(Applicant)
- and -
THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Respondent by Cross Appeal
(Respondent)
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, Wednesday, the 6th day of September 2000
JUDGMENT delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, September 6, 2000
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: SHARLOW J.A.
Date: 20000906
BETWEEN:
THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Appellant
(Respondent)
- and -
ROBERT LAVIGNE
Respondent
(Applicant)
AND BETWEEN:
ROBERT LAVIGNE
Appellant by Cross Appeal
(Applicant)
- and -
THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Respondent by Cross Appeal
(Respondent)
Docket: A-678-98
CORAM: LINDEN J.A.
McDONALD J.A.
SHARLOW J.A.
BETWEEN:
THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Appellant
(Respondent)
- and -
ROBERT LAVIGNE
Respondent
(Applicant)
AND BETWEEN:
ROBERT LAVIGNE
Appellant by Cross Appeal
(Applicant)
- and -
THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Respondent by Cross Appeal
(Respondent)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Oral reasons delivered from the Bench on
Wednesday, September 6, 2000)
SHARLOW J.A.
[1] The issue in this appeal is whether the motions judge erred in concluding that the respondent Mr. Lavigne is entitled to all of the information he has requested, to the extent that it meets the definition of personal information" in the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21. We are not persuaded that there is any error (the decision of the motions judge is reported at [1998] F.C.J. No. 1527 (T.D.) (QL)).
[2] The appellant, the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, is resisting disclosure of notes of interviews taken in the course of a now concluded investigation of a complaint made by Mr. Lavigne under the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp), c. 31. The appellant relies on paragraph 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act, which reads as follows:
| 22(1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) |
| (b) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or the conduct of lawful investigations [...]. |
[3] Before the motions judge, and in this appeal, it was argued for the appellant that disclosure could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of lawful investigations required to be made by the appellant under the Official Languages Act. That argument must fail unless we depart from the decisions of this Court in Rubin v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1998] 2 F.C. 430 (F.C.A.), Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2000] F.C.J. 779 (F.C.A.) (QL) and Canada (Information Commissioner) and Canada (Immigration and Refugee Board), [1997] F.C.J. No. 1812 (F.C.T.D.)(QL).
[4] Those cases establish that paragraph 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act cannot justify a refusal to disclose information on the basis that disclosure would have a chilling effect on possible future investigations. We are not persuaded that the interpretation of paragraph 22(1)(b) adopted in those cases is wrong. Nor do we accept the argument of counsel for the appellant that a different interpretation is justified in this case by the statutory mandate of the Commissioner of Official Languages and the statutory duty of confidentiality imposed on the Commissioner.
[5] Counsel for the appellant argues that the motions judge failed to consider whether disclosure could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada, and that the record establishes that the appellant was entitled to rely on paragraph 22(1)(b) on that basis. We are not persuaded that the record is capable of supporting such a conclusion. In our view, the evidence establishes, at most, the possibility that people may be reluctant to cooperate with the appellant's investigators unless they have an assurance of secrecy. In our view, that does not establish that disclosure could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of the Official Languages Act.
[6] For these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed.
[7] Mr. Lavigne seeks in his cross appeal to expand the order of the Motions Judge to compel disclosure of information that does not meet the definition of "personal information" with respect to himself. We are not persuaded that there is any authority under the Privacy Act to compel disclosure of such information. For these reasons, the cross appeal will be dismissed.
Karen R. Sharlow
J.A.
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