Date: 19990429
Docket: A-430-97
(T-1229-96)
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
ROBERTSON J.A.
SEXTON J.A.
BETWEEN:
BETTY M.E. HOLMES
Appellant
(Applicant)
- and -
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
(Respondent)
- and -
CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Intervenor
Heard at Ottawa (Ontario) on Thursday, April 29, 1999.
Judgment delivered from the Bench on April 29, 1999.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY: DÉCARY J.A.
Date: 19990429
Docket: A-430-97
(T-1229-96)
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
ROBERTSON J.A.
SEXTON J.A.
BETWEEN:
BETTY M.E. HOLMES
Appellant
(Applicant)
- and -
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
(Respondent)
- and -
CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Intervenor
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa (Ontario)
on Thursday, April 29, 1999)
DÉCARY J.A.
[1] The appellant has complained to the Canadian Human Rights Commission that the Department of Veterans Affairs ("the Department") discriminated against her by releasing her from her employment due to a disability, contrary to section 7 of the Canadian Human Rights Act1 ("the Act"). The complaint was filed after a lengthy and eventually unsuccessful attempt to obtain relief under the Public Service Employment Act.2
[2] By letter dated April 19, 1996 and received on April 24, 1996, the Commission notified the appellant that it had dismissed the complaint pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(h)(i) of the Act, being satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, that an inquiry into the complaint was not warranted.
[3] By way of an application for judicial review filed with the Trial Division of this Court, the appellant challenged, and unsuccessfully so3, the Commission's finding that no further proceedings were warranted.
[4] In our view, when it is exercising its screening functions, the Commission is vested with a very wide latitude. That has been the law for some time now, and it was stated again by this Court in its recent decision in Bell Canada v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada4 in the following words:
| [35] It is settled law that when deciding whether a complaint should be referred to a tribunal for inquiry under sections 44 and 49 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Commission acts "as an administrative and screening body" (Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) , [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, at page 893, La Forest J.) and does not decide a complaint on its merits (see Northwest Territories v. Public Service Alliance of Canada (1997), 208 N.R. 385 (F.C.A.)). It is sufficient for the Commission to be "satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the complaint is warranted" (subsections 44(3) and 49(1)). This is a low threshold and the circumstances of this case are such that the Commission could have validly formed an opinion, rightly or wrongly, that there was "a reasonable basis in the evidence for proceeding to the next stage" (Syndicat des employés de production du Québec et de l'Acadie v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission ), supra, paragraph 30, at page 899, Sopinka J., approved by La Forest J. in Cooper, supra, at page 891. |
|
| [38] The Act grants the Commission a remarkable degree of latitude when it is performing its screening function on receipt of an investigation report. Subsections 40(2) and 40(4) and sections 41 and 44 are replete with expressions such as "is satisfied", "ought to", "reasonably available", "could more appropriately be dealt with", "all the circumstances", "considers appropriate in the circumstances" which leave no doubt as to the intent of Parliament. The grounds set out for referral to another authority (subsection 44(2)), for referral to the President of the Human Rights Tribunal Panel (paragraph 44(3)(a ) or for an outright dismissal (paragraph 44(3)(b)) involve in varying degrees questions of fact, law and opinion (see Latif v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, [1980] 1 F.C. 687 (C.A.), at page 698, Le Dain J.A.), but it may safely be said as a general rule that Parliament did not want the courts at this stage to intervene lightly in the decisions of the Commission. |
|
[5] The question before the Commission at this stage was whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry was warranted. The Commission found it was not. There are a number of legitimate reasons or reasonable grounds upon which the Commission could decide the way it did. In reaching a conclusion the Commission is entitled and obligated to have regard to all of the facts and allegations placed before it. In this case, there was sufficient evidence on which the Commission could conclude that further consideration of the matter by a tribunal was not warranted. As was noted by La Forest J. in Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission)5:
| [...] It is not the job of the Commission to determine if the complaint is made out. Rather its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts. The central component of the Commission's role, then, is that of assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before it [...] |
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[6] The appeal will be dismissed, with costs in favour of the respondent.
"Robert Décary"
J.A.
__________________
1 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 as amended.
2 See MacNeill v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 3 F.C. 261 (C.A.).
3 Holmes v. Canada (Attorney General) (1997), 130 F.T.R. 251.
4 [1999] 1 F.C. 113 at 136-37 (C.A.).
5 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 at 891.
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