Arthur v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 FCA 223

Date: 20010704

                                                                                                                                          Docket: A-333-99

OTTAWA, ONTARIO, WEDNESDAY, JULY 4, 2001

CORAM:          DÉCARY

LÉTOURNEAU

NOËL, JJ.A.

BETWEEN:

ANDRÉ ARTHUR

Applicant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 28(1)(c)

OF THE FEDERAL COURT ACT

JUDGMENT

The application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.

                        "Robert Décary"

                                                                       J.A.

Certified true translation

Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L., Trad. a.

                                                  Date: 20010704

                                               Docket: A-333-99

Neutral citation: 2001 FCA 223

CORAM:          DÉCARY

LÉTOURNEAU

NOËL, JJ.A.

BETWEEN:

ANDRÉ ARTHUR

Applicant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 28(1)(c)

OF THE FEDERAL COURT ACT

Hearing held in Montréal, Quebec, Friday, June 22, 2001

Judgment rendered in Ottawa, Ontario, Wednesday, July 4, 2001

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: LÉTOURNEAU J.A.

CONCURRING:                     DÉCARY J.A.

                                                          NOËL J.A.

Date: 20010704

                                               Docket: A-333-99

Neutral citation: 2001 FCA 223

CORAM:          DÉCARY

LÉTOURNEAU

NOËL, JJ.A.

BETWEEN:

ANDRÉ ARTHUR

Applicant

AND:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 28(1)(c)

OF THE FEDERAL COURT ACT

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LÉTOURNEAU J.A.

[1]         This is an application for judicial review under section 28 of the Federal Court Act. The applicant, an experienced open-line radio host, is seeking a number of conclusions in relation to a decision of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). This decision (CRTC 99-93) was rendered on April 29, 1999.

[2]         By decision of this Court, rendered December 23, 1999 pursuant to an application to strike out the proceeding initiated by the plaintiff, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1917 (QL), (1999), 254 N.R. 136, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused on September 14, 2000, (2000) C.S.C.R. No. 85 (QL), all of the conclusions sought by the applicant were dismissed, with the exception of the following:

Limit CRTC decision 99-93 so that no blame, criticism, complaint or any form of negative comment appears therein respecting the plaintiff;

[3]         More specifically, this Court allowed the application for judicial review of the applicant to follow its normal course on the following question alone:

[W]as there in the case at bar an infringement of the rules of procedural fairness, and if so, should the CRTC decision be altered to ensure that it contains no blame, criticism, complaint or any other form of negative comment about Mr. Arthur?

[4]         The question at issue in this case requires two successive analyses. First, we must ask ourselves whether the CRTC blamed, criticized, complained or made any negative comment about the applicant. A negative reply to this question closes the matter. But an affirmative reply leads inevitably to the second analysis, to determine whether the decision laying such blame was made at the conclusion of a process consistent with the rules of procedural fairness.

[5]         Before discussing the applicant's submission, and in order to put the problem in its proper context, I must make two comments: one concerning the scope of the principles of procedural fairness, the other on the jurisdiction of the CRTC.

Scope of principles of procedural fairness

[6]         It is well known that the nature and extent of the duty of an administrative agency to act fairly varies "with the specific context and the various fact situations dealt with by the administrative body, as well as the nature of the disputes it must resolve": Therrien (Re), 2001 S.C.C. 35, No. 27004, June 7, 2001, par. 82. It is now clear law as well that there are essentially two components to the duty to act fairly: the right to be heard and the right to an impartial hearing: ibidem.

[7]         At the hearing, counsel for the applicant submitted that the CRTC had acted with a bias against his client. The respondent's counsel quite rightly expressed surprise at this allegation and objected to this ground of review since it did not appear at all in the applicant's Memorandum of fact and law, the applicant having unmistakably complained therein that he had not been heard.

[8]         It seems to me that the applicant's counsel has confused the audi alteram partem rule with the right of his client to a hearing by an impartial tribunal. An allegation of bias, especially actual and not simply apprehended bias, against a tribunal is a serious allegation. It challenges the integrity of the tribunal and of its members who participated in the impugned decision. It cannot be done lightly. It cannot rest on mere suspicion, pure conjecture, insinuations or mere impressions of an applicant or his counsel. It must be supported by material evidence demonstrating conduct that derogates from the standard. It is often useful, and even necessary, in doing so, to resort to evidence extrinsic to the case. That is why such evidence is admissible in derogation of the principle that an application for judicial review must bear on the matter as it came before the court or tribunal.

[9]         In the case at bar, the applicant's counsel attempted unsuccessfully to support his client's allegation by referring us to certain documentary exhibits appearing on the record. I say unsuccessfully since these exhibits do not have the probative value that the applicant would like to have attributed to them. His interpretation of them is unduly subjective, and, on the objective reading that they must be given, has no foundation in the actual content of these exhibits.

Jurisdiction of the CRTC

[10]       The applicant's counsel also argued that under cover of a licensee's renewal of licence proceeding the CRTC had in fact initiated proceedings against the applicant himself. To some degree this submission was also used to support the allegation of bias made against the CRTC.

[11]       It is important to note that the CRTC's jurisdiction is not exercised in regard to radio hosts like the applicant, but rather in relation to radio broadcasters, that is, the license holders. This is clear from subsections 4(2) and (3) of the Broadcasting Act (the Act), S.C. 1991, c. 11:

[12]       It can also be observed from reading paragraph 3(1)(h) that license holders have a responsibility for the programs they broadcast and must therefore ensure that their employees comply with the Act and the Regulations thereunder, and that, in the context of renewal of their licence, they are accountable to the CRTC for their conduct and the conduct of their employees:

[13]       It follows, then, that the complaints laid in the case at bar, which the CRTC analyzed and to which I will return later, are complaints made against the licence holder as a result of the conduct of its employees and not against the applicant himself. In this regard, the applicant's counsel cites section 11 of the CRTC Rules of Procedure, C.R.C. c. 375, and argues that the applicant should have received a personal notice informing him that a public hearing would be held:

He argues that section 11 should be given a large and liberal construction that would cover the applicant against whom, I repeat, the complaint is not made.

[14]       With respect, I do not think we can give this provision the scope that is claimed by counsel for the applicant. To accept his submission would, in the first place, contradict the language of the provision, which stipulates that the notice must be given to the person against whom the complaint is made, in this case the holder of the licence. It would also disregard subsections 4(2) and (3) of the Act and give the CRTC a jurisdiction over the applicant that Parliament did not accord to him. If notice had to be given to the applicant, it would be under the rules of natural justice and not under section 11 that such a duty would exist. As we will see later, such notice was not required.

[15]       All in all, I am satisfied that the proceeding in the case at bar was a proceeding for renewal of the holder's licence, in which the holder was required to account for the operation of its licence, including its own conduct and that of its personnel during the period preceding the expiration of this licence. It was not a public hearing concerning one or more complaints against the holder of the licence within the meaning of section 11 and still less a public hearing concerning a complaint against the applicant. This leads me now to the question at issue.

Did the CRTC censure the applicant?

[16]       Concerning the first aspect of the question, the applicant's counsel argues that the CRTC, in 10 of the 22 paragraphs of its decision, effectively censured the applicant for comments he was alleged to have made on the air. I reproduce paragraph 7 of the applicant's memorandum of fact and law:

[Translation]

7.              Furthermore, in decision 99-93, the CRTC refers to the applicant in 10 of the 22 paragraphs and harshly criticizes him for comments that are allegedly "course", "insulting", "hurtful", "abusive", "defamatory", "discriminatory", "bordering on contempt", "unacceptable" and "grave", criticisms that directly infringe the rights of the applicant.

[17]       With respect, I think the applicant's counsel is misreading the CRTC decision and, on the one hand, confusing its statements of fact with its conclusions. This misreading also leads him, on the other hand, to overlook the fact that the conclusions arrived at by the CRTC are not aimed at the applicant but rather at the actual holder of the licence, which, as I said, was the subject matter of a renewal. I reproduce paragraphs 2 to 15 of the decision, which contain the CRTC's comments that are attacked by the applicant's counsel:

The complaints

2.              The Commission decided to examine eight of the complaints it had received concerning comments made during the open-line program hosted by André Arthur which is broadcast by CKVL, specifically:

×              two complaints filed on behalf of Groupe Jean Coutu inc., a well-known family business that specializes in the distribution and retailing of pharmaceutical, parapharmaceutical and other products. Le Groupe Jean Coutu inc. addressed these complaints at the hearing.

×              a number of complaints filed by Mrs. Louise Cadieux;

×              five complaints filed by Mrs. Marie Marra on behalf of "les amis du général de Gaulle," branch of the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal, Mr. Charles Durand of the same organization, and Messrs Jean-Louis Tremblay, Mario Cusson and Gilles Rhéaume.

3.             Groupe Jean Coutu inc. and the members of the Coutu family emphasized, in their intervention, how host André Arthur relentlessly seeks to discredit them in his on-air comments on CKVL, using innuendo as well as defamatory, offensive and injurious remarks that question their honesty and integrity and damage their reputation.

4.             Mrs. Cadieux's complaints focused on the discriminatory and disparaging terms used by Mr. Arthur in reference to disabled persons. Mrs. Cadieux was also outraged that the host invaded her privacy by repeatedly giving her name, address and telephone number over the air on CKVL.

5.             In its letter replying to Mrs. Cadieux, the licensee apologized for its host's remarks and indicated that they did not reflect the opinions of the management of CKVL. It had warned Mr. Arthur to use language that is more respectful and meets desirable standards of broadcasting.

6.             The five other complaints all focused essentially on the host's coarse and insulting remarks about General de Gaulle, France and French people.

7.             During the hearing, the Commission gave the licensee every possible opportunity to present its side of the story and justify the on-air comments in question in the light of, among other things, the Code of Ethics proposed by CKVL for information and phone-in programming, and the requirements of the Broadcasting Act (the Act) and the Radio Regulations, 1986 (the regulations).

8.             According to Section 3(1)(g) of the Act, the programming originated by broadcasting undertakings should be of high standard. Section 3(b) of the regulations states that a licensee shall not broadcast any abusive comment that, when taken in context, tends to or is likely to expose an individual or a group or class of individuals to hatred or contempt on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age or mental or physical disability.

Discussion

9.             In the Commission's view, the licensee trivialized the importance of the host's remarks by citing the polemic nature of such programming and the context in which the comments were made, the use of verbal caricature and the interpretation of the terms used. Métromédia also expressed certain reservations about implementing control mechanisms to ensure the high quality of Mr. Arthur's program. Lastly, the licensee pointed out that it had never received any complaints about CKVL in the past.

10.           The Commission disagrees with the position taken by the licensee in this regard. Following a lengthy discussion, the licensee agreed that the host's comments failed to meet the quality standards established by the Act and the provisions of its proposed Code of Ethics relating to privacy. It also acknowledged that Mr. Arthur's comments about disabled persons contravened the provisions of the regulations.

11.           The Commission further noted during the hearing that Métromédia's proposed Code of Ethics contained no provisions concerning the right of reply. It asked the licensee to take appropriate steps to guarantee a real right of reply, in which a balance of opinion is assured, to any listener who feels aggrieved.

12.           Métromédia agreed to revise its proposed Code of Ethics in order to address these shortcomings. Such shortcomings also pertain to the lack of provisions concerning insults and coarse and vulgar remarks. Following review, the Commission accepts the revised version of CKVL's Code of Ethics.

13.           In response to the Commission's concern that the licensee does not always respond to the complaints it receives or that it takes too long to do so, the licensee has agreed to respond to complaints within three weeks of their receipt. The Commission expects the licensee to abide by this commitment.

The Commission's conclusions

14.           The Commission deplores the licensee's apparent trivialization of the comments made on-air by the host, comments that the Commission has deemed unacceptable in other past cases. It also deplores the tolerance shown by the licensee towards programming of less-than-expected quality. The Commission reminds the licensee that it is obligated to ensure that its on-air hosts respect the provisions of the Act and the regulations at all times.

15.           Given the seriousness of the comments made by the host, the Commission has decided to require the licensee, as a condition of licence, to abide by the revised version of its Code of Ethics. This condition is set out later in this decision.

[18]       As is apparent from the decision, the CRTC, in paragraphs 2 to 6, simply reports the fact that it has received some complaints concerning the applicant and succinctly describes the nature and content of those complaints. These are not criticisms that the CRTC makes against the applicant. These paragraphs, as is apparent from Volume V of the Applicant's Record, at pages 982, 984, 987, 1005, 1028, 1034, 1037, 1044 and 1057, substantially repeat the allegations of the complainants.

[19]       Paragraphs 7 and 8 can hardly be construed as a reprimand or criticism of the applicant. Paragraph 7 is addressed to the licencee and simply states a fact. As to paragraph 8, it repeats the requirements of the Broadcasting Act and the Radio Regulations, 1986.

[20]       Paragraphs 9 to 13, on the whole, report on the discussions that occurred between the CRTC and the licencee. More particularly, paragraph 9, if it is a criticism, is a criticism of the licensee. Paragraph 10 describes an admission made by the licensee and cannot constitute a finding by the CRTC that the applicant is blameworthy. The applicant's counsel argued that this admission had been extorted by the CRTC by way of constraint, but beyond his own perception and his impressions, which are shared by his client, he submitted no evidence in support of his submission. Paragraphs 11 to 13, regarding the apparent deficiencies in the licensee's proposed Code of Ethics or the latter's delay in responding to the complaints it receives, are addressed not to the applicant but to the licensee.

[21]       This leads us now to the CRTC's conclusions, which are found at paragraphs 14 and 15 of the decision.

[22]       Paragraph 14 of the decision accomplishes three things that affect only the licensee. First, the CRTC reminds the licensee that it has a duty to ensure that its staff comply with the statutory requirements. Second, it criticizes the licensee for not taking seriously the comments that had been made by the applicant. Finally, it reprimands the licensee for indulging in programming of inferior quality. There is nothing in this paragraph that could be construed as reprimanding or constituting a criticism of the applicant.

[23]       That leaves only the fifteenth paragraph, then, as a basis for the applicant's submissions. What does this paragraph say? We find that the CRTC imposes a condition of licence because of the "seriousness of the comments made by the host". The French text explains that this condition is imposed "compte tenu de la gravité des propos tenus par M. Arthur".

[24]       No doubt the CRTC is referring to the comments made by the applicant that have given rise to the complaints against the licensee that it examined in the context of the latter's renewal of licence. What, then, are these comments to which the CRTC refers?

[25]       Without repeating all of them, one can see in the Respondent's Record, at the pages I mentioned earlier, and adding a reference to pages 1268-69, that the applicant is criticized, for example:

(a)            for having called the vehicles of disabled persons "mobile vegetables";

(b)            for having called General de Gaulle an "old ass-hole", a "bastard", and a "son of a bitch";

(c)            for having urged citizens to deposit bags of garbage and dog excrement on the site of the statue of the former President of France that was about to be unveiled;

(d)            for having said that France is an ass-hole of a country and that the French are filthy;

(e)            for having called the president of Pharmacies Jean Coutu an assassin and an ass-hole with the head of a moron and having referred to his family as a family of morons;

(f)             and, finally, for having used language that infringed the credibility, honesty and personal and professional reputation of the Groupe Jean Coutu and its executives.

[26]       The complainants characterized the language used on the applicant's air waves as grave or serious. The CRTC seems to have adopted this characterization. But in doing so, it was not, in my opinion, reprimanding the applicant.

[27]       In fact, it is inevitable that, in the licence renewal context, the CRTC will be sensitive to the public's complaints and to the licensee's reaction to those complaints that allege an abuse of rights. The CRTC would not be playing its role and would be abdicating its responsibilities if it were indifferent to the public interest or to allegations that a licensee is compromising the public interest by its deeds and actions or its excessive passivity or tolerance. In this context of a licence renewal in the best interests of the public, it must be able to report abuses that the public complains of and to verify whether the licensee has complied with the Act, the Regulations, its conditions of licence or any specific undertakings it may have made. In such a context, it is certain that someone whose conduct is the source of public complaints can feel oppressed, even censured, by a mere narration of the facts that are the subject matter of the complaint. But in my opinion we should be careful not to confuse a statement of the facts or their assessment, their characterization or the seriousness that may be assigned to those facts with an unfavourable conclusion that is drawn from those facts as amounting to a censure, a reprimand or a criticism addressed to their perpetrator.

[28]       It is undeniable that in this case, in the context of the licensee's renewal of licence, the CRTC recounted the facts that are sources of complaints by the public. At most, if the characterization of the applicant's comments as serious is attributed to the CRTC and not to the complainants, and I am inclined to assign such an attribution to it, the most one can conclude is that it made an assessment or a characterization of the facts. But it cannot be concluded from this assessment or this characterization of the facts that the CRTC found that the applicant, the source of the comments, should be reprimanded. To say that a comment is serious or grave means it is a comment that merits some attention. However, that does not mean it is justified or unjustified, excusable or inexcusable, still less that the person who made the comment is being censured.

[29]       From reading the written intervention of the Groupe Jean Coutu I could see that it was vehement and expressed the complainant's anger and frustration in regard to the applicant and the way in which he hosted his open-line programs. However, having analyzed the transcripts of the interventions made at the hearing and the reasons for the decision, I am satisfied that the CRTC was careful not to endorse the comments of the Groupe Jean Coutu and limited itself solely to an examination of the two complaints filed by this intervenor within the perspective of the licence renewal, which the intervenor opposed. I am satisfied that the process adhered to by the CRTC was not tainted or vitiated by the written intervention filed by the intervenor: given the other complaints made against the licensee for its open-line radio broadcasts, the CRTC would have come to the same conclusion and the same decision in regard to the licensee, and for the same reasons even if the intervention of the Groupe Jean Coutu had not been made and filed.

[30]       This detailed analysis of the CRTC decision and the evidence convinces me that the applicant was not reprimanded in any way by the Commission. It would be unnecessary, therefore, to proceed with the second analysis, which would have served to determine whether any such reprimand was the outcome of a process consistent with the rules of procedural fairness. But the issue of breach of the principles of procedural fairness was argued at length by the parties and with such conviction by the applicant that I think it would be useful for me to dispose of it.

Was the applicant a victim of a breach of the principles of procedural fairness?

[31]       The reply to this question, applying the criteria identified in the Therrien case, supra, is an unequivocal no. The hearing held by the CRTC was addressed to the renewal of the holder's licence and not the applicant. The licensee was properly summoned to the hearing. It was informed of the public's complaints against it. It was also notified in Notice of Hearing 1998-7 that the complaints against station CKVL would be discussed when the interventions that had been received were heard. The licensee, in writing prior to the hearing and orally at the hearing itself, supplied the explanations it considered appropriate. It was able to lay out the measures it intended to take in order to produce high quality programming that complied with the Act and the Regulations.

[32]       The applicant was not a party to these proceedings. The CRTC was under no requirement to summons him, other than under the rules of natural justice if it intended to censure him for his conduct. I agree with the respondent's counsel that in the circumstances the applicant had no legitimate expectation of being summonsed to these hearings. The applicant could, however, present a request for intervention under section 13 of the Act in order to support the renewal of the licence of the holder, who had hired him. He did not do so. He gave two reasons to justify his inaction.

[33]       First, he did not know that the licence renewal hearing would be discussing the question of public complaints. Implicit in this approach is the fact that he would have intervened to justify his comments and claim his right to freedom of expression. I note in passing that the CRTC is not unsympathetic to a citizen's right to freedom of expression. In a letter sent to a complainant on August 26, 1997 informing him that it did not intend to continue with his complaint in light of the explanations received from the parties involved, the CRTC reminds the complainant that it takes into account the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, particularly freedom of expression, and that in case of doubt it decides in favour of the fundamental concept of freedom of expression: see Respondent's Record, volume V, page 1125. Moreover, in two previous decisions, 96-730 and 98-126, the CRTC restated the crucial importance of freedom of expression and the principle that it should not be subject to limits other than in cases of flagrant excess: see the transcript of the hearings, Respondent's Record, volume V, pages 1230-32.

[34]       Second, the applicant states that when he learned of the notice of October 2, 1998, the CRTC stated that an application for intervention was foreclosed since only the interventions already received, accepted by the CRTC and filed in the public record would be considered: see Applicant's Record, volume II, page 345. This public notice indicated for the first time that the CRTC wanted to discuss during the hearing some complaints received in relation to the licensee. The initial notice of May 10 [19], 1998 (CRTC 1998-51) had only cited, in regard to the licensee, its presumed failure to comply with the regulations concerning the broadcasting of French-language vocal music: see Respondent's Record, volume I, page 33.

[35]       I do not think the applicant was caught off guard by the notice of October 2, 1998 and by surprise as to the complaints that were laid. On August 28, 1998, the CRTC published a second notice (CRTC 98-393) in which it informed the public that the holder's licence had been renewed for one year subject to the terms and conditions in effect under the current licence, but that this decision did not "in any manner dispose of the licence renewal application, nor of any relevant matters before the Commission in connection with that application". The notice indicated the CRTC's intention to consider these matters at the time it considered the licence renewal application. In my opinion that was a clear indication that what was at issue in the licence renewal was not only the matter of broadcasting of French-language vocal music cited in the notice of May 10, 1998.

[36]       Furthermore, the events surrounding the various complaints occurred during programs that were broadcast on July 16, 21 and 22, 1997, August 6, 1997, April 15 and 28, 1998 and September 17, 1998: Respondent's Record, volume V, pages 982, 1005, 1015, 1024, 1026, 1034 and 1044. The licensee, through its attorneys, answered the CRTC questions. It is unreasonable to think, even for a moment, that the applicant was unaware that some citizens had been offended by the comments made on the said programs. Moreover, on November 4, 1998, Ms. Cadieux formally notified the applicant that she had complained on October 8 to the CRTC about his program of September 17. It is also inconceivable that the licence holder and employer of the applicant could have replied to the CRTC without saying a word about this to the applicant and notifying him that his open-line hosting was in the CRTC's line of sight.

[37]       In any event, the applicant is a communications professional. He is well acquainted with the CRTC's machinery and functioning, with which he has had a number of wrangles: see the hearing transcript, Applicant's Record, volume V, at pages 1246, 1248 and 1266, where a Commission member refers to this. He could not be unaware that the CRTC, pursuant to the licence renewal application, would give some consideration to the many public complaints about his employer for his programs and the latitude taken in regard to the Act and the Regulations.

[38]       I am prepared to acknowledge that the interests of an employer and an employee are not identical solely because they are not opposed: Canadian Transit Co. v. Canada, [1989] 3 F.C. 611, pages 623-24, per MacGuigan J.A. (F.C.A.). But the employee must still appear at the proper time to claim his interests. In this case, the applicant never asked to be heard as he could have done under section 13 of the Act. Instead, he preferred to oppose an application for intervention by a group that was trying to obtain the non-renewal of his employer's licence. Absent any proceeding amounting to a breach of the rules of natural justice in regard to him, it was his obligation, if he wished to be heard, to make an application to intervene by justifying, if necessary, his delay in entering an appearance.

[39]       For these reasons, I would dismiss the application for judicial review, with costs.

                       "Gilles Létourneau"

                                                                       J.A.

"I agree

Robert Décary J.A."

"I agree

Marc Noël J.A."

Certified true translation

Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L., Trad. a.

FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

APPEAL DIVISION

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

FILE NO:                                               A-333-99

STYLE:                                                   ANDRÉ ARTHUR

Applicant

- and -

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

PLACE OF HEARING:                      Montréal, Quebec

DATE OF HEARING:                         June 22, 2001

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:             Létourneau J.A.

CONCURRING:                                               Décary J.A.

Noël J.A.

DATED:                                                July 4, 2001

APPEARANCES:

Daniel O'Brien                                                                  FOR THE APPLICANT

Pascale-Catherine Guay                                                                FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

O'Brien, Advocates                                                                        FOR THE APPLICANT

Québec, Quebec

Morris Rosenberg                                                                           FOR THE RESPONDENT

Deputy Attorney General of Canada