Daoust v. The Queen, [1986] 1 SCR 248

Daoust v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 248

Denis Daoust    Appellant;

and

Her Majesty The Queen    Respondent.

File No.: 17756.

1986: February 26; 1986: March 20.

Present: Beetz, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson, Le Dain and La Forest JJ.

on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec

                   Criminal law ‑‑ Trial without jury ‑‑ Accused convicted of attempted murder ‑‑ Conviction affirmed by Court of Appeal majority ‑‑ Possibility that a majority judge thought trial was with jury ‑‑ Appeal de novo directed.

                   APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal¹, dismissing by a majority an appeal by accused convicted of attempted murder by a judge of the Court of Sessions of the Peace. Appeal allowed and appeal de novo directed.

¹ J.E. 83‑443; C.A. Mtl., No. 500‑10‑000147‑809, March 18, 1983.

                   Josée Ferrari, for the appellant.

                   Roger Carrière, for the respondent.

                   English version of the judgment delivered by

1.                The Court‑‑ After a trial before a judge of the Court of Sessions of the Peace sitting without a jury, appellant was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to eighteen years in prison. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed, but not unanimously: one of the three judges would have acquitted him. Of the two judges in the majority, who considered that his appeal should be dismissed, one rendered his judgment as follows:

[TRANSLATION]  Like my brother Montgomery J.A., I am of the view that appellant had a fair trial. The jury did not believe him.

                    I would therefore dismiss the appeal.

2.                Did the judge think this was a trial by jury? Or, realizing that the trier of fact was a judge of the Court of Sessions of the Peace, did he simply make an error in describing the trier of fact?

3.                The accused raised this as one of the arguments in support of his appeal to this Court.

4.                We are all of the view that it is in the interests of the proper administration of justice that this Court allow the appeal and direct that the appeal of the accused be heard de novo by the Court of Appeal.

5.                In view of this conclusion, it would be inappropriate for us to rule on the other arguments made by the accused in this Court.

                   Appeal allowed and appeal de novo directed.

                   Solicitor for the appellant: Josée Ferrari, Montréal.

                   Solicitor for the respondent: Roger Carrière, Montréal.