Held: The appeal should
be allowed.
Section 2 of the By‑law and the two
resolutions should be quashed. By a charter and the Cities and Towns Act,
the Legislature conferred on the Council of the City of Dorval the power to tax
by by‑law. By adopting By‑law 577, the Council delegated to itself
the power to set the business tax rate by way of resolution, whereas the
Legislature had conferred this power on it with a requirement that it be
exercised by by‑law. It thus wrongfully authorized itself to do by way of
resolution what it could only do by by‑law. The Council of the City of
Dorval in this way exceeded its jurisdiction, which provided a basis for remedy
under art. 33 C.C.P.
Cases Cited
Corporation du Village de Ste‑Anne‑Du‑Lac
v. Hogue, [1959] S.C.R. 38; Trustees of Grosvenor St.
Presbyterian Church v. City of Toronto (1918), 45 D.L.R. 327; Ponton v.
City of Winnipeg (1908), 41 S.C.R. 18; Liverpool and Milton Ry. Co. v.
Town of Liverpool (1903), 33 S.C.R. 180; Waterous Engine Works Co. v.
Town of Palmerston (1892), 21 S.C.R. 556; Whelan v. Ryan (1891), 20
S.C.R. 65; Town of St. Louis v. Citizens Light and Power Co. (1903), 13
Que. K.B. 19; Canadian Institute of Public Real Estate Companies v.
Corporation of the City of Toronto, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 2; Brant
Dairy Co. v. Milk Commission of Ontario, [1973] S.C.R. 131; St‑Joseph
de Beauce v. Lessard, [1954] Que. Q.B. 475; Donohue Bros. v. Corp. La Malbaie,
[1924] S.C.R. 511, Cité de Sillery v. Sun Oil Co., [1964] S.C.R. 552; Boily
v. Corporation de St‑Henri de Taillon (1920), 61 S.C.R. 40; Corporation
d’Aqueduc de St. Casimir v. Ferron, [1931] S.C.R. 47; City of Outremont
v. Protestant School Trustees of the City of Outremont, [1952] 2 S.C.R.
506; City of Verdun v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] 1 S.C.R. 222, referred to.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act to amend the charter
of the town of Dorval, 1954‑55 (Que.), c.
83, art. 1 (as am. by An Act to amend the charter of the city of Dorval,
1956‑57 (Que.), c. 91, art. 4).
By‑law Concerning
Business Taxes and License Fees, By‑law of
the City of Dorval, No. 577, art. 2.
Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 233, art. 526 (as repl. by s. 1 of An Act to amend
the charter of the town of Dorval, 1954‑55 (Que.), c. 83, and as am.
by s. 4 of An Act to amend the charter of the city of Dorval,
1956‑57 (Que.), c. 91).
Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 193, ss. 385, 388, 390, 391, 395, 396, 411, 421, 423.
Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C‑19, s. 70(2) (as rep. by An Act respecting
land use planning and development, 1979 (Que.), c. 51, s. 260).
Civil Code, arts. 2242, 2260.8.
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 33 (formerly art. 50).
Municipal Code of Québec, R.S.Q., c. C‑27.1, s. 989.
Authors Cited
Rousseau, G. "Le
recours en cassation dans le contentieux municipal" (1980), 21 C. de D.
715.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of
Appeal, [1982] C.A. 124, 21 M.P.L.R. 66, affirming a judgment of the Superior
Court, dismissing appellant's action for a declaration of nullity of a by‑law
and two resolutions of respondent and for an order to reimburse taxes. Appeal
allowed.
François Michel Gagnon
and Marc‑André Fabien, for the appellant.
Yvon Denault
and Pierre Roy, for the respondent.
English version of the judgment delivered by
1. The
Court‑‑By a direct action in nullity, appellant is asking
the Court to strike down s. 2 of By‑law 577 and Resolutions 247‑72
and 615‑73 of respondent, by which the latter imposed a business tax.
Appellant is further asking the Court to direct respondent to repay the sum of
$154,754.20 which it paid pursuant to this by‑law and these resolutions.
2. Appellant's action was dismissed in the
Superior Court and the Court of Appeal.
3. The City of Dorval is governed by a
special Charter, An Act concerning the charter of the town of Dorval,
1912 (Que.), 2 Geo. V, c. 71, as amended by An Act to consolidate the
charter of the town of Dorval, 1950 (Que.), c. 120.
4. It is also governed, where these are not
inconsistent with its Charter, by the provisions of the Cities and Towns Act,
R.S.Q. 1941, c. 233 (subsequently R.S.Q. 1964, c. 193, and now the Cities
and Towns Act, R.S.Q., c. C‑19).
5. By‑law 577 adopted on June 7, 1963
is based on s. 526 of the Cities and Towns Act, as
replaced for the City of Dorval by s. 1 of An Act to amend the charter
of the town of Dorval, 1954‑55 (Que.), c. 83, amended by An Act to
amend the charter of the city of Dorval, 1956‑57
(Que.), c. 91, s. 4:
526. The council may impose by by‑law and collect certain annual dues
or taxes on all or some trades, manufactures, financial or commercial
occupations, arts, professions, callings or means of earning a profit or
livelihood, carried on or followed in the city. Such dues or taxes may consist
of a fixed amount or be proportionate to the annual rental value as assessed on
the premises occupied for such purposes; such dues or taxes may be imposed
under both forms at the same time, and may be different or higher when payable
by persons who do not reside in the city or who have resided therein for less
than twelve months; however, in no such case shall the sum fixed exceed two
hundred dollars and the sum proportionate to the annual rental value, ten per
cent of such value.
6. Section 2 of By‑law 577 provides:
An
annual tax is hereby imposed on all business carried on in the city, except
those specifically referred to in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this by‑law, and
such tax is hereby levied on every person carrying on any such business at a
rate, to be fixed annually by resolution of the City Council, but not to exceed
ten per cent (10%) of the annual rental value as assessed on the premises
occupied for such purposes, provided, however, that such tax shall not be less
than twenty‑five dollars ($25.00) per annum for each of the premises
occupied for any such purposes in the city.
7. Pursuant to this by‑law the
following resolutions were adopted on April 4, 1972 and September 17, 1973:
April
4, 1972
247‑72
MOVED BY COUNCILLOR BERNIER
SECONDED BY COUNCILLOR BALLANCE
UNANIMOUSLY RESOLVED:
To fix
a tax of 8½% for the year beginning May 1, 1972 and ending April 30, 1973 on
the annual rental value as assessed on the premises occupied for the operation
of business in the City of Dorval, where applicable; the whole in accordance
with By‑law 577 concerning business taxes and license fees.
September 17,
1973
615‑73 Council
takes cognizance of a report from the City Manager, dated September 17, 1973,
re Business Rate for 1973‑1974.
MOVED
BY COUNCILLOR BERNIER
SECONDED BY COUNCILLOR RIOUX
UNANIMOUSLY RESOLVED:
To fix
a tax rate of 6% for the year beginning May 1, 1973 and ending April 30, 1974,
on the annual rental value as assessed by the Montreal Urban Community, on the
premises occupied for the operation of business in the City of Dorval, where
applicable, the whole in accordance with By‑law 577 concerning business
taxes and license fees.
8. Only the legality of the impugned by‑law
and resolutions is at issue. The parties admitted the appropriateness of this
passage from the judgment of the Superior Court:
[TRANSLATION]
There is no conflict as to the facts, as counsel agreed that the only point at
issue concerned the legality of the impugned by‑law and resolutions. If
the latter were found to be invalid, the action should be allowed, and on the
contrary, if they were found to be "intra vires", the action of
plaintiff would have to be dismissed.
9. In particular, the Court has to
determine whether the fact that respondent did not set the tax rate in the By‑law
but authorized the Council to do so by way of resolution has the effect of
vitiating s. 2 of the By‑law and resolutions.
10. The Court must also determine whether
appellant could proceed by a direct action in nullity under art. 33 C.C.P.,
or whether it should have proceeded by a motion to quash a by‑law under
s. 411 of the Cities and Towns Act, which imposes a prescription period
of three months from the date the by‑law became effective.
11. In the Superior Court appellant raised an
argument which it has since abandoned. It maintained that respondent's power to
impose a business tax could only be based on s. 526a, added to the Cities
and Towns Act by s. 13 of An Act to amend the Cities and
Towns Act, 1957‑58 (Que.), c. 36. This section was more limiting than
s. 526, notwithstanding the amendment of the latter for the City of Dorval. The
Superior Court judgment is mostly devoted to rejecting this argument.
12. The argument in this Court was the same as
in the Court of Appeal, and is summarized as follows in the majority reasons of
the Court of Appeal, [1982] C.A. 124, at p. 126:
[TRANSLATION]
Respondent admitted that it was irregular and contrary to section 526, cited
above, not to fix the annual rate of the tax by by‑law and to do it by
way of resolution.
Where
the parties differ is as to the consequences of this irregularity.
Appellant
argued that By‑law 577 is subject to absolute nullity, respondent that
there was only a formal defect which is covered by the failure to assert it by
a motion to quash within three months.
Respondent
added that it is definitely not a case in which the remedy of art. 33 C.C.P.
was available to appellant.
Returning
to appellant, it argued that essentially section 2, cited above, is simply a
repetition of section 526 and sets no rate, one of the two essential components
of any tax, the other being the property.
13. A municipality only has those powers
expressly conferred by the Legislature. In City of Verdun v. Sun Oil Co.,
[1952] 1 S.C.R. 222, it is stated at p. 228:
That
the municipalities derive their legislative powers from the provincial
Legislature and must, consequently, frame their by‑laws strictly within
the scope delegated to them by the Legislature, are undisputed principles. In
the very words of Sir Mathias Tellier, the then Chief Justice of the Province
of Quebec, in Phaneuf v. Corporation du Village de St‑Hughes,
Q.R. (1936) 61 K.B. 83 at 90:
[TRANSLATION]
In the area of legislation, municipal corporations have only those powers
formally delegated to them by the Legislature; and they can neither extend nor
exceed these powers.
14. The same principle was stated by this
Court in City of Outremont v. Protestant School Trustees of the City of
Outremont, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 506, at pp. 511 and 513.
15. A municipal corporation can only express
its will by resolution or by‑law.
16. In an article titled "Le recours en
cassation dans le contentieux municipal" (1980), 21 C. de D. 715,
G. Rousseau writes at p. 729:
[TRANSLATION] The words
"resolutions" and "by‑laws" serve to differentiate
the typical decision proceedings of the Council. A resolution may be regarded
as a simple or ordinary deliberation, since in principle it only requires a
vote of a majority of members of the municipal Council present. The word
"by‑law" has a very special meaning in Quebec municipal law. It
is defined not by its content, for example, as an act of general application as
opposed to an individual act, but by its form. A by‑law is an act done in
accordance with a special procedure, which does not apply to the resolution: it
must be preceded by a notice of motion, given at an earlier session of the
Council, and then be published.
17. In the Cities and Towns Act, the
Legislature has taken care to indicate the cases in which a municipality may
act by by‑law and to distinguish them from those in which it may act by
way of resolution, and from those where it may choose either.
18. Sections of the Act requiring the passing
of a by‑law are worded in two ways.
19. The first group states that "The
council may, by by‑law" enact a measure or decide on a given matter.
Examples of this which may be mentioned are ss. 68.2(a), 398, 439, 449
and 475 of the Cities and Towns Act. All these references are to c. 193
of the 1964 Revised Statutes.
20. The second group provides that "The
council may make by‑laws" for one or more defined purposes. Sections
424, 428, 442, 459, 469 and 472 illustrate this.
21. Other sections such as ss. 516, 517, 579,
604.4 and 688 expressly authorize the council to act by way of resolution.
22. Some provisions prescribe no particular
procedure, such as ss. 26.1, 81, 99, 115, 470 and 576. It is generally
recognized that in such cases the Council may act by way of resolution.
23. Finally, the Act sometimes allows the
council to proceed either by way of resolution or by by‑law: ss. 68.1 and
429.7a) are of this type.
24. In general a resolution is used for
everyday administrative decisions. It is used in cases where the Act specifies,
as in the sections referred to above, and it is also used when the Act is
silent as to the way in which the municipality may express its decision. The
resolution is devoid of any formal requirement.
25. A by‑law, on the other hand, is
subject to special and specific formal requirements, especially regarding the
publicity which must accompany it.
26. A by‑law must, on pain of nullity,
be preceded by a notice of motion. Section 385 of the Cities and Towns Act
provides:
385. The council may determine the notice to be given of the introduction
of municipal by‑laws, and order that such by‑laws be read twice or
three times before being passed, on different days or on the same day.
Where
the council has not fixed the procedure respecting notice of introduction of
municipal by‑laws and the reading thereof, under the preceding paragraph,
no by‑law, on pain of nullity, shall be passed unless it is preceded by
notice of motion given at a sitting of the council and is read at a subsequent
sitting held on a later day.
27. In Corporation d’Aqueduc de St. Casimir
v. Ferron, [1931] S.C.R. 47, Rinfret J., as he then was, wrote for the
Court at p. 50:
[TRANSLATION] By
indicating the purpose of the by‑law, the notice of motion or notice of
publication informs all those concerned of the nature of the municipal order
being proposed or adopted, and constitutes a warning of the imminence of
legislation on all questions relating to the subject mentioned.
28. In Boily v. Corporation de St‑Henri
de Taillon (1920), 61 S.C.R. 40, this Court stroke down a by‑law because
it had not been preceded by a valid notice of motion. In the case at bar, not
only was there no notice of motion, but there was no by‑law so far as
setting the tax rate was concerned.
29. The by‑law must be published (ss. 390,
391 and 396). It must be registered in a special book (s. 388). It must be sent
to the Minister of Municipal Affairs, who may cause it to be disallowed by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council (s. 423). In the six following cases, this Court
stroke down resolutions in cases where a by‑law was required:
‑‑Corporation
du Village de Ste‑Anne‑Du‑Lac v. Hogue, [1959] S.C.R. 38
(Quebec);
‑‑Trustees
of Grosvenor St. Presbyterian Church v. City of Toronto (1918), 45 D.L.R.
327 (Ontario);
‑‑Ponton v.
City of Winnipeg (1908), 41 S.C.R. 18 (Manitoba);
‑‑Liverpool
and Milton Ry. Co. v. Town of Liverpool (1903), 33 S.C.R. 180 (Nova
Scotia);
‑‑Waterous
Engine Works Co. v. Town of Palmerston (1892), 21 S.C.R. 556 (Ontario);
‑‑Whelan v.
Ryan (1891), 20 S.C.R. 65 (Manitoba).
30. It should be mentioned that it is possible
to distinguish two of these cases and the case at bar. In Corporation du
Village de Ste‑Anne‑Du‑Lac, in addition to a requirement
to proceed by by‑law in granting an exclusive privilege to operate a
waterworks system, the Municipal Code directed that the by‑law
should be approved by a vote of a majority in number and value of the electors
who were property owners and by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The penalty
attaching to failure to proceed by by‑law and obtain the necessary
approvals is indicated in express terms in the unanimous judgment written by
Taschereau J., as he then was. He said, at p. 40:
[TRANSLATION] Now, this
was not done: they simply passed a resolution, which of course has no
legal validity and can confer no right on respondents. The act of the municipal
council is subject to absolute nullity, which may be pleaded by all the parties
concerned.
31. In Liverpool and Milton Ry. Co. v. Town
of Liverpool, the municipality had by way of resolutions authorized the
construction of a railway through its territory. The Act required that such
authorization be given by by‑law and that the by‑law be approved by
the Governor in Council. The resolutions were held to be invalid, the Court
giving as its reasons both the failure to proceed by by‑law and the
failure to obtain approval.
32. However, in the four other decisions of
this Court cited above, only the failure to proceed by by‑law was at
issue. No special approval was required.
33. In the last cited of these cases, Whelan
v. Ryan, the question was precisely whether the imposition of a tax by a
municipality was valid. Immovables had been sold because the taxes were not
paid, and the sale was voided on the ground that the tax had not been validly
imposed, as it was not imposed by by‑law. Strong J. wrote, inter alia,
at pp. 69‑70:
As regards the taxes
claimed for both the years 1880 and 1881 it appears to me to be very clear that
there was no imposition of rates such as the law required, and consequently the
land was sold for taxes not legally due. The legality of the taxes claimed for
those two years depends on different statutes, that for 1880 being regulated by
43 Vic. ch. 1 and that for 1881 by 44 Vic. ch. 3, but they each contain a
clause, identical in terms, providing that the council shall in each year after
the revision of the roll pass a by‑law "for levying a rate on all
the real and personal property in the said roll to provide for all the
necessary expenses of the said municipality".
...
... the fact is
established that there never was a by‑law in either year. It is true that
it does appear that on the 2nd August, 1880, a resolution was passed that a
rate of five mills on the dollar be struck on the total of the assessment roll
and a similar resolution was passed on the 11th July, 1881. But these
resolutions are not the equivalents of by‑laws, not being passed with the
same solemnities....
34. To these judgments one may add that of the
Court of Appeal in Town of St. Louis v. Citizens Light and Power Co.
(1903), 13 Que. K.B. 19, which is cited by this Court in City of Outremont
v. Protestant School Trustees of the City of Outremont, supra,
at p. 513.
35. Additionally, an analogy can be made
between the case at bar and the following decisions of this Court:
‑‑Canadian
Institute of Public Real Estate Companies v. Corporation of the City of Toronto,
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 2;
‑‑Brant
Dairy Co. v. Milk Commission of Ontario, [1973] S.C.R. 131.
36. It is true that in these cases the
authority vested with regulatory power instead of exercising it and defining
precise standards simply reproduced the enabling provisions in a by‑law.
Thus, the authority was in a position to decide on the merits of each case at
its discretion. The following extract from the reasons of Spence J. in Canadian
Institute of Public Real Estate Companies, at p. 9, in which he cites
Laskin J., as he then was, in Brant Dairy Co., clearly illustrates the
procedure:
In the Brant
Dairy case, the regulations of the Commission permitting the action of the
Board in enacting its regulations there in question provided for, inter alia,
the fixing and allotting to persons of quotas for the marketing of a regulated
product on such basis as the Board deems proper. In each case, the subordinate
legislating body purported to exercise the power by, to quote Laskin J., as he
then was, in the Brant Dairy case at p. 146:
What the Board had done
has been to exercise the power in the very terms in which it was given. It has
not established a quota system and allotted quotas, but has simply repeated the
formula of the statute, specifying no standards and leaving everything in its
discretion.
I am of
the opinion that those words may be exactly adopted to the action of the
municipal council in the enactment of by‑law 419‑74. There has been
the mere simple repetition of the power and not the exercise of the power by
the enactment of a by‑law defining the desired regulations. Laskin J., as
he then was, continued on the same page:
A statutory body which is
empowered to do something by regulation does not act within its authority by
simply repeating the power in a regulation in the words in which it was
conferred. That evades exercise of the power and, indeed, turns a legislative
power into an administrative one. It amounts to a redelegation by the Board to
itself in a form different from that originally authorized; and that this is
illegal is evident from the judgment of this Court in Attorney General
of Canada v. Brent, [1956] S.C.R. 318.
37. In the case at bar the Council of the City
of Dorval did not simply reproduce the provisions of s. 526 of the Cities
and Towns Act in By‑law 577. It enacted provisions in accordance with
the Act by making certain of the choices offered to it. However, it did not
exercise its power respecting the rate. To use the language of Laskin J. in Brant
Dairy Co., the Council, in which the power to set a rate by by‑law
was vested, redelegated to itself the power to set it by way of resolution. The
Council did not have the power to thus make a redelegation to itself.
38. It should be observed that in some cases
the Legislature has provided that a municipal council can pass a by‑law
and by that by‑law delegate certain powers to itself.
39. Thus, section 70(2) of the Cities and
Towns Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C‑19, provided, before it was repealed by An
Act respecting land use planning and development, 1979 (Que.), c. 51, s.
260:
(2) The
council, by by‑law, may:
(a) establish a
town‑planning commission, composed of such number of members as it shall
determine, who may be chosen from among the members of the council, the
officers or employees of the municipality and the ratepayers residing in the
municipality;
...
(h) authorize the
council to appoint, by resolution, the members and officers of the commission
and to add to it, also by resolution, persons whose services may be necessary
for the performance of its duties.
40. Reference may also be made to s. 989 of
the Municipal Code of Québec, R.S.Q., c. C‑27.1, which has no
equivalent in the Cities and Towns Act:
989. Every local corporation may impose and levy annually, within the
limits determined by this Code, by direct taxation on all the taxable property
of the municipality, any sum of money required to defray the expenses of
administration, or for any special purpose whatever, within its jurisdiction.
The
council of any local corporation may order, by by‑law, that the annual
real estate tax shall be imposed by resolution. From and after the coming into
force of such by‑law and until it has been repealed, such tax shall be
imposed by resolution.
41. No similar applicable provision exists in
the case at bar.
42. Finally, it should be noted regarding the
resolutions themselves that under s. 395 of the Cities and Towns Act,
"A by‑law may be repealed or amended only by another by‑law".
The effect of the resolutions fixing the annual rate of the business tax which
the by‑law did not establish was clearly to add to the by‑law,
thereby amending it. They cannot be valid.
43. Respondent further argued that the remedy
provided by art. 33 C.C.P. (formerly art. 50 C.C.P.), namely the
direct action in nullity, does not lie, and that appellant could only present a
motion to quash the by‑law on the ground of illegality (s. 411 of the Cities
and Towns Act), this remedy being prescribed after three months from the
date the by‑law comes into effect (s. 421).
44. In the case at bar, the action was brought
over ten years after By‑law 577 came into effect. However, the direct
action in nullity is subject only to the thirty‑year prescription of art.
2242 C.C.
45. An action for recovery of taxes, on the
other hand, is prescribed after five years (art. 2260.8 C.C.), but this
prescription is not at issue. The taxes for which reimbursement is claimed
relate to the taxation years 1972 and 1973. The action brought in April 1974
was brought well within the five‑year period.
46. Either appellant had only the remedy of a
motion to quash, which was manifestly prescribed, or it could have proceeded by
a direct action, a right which ceased after thirty years, and its remedy in
that case was not prescribed. We consider that appellant could proceed by a direct
action in nullity.
47. In St‑Joseph de Beauce v. Lessard,
[1954] Que. Q.B. 475, Pratte J. wrote at p. 478:
[TRANSLATION]
The scope of art. 50 C.C.P. has been so often canvassed that it would be futile
to re‑examine all the judgments regarding it, in which its limits have
been set. We need only mention that it is settled law that an action under art.
50 C.C.P. will lie against municipal proceedings in cases of excess of power,
in cases of fraud, and when a breach of a statute or an abuse of power
amounting to fraud has the effect of a flagrant injustice.
48. This passage from the judgment of Pratte
J. was cited by this Court in Cité de Sillery v. Sun Oil Co., [1964]
S.C.R. 552, at pp. 556‑57.
49. In Donohue Bros. v. Corp. La Malbaie,
[1924] S.C.R. 511, Mignault J. wrote at p. 521:
[TRANSLATION] Want or
excess of jurisdiction produces absolute nullity and a party affected thereby
always has a remedy under article 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
50. By the Charter and the Cities and Towns
Act, the Legislature granted the Council of the City of Dorval the power to
tax by means of a by‑law. The Council adopted By‑law 577, by which
it gave itself the power to set the tax rate by way of resolution. The Council
thus wrongfully used the Charter and the Act to authorize itself to do by way
of resolution what it could only do by by‑law. It delegated to itself the
power to set the rate by way of resolution, whereas the Legislature had
conferred this power on it with a requirement that it be exercised by a by‑law.
The Council of the City of Dorval in this way exceeded its jurisdiction, which
provided a basis for remedy under art. 33 C.C.P.
51. In conclusion, we adopt this passage from
the reasons of Lajoie J.A., dissenting in the Court of Appeal (at p. 130):
[TRANSLATION] What
section 526 of the Cities and Towns Act authorized was the imposition of
a business tax by by‑law, with the mandatory formalities attaching to
this type of legislation. By claiming to legislate by way of resolution, the
City of Dorval acted without being authorized to do so by the Legislature.
52. For these reasons we would allow the
appeal, reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court,
allow appellant's action, declare s. 2 of By‑law 577 of the City of
Dorval, its Resolution 247‑72 dated April 4, 1972 and its Resolution 615‑73,
dated September 17, 1973, to be void and ultra vires, and order
respondent to pay appellant the sum of $154,754.20, with interest from the date
of service and costs in all courts.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Martineau, Walker,
Montréal.
Solicitors for the respondent: Viau, Hébert,
Denault, Montréal.
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