Supreme Court of Canada
Imperial Oil Ltd. v. R., [1974] S.C.R. 623
Date: 1973-02-28
Imperial Oil
Limited Appellant;
and
Her Majesty The
Queen Respondent.
1972: March 27; 1973: February 28.
Present: Judson, Ritchie, Hall, Spence and
Laskin JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA
Expropriation—Public works—Injurious
affection—Pipe lines laid below harbour bed, relocated because of extension to
harbour facilities—Right to compensation.
The appellant was granted an easement for 21
years by the Hamilton Harbour Commissioners to lay down, construct, operate and
maintain not more than four pipe lines below the Hamilton Harbour bed. The way
in which the appellant laid the pipe lines was subsequently approved by the
Minister of Public Works. In 1961, it was decided to increase the dock
facilities and to dredge the harbour. It became apparent that the appellant’s
pipe lines would have to be relocated. Purporting to act under s. 2(3) of
the Works in Navigable Waters Regulations, the Minister directed the
appellant to relocate its pipe lines. These directions were followed at a cost
of $95,000. The trial judge held that the appellant was not entitled to
compensation for damage allegedly done to property injuriously affected by the
construction of a public work. An appeal was launched at this Court.
Held (Judson
J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed.
Per Ritchie,
Hall, Spence and Laskin JJ.: It does not appear that there is any provision in
the Expropriation Act or the Navigable Waters Protection Act giving
clear and unambiguous expression to the intention of Parliament to empower the
Minister by regulation or otherwise to provide that a suppliant’s land may be
injuriously affected by the construction of a public work without compensation.
There can be no doubt that the proposed extension of the dock into the waters
of Hamilton Harbour constituted a public work within the meaning of
s. 2(g) of the Expropriation Act. The pipe lines were required to
be moved because the dock would cover them and prevent
[Page 624]
access to them and also because they would
interfere with the dredging operations. It was because of the decision to
proceed with these public works that the pipes had to be moved and lowered and
the fact that this was done before the public works were constructed affords no
ground for proceeding on the assumption that the injurious affection which was
undoubtedly suffered by the appellant was not occasioned “by the construction
of any public work”.
Per Judson J.,
dissenting: The 1952 agreement between the parties did not and could not
confer an unqualified right to maintain these pipe lines in situ. The
1961 direction of the Minister to lower the pipe lines and relocate them in
part was properly given for navigation purposes as authorized by s. (2) of
the Regulations. It was a risk which had existed from the very beginning and it
does not give rise to a claim for compensation.
APPEAL from a judgment of Cattanach J. of the
Exchequer Court of Canada, refusing compensation. Appeal allowed, Judson J.
dissenting.
D.K. Laidlaw, Q.C., and T.G. Heintzman,
for the appellant.
P.M. Troop, Q.C., and E.A. Bowie, for the
respondent.
JUDSON J. (dissenting)—I agree with the
single reason upon which Cattanach J. founded his judgment in the Exchequer
Court. The 1952 agreement between Imperial Oil and the Harbour Commissioners
did not and could not confer an unqualified right to maintain these pipe lines in
situ. The right was always subject to the provisions of the Navigable
Waters Protection Act and the Regulations made under that Act.
The subsequent approval of the Minister does not
improve Imperial’s position. That approval was also subject to the terms of the
Act and Regulations. The 1961 direction of the Minister to lower the pipe line
and relocate it in part was properly given for navigation purposes as
authorized by s. 2 of the Regulations. It followed as a consequence of
completion of the
[Page 625]
Seaway. It was a risk which had existed from the
very beginning and it does not give rise to a claim for compensation.
City of Toronto v. Consumers’ Gas Company is not in point. The Gas Company had an
unqualified and unconditional right given by its own Act of incorporation (11
Vict., c. 14) to lay its mains under city streets.
I have accepted one finding of the trial judge
with some doubt. These pipe lines should have been laid six feet below the bed
of the harbour. Instead of doing this, the Company had them laid on the surface
of the bed, hoping that they would sink to the required depth. The trial
judge’s opinion was that they had not sunk more than two feet. Nevertheless, he
declined to found his judgment on this ground, being of the opinion that the
Minister, if he was not satisfied with the material before him at the time of
the application for approval, should have demanded further proof that the lines
were where they should have been. The trial judge might well have found that
the lines were in their proper position. However, he based his opinion upon the
over-riding authority of the Act and Regulations, and with this opinion I
agree.
I would dismiss the appeal.
The judgment of Ritchie, Hall, Spence and Laskin
JJ. was delivered by
RITCHIE J.—This is an appeal from a judgment of
Cattanach J. of the Exchequer Court of Canada in which he held that the
suppliant was not entitled to compensation from Her Majesty the Queen for
damage allegedly done to property injuriously affected by the construction of a
public work.
By lease dated April 1, 1952, the suppliant was
granted an easement for 21 years by the
[Page 626]
Hamilton Harbour Commissioners according it the
right to
lay down, construct, operate, maintain,
inspect, alter, remove, replace and reconstruct not more than four pipe lines
over land far the greater part of which constitutes the bed of Hamilton Harbour
perpetually covered by water.
One of the provisions of the lease was that all
pipes were to be buried to a minimum depth of six feet below the Harbour bed,
and although the suppliant did not comply with this condition, it will be seen
that the way in which it laid the pipe lines was subsequently approved by the
Minister of Public Works.
At the time when the pipe lines were initially
laid, s. 4(1) of the Navigable Waters Protection Act, R.S.C. 1952,
c. 193, provided that:
4. (1) No work shall be built or placed in,
upon, over, under, through or across any navigable water unless the site
thereof has been approved by the Governor-in-Council, nor unless said work is
built, placed and maintained in accordance with the plans and regulations
provided or made by the Governer-in-Council.
The suppliant’s initial application for approval
was not granted because the work had already been completed when the
application was made, but the Navigable Waters Protection Act, was
amended by c. 41, S.C. 1956, the following sections of which appear to me
to be pertinent to the present case:
4. (1) No work shall be built or placed in,
upon, over, under, through or across any navigable water unless
(a) the site and plans thereof have
been approved by the Minister; and
(b) the work is built, placed and
maintained in accordance with the plans and the regulations.
5. …
(2) The Minister may, subject to deposit
and advertisement as in the case of a proposed work, approve of the plans and
site of a work after construction thereof has commenced.
…
[Page 627]
(b) if five years have elapsed since
completion of construction of the work;
and such approval has the same effect as if
given prior to commencement of construction of the work.
Pursuant to the power afforded by the
last-quoted section, the Minister gave formal approval on February 19, 1958, in
the following terms:
APPROVAL
TWO 6-INCH PIPE LINES WATER LOT “A”,
WATER LOT “B”, HAMILTON HARBOUR,
WATER LOT ADJOINING HAMILTON
HARBOUR PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.
The Honourable the Minister of Public
Works, pursuant to the provisions of the Navigable Waters Protection Act,
Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, Chapter 193, as amended by Chapter 41 of the
Statutes of Canada, 1956, hereby approves the site according to the attached
description, and the annexed plans, of the above-mentioned work.
By paragraph 3(a) of its amended defence the
respondent pleaded that this ministerial approval was based on a
misrepresentation by the suppliant as to the position of the pipe and it was
further alleged that the two pipe lines of the suppliant were not built or
placed on the site approved by the Minister or built in accordance with the
plans so approved. In this regard I adopt the view expressed by the learned
trial judge where he said:
In my view this defence is not supported by
the evidence adduced. What is alleged is that the pipe lines were not laid as
represented in the plan accompanying the application for approval in that the
pipe lines were not at the elevation, nor buried to the depth indicated on the
plan and that the Minister was misled into approving something he did not
intend to approve. The plan was nothing more than a diagramatic schematic
sketch. It flows from a section taken along the centre line and does not
purport to show nor could it show with exactitude where the two pipe lines,
which were far removed from the centre line, lay with respect to the surface of
the Harbour bed. There was no misrepresentation nor any intention to mislead.
If the plan was inadequate or deficient in any particular for the Minister’s purposes,
it seems to me that the remedy was to require
[Page 628]
a more specific and detailed plan. It was
ascertained subsequently that the pipes were not 6 feet below the surface of
the bed but, in my opinion, what the Minister approved in February 19, 1958 was
the vertical and horizontal location of the pipe lines as they then lay. In
this conclusion I am fortified by a statement in the examination for discovery
of a Crown witness which was read in as part of the suppliant’s evidence that
approval was given to the works ‘as they then were’.
In 1961 it was decided by the Hamilton Harbour
Commissioners and the Minister of Public Works that as a result of the
completion of the Seaway and the heavier traffic which was therefore to be
anticipated in Hamilton Harbour, it would be necessary to increase the dock
facilities and to dredge the harbour to a depth of 27 feet to accommodate
vessels of that draft.
Accordingly the Harbour Commissioners, in
conjunction with the Department of Public Works, undertook to extend the dock
at the foot of St. Catherines Street westward into the waters of the
harbour in such fashion as to cover the suppliant’s two pipe lines for a
distance of approximately 960 feet, and to prevent access thereto by the
suppliant. Such an extension, taken in conjunction with the anticipated
increase in the use of the harbour by vessels of a deeper draft, made it
apparent that the suppliant’s pipe lines would have to be relocated and buried
to a further depth of six feet. In this regard the learned trial judge
observed:
There was the utmost co-operation between
the parties with respect to engineering design and the like to accomplish this
end with the least inconvenience to either party. The only disagreement between
them was which party should bear the cost.
The cost of dredging the bay was assumed
entirely by the Crown and paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
The cost of the construction of the wharf
was shared equally by the Crown and the Hamilton Harbour Commissioners. The 50%
burden assumed by the Crown was paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The
50% share of the cost assumed by the Commissioners was paid to the extent of
25% from
[Page 629]
the Commissioners’ funds and the balance of
75% assumed by the Commissioners was financed by a loan from the Crown.
Therefore there is no question that the
dredging of the Harbour and the construction of the wharf constituted ‘public
works’ within the meaning of those words as defined in section 2(g) of the
Expropriation Act, nor was this disputed by counsel for the Crown.
By two letters dated July 18th, 1961 and
December 4th of the same year, the Minister of Public Works directed the
suppliant to lower its pipe lines six feet below the level shown on the plans
approved by the Minister in 1958 and to relocate them in order to make way for
the new extended dock facilities. These directions were followed by the
suppliant to the satisfaction of the Minister at a cost of $95,000 and as I
have indicated, the only issue on this appeal is the question of whether the
suppliant is entitled to be compensated for this expenditure.
The Minister’s direction in relation to the pipe
lines purport to be given pursuant to the authority of s. 2(3) of the Works
in Navigable Waters Regulations, S.O.R. 1956‑300 which provides
that:
2. (3) The owner or person in possession of
a work shall comply with such directions for navigation purposes as may be
given by the Minister in respect of such work.
The broad foundation upon which the suppliant
bases its claim for compensation is its reliance upon the general principle
expressed by Lord Warrington of Clyffe in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.
v. Melbourne Harbour Trust Comrs., where
he said in relation to the statute in question in that case:
In considering the construction and effect
of this Act, the board is quided by the well‑known principle that a
statute should not be held to take away private rights of property without
compensation unless the intention to do so is expressed in clear and
unambiguous words.
It is contended on behalf of the respondent that
the ministerial approval given in February
[Page 630]
1958 was conditional upon compliance by the
suppliant with the provisions of the Navigable Waters Protection Act and
the regulations made thereunder and that as Regulation 2(3), supra, was
made pursuant to the powers vested in the Minister under s. 10 of the Navigable
Waters Protection Act, and it being agreed that the pipe lines in question
constituted “a work” within the meaning of that statute, the suppliant’s
position was that its title was at all times subject to the requirement that it
“comply with such directions for navigation purposes as may be given by the
Minister in respect of such work”.
Assuming this to be the case, it does not appear
to me that there is any provision in the Expropriation Act or the Navigable
Waters Protection Act giving clear and unambiguous expression to the
intention of Parliament to empower the Minister by regulation or otherwise to
provide that a suppliant’s land may be injuriously affected by the construction
of a public work without compensation.
It cannot be disputed that the rights which the
suppliant enjoyed under its agreement with the Hamilton Harbour Board are
included in the definition of “land” in s. 2(d) of the Expropriation
Act nor can there be any doubt that the proposed extension of the
St. Catherines Street dock into the waters of Hamilton Harbour constituted
a public work within the meaning of s. 2(g) of that statute. It appears
clear to me that the intention to compensate a land owner for injurious
affection created by the construction of any public work is made manifest by
the provisions of s. 23 of the Expropriation Act which provide:
The compensation money agreed upon or
adjudged for any land or property acquired or taken for or injuriously affected
by the construction of any public work shall stand in the stead of such land or
property; and any claim to or encumbrance upon such land or property shall, as
respects Her Majesty, be converted into a claim to such compensation money or
to a proportionate amount thereof, and shall be
[Page 631]
void as respects any land or property so
acquired or taken, which shall, by the fact of the taking possession thereof,
or the filing of the plan and description, as the case may be, become and be
absolutely vested in Her Majesty.
In relation to the circumstances of the present
case, I take this section to support the view that if the suppliant was
required to move its pipe lines by reason of the intrusion of the dock into the
area occupied by them, the suppliant is entitled to compensation payable in
accordance with the statutory procedures established to that end.
The learned trial judge, in describing the
reason for requiring the pipe lines to be moved, had this to say:
On completion of the Seaway the Hamilton
Harbour Commissioners decided to increase their dock facilities and where
necessary to dredge the Harbour to a depth of 27 feet to accommodate the larger
vessels of that draft which it was anticipated would be using the Harbour.
To accomplish this end the Commissioners
undertook to extend their dock, known as the Catherine Street dock, westward
into the waters of the Harbour. This would cover the suppliant’s two pipe lines
for a distance of approximately 960 feet and would prevent access thereto by
the suppliant. Further, the presence of the pipe lines at their then depth
presented the danger of their being fouled by the anchors of ships using the
area and also prevented the necessary dredging operations to deepen the Harbour
and the use of fill to construct the dock.
This appears to me to be a clear finding that
the pipe lines were required to be relocated and lowered as a result of the
Crown’s decision to construct a public work, but notwithstanding this finding,
the learned trial judge found the suppliant’s claim for compensation to be
fallacious on the following grounds:
The fallacy of the argument on behalf of
the suppliant is, as I see it, that the suppliant was required to move its pipe
lines by reason of the intrusion of the public work into the area occupied by
its pipe lines. That was not the case.
[Page 632]
It is well settled that the right to
expropriate, being an unusual and exorbitant right, must be found in the
express words of a statute for the right is never implied. The Minister did
not, nor did he purport to expropriate anything from the suppliant. Section 3
of the Expropriation Act outlines what the Minister is empowered to do.
Those powers were not invoked, nor did he purport to act under any other
statute giving the power of expropriation. Of course counsel for the suppliant
directed my attention to the words in section 23 of the Expropriation
Act where reference was made to compensation for lands injuriously affected
by the construction of any public work, but here there was no public work
constructed until after the removal of the pipe lines.
The suppliant was required to move its pipe
lines because it was so directed to do by the Minister as he was authorized to
do for navigation purposes by virtue of section 2(3) of the Regulations.
Approval had been given to the suppliant to lay its pipe lines where and as it
did but that approval was conditional upon the Regulations and the Regulations
were invoked to direct the removal of those pipe lines from that location.
Since the approval originally given was qualified, it could not have been an
absolute approval but one that was subject to revocation or amendment as was
done.
The italics are my own.
It appears to me that the learned trial judge
recognized the force of the suppliant’s argument based on section 23 of
the Expropriation Act but considered that because the public work was
not constructed until after the removal of the pipe lines the suppliant’s
rights were not injuriously affected by reason of its construction. I am unable
to subscribe to this argument because, as the learned trial judge himself
pointed out, the pipe lines were required to be moved because the dock would
cover them for approximately 960 feet and prevent access to them and also
because they would interfere with the dredging operations. It was because of
the decision to proceed with these public works that the pipes had to be moved
and lowered and the fact that this was done before the public works were
constructed in my view affords no ground for proceeding on the assumption that
the injurious
[Page 633]
affection which was undoubtedly suffered by the
suppliant was not occasioned “by the construction of any public work”. The
reasoning of the learned trial judge appears to me to involve the proposition
that if the suppliant’s rights are injuriously affected as a necessary
prerequisite to the construction of a public work he is not entitled to any
compensation, whereas different considerations apply if the work has been
constructed. This kind of reasoning was rejected by the Privy Council in Toronto
Corporation v. Consumers’ Gas Co. The
gist of that case was in my view accurately described in the course of the
reasons for judgment of Mr. Justice Cattanach where he summarized it as
follows:
The city constructed a sewer under a street
in which the freehold vested in the city. This construction made it necessary
for the Gas Company to lower its gas mains. It was held that the gas mains were
within the definition of land in section 321(b) of the Ontario
Municipal Act (1913) Ontario. The definition in that section included
a right or interest in, and an easement over land. The definition of ‘land’ in
section 321(b) of the Ontario Municipal Act (supra) then in effect
is similar to and even narrower than the definition of ‘land’ in
section 2(d) of the Expropriation Act.
It was also held that the Toronto
Corporation was liable for the cost of lowering the gas mains in that the gas
company’s ‘land’ was injuriously affected by the Toronto Corporation’s exercise
of its statutory powers under section 325(1) of the Ontario Municipal
Act the language of which is substantially similar to that of
section 23 of the Expropriation Act.
In the course of the reasons for judgment
delivered by Meredith, C.J.O., on behalf of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in
the Consumers Gas case, he
took note of the fact that the reason for lowering the gas mains was so that
the sewer could be constructed, saying, at page 23:
[Page 634]
It is conceded by the appellant that the
lowering of the gas main was necessary to enable the sewer to be constructed,
and that, if the appellant is liable to pay the expense incurred in lowering
the gas main, the respondent is entitled to recover the amount sued for; and
the action is really brought for the purpose of obtaining a judicial
determination as to whether the cost of such a work is to be borne by the
appellant or by the respondent.
In conclusion, Meredith C.J.O. said, at page 24:
The land of the appellant, (Consumers’ Gas
Co.) i.e., the soil in which its pipes were laid, was injuriously affected by
the exercise of the power of the respondent or its council in the construction
of the sewer, the laying of which necessitated the removal of the pipes, and
the appellant was entitled to compensation for the damages necessarily
resulting from the exercise of that power, and it follows that the appellant
cannot be required to repay to the respondent the expense incurred in taking up
and relaying the pipes.
Mr. Justice Cattanach’s view that
compensation should be denied under s. 23 of the Expropriation Act because
“there was no public work constructed until after the removal of the pipe
lines” appears to me to run directly contrary to the reasoning in the Consumers’
Gas case, and as I am in any event unable to subscribe to it, I would allow
this appeal and grant the prayer of the suppliant for compensation in the
amount of $95,000 together with interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per
annum from October 1, 1962, when the work of lowering and relocating the pipe
lines was completed until the date of judgment.
The appellant will have its costs in this Court
and in the Exchequer Court of Canada.
Appeal allowed, Judson J. dissenting.
Solicitors for the appellant: McCarthy
& McCarthy, Toronto.
Solicitor for the respondent: D.S.
Maxwell, Ottawa.