Kirzner v. R., [1978] 2 SCR 487

Supreme Court of Canada

Kirzner v. R., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 487

Date: 1977-12-14

Allan Howard Kirzner (Plaintiff) Appellant;

and

Her Majesty The Queen (Defendant) Respondent.

1977: October 12; 1977: December 14.

Present: Laskin C.J. and Martland, Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz, Estey and Pratte JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO.

Criminal law—Defences—Entrapment—Police informer—Possession of cocaine and heroin—Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. N-1, ss. 3(1), (2), 4(2), (3).

Appellant was found by Metropolitan Toronto police to be in possession of heroin and was arrested. He told the police that he worked as an informer for the R.C.M.P. but that the R.C.M.P. were unaware that he had bought the heroin and was going to sell it. He was also found to be in possession of cocaine. Appellant was a drug addict and this was known to the R.C.M.P. He had been used by the R.C.M.P. as a decoy and informer, and this involved him, according to his evidence, in purchasing drugs with money supplied by the R.C.M.P. and in selling drugs. The R.C.M.P. contact’s evidence was that appellant had not told him that he was selling drugs as well as buying them and that appellant was used by the R.C.M.P. as a paid informer even after his arrest, not an unusual practice of the R.C.M.P. in their use of informers. Appellant was convicted of possession and possession for the purpose of trafficking after his defence of entrapment was withdrawn from the jury by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal in affirming the convictions but reducing the sentence asserted that the defence of entrapment was not open to the accused, adding that no such defence is available in England and that U.S. judgments dealing with entrapment have not been applied in Canada. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal further on the question of law: “Did the Ontario Court of Appeal err in holding that the learned trial judge was right in not putting the defence of entrapment to the jury?”

Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

Per Martland, Ritchie, Pigeon, Beetz and Pratte JJ.: The sole point raised by counsel for the appelant was that entrapment should have been left to the jury because the evidence showed a police-concocted plan to

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ensnare him going beyond mere solicitation. The evidence was not open to such a view. Without expressing an opinion on any other question the appeal should be dismissed.

Per Laskin C.J. and Spence, Dickson and Beetz JJ.: The use of spies and informers is an inevitable requirement for detection of consensual crimes and of discouraging their commission. Such practices do not involve such dirty tricks as to be offensive to the integrity of the judicial process. Nor can objection on this ground be taken to the use of decoys who provide the opportunity to others intent upon the commission of a consensual offence. In such cases the offender can claim no extenuation that would mitigate his culpability or the use of evidence to establish it or his punishment upon conviction. The problem which has caused judicial concern is the one which arises from the police instigated crime, where the police have gone beyond mere solicitation or mere decoy work and have actively organized a scheme of ensnarement, of entrapment, in order to prosecute the person so caught. It is only in this situation that it is proper to speak of entrapment and to consider what effect this should have on the prosecution of a person thus drawn into the commission of an offence. In England and in New Zealand, judicial revulsion against entrapment of an accused has been manifested not through recognition of it as a defence but rather through a discretionary control of the admissibility of evidence and through mitigation of sentence. While in Canada there is no appellate Court judgment in which entrapment has been accepted as providing a defence or even as going to discretionary power to exclude evidence, it was touched on in R. v. Ormerod, [1969] 2 O.R. 230. No conclusion was reached in that case because the issue did not arise on the facts which did not go beyond ordinary solicitation of a suspected drug seller. The present case like Ormerod and others does not squarely confront the Court with the need to decide what legal effect should be given to such entrapment.

The evidence in the present case taking it most favourably to the appellant failed to show entrapment in respect of the offences charged. Appellant had initiated a transaction which he carried out on his own for his own benefit. The view of the Court of Appeal in this case or of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Chernecki (1971), 16 C.R.N.S. 230, rejecting entrapment as a defence should not be endorsed. That question should be left open.

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APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario[1] dismissing an appeal by the appellant from his conviction on charges under the Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, ss. 3, 4. Appeal dismissed.

Victor S. Paisley, for the appellant.

S.M. Froomkin, Q.C., and Michael Dambrot, for the respondent.

The judgment of Laskin C.J. and Spence, Dickson and Estey JJ. was delivered by

THE CHIEF JUSTICE—This appeal is here by leave of this Court on the following question of law:

Did the Ontario Court of Appeal err in holding that the learned trial judge was right in law in not putting the defence of entrapment to the jury?

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of two drug offences, namely, possession of cocaine contrary to s. 3(1), (2) of the Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1 and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 4(2), (3) of the same Act. His main defence was entrapment, which was withdrawn from the jury in the trial judge’s charge to them. In affirming the convictions but reducing the sentence, the Ontario Court of Appeal asserted that the defence of entrapment was not open to the accused, adding that no such defence is available in England and that judgments of Courts in the United States dealing with entrapment have not been applied or followed in Canada: see R. v. Kirzner[2].

The trial judge’s charge to the jury shows that he took a broad view of entrapment, taking it to embrace the use of an agent provocateur or the use of an informer as well as inveiglement by the police. However, he distinguished the situation where there was a complete concoction, presumably by the police, so that there was no actus reus and perhaps not even any mens rea by the accused. The trial judge obviously had in mind the judg-

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ment of this Court in Lemieux v. The Queen[3], to which I will return later in these reasons.

The following three passages in the charge to the jury show how the issue of entrapment was dealt with by the trial judge:

(1)… Entrapment is basically where a police officer or somebody in authority has inveigled somebody or tricked them to carry out some duty, or possibly it may be argued that the person who claims they are entrapped, did it on their own volition. In other words, it arises in a case such as this where we have an agent provocateur, the police agent or undercover agent who uses an informer. Now, entrapment in our law is no defence.

(2)… If you found the accused in fact committed the offence with which he is charged and had done this at the solicitation of an agent provocateur, that is an undercover agent, that would have been irrelevant as to the question of guilt or innocence It may go to the question of sentence but if you find he has acted as an agent in an illegal act he would still be guilty.

(3)… it is not a defence for a person who carries out a forbidden act or consents to do it knowing what he is in fact doing. The only thing is that it would go to the mitigation of sentence. So that a crime in some instances may be committed from the best of motives, but it is still a crime.

…

So, I repeat to you, basically in this country entrapment is not defence to the charge unless the only way that you could find would be on the evidence that the accused really had no intention of committing the crime, it wasn’t his act, this was a complete concoction. That wouldn’t even involve entrapment in such a case, it would really be that a crime had not been committed. It would be something similar to what I have told you of the undercover arrangement for the break-in.

Again I must remind you that an accused if he in fact did commit the offence with which he was charged, and in the circumstances he had committed the act at the solicitation of an agent provocateur, this would go to the question of his guilt or innocence.

It was contended by counsel for the appellant that this Court should recognize the defence of

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entrapment both where a drug offence has been committed through the mere solicitation of a police agent and where the police, through a plan or design to ensnare a person in order to prosecute him, have induced him to commit an offence. On the other hand, counsel for the Crown has urged this Court to refuse to recognize the defence in either situation but contended that even if it be proper to accept entrapment as a defence, the distinction recognized in the American cases, between mere solicitation or use of an informer and origination of a criminal design by the police into which the accused is drawn, would exclude it as a defence in the present case. This submission by the Crown depends, of course, on a particular view of the evidence as not being capable of supporting a finding that there was here a plan or design by the police to inveigle the accused into the commission of an offence.

Entrapment is not self-defining, and, in a generic sense, may encompass a wide array of practices involving police action which, directly or indirectly, reveals or brings about the commission of an offence by another. The police, or the agent provocateur or the informer or the decoy used by the police do not have immunity if their conduct in the encouragement of a commission of a crime by another is itself criminal. Of course, whether they are prosecuted is a matter for the Crown attorneys and ultimately, for the Attorneys-General. What, however, of the person who is charged as a result of the action of an informer or who commits an offence through the solicitation or encouragement of a spy or decoy or through police instigation or through a plan or design of the police to ensnare him? Absent duress, as dealt with in s. 17 of the Criminal Code, what should the Court’s attitude be if the evidence shows police involvement, in any one of the ways above-mentioned, in the commission of the offence?

The role of the police and the role of the Courts in the enforcement of the criminal law are distinct although interacting. The former are charged with the investigation and detection of criminal conduct and with gathering the evidence upon which

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charges are laid to bring the alleged offenders before the Courts for judicial determination of their culpability. Courts are concerned with the proper interpretation and application of the criminal law invoked against accused persons, with the propriety of the conduct of the prosecution and of the defence, especially in the light of the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence, and in this connection, with the behaviour of the police authorities in respect of their dealings with an arrested or about-to-be arrested accused. It was in the exercise of this judicial oversight that the Courts recognized duress as a defence (see R. v. Steane[4]), developed the exclusionary rules respecting confessions (see, for example, Boudreau v. The King[5] and Piché v. The Queen[6]) and, in this country, have accepted res judicata or issue estoppel as a bar to a second conviction (see Kienapple v. The Queen[7]). These were common law developments, although, in the case of duress, codification in s. 17 of the Criminal Code has overlaid the common law: see Paquette v. The Queen[8].

There is, of course, a balance to be struck between giving reasonable latitude to the police in the employment of stratagems to control the spread of crime, especially in the case of the illegal drug traffic, and controlling behaviour that goes beyond any reasonable latitude. American jurisdictions have, on a constitutional basis, sought to control the introduction of illegally obtained evidence; in England, the Courts have continued to exercise a discretionary power to control the admissibility of evidence that would operate unfairly against an accused. Control techniques may thus relate to the recognition of substantive defences or to rules against the admission of evidence or to a discretion as to its reception. Abuse of process or stay of proceedings have also been put forward as techniques of control.

Methods of detection of offences and of suspected offences and offenders necessarily differ according to the class of crime. Where, for example, violence or breaking, entering and theft are

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concerned, there will generally be external evidence of an offence upon which the police can act in tracking down the offenders; the victim or his family or the property owner, as the case may be, may be expected to call in the police and provide some clues for the police to pursue. When “consensual” crimes are committed, involving willing persons, as is the case in prostitution, illegal gambling and drug offences, ordinary methods of detection will not generally do. The participants, be they deemed victims or not, do not usually complain or seek police aid; that is what they wish to avoid. The police, if they are to respond to the public disapprobation of such offences as reflected in existing law, must take some initiatives. They may, for example, use a spy, either a policeman or another person, to obtain information about a consensual offence by infiltration; they may make arrangements with informers who may be parties to offences on which they report to the police to enable the other parties to be apprehended; or the police may use decoys or themselves act under cover to provide others with the opportunity to commit a consensual offence or to encourage its commission. Going one step farther, the police may use members of their force or other persons to instigate the commission of an offence, planning and designing it ab initio to ensnare others.

The use of spies and informers is an inevitable requirement for detection of consensual crimes and of discouraging their commission; otherwise, it would be necessary to await a complaint by a “victim” or to try to apprehend offenders in flagrante delicto, an exercise not likely to be crowned with much success. Such practices do not involve such dirty tricks as to be offensive to the integrity of the judicial process. Nor can objection on this ground be taken to the use of decoys who provide the opportunity to others intent upon the commission of a consensual offence. In all such cases, the offender can claim no extenuation that would mitigate either his culpability or the use of evidence to establish it or his punishment upon conviction.

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The problem which has caused judicial concern is the one which arises from the police‑instigated crime, where the police have gone beyond mere solicitation or mere decoy work and have actively organized a scheme of ensnarement, of entrapment, in order to prosecute the person so caught. In my opinion, it is only in this situation that it is proper to speak of entrapment and to consider what effect this should have on the prosecution of a person who has thus been drawn into the commission of an offence.

There is no doubt that it may be difficult in particular cases to draw the line between mere use of spies, decoys or informers and the use of agents provocateurs who go beyond mere solicitation or encouragement and initiate a criminal design for the purpose of entrapping a person in order to prosecute him. The principle of the distinction has, however, been recognized in a series of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States which has established that entrapment, in the ensnarement sense above-mentioned, is available as a defence. The line of cases begins with Sorrells v. United States[9] and extends through Sherman v. United States[10], United States v. Russell[11] and Hampton v. United States[12]. The issue in the United States, as reflected in the foregoing judgments of its Supreme Court and in a host of judgments of other federal Courts and of state Courts, is no longer whether entrapment should be recognized as a defence or a bar to conviction but whether the approach to it should be subjective, fastening on the predisposition of the particular accused, or objective, fastening on the police conduct and on whether that conduct would have caused a reasonable person to commit the offence. On the subjective approach, an accused with a predisposition to the crime would not have the benefit of the defence of entrapment, regardless of the degree of police involvement.

In England, judicial revulsion against entrapment of an accused has been manifested not through recognition of a defence on that ground

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but rather through a discretionary control of the admissibility of evidence and through mitigation of sentence: see Mealey and Sheridan v. The Queen[13]; R. v. Birtles[14]; R. v. Ameer and Lucas[15]. The Courts of New Zealand have taken the same view: see R. v. Capner[16]; R. v. Pethig[17]. In Canada there is no appellate Court judgment in which entrapment has been accepted as providing a defence or even as going to discretionary power to exclude evidence. Although it was touched on by me as a member of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Ormerod[18], I was of the opinion there that I did not think it wise in that case to come to any conclusion on the acceptability of entrapment as a defence. That was because the issue did not arise on the facts, which did not go beyond ordinary solicitation of a suspected drug seller.

In R. v. Chernecki[19], the British Columbia Court of Appeal likewise found that the facts did not show such “calculated inveigling or persistent importuning” (words used by me in R. v. Ormerod as a description of entrapment) as to make it necessary to consider whether entrapment should be recognized as a defence. The Court added that it did not think that any such defence existed at the time in Canada. However, in R. v. Bonnar[20], the Nova Scotia Appeal Division stated that if entrapment (as opposed to merely providing an opportunity for the commission of an offence) was established the proper course was to stay proceedings or to discharge the accused where he did not have a prior intention or predisposition to commit the offence charged. Macdonald J.A. speaking for the Court considered that there was abuse of process in such a situation and that the entrapment was contrary to public policy. In the particular case, it was held on appeal that the facts did not

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show entrapment.

The present case, like Ormerod, Chernecki and Bonnar does not squarely confront the Court with the need to decide what legal effect should be given to a showing of entrapment as I have described it. The facts, taking them, as we must, most favourably to the accused, are against such a showing, and I shall come to them shortly. In these circumstances, I would not, however, endorse the view of the Ontario Court of Appeal in the present case or of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Chernecki rejecting entrapment as a defence. There are good reasons for leaving the question open. Indeed, if that position is based on a static view of s. 7(3) of the Criminal Code I find it unacceptable. I do not think that s. 7(3) should be regarded as having frozen the power of the Courts to enlarge the content of the common law by way of recognizing new defences, as they may think proper according to circumstances that they consider may call for further control of prosecutorial behaviour or of judicial proceedings.

Although Courts may agree that entrapment outrages one’s sense of decency and shames the administration of justice, there is a difference of opinion as to what the control mechanism should be. The division of opinion in the United States between the subjective and objective approaches to entrapment is one aspect of the problem although it appears that there is growing disposition in lower Court decisions, especially in those of state Courts, to opt for the objective approach as being one which avoids problems that arise in fastening on the predisposition of particular accused. Among the extensive literature on the subject reference may be made to Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agents Provocateurs (1951) 60 Yale L.J. 1091; Park, The Entrapment Controversy (1975-76) 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163. The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute, promulgated in 1962, appears to have incorporated an objective approach in its

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broadened definition of entrapment in s. 2.13(1), reading as follows:

(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:

(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or

(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.

The English Law Commission, which has given some consideration to the problem and has examined the way in which the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code has dealt with the matter was undecided on whether there should be a defence of entrapment but would circumscribe it as narrowly as has the Model Penal Code: see English Law Commission, Working Paper No. 55 (1974). Professor Glanville Williams in his work The Criminal Law, The General Part (2nd ed. 1961) at p. 785 says this:

Is there any technical means by which the courts could give effect to a defence of official instigation or procurement, if they were so minded? If one thinks merely in terms of established legal concepts, as the English courts have hitherto done, it may seem difficult to give an affirmative answer. The police have no general power to consent to or authorise acts that would otherwise be breaches of the criminal law. The strict doctrine of estoppel has not been applied in criminal law, except in respect of estoppel by judgment; and in any event the situation is not precisely one of estoppel. In civil law the doctrine of estoppel is not allowed to be used to extend the limits of governmental power. There is no other ready-made doctrine to cover the situation.

Another English writer, J.D. Heydon, The Problems of Entrapment, [1973] Camb. L.J. 268 would reject entrapment as a defence but would give it legal effect through a discretionary bar on the admission of evidence and as a mitigating factor in sentencing.

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Another issue concerns the range or class of offences on which entrapment should have a bearing, either as a matter of defence or of discretionary control of admissibility of evidence or of the course of proceedings: see Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections, 1969 (The Ouimet Report), at pp. 79-80. The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code has taken the position that with respect to some offences, as for example offences of violence, the social interest in controlling the behaviour of an accused outweighs that involved in disapprobation of undesirable police behaviour: see s. 2.13(3).

There is the further problem arising in jury trials whether entrapment should be dealt with by judges alone, or should involve the jury as a trier of fact. The Model Penal Code takes the position that the issue of entrapment should be tried by the Court in the absence of the jury: s. 2.13(2). The jury would not be excluded on the subjective test since, if there was evidence of entrapment, it would be for the jury to determine if there was entrapment in fact and if there was predisposition in the accused. This is consistent with Canadian practice in respect of factual issues in a trial with a jury, which is to limit the judge to a determination of whether there is evidence to go to the jury and to leave it to the jury to act on its view of the evidence once the issue is left to them.

In short, there are difficult questions that arise in respect of entrapment which prudence dictates we should leave for consideration when a decision thereon is demanded by the record. Canadian writings on the subject have been alive to this policy of avoidance in their examination of a number of cases, two of them in this Court, which raised entrapment issues but the writings, useful survey articles, have also been alive to the dilemmas that entrapment raises: see Shafer and Sheridan, The Defence of Entrapment (1970), 8 Osg.H.L.J. 277; Watt, The Defence of Entrapment (1971), 13 Cr.L.Q. 313; Sneideman, A Judicial Test for Entrapment: The Glimmerings of a Canadian

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Policy on Police-Instigated Crime (1973), 16 Cr.L.Q. 81.

I wish to refer to the two cases in this Court in which an issue of entrapment was allegedly raised by the facts. They are Lemieux v. The Queen, supra, and Patterson v. The Queen[21]. In Lemieux v. The Queen, supra, an informer, acting under police instruction, induced the accused to participate in a break-in as driver of the car in which the informer and a third person were taken to the particular house. The owner co-operated by giving the police a key to the premises. It was found that the accused had no thought of being party to any such offence until induced by the informer to participate. This Court, speaking through Judson J., held that it was open to the jury to find that there was no actus reus in view of the owner’s consent to the breaking and entering. The facts, leaving aside the participation of the owner of the premises selected for the break-in, fit exactly the defence of entrapment as accepted in the American cases. In concluding his reasons, Judson J. said this, at p. 496:

Had Lemieux in fact committed the offence with which he was charged, the circumstance that he had done the forbidden act at the solicitation of an agent provocateur would have been irrelevant to the question of his guilt or innocence.

This observation was not, of course, necessary to the decision, and in so far as it envisages the same set of facts but without the house owner’s involvement, it would involve entrapment as I have viewed it in these reasons. On the other hand, if there was solicitation by an informer without the complicity of the police, there would be no question of entrapment.

Patterson v. The Queen involved a charge of keeping a bawdy house, a charge which arose out of a telephoned sexual proposition by a police agent, resulting in an assignation at certain residential premises where the police disclosed their identity and made an arrest. This Court allowed an appeal from conviction on the ground that there

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was no evidence of frequent or habitual use of the house for the purpose of prostitution and it does not appear that any question of entrapment was argued; certainly it was not dealt with. In any event, the mere telephone solicitation would not qualify, in respect of a willing accused, as an entrapment within the rationale of the cases that have recognized such a defence.

A different set of facts concerning police instigation of an offence is found in R. v. Woods[22], a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal. That Court set aside a conviction of breaking and entering and theft (and in the result, directed an acquittal) where it appeared that off duty police officers in plain clothes, passing themselves off as toughs from Toronto, threatened violence to the accused, whom they had not previously met, if he did not produce a stolen outboard motor which they wished to purchase at a discount. The accused yielded to the threats, broke into a marina and stole an outboard and was then charged. The fact of the threat of violence came out in the evidence of the police officers but the magistrate who tried the accused convicted on the basis of giving credit to the evidence of one of the officers because the magistrate knew him personally. The Court of Appeal found this to be an extraneous circumstance and concluded the conviction must be quashed and then (the Crown agreeing) ordered an acquittal. No consideration was given to entrapment as a possible defence.

There are two lower Court decisions, R. v. Shipley[23], an Ontario County Court judgment R. v. MacDonald[24], a judgment of a British Columbia Provincial Court, in which, on a finding of entrapment, a stay of proceedings was directed in the first case and an acquittal in the second. In another more recent British Columbia Provincial

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Court judgment, R. v. Haukness[25], in which the aforementioned two cases were considered as well as Ormerod and Chernecki, an acquittal was also entered on a direct recognition of entrapment as a defence, the Court saying that “notwithstanding [the accused’s] commission [of the drug] offence, it would be contrary to the principles of the administration of justice in this country to convict him”. Having indicated that I prefer to leave open the question whether entrapment, if established, should operate as a defence I express no view on the approach taken in the Haukness case. Similarly, I leave open the question whether the appropriate way to deal with entrapment is by a stay of proceedings, a matter considered by this Court in another context in R. v. Rourke[26]. In the present case, although the factum of the accused mentions stay of proceedings, his counsel did not press the point, nor did he found any of his submissions on any issue of admissibility of evidence. His main, indeed, sole point was that entrapment should have been left to the jury because the evidence showed a police‑concocted plan to ensnare him going beyond mere solicitation.

I do not think that the evidence is open to such a view. Although the trial judge’s charge is confusing on what is meant by entrapment, the accused cannot complain of the withdrawal of entrapment as a defence (assuming it to be a defence, if established by a preponderance of evidence) if there was no evidence upon which it could be based.

The accused was found by the Metropolitan Toronto police to be in possession of heroin and was arrested by them. He made certain statements to the police, including assertions that he worked as an undercover agent, as an informer in fact, for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The state-

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ments were admitted in evidence after a voir dire as to their admissibility. He told the Toronto police that the R.C.M.P. were unaware that he had bought the heroin and unaware that he was going to sell it. When taken to the police station he was found in possession of cocaine as well as heroin. Upon his release from custody and while awaiting trial, the accused had several conversations with members of the Toronto police force about acting as a paid informer but nothing came of it.

The accused was a drug addict, and this was known to the R.C.M.P. and to a particular officer of that force, one Gascon. He had been used by the force on various occasions as a decoy and informer to ferret out information on drug pushing in the Montreal area, and this involved him, according to his evidence, in purchasing drugs with money supplied by the R.C.M.P. and in selling drugs as well. He reported these activities to his R.C.M.P. contact. It was also Kirzner’s evidence that he told Gascon of a chance encounter with a person in the illegal drug trade through whom he could set up a big “buy” and that Gascon agreed to the plan. Gascon was on vacation when the chance for the “buy” arrived, but the accused went ahead on his own and consummated the deal, although it was by no means clear that he was under instruction by Gascon to go ahead in the latter’s absence. It was in respect of this “buy” of heroin that the accused was arrested. Gascon’s evidence was that the accused had not told him that he was selling drugs as well as buying them. He was used by the R.C.M.P. as a paid informer even after his arrest, but this was not an unusual practice of the R.C.M.P. in their use of informers.

I fail to see how this evidence, taking it most favourably to the accused, shows entrapment in respect of the offences committed by the accused. To me it is obvious that he saw his police contacts as a shield for activities which he carried out on his own, activities amounting to trafficking in drugs. He had initiated a transaction which he carried out for his own benefit.

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In the result, while not agreeing with the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal, I come to the same conclusion and would dismiss the appeal.

The judgment of Martland, Ritchie, Pigeon, Beetz and Pratte JJ. was delivered by

PIGEON J.—As the Chief Justice says in reasons which I have had the advantage of reading, the sole point raised by counsel for the accused at the hearing was that entrapment should have been left to the jury because the evidence showed a police-concocted plan to ensnare him going beyond mere solicitation. I agree that the evidence is not open to such a view and that accordingly the accused cannot complain on that account although the trial judge’s charge was confusing. Without expressing an opinion on any other question, I concur in the disposition of the case proposed by the Chief Justice.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitor for the appellant: Victor S. Paisley, Toronto.

Solicitor for the respondent: The Attorney General for Ontario, Toronto.