Supreme Court of Canada
Syndicat Catholique des Employés de Magasins de Québec Inc. v. Paquet
Ltée, [1959] S.C.R. 206
Date: 1959-01-27
Le Syndicat Catholique des Employés de
Magasins de Québec Inc. (Plaintiff) Appellant;
and
La Compagnie Paquet Ltée. (Defendant)
Respondent.
1958: June 18; 1959: January 27.
Present: Kerwin C.J. and Taschereau, Locke, Cartwright,
Fauteux, Abbott and Judson JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE,
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
Labour—Collective agreement—"Rand Formula"—Whether
compulsory check-off clause a "condition de travail"—Whether valid in
the Province of Quebec—The Labour Relations Act, R.S.Q. 1941,
c. 162A, as amended—The Professional Syndicates' Act, R.S.Q. 1941,
c. 162, as amended—Articles 1028, 1701 of the Civil Code.
A clause in a collective bargaining agreement between an
employer and a union certified as a bargaining agent whereby the employer is to
withhold from the wages of all his employees, whether union members or not, a
sum equal to the union dues fixed by the union for its members, and to remit
the same to the union, is valid and binding in the Province of Quebec
(Taschereau, Locke and Fauteux JJ., contra.)
The plaintiff, a labour union incorporated under the Professional
Syndicates' Act and duly certified as a bargaining agent under the Labour
Relations Act, sued the defendant to recover certain sums of money which
had been withheld by the latter from the wages of a number of non-union
employees and which had not been remitted to the union as provided for under a
checkoff clause in the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. The
defendant alleged that it had deposited the money in a special bank account
because these employees had objected to the withholding; and further pleaded that
the check-off clause was null as being unlawful. The trial judge dismissed the
action and held the check-off clause to be null and void since it could not be
considered as a "condition de travail".
This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
[Page 207]
Held (Taschereau, Locke and Fauteux JJ. dissenting) :
The plaintiff union was entitled to recover the sum withheld from the non-union
members and not remitted to the union.
Per Kerwin C.J. and Cartwright, Abbott and Judson JJ.:
The compulsory check-off clause here in question was a "condition de
travail" within the meaning of the Quebec legislation. There was nothing
in the legislation to justify the subdivision made by the trial judge into
conditions "en soi", which did not need the
assent of the employees, and conditions "conventionnelles",
requiring such assent. Once the union and the employer agreed upon the
clause, it became as much regulatory of the employer-employee relationship as
any other clause in the agreement. Being a regulation of the contract of labour
to that extent, it could not be rejected as being something outside the scope
of the Act. The test must be its real connection with the contract of labour,
and assent or non-assent of the individual member of the unit was immaterial.
By virtue of its incorporation and certification, the union
negotiates as the compulsory statutory representative of the whole group of
employees whether members of the union or not. This leaves no room for private
negotiation between the employer and employee on the matters covered in the
agreement. The agreement tells the employer on what terms he must conduct his
master and servant relations. As to the employees, they are put to their
election either to accept the terms or seek other employment.
The compulsory check-off was not prohibited by any law.
Section 17 of the Professional Syndicates' Act, which limits the right
of the union to three months' dues from a member who resigns, did not affect
the non-union employees. It did not affect the right of the union and the
employer to contract for a compulsory check-off as a condition of employment.
There was nothing in the legislation which disclosed any
intention to make the law of mandate applicable to the situation contemplated
by the Act. The status conferred upon the union resulted from the legislation
and not from a contractual relation of mandate.
Per Taschereau and Locke JJ., dissenting: The
withholding by the employer for remittance to the union of part of the salary
of an employee objecting to such withholding was not a "condition de
travail" within the meaning of the legislation. It related only to the
financial administration of the union and had no relation to the conditions
under which an employee must or must not work. Such a clause was not included
within the restricted limits of s. 2(e) of the Labour Relations Act or
s. 21 of the Professional Sydicates' Act. The objecting employees could
be bound only by the conditions envisaged by the legislation.
It seemed indisputable that the Legislature never had the intention
of considering the compulsory check-off as a "condition de travail".
The check-off made its appearance in Quebec a long time after the enactment of
the Quebec legislation and could bind the parties only by consent.
The plaintiff union could not rely upon the provisions of
arts. 1028 and 1029 of the Civil Code.
[Page 208]
Per Fauteux J., dissenting: The clause was not a
"condition de travail" within the meaning of the legislation, and
hence could not be the object of a collective agreement and must be held
invalid.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench,
Appeal Side, Province of Quebec, affirming a judgment of Choquette J.
Appeal allowed, Taschereau, Locke and Fauteux JJ. dissenting.
L. P. Pigeon, Q.C., and Roger Thibaudeau, for
the plaintiff, appellant.
J. M, Guérard, Q.C., and J. H.
Gagné, Q.C., for the defendant, respondent.
The judgment of Kerwin C. J. and Cartwright, Abbott and
Judson JJ. was delivered by
Judson J.:—The
judgment under appeal holds that a certain clause in the
collective bargaining agreement made between the appellant and the respondent
is null and void. The clause in full is as follows:
The employer shall withhold from the wages of each regular
employee covered by this agreement a sum equal to the union dues fixed by the
Syndicate for its members and shall within the first ten days of the ensuing
month remit the amount so withheld to the Syndicate's authorized
representative.
The object of the clause is well-known and obvious. It
is to throw upon all employees, whether members of the union or not, equal
responsibility for the financial upkeep of the union on the theory that the
gains achieved by the union on behalf of all employees must, at least to the
extent of financial support, be paid for by all. For the union the advantages
and convenience of a compulsory check-off are equally obvious.
The appellant is a labour union incorporated under the Professional
Syndicates' Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 162. It was duly certified as a bargaining
agent under the Labour Relations Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c.
162A, by decisions of the Quebec Labour Relations Board dated December
6, 1950, and May 20, 1954. The collective agreement, which contains the
impugned clause, is dated March 24, 1955. It was made between the appellant and
the respondent following a strike of the respondent's employees. Immediately
after the signing of the agreement all the employees were
[Page 209]
notified in writing of the existence of the clause by a
circular prepared by the union but distributed by the company. With the week
ending April 9, 1955, the company began to deduct fifty cents per week from the
wages of all employees whether members of the union or not. Shortly afterwards,
on April 22, 1955, a number of employees, who were almost all non-members of
the union, expressed their dissent by signing the following document:
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I do not authorize
the Compagnie Paquet Limitée to withhold from my weekly wages the sum of $0.50
by application of the "Rand formula" from this date to the end of the
present contract.
Ultimately, 254 out of 607 employees covered by the
agreement expressed this dissent. Of the remainder, 230 union members
authorized the deduction and 123 employees gave no authorization but made no
objection. The company nevertheless continued to withhold the fifty cents per
week from all employees but instead of remitting the amounts collected from the
254 dissenting employees, deposited this money in a special bank account and
notified the union of its action. After intermediate negotiations and
proceedings under the agreement, which are of no significance in the
determination of this matter, the union began this action in the Superior Court
to claim from the company the amount collected. The Superior Court held that
this compulsory check-off was null and void. This judgment was affirmed by the
unanimous decision of the Court of Queen's Bench. The union now appeals
to this Court.
The main reason given for the rejection of the clause was
that it was not a "condition de travail" within the meaning of the Professional
Syndicates' Act and the Labour Relations Act and that consequently,
it was outside the scope of the contracting power of the union and company when
they made their collective labour agreement. I therefore turn immediately to an
examination of the relevant provisions of these two enactments. The Professional
Syndicates' Act, enacted in 1924, authorizes the incorporation of these
associations and provides for the negotiation of collective labour agreements,
which agreements are enforceable contracts. "Any agreement respecting the
conditions of labour (les conditions du travail)
not prohibited by law may form the object of a collective
[Page 210]
labour agreement" (s. 21). It is apparent that a collective agreement may be
of wide scope. There are only two limiting factors. The terms of this agreement
must relate to conditions of labour (conditions du travail)
and must not be prohibited by law.
This Act did not provide for compulsory collective
bargaining. This came with the Labour Relations Act in 1944, which
compelled an employer to recognize as the collective representative of his
employee "the representatives of any association comprising the absolute
majority of his said employees and to negotiate with them, in good faith, a
collective labour agreement" (s. 4). "Collective Agreement" is
defined as
Any arrangement respecting conditions of employment
(conditions de travail) entered into between persons acting for one or more
associations of employees, and an employer or several employers or persons
acting for one or more associations of employers, (s. 2(e))
Section 19(a) provides that the Act applies "to a
collective agreement entered into under the Professional Syndicates'
Act.…"
The Professional Syndicates' Act was enabling only,
not compulsory, and the right of representation of the syndicate was confined
to its members. Theoretically it was possible to have a collective agreement
under this Act which left untouched the position of employees who were not
members of the syndicate. The change made by the Labour Relations Act in
1944 was profound. The collective representative with the necessary majority
acquired the right of representation for all the employees, whether members or
not, and the employer became obligated to negotiate in good faith with that
collective representative. Failure to agree might result in conciliation
proceedings and eventually in the appointment of a council of arbitration.
The legal problem under consideration in this litigation has
to be determined with this compulsory aspect of the legislation in mind.
Nowhere do the two Acts attempt to define "conditions de travail",
"conditions of labour" "or "conditions of employment".
The differences in phraseology between the French and English versions of the
two Acts leap to the eye but the reasons of the learned trial judge and of the
Court of Queen's Bench, rightly, in my respectful opinion, decline to make
these differences a governing
[Page 211]
factor in their decisions. Whatever the phrase may be,
"conditions de travail", "conditions of
labour" or "conditions of employment", all three deal with the
same general concept and in one language the terminology is uniform.
Why has the impugned clause been rejected as a
"condition de travail" and consequently as being beyond the proper
scope of a collective agreement? The learned trial judge subdivided
"conditions de travail" into two classes,
"conditions de travail en soi" and
"conditions de travail conventionnelles"
and in doing so doubtless accepted the suggestion put forward in
Beaulieu, Les Conflits de Droit dans les
Rapports Collectifs du Travail. The first type of condition,
he held, was a true "condition de travail" and could
be inserted in a collective agreement without the individual assent of the
employees, and the second, in his opinion, required such assent. The ratio of
his judgment on this point is expressed in the following extract from his
reasons:
qu'il y a lieu, en effet, de distinguer entre
conditions de travail en soi, ou clauses normatives des conditions de
travail, et conditions de travail conventionnelles stipulées en marge
des premières (Me M. L. Beaulieu, Conflits de droit dans les rapports
collectifs du travail, pp. 360, 366, 368, 370) ; que seules les premières
peuvent faire l'objet d'une convention collective, sans qu'il soit nécessaire
d'obtenir l'assentiment individuel des employés représentés; que les secondes,
au contraire, exigent cet assentiment ;
I can find nothing in this legislation which would justify
this subdivision nor any guide for the doing of it. It is obvious that one may
have a collective agreement which is satisfactory to the parties without this
clause. When, however, the parties have agreed upon it, it is to me just as
much regulatory of the employer-employee relationship as any other clause in
the agreement. It is directly concerned with the right to hire and the right to
retain employment, for without accepting this term a person cannot be hired,
or, if he is already an employee, cannot retain his employment. If it is a
regulation of the contract of labour to this extent, and it' clearly is, how
can it be rejected as being something outside the authorization of the Act? A
term either is or is not a "condition de travail".
The test must be its real connection with the contract of labour, and
[Page 212]
assent or absence of assent of the individual member of the
bargaining unit seem to me to be matters that have no relevancy in the
determination of the question.
In the Court of Queen's Bench the clause was variously
described as being solely in the interest of the union at the expense of the
employees; as being directed against the freedom of the employer in his hiring
of employees, and as being in no way concerned with the work of the employee.
Consequently, it was rejected as a "condition de travail".
I cannot accept this characterization of the clause. It is easy to see its
convenience and advantage to the union. Nevertheless, the union is negotiating
as the compulsory statutory representative of the whole group of employees—
whether members of the union or not. How can one validly infer that a
compulsory check-off clause is not a necessary incident of employer-employee
relations or is not the proper concern of those who are negotiating about these
relations? It is not an assumption that would be made by one of the parties.
The other party that now attacks the clause signed the agreement. The clause is
one that has been used in collective agreements for some considerable time.
This, in itself, is some indication that it has been found useful to and is
accepted as desirable by those who are the interested parties in these
agreements and I have already indicated that in my opinion, it is directly
concerned with the regulation of employer-employee relations. This, I think, prevents
any judicial inference that it is outside the scope of the collective agreement
as not being a "condition de travail".
The union is, by virtue of its incorporation under the Professional
Syndicates' Act and its certification under the Labour Relations Act, the
representative of all the employees in the unit for the purpose of negotiating
the labour agreement. There is no room left for private negotiation between
employer and employee. Certainly to the extent of the matters covered by the
collective agreement, freedom of contract between master and individual servant
is abrogated. The collective agreement tells the employer on what terms he must
in the future conduct his master and servant relations. When this collective
agreement was made, it then became the duty of the employer to modify
[Page 213]
his contracts of employment in accordance with its terms so
far as the inclusion of those terms is authorized by the governing statutes.
The terms of employment are defined for all employees, and whether or not they
are members of the union, they are identical for all. How did this compulsory
check-off of the equivalent of union dues become a term of the individual
employee's contract of employment? They were told by the notice that in future
this deduction would be a term of their contract of employment. They were put
to their election at this point either to accept the new term or seek other
employment. They made their election by continuing to work and the deductions
were actually made. It is admitted that all these employees were employees at
will and no question arises as to the right of the employer to make or impose
new contracts or of the length of notice that may be required to bring this
about. It was not within the power of the employee to insist on retaining his
employment on his own terms, or on any terms other than those lawfully inserted
in the collective agreement.
I now turn to the question whether the compulsory
withholding is prohibited by law. The learned trial judge stated that it was
clearly unlawful against non-union members on the ground that it infringed s.
17 of the Professional Syndicates' Act. The Act authorizes the
imposition of an annual assessment upon the members. Section 17 provides:
17. The members of a professional syndicate may resign
voluntarily, without prejudice to the syndicate's right to claim the assessment
for the three months following such resignation.
They shall not be personnally liable for the debts of the
syndicate.
The syndicate shall not claim from a member ceasing to
adhere thereto the assessment of more than three months.
How does this make the collection of the equivalent of
union dues from non-members unlawful? It deals only with the position of
members and limits the right of the syndicate to three months' dues from a
member who resigns. If this section were not in the Act, it would be possible,
by bylaw, to compel payment of dues for a longer period even after resignation.
The non-union employee is not affected in any way by this section. As long as
he retains his employment he is subjected to a compulsory check-off of the
equivalent of union dues but if he resigns his employment, as he is free to do
at any time, he pays no more. The only
[Page 214]
effect of s. 17 is to limit the right of the union to
collect dues from its members after their resignation. It does not affect the
right of the parties to contract for a compulsory-check-off as a condition of
employment.
Next, it is said both in the reasons of the learned trial
judge and in certain of the reasons of the Court of Queen's Bench that by
virtue of the provisions of ss. 4 and 9 of the Labour Relations Act the
union became a mandatary of the members of the bargaining unit and that this
precluded it from inserting a term in the collective agreement in its own
interest. Section 4, which I have already referred to, deals with the
compulsory recognition of a union comprising the absolute majority of the
employees, and s. 9 states that
"The Board shall issue, to every recognized
association, a certificate specifying the group which it is entitled to
represent." There is nothing in the legislation which discloses any
intention to make the law of mandate applicable to the situation contemplated
by the Act. There is only a legislative recognition and certification of a
union as the collective representative of the employees, provided the union
comprises the absolute majority of the employees. When this situation arises
the employer must negotiate and contract with the collective representative and
the collective representative represents all employees, whether union members
or not, not because of a contractual relation of mandate between employees and
union but because of a status conferred upon the union by the legislation.
If the relation between employee and union were that of
mandator and mandatary, the result would be that a collective agreement would
be the equivalent of a bundle of individual contracts between employer and
employee negotiated by the union as agent for the employees. This seems to me
to be a complete misapprehension of the nature of the juridical relation
involved in the collective agreement. The union contracts not as agent or
mandatary but as an independent contracting party and the contract it makes
with the employer binds the employer to regulate his master and servant
relations according to the agreed terms.
[Page 215]
Planiol and Ripert Droit Civil (1932) vol. 11, no.
882, in discussing the nature of the collective agreement, defined by the law
of France in terms indistinguishable from those of the Quebec legislation under
consideration here, reject the legal theory of mandate in this situation in
these words :
C'est ainsi qu'on ne peut l'expliquer par un mandat
que l'ouvrier donnerait au syndicat de fixer les conditions du travail dans
un accord passé à son profit avec le patron, l'adhésion au syndicat ne
permettant pas de supposer l'existence de ce mandat.
The learned authors in their second edition (1954) vol. 11,
no. 881, adhere to this opinion:
Dès cette époque il apparaissait cependant que
la convention collective n'était pas destinée à créer directement entre les
employeurs et les salariés des relations de travail, mais à préciser les
conditions auxquelles les contrats individuels devaient être conclus.
Durand and Jussand, Traité de droit du travail, t. 1,
no. 106, p. 130, are of the same opinion.
What the learned authors have to say about the impossibility
of explaining the collective agreements by the theory of mandate as far as
union members are concerned seems to me to apply with all the more force to
non-union employees, whose only connection with the collective representative
is by virtue of the Labour Relations Act. Apart from the judgment under
appeal, we were referred to no authority to justify the application of the
doctrine to the novel situation contemplated by the Labour Relations Act. The
collective agreement is a recent development in our law and has a character all
of its own. To attempt to engraft upon it the concepts embodied in the law of
mandate, would, in my opinion, effectively frustrate the whole operation of the
Act.
My conclusion therefore is that the clause under
consideration is a "condition de travail" within the meaning of the
Quebec legislation and that it is not prohibited by any law. I would allow the
appeal and declare the clause valid and binding and enter judgment for the
appellant for the sums withheld from the 254 employees and not remitted to the
appellant. The appellant is entitled to its costs throughout.
[Page 216]
The judgment of Taschereau and Locke JJ. was delivered by
Taschereau J. (dissenting):—Il est inutile de relater de nouveau tous les
faits de cette cause, qui l'ont été déjà par mon collègue M. le Juge Judson. Il
me suffira d'en signaler quelques-uns seulement.
Pour solutionner le problème qui se présente,
il est important de retenir deux lois statutaires, qui ont été discutées et
analysées par les cours inférieures et par les procureurs des deux parties. La
première est la Loi des syndicats professionnels de la province de Québec, S.R.Q.
1941, c. 162 et amendements, en vertu de laquelle l'appelant est incorporé, et
la seconde est la Loi des relations ouvrières, S.R.Q. 1941, c. 162A et
amendements, qui édicté entre autres choses que tout employeur est tenu de
reconnaître comme représentant collectif des salariés à son emploi, les
représentants d'une association groupant la majorité absolue desdits salariés,
et de négocier de bonne foi avec eux, une convention collective de travail. La
loi définit la "convention collective" comme étant une entente
relative aux conditions de travail, conclue entre les personnes agissant
pour une ou plusieurs associations de salariés, et un ou plusieurs employeurs
ou personnes agissant pour une ou plusieurs associations d'employeurs.
Le 24 mars 1955, une "convention
collective" a été signée entre l'appelant, qui est l'agent négociateur
pour représenter les employés de l'employeur, et l'intimée, et la clause 2.01
qui est à la base du présent litige se lit ainsi:
ARTICLE 2.01—L'employeur
retiendra sur la paie de chaque employé régulier, assujetti à la présente
convention, une somme égale à la cotisation fixée par le syndicat pour ses
membres, et remettra dans les dix premiers jours du mois suivant, au
représentant autorisé du syndicat, le prélèvement ainsi perçu.
A cette date du 24 mars 1955, la compagnie
intimée avait à son emploi au delà de 600 employés affectés par le certificat
de reconnaissance syndicale de l'appelant, mais 230 membres seulement du
syndicat appelant autorisèrent la compagnie à déduire de leurs salaires le
montant de la cotisation syndicale, 123 ne donnèrent aucune autorisation mais
ne s'objectèrent pas à l'application de la clause, et 254 employés, non membres
du syndicat, refusèrent de reconnaître l'application de la clause 2.01, et
interdirent à la compagnie intimée de faire aucune déduction. L'intimée a quand
[Page 217]
même retenu les cotisations des employés non
membres du syndicat, et en a déposé le produit dans un compte de banque
"In Trust", en attendant une adjudication finale, et le syndicat en a
été avisé.
Le 13 septembre 1955, vu qu'aucun règlement
n'était intervenu, ni par conciliation ni autrement, l'appelant a institué les
présentes procédures, et a réclamé de la défenderesse-intimée la somme de
$3,000, représentant les cotisations des employés protestataires, déposées dans
le compte "In Trust".
L'intimée a invoqué plusieurs moyens de
défense, mais je crois qu'il est nécessaire de n'en retenir qu'un seul, car il
est à mon sens suffisant pour disposer de ce litige.
En vertu de la Loi des relations ouvrières,
arts. 4 et 19(a), tout
employeur, c'est-à-dire l'intimée dans la présente cause, est tenu de
reconnaître comme représentant collectif des salariés à son emploi, les
représentants d'une association groupant la majorité absolue desdits salariés,
et de négocier de bonne foi avec eux, une convention collective de travail. La
Loi des relations ouvrières s'applique à une convention collective de
travail conclue sous la Loi des syndicats professionnels par une
association qui est reconnue à compter de la date du dépôt de cette convention
au bureau du ministre du Travail, conformément à la Loi des syndicats
professionnels. Comme ce dépôt a été fait au bureau du ministre du Travail
le 29 mars 1955, la convention a donc
pris effet à partir de cette date.
Il est certain qu'en vertu de la Loi des
relations ouvrières, tous les employés de la Compagnie Paquet, l'intimée,
sont liés en ce qui concerne les conditions de travail, par la
convention collective signée entre les parties. Je suis bien d'avis que la
détermination des heures de travail, des congés, des vacances, des salaires,
des droits d'ancienneté ou des congédiements, comporte essentiellement des conditions
de travail, pour lesquelles le syndicat, en vertu de la loi, peut stipuler
pour le bénéfice des employés, et lier ainsi l'employeur qui signe la
convention. Mais je ne puis admettre que la retenue hebdomadaire par
l'employeur d'une partie du salaire d'un employé protestataire, pour remise au
syndicat, soit une condition de travail au sens de la loi. Il ne s'agit
alors que d'une affaire
[Page 218]
d'administration financière du syndicat, qui
veut évidemment faciliter ainsi la perception des cotisations, et qui n'a aucun
rapport aux conditions dans lesquelles un employé doit ou ne doit pas travailler.
Ce n'est que lorsque les conditions de travail telles que prévues par
les statuts, sont affectées, que le syndicat peut exercer son recours.
L'article 4 de la Loi des relations ouvrières et
l'art. 2 para, (e) de la même loi qui définissent
la convention collective me semblent assez clairs pour éliminer tout
doute sur ce point.
Il est certain, que la retenue du salaire peut
être une condition de travail dont dépend le droit d'un employé de
travailler. Mais la question est de savoir si une semblable condition est
comprise dans le cadre restreint de l'art. 2(e) de
la Loi des relations ouvrières, ou de l'art. 21 de
la Loi des syndicats professionnels. Je ne le crois pas. Toutes les
conditions ne sont pas prévues aux statuts. Ce ne sont que celles que la loi
envisage qui puissent lier les dissidents. Ainsi, une clause stipulant que
seules les personnes appartenant à une religion ou une race particulière,
auraient le droit d'être employées à un travail quelconque, pourrait être, dans
un sens, considérée comme une condition de travail, mais personne ne
peut suggérer sérieusement que la Législature ait jamais songé qu'un syndicat
représentant des employés, pourrait les lier légalement par une telle clause.
Il me semble aussi indiscutable que la
Législature dans la rédaction de ses lois ouvrières, n'a jamais eu l'intention
de considérer la retenue d'une partie des salaires des groupes dissidents comme
une condition de travail. Le "check-off", comme on est convenu de l'appeler, n'a été mis en évidence dans la province
de Québec qu'en 1946, quand mon collègue, M. le juge Rand, nommé arbitre pour régler un différend
survenu à la compagnie Ford, le suggéra, bien longtemps après la législation de
Québec. Il s'agissait alors d'un compromis proposé par M. le juge Rand, que
les parties s'étaient d'avance engagées à reconnaître, où le
"close shop" et le "union shop"
entre autres, ont été refusés, et le "check-off"
accordé. La formule Rand ne peut lier les parties que par consentement, ce qui n'existe pas ici.
Seule la loi spéciale
[Page 219]
invoquée dans la présente cause pourrait
autoriser la retenue de partie des salaires des employés non syndiqués, si elle
s'appliquait.
Pour les raisons données par la Cour du banc
de la reine, je suis d'opinion qu'on ne peut
invoquer le bénéfice des arts. 1028 et 1029 C.C., pour donner effet à la présente réclamation.
Comme je suis clairement d'opinion que la
retenue syndicale n'est pas une condition de travail, au sens de la loi,
je crois, comme la Cour supérieure et comme la Cour du banc de la reine, que la
clause 2.01 de la convention est ultra vires.
L'appel doit donc être rejeté avec dépens.
Fauteux J. (dissenting):—Les raisons données par M. le Juge Pratte, de la Cour d'Appel1, démontrent
clairement, à mon avis, que l'engagement relatif à la retenue du salaire, dont
le syndicat demande l'exécution, ne porte pas sur une condition de travail au
sens de la législation considérée et que, partant, il ne pouvait faire l'objet
d'une convention collective et doit être tenu pour invalide.
Je renverrais l'appel avec dépens.
Appeal allowed with costs, Taschereau, Locke
and Fauteux JJ. dissenting.
Attorneys for the plaintiff, appellant: Germain,
Pigeon & Thibaudeau, Quebec.
Attorneys for the defendant, respondent:
Jean-Marie Guérard and Jean-H. Gagné, Quebec.
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