Supreme Court of Canada
Worldwide Evangelization Crusade (Canada) v. Beamsville (Village of), [1960] S.C.R. 49
Date: 1959-11-30
Worldwide
Evangelization Crusade (Canada) (Plaintiff) Appellant;
and
The Corporation of
the Village of Beamsville (Defendant) Respondent.
1959: June 10; 1959: November 30.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR
ONTARIO.
Taxation—Municipal—Missionary training
centre—Whether property exempt from municipal taxation as “seminary of learning
maintained for philanthropic or religious purposes”—The Assessment Act, R.S.O.
1950, c. 24, s. 4(5).
The plaintiff, a non-profit evangelical
corporation, owned properties in the defendant municipality, which it used for
training and preparing persons to be missionaries in foreign fields. The
training given consisted of Scripture readings and general religious
discussions, and in learning skills considered valuable to missionaries, such
as cooking, sewing, motor mechanics, carpentry, etc. There was no fixed
curriculum.
The plaintiff sued the municipality for a
declaration that the properties were exempt from taxation under s. 4(5) of The
Assessment Act, which provides exemption from tax for buildings used bona
fide “in connection with and for the purposes of a seminary of learning
maintained for philanthropic or religious purposes, the whole profits of which
are devoted or applied to such purposes”. The action was dismissed by the trial
judge, and this judgment was affirmed by a majority in the Court of Appeal.
Held (Kerwin
C.J. and Judson J. dissenting): The plaintiff was entitled to the exemption
claimed.
The word “seminary” standing by itself, has
no fixed legal meaning. It is not a term of art and its primary meaning is
simply a place of education. The proper way to decide whether para. 5 of s. 4
of the Act applied was not to compare the plaintiff’s method of instruction
with that given in other institutions falling within the description of
“seminary of learning”, but rather to inquire whether those in attend-
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ance learned to fulfil better and more
effectively the religious purpose to which they had dedicated themselves. The
evidence showed that that result was achieved.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal
for Ontario, affirming a
judgment of LeBel J. Appeal allowed, Kerwin C.J. and Judson J. dissenting.
P.B.C. Pepper, for the plaintiff,
appellant.
G.M. Lampard, Q.C., for the defendant,
respondent.
The judgment of Kerwin C.J. and Judson J. was
delivered by
THE CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting):—I agree
with the reasons given by Schroeder J.A. The appeal should be dismissed with
costs.
The judgment of Locke, Cartwright and Martland
JJ. was delivered by
CARTWRIGHT J.:—This as an appeal from a judgment
of the Court of Appeal for Ontario
dismissing an appeal from a judgment of LeBel J., as he then was, whereby the
appellant’s action for a declaration that certain property owned by it situate
in the respondent village is exempt from taxation was dismissed. Mackay J.A.,
dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and granted the declaration.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. They are
conveniently summarized in the following passage in the reasons of Mackay J.A.:
The Plaintiff is a corporation incorporated
by Letters Patent issued pursuant to the provisions of The Ontario Companies
Act. The Letters Patent provide that the corporation shall be carried on
without the purpose of gain for its members, and that any profit or other
accretions to the corporation shall be used in promoting its objects. The
purposes and objects of the corporation as set out in the Letters Patent are:
“To train, equip and send missionaries for
service in the foreign countries in which the Worldwide Evangelization Crusade
operates; to maintain and support such missionaries; to disseminate missionary
and spiritual literature and information; and to do all such other things as
are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objects.”
The properties owned by the appellants are
two adjoining house properties known as Numbers 127, 133 and 149 King Street, in the Village of Beamsville. The permanent staff, who live on the premises, are Mr. Arthur
E. Frid, Canadian Secretary and Executive Officer of the appellant corporation,
his wife, who is a former school teacher; Miss Evelyn Thomas,
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a former school teacher and also a
qualified dietitian, and Miss Annabel Truedson, also a former school teacher,
who acts as treasurer and as secretary and assistant to Mr. Frid.
The only purpose for which the premises are
said by the appellant to be used is for training and preparing candidates for
service as missionaries in foreign fields. The students are persons who are
either graduates of recognized Bible Schools and ordained for the ministry, or
persons who are qualified to be ordained, and in addition to these students,
missionaries who are former graduates of the institution and who have served as
missionaries in foreign fields, are required, when they return to Canada, on
furlough to attend in the dual capacity of students taking a refresher course
and as instructors to give instruction and counsel in regard to problems and
conditions encountered by them in their work as missionaries, to those students
who have not yet served as missionaries.
While there is no fixed curriculum, the
staff and all students each morning, for two and a half hours, attend a meeting
for Scripture reading and general religious discussion, including the
application of the lessons of the Scriptures to practical daily problems of
living and working, particularly with relation to missionary work in foreign
fields. During the rest of the day the students are given instruction in
dietetics, cooking, sewing, motor mechanics and carpentry, a knowledge of such
skills being considered necessary to enable them to successfully carry on their
work as missionaries in foreign fields under primitive conditions. The minimum
length of time the students are required to attend at the institution is six
months and the maximum two years. There are no examinations and the length of
time the students attend depends on the discretion of the staff, the students
being allowed to leave and enter missionary work when the staff feel that they
are qualified to do so. The institution is financed by voluntary contributions.
The students do not pay any fees or make any payment for board and lodging. The
staff do not receive any salaries.
The appellant’s claim to exemption is based on
para. 5 of s. 4 of The Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 24, but it
will be convenient to set out paras. 4 and 6 of that section also:
4. All real property in Ontario shall be liable to assessment and
taxation, subject to the following exemptions from taxation:—
* * *
4. The buildings and grounds of and
attached to or otherwise bona fide used in connection with and for the
purposes of a university, high school, public or separate school, whether
vested in a trustee or otherwise, so long as such buildings and grounds are
actually used and occupied by such institution, but not if otherwise occupied.
5. The buildings and grounds of and
attached to or otherwise bona fide used in connection with and for the
purposes of a seminary of learning maintained for philanthropic or religious
purposes, the whole profits from which are devoted or applied to such purposes,
but such grounds and buildings shall be exempt only while actually used and
occupied by such seminary.
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6. The buildings and grounds not exceeding
in the whole fifty acres of and attached to or otherwise bona fide used
in connection with and for the purposes of a seminary of learning maintained
for educational purposes, the whole profits from which are devoted or applied
to such purposes, but such grounds and buildings shall be exempt only while
actually used and occupied by such seminary, and such exemption shall not
extend to include any part of the lands of such a seminary which are used for
farming or agricultural pursuits and are worked on shares with any other
person, or if the annual or other crops, or any part thereof, from such lands
are sold.
It is conceded that the activities carried on by
the appellant in the buildings and grounds for which it claims exemption are
“for religious purposes” but the respondent contends that those activities are
not such as to bring the appellant’s institution within the meaning of the word
“a seminary of learning” as used in para. 5.
I agree with the view expressed by Schroeder
J.A. that the word “seminary”, standing by itself, has not acquired any fixed
legal meaning. It is not, in my opinion, a term of art and its primary meaning
is simply a place of education.
It is, however, argued for the respondent that
the phrase “a seminary of learning” requires as a condition of its application
to any institution that the instruction given therein shall be of a higher
standard of scholarship and erudition than that given in the appellant’s
establishment, and shall approximate that given in universities. One difficulty
that I have in accepting this argument is that any institution fulfilling the
suggested requirements would appear to fall within either para. 4 or para. 6 of
s. 4, and para. 5 would become unnecessary.
It appears from uncontradicted evidence that the
purpose of those attending the appellant’s establishment is to learn how to
become missionaries or, in the case of those who are already engaged in that
calling, to become better missionaries. It further appears that there has been
great success in achieving the desired result. Learning to be better
missionaries is no mere by-product or chance result of these persons living and
working together in this establishment; it is the primary purpose of their
association. That the subjects of their study comprise only the Holy Scriptures
and those practical skills useful in the mission field does not, in my opinion,
render the word “learning” inapt to describe their activities.
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In my opinion, the proper way to decide whether
para. 5 is applicable is not to compare the appellant’s method of instruction
with that given in other institutions which undoubtedly fall within the
description of “seminary of learning”, but rather to inquire whether those in
attendance do learn to fulfil better and more effectively the religious purpose
to which they have dedicated themselves.
I have reached the conclusion that the appellant
is entitled to the exemption claimed.
While in view of the difference of opinion in
the Courts below I have endeavoured to express my reasons in my own words, I
wish also to rest my judgment on the reasons of Mackay J.A. with which I am in
full agreement.
I would allow the appeal and direct that
judgment be entered for the appellant for the declaration claimed with costs
throughout.
Appeal allowed with costs, KERWIN C.J.
and JUDSON J. dissenting.
Solicitors for the defendant, respondent:
Seymour, Lampard, Goldring
& Young, St. Catharines.