Supreme Court of Canada
Bank of Montreal v. Bloomer, [1965]
S.C.R. 696
Date: 1965-06-24
Bank of Montreal (Defendant) Appellant;
and
Grant
Blommer (Plaintiff) Respondent.
1965: April 29, 30; 1965:
June 24.
Present: Cartwright, Abbott,
Martland, Hall and Spence JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF
APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA
Banks and banking—Purchaser
turning over bank draft to third party to effect payment for shares—Proceeds of
draft credited to account of holding company to cover latter's cheque to payee—Bank
not liable for conversion.
The plaintiff B and certain other persons connected with N
Ltd. became interested in the acquisition of shares in that company, which were
owned by a group living in the United States, which controlled 410 out of the
1,000 issued common shares of the company. An arrangement made by Y, the
president of the company, involved the sale by one L of a total of 54 shares,
and the acquisition of a like number by B. The latter, on March 29, 1962,
purchased a draft for $13,500 (U.S.) from the defendant bank in Vancouver and
turned it over to Y to effect payment to L.
Unknown to B was the fact that the shares controlled by L in
the company were not registered in his own name. The 410 shares of the company
controlled by the American group were registered in the name of a holding
company, S, incorporated in British Columbia. To avoid a loss on exchange, the
procedure which was followed was to have S issue its cheque to L in the amount
of $15,000 (U.S.), which L duly cashed. When the S cheque was returned to the
bank in Vancouver there was delivered to the bank the bank draft to L, which
was applied to cover the payment made by S.
The secretary of the company, by May 9, 1962, had in his possession all the documents necessary to register B as the owner of the 54 shares
which he was purchasing from L. However, no share certificate was issued to B
at that time and it was not until July 30 that his solicitors were advised that
B was recorded on the register of transfers and that share certificates were
available for delivery. In the meantime B had repudiated the purchase of shares
on the ground that the shares had not been delivered. The company went into
liquidation in August 1962.
In an action for damages for conversion of the draft, the
trial judge held that there had been such conversion. The Court of Appeal in
dismissing an appeal from the trial judgment took the position that B was not
obliged to accept company shares from S because his contract with L was for the
purchase of shares owned by L.
Held: The appeal should be allowed.
If a contract specifically stipulated for delivery of a
specified article, or in a specified manner, a party to it was entitled to
insist upon performance in the agreed manner. Here, however, there was no
written contract, and no evidence that, in his negotiations with L, B
stipulated for the purchase of shares which must have been registered in L's
own name.
B knew that Y had negotiated the purchase for B and others
from the American group of a block of company shares, and that the draft
[Page 697]
was turned over to Y to pay for those shares which B was to
acquire. The draft, while it did not reach L directly, was used to effect that
payment. The bank could not be guilty of conversion merely because B was not
aware of the actual procedure by means of which the deal was to be finally
effected.
Bowes v. Shand (1877), 2 App. Cas 455, distinguished.
APPEAL from a judgment of the
Court of Appeal for British Columbia, affirming a judgment of Munroe J. in an action for
conversion of a negotiable instrument. Appeal allowed.
F. H. Bonnel, Q.C., and D.
A. Freeman, for the defendant, appellant.
H. E. Hutcheon, for the
plaintiff, respondent.
The judgment of the court was
delivered by
MARTLAND J.:—This is an appeal
from the Court of Appeal for British
Columbia, which affirmed the judgment
at trial in an action in which the respondent, Bloomer, was plaintiff and the
appellant bank the defendant. Bloomer obtained a judgment for $14,183.44, plus
interest and costs, in respect of a claim for conversion by the bank of a bank
draft purchased by him from the bank, in the amount of $13,500 U.S. funds,
payable to one James C. Lewis and drawn on the United California Bank.
On April 17, 1961, Bloomer
became an employee of Nutri-Bio of Canada Ltd. (hereinafter called "the
company"), in Vancouver. The company, which was a private company
incorporated under the Canadian Companies Act, and an affiliated company
in the United States of America, Nutri-Bio Corporation, were engaged in the
distribution and sale of dietary supplements. In February 1962, Bloomer became
the vice-president of the company in charge of distributor relations. The
president of the company was Charles W. Young, and he and Bloomer had their
offices in the premises of the company in Vancouver.
Bloomer and certain other persons
connected with the company became interested in the acquisition of shares in
the company, which were owned by a group living in the United States,
which controlled 410 out of the 1,000 issued common shares of the company. They
were interested in
[Page 698]
acquiring the shares because of
the likelihood of the company being converted into a public company and making
a public issue of its shares.
Bloomer had had some discussion
with James C. Lewis, of Los Angeles, regarding the acquisition of some shares from him,
in December of 1961. Early in 1962, Young had discussions with Lewis, in Los Angeles,
regarding Bloomer acquiring some of Lewis's shares.
The discussions culminated in a
meeting held at the offices of the company in March 1962, which is described in
the following extract from the evidence of W.R.D. Underhill, the solicitor
and secretary of the company:
Subsequently in 1962 I was
advised by Mr. Young in Mr. Bloomer's presence that Mr. Young was engaging in
negotiations with certain members of the American group, among them, Lewis, for
the sale of shares in Nutri-Bio of Canada Ltd., to a number of Canadian
officers of the company, including Bloomer, Strong and Granholme. These
negotiations had gone on for some period of time and at the end of March, I was
at the office, company offices for business purposes and present at a meeting,
at which meeting there was also present Mr. Bloomer, Mr. Young and I believe
Mr. Granholme, and I was informed at that meeting that a sale had been
negotiated of shares to Bloomer, Strong and Granholme. I was informed of the
price and I was informed that Mr. Bloomer's draft in payment for the shares was
on Mr. Young's desk. The meeting took place in Young's office. I was asked to
attend to the details of effecting the share transfer.
The arrangement made by Young
involved the sale by Lewis of a total of 54 shares, and the acquisition of a
like number by Bloomer. The draft referred to is the one which is in issue,
which Bloomer purchased from the bank on March 29, 1962.
After purchasing it, Bloomer had handed it to Young's secretary, saying:
"Here is the draft for Mr. Lewis."
As previously noted, Young was
conducting the negotiations for the share purchases, including Bloomer's, and
in evidence Bloomer stated that Young negotiated the price of the shares and
the actual sale of the shares with Lewis on Bloomer's behalf. He was also asked
the following question and gave the following answer:
Q. Now, would it be correct
to say, Mr. Bloomer, that you left the question of the acquisition of these
shares and the payment of the money entirely in the hands of Chuck Young and
Mr. Underhill?
A. In as much as the money
to be sent to James C. Lewis when I acquired the shares, yes.
[Page 699]
Unknown to Bloomer, but known to
Underhill, as secretary of the company, was the fact that the shares controlled
by Lewis in the company were not registered in his own name. The 410 shares of
the company controlled by the American group were registered in the name of a
holding company, Saturn Enterprises Ltd., incorporated in British Columbia. All of the shares in Saturn were registered in the name of another
holding company, Mars Holdings Limited, also incorporated in British Columbia, whose shares were owned by the American group in the same proportions
as the respective share holdings they had had in the company prior to their
transfer to Saturn. These holding companies had been created at the suggestion
of Underhill in order to meet certain tax problems in the United States.
In the result, however, each of the shareholders of Mars could exercise control
over, and could dispose of those shares in the company, now registered in the
name of Saturn, which, previously, he had owned in his own name. The procedure
followed by a beneficial owner in effecting a sale of shares held on his behalf
in the company was to have Saturn effect the sale to the purchaser, the
proceeds then being applied by Saturn in the purchase, from the beneficial
owner, of a proportionate number of the shares held by him in Mars.
The draft which Bloomer had
delivered to Young's secretary to effect payment for the shares to be obtained
from Lewis was made payable to Lewis, and not to Saturn, of whose existence
Bloomer was not aware. Underhill learned from the bank that if the draft were
to be cancelled there would be a loss on exchange. The procedure which was
followed was to have Saturn issue its cheque to Lewis in the amount of $15,000
(U.S.), which Lewis duly cashed. When the Saturn cheque was returned to the
bank in Vancouver there was delivered to the bank the bank draft to
Lewis, which was applied to cover the payment made by Saturn. On April 4 both
documents came into the hands of the associate manager of the foreign exchange
department of the bank at its main office in Vancouver, and the above
procedure was followed. He was not aware that the bank draft had initially been
purchased by Bloomer, and assumed that it belonged to Saturn. He marked the
draft "Proceeds refunded to Purchaser", and Saturn obtained the
credit for it. This occurred on April 4, 1962.
[Page 700]
Prior to that time, Underhill had
communicated with Butler, a lawyer in the United States, who acted for Nutri-Bio
Corporation (the American company) and who also represented most of the American
group who controlled shares in the company, including Lewis, and arranged for
the delivery to Butler of Saturn's share certificate for 410 shares in the
company, and for payment to those persons who controlled them for those shares
which were being sold. The certificate was forwarded to Underhill on April 17,
and in the meantime Underhill prepared the directors' resolution approving the
transfers from Saturn to the various purchasers. The signed resolution was in
Underhill's possession on May 8 or 9. Underhill says he signed this and gave
instructions to file it in the minute book and to have the share register noted
accordingly.
No share certificate was issued
to Bloomer at that time, and in the latter part of June Bloomer inquired about
it. Underhill told him the certificates were not prepared, but that he would do
so as soon as he could, but that he was pressed with other business,
particularly company business.
On June 29 Bloomer was discharged
from the service of the company. A few days later he learned that the proceeds
of the draft had been received by Saturn.
On July 17 Bloomer wired Lewis to
advise that he was repudiating the purchase of shares from him on the ground
that the shares had not been delivered and on other grounds, which were not stated.
This was confirmed by a letter from Bloomer's solicitors.
On July 30 Underhill wrote to
Bloomer's solicitors, advising that Bloomer was recorded on the register of
transfers and that the share certificates were available for delivery.
In August 1962, the company made
a proposal under the Bankruptcy Act and then went into liquidation under
the Winding Up Act.
On January 18, 1963, Bloomer
issued a writ against the bank claiming damages for conversion of the bank
draft, on the basis that the bank had wrongfully converted the proceeds of his
draft.
The learned trial judge held that
there had been a conversion by the bank of Bloomer's draft. He relied upon the
statements of the law made in Paget's Law of Banking, 6th ed., p. 303:
[Page 701]
A conversion is a wrongful
interference with goods, as by taking, using or destroying them, inconsistent
with the owner's right of possession. To constitute this injury, there must be
some act of the defendant repudiating the owner's right, or some exercise of
dominion inconsistent with it.
Intention is no element in
conversion.
"Any person who,
however innocently, obtains possession of goods the property of another who has
been fraudulently deprived of the possession of them, and disposes of them,
whether for his own benefit or that of another person, is guilty of a
conversion."
He also cited from Salmond on
Torts, 13th ed., p. 262:
A conversion is an act of
wilful interference, without lawful justification, with any chattel in a manner
inconsistent with the right of another, whereby that other is deprived of the
use and possession of it. Two elements are combined in such interference: (1) a
dealing with the chattel in a manner inconsistent with the right of the person
entitled to it, and (2) an intention in so doing to deny that person's right or
to assert a right which is in fact inconsistent with such right.
He rejected the defence that
Young and Underhill had authority to deal with the draft in the way they did,
and also the defence that the bank's disposition of the draft had not caused
damage to Bloomer.
The Court of Appeal took the
position that Bloomer was not obliged to accept company shares from Saturn
because his contract with Lewis was for the purchase of shares owned by Lewis.
On this point reference was made to Bowes v. Shand
, per Lord Cairns L. C. at p. 463:
My Lords, if that is the
natural meaning of the words, it does not appear to me to be a question for
your Lordships, or for any Court, to consider whether that is a contract which
bears upon the face of it some reason, some explanation why it was made in that
form, and why the stipulation is made that the shipment should be during these
particular months. It is a mercantile contract, and merchants are not in the
habit of placing upon their contracts stipulations to which they do not attach
some value and importance, and that alone might be a sufficient answer.
***
My Lords, I must submit to
your Lordships that if it be admitted, as the Lord Justice is willing to admit,
that the literal meaning would imply that the whole quantity must be put on
board during a specified time, it is no answer to that literal meaning, it is
no observation which can dispose of, or get rid of, or displace, that literal
meaning, to say that it puts an additional burden on the seller, without a
corresponding benefit to the purchaser; that is a matter of which the seller
and the purchaser are the best judges. Nor is it any reason for saying that it
would be a means by which purchasers without any real cause would frequently
obtain an excuse for rejecting contracts when prices had dropped. The non-fulfilment
of any term in any contract is a means by which a purchaser is able to get rid
of the contract when prices have dropped; but that is no reason why a term
which is found in a contract should not be fulfilled.
[Page 702]
In the same case Lord Hatherley
said at p. 474:
Now under these
circumstances, and with the plain meaning of the contract lying, as it appears
to me, on its surface, we are not entitled to speculate on the reasons and
motives which have induced those who are engaged in this particular trade,
those who have this "usual run," as the witness describes it, of
contracts before them from time to time, and who must have pondered upon the
matter, to frame their contracts in the manner which pleases them best.
There is no doubt that if a
contract specifically stipulates for delivery of a specified article, or in a
specified manner, a party to it is entitled to insist upon performance in the
agreed manner. In the Bowes case there was a written contract for the
sale of rice to be shipped in specified months, and the purchaser was held to
be entitled to insist upon shipment in that period.
There is no written contract
here, and no evidence that, in his negotiations with Lewis, Bloomer stipulated
for the purchase of shares which must have been registered in Lewis' own name.
The negotiations with Lewis were conducted by Young, who was not Lewis' agent.
In his own evidence, in chief, Bloomer was asked: "What were you to get
out of the transaction?" and his reply was: "I was to get 54 shares
of Nutri-Bio of Canada Ltd. from James C. Lewis transferable to my name."
I am satisfied, on reading all the evidence, that this accurately describes the
deal between Bloomer and Lewis. The evidence, previously reviewed, shows that
Lewis was personally in control of that number of shares in the company through
the two holding companies. I am satisfied that, in so far as Lewis was
concerned, the contract between him and Bloomer was performed. The secretary of
the company had in his possession, by May 9, all the documents necessary to
register Bloomer as the owner of the 54 shares which he was purchasing from
Lewis. Any delays thereafter in effecting the registration and issuing a share
certificate to Bloomer were the responsiblity of the company secretary, and not
of Lewis.
In the light of this, I do not
see how it can be said that the bank could be made liable for the conversion of
Bloomer's draft. That draft was acquired by Bloomer in order to effect payment
to Lewis for the shares which Bloomer was purchasing from him. Bloomer, in his
evidence, previously cited, said that inasmuch as the money to be sent to Lewis
when he acquired the shares was concerned, the payment
[Page 703]
was left in the hands of Young
and Underhill. The draft was used as the means whereby Lewis received payment
for those shares. It is true that it did not reach Lewis directly, but it was
used by Young and Underhill to effect that payment. Adopting the statement in
Paget's Law of Banking, previously cited, I do not see how it can be said that
the act of the bank, in crediting it to Saturn's account to cover Saturn's
cheque to Lewis, was an act which repudiated Bloomer's right or an exercise of
dominion inconsistent with it. The essential facts are that Bloomer knew that
Young had negotiated the purchase for Bloomer and others from the American
group of a block of company shares, and that the draft was turned over to Young
to pay for those shares which Bloomer was to acquire. When the draft was used
for that purpose I cannot see how the bank is guilty of conversion merely
because Bloomer was not aware of the actual procedure by means of thich the
deal was to be finally effected.
In my opinion the appeal should
be allowed and the respondent's action should be dismissed. The bank is
entitled to its costs here and in the Courts below.
Appeal allowed with
costs.
Solicitors for the
defendant, appellant: Freeman, Freeman, Silvers & Koffman, Vancouver.
Solicitors for the
plaintiff, respondent: Shakespeare & Hutcheon, Vancouver.